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A b s t r a c t
The history of dissent in economics has thus far been subject to scant interest. The 
existing scholarship, authored by dissenters probing their own past, has failed to address 
the crucial questions of how dissent emerged and rooted itself.
This study is about two dissenting communities, Radical Political Economics and 
Post Keynesian Economics. I review the circumstances that led to their emergence 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. I draw from the histories of religious and scientific 
dissent to explore the making of the dissenters’ challenge to the economics orthodoxy. 
Notably, I use the concept of boundary work to analyse the debates between dissenters 
and mainstream.
The history of Radical Political Economics begins with the founding in 1968 of 
the Union for Radical Political Economics. Onto this Union converged a generation 
of young radicalised academics that sought to unite their political interests and their 
scholarly pursuits. After a period devoted to the design of a “paradigm of conflict,” 
radicals turned to outreach work with popular movements. The new commitment 
brought divisive political identities into their Union that barred any agreement on a 
programme to transform economics.
Post Keynesian Economics emerged in the aftermath of debates on capital theory 
between Cambridge left Keynesians and neoclassical economists. With the conviction 
that the debates signalled the emergence of a new theory in economics, American 
dissenters decided to ally with the Cambridge critics. The content of the alliance was 
redefined many times in the 1970s by a succession of spokespersons for the group. Of 
this period resulted a weakly bound community joined by a sense of shared ancestry.
The two case studies reveal the diverse resources and allies that dissenters mustered 
for their battle with the economics orthodoxy. They show how the dissenters’ challenge 
shaped the boundaries of their communities and the content of their identity.
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1Dissent in science
A historical and methodological introduction
1.1 Introduction: the troubling 1970s
It is well recognised in the history of the American social sciences that the late 1960s 
and the 1970s were a period of crisis and major transformation of these disciplines. 
The decade arrived after the social sciences’ “highest point of self-confidence and of 
intellectual popular authority in the United States and around the world.”1 The 
causes of the crisis and its impact are now being examined as some of the historical 
record begins to settle.2
One particular social science, economics, appears in these narratives as an 
anomaly. The received view compares economics to other social sciences to conclude 
that
The political shifts that battered the other social sciences served to benefit 
economics. In the United States, the left radicalism of the 1960s had little 
influence in economics, while the conservative and libertarian politics of 
the following decades rewarded rational choice theory and the generally 
antistatist neoclassical mainstream of the discipline.3
This assessment agrees with recent reviews of the past by leadings economists.4
While these economists may concede the existence of 1970s controversies between
xRoss (2003), p. 229.
2 A notable exchange on the identity debates of the academic professions can be found in the Winter 
1997 issue of Daedalus. In the volume prominent literary critics, philosophers, political scientists and 
economists were asked to provide overviews of the developments in their respective fields. Katznelson, 
commenting on the volume’s contributions, noted how little was said about the sixties’ upheaval ((1997), 
p. 311).
3Ross (2003), p. 236.
4Solow (1997), Kreps (1997).
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“saltwater” Keynesians and “freshwater” Monetarists, they downplay their 
significance.5 Instead the stress is placed on continuity in post-World War II 
economics, characterized by accumulating achievements and devoid of intellectual 
revolutions.
However, the anomalous status of economics in the history of the social sciences 
may have been overplayed. Few historians of economics will deny that the late 1960s 
and the 1970s were a period of decreased self-confidence and public clout for 
economics, and that this once consensual academic field was in that period partitioned 
into factious competition. For A. W. Coats, an attentive observer of the trends in the 
American economic profession, the crisis of economics was not perceived as less acute 
than that faced by the other social sciences, but more so. Coats argues that “the 
trauma seems to have been especially acute in economics, a subject in the forefront of 
public affairs which has often been described as the “hardest” of the “soft” sciences.”6 
The crisis does figure in some histories of economics. For instance, Michael 
Bernstein’s history of economists’ involvement in national policy making discussed it 
in connection with the bad fortunes of the economy. He noted that,
Not the least of the consequences of the national economy’s unfortunate 
performance throughout the 1970s, and the attendant fracturing of the 
broad based analytical consensus that had characterized the predominant 
part of the American economics profession for decades, was the havoc 
wrought on policy discussion itself. Gone were both the self-confident 
agreement about the principles and the interpersonal comity that more 
often than not went with it.7
One of the crucial features of the crisis was thus the emergence of “a veritable babel 
of tongues, a variety of groups, schools and splinter movements, and almost as many 
standpoints from which to assess the current state of the art” .8 The transformation 
was manifest at the level of graduate programs; hence “a sharpened differentiation in 
the intellectual orientations of the various departments became a more significant
5Kreps (1997), p. 80-82. These controversies have been exhaustively discussed, for a recent overview 
see Leeson (2000).
6Coats (1992a), p. 407.
7Bernstein (2001), p. 168. Bernstein discusses the crisis of economics on pages 148-184.
8Coats (1992a), p. 411.
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part of their respective identities.”9 The “babel of tongues” has not regressed into 
silence. The persistence in economics of various groups of dissenters and orthodoxies 
is one of the legacies of the 1960s and 1970s.
1.2 H istory o f dissent in econom ics
As Roger Backhouse has argued, it was only in the post World War II period that 
organized dissenting groups emerged in the economics profession, following the rise of 
an orthodoxy.10 Under the heading of dissenters, Backhouse listed “Post Keynesians, 
institutionalists, evolutionary economists, Radicals, Marxists, Feminists, and other 
such groups” .11 The author put forward a sociological explanation for the groups’ 
emergence along three necessary conditions: “(a) a dominant orthodoxy against 
which ‘rebellion’ can take place; (b) an environment in which dissent can be 
institutionalised; (c) the motivation to identify as a heterodox group.”12 Backhouse 
also highlighted the socio-political context as seconding the dissenting groups’ 
emergence: “the intellectual environment, the changed economic environment and the 
challenge of the Vietnam War, the expansion of higher education in many developed 
countries, and even the changing economics and technology of publishing.”13 
In the history of economics, interest in the study of dissent is a recent 
development. The character of existing work on the subject can be gauged from the 
essays contained in Economics and its Discontents and A Biographical Dictionary of 
Dissenting Economists.14 Both books examine dissent from the perspective of the 
dissenting author by collecting either first-person accounts of a life’s work or through 
biographies written by disciples of the dissenters.15 Dissent is broadly defined as
9Barber (1996), p. 25.
10It is now well established in the history of economics, that there is a discontinuity between the 
economics profession pre-World War II, pluralistic in approach, and post-W W  II economics dominated 
by a brand of neoclassical economics, see Morgan and Rutherford (1998).
11 Backhouse (2004), p. 265.
12Backhouse (2000), p. 150.
13Ibid., p. 151.
14 Holt and Pressman (1998); Arestis and Sawyer (2000).
15Further examples of this style of biographical or autobiographical histories are Harcourt (1993) 
and Kregel (1989).
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disagreement with an orthodoxy prevailing at the author’s lifetime,16 “Dissent is a 
synonym for disagreement” ,17 but the particulars may differ widely, for instance: a 
rejection of mathematics and of professional neutrality for the sake of philosophical 
arguments;18 an ideological opposition to capitalism;19 or opposition to progressive 
politics.20 As these studies remain disconnected they provide us not so much with a 
history of dissent as with histories of dissents. Even within the fold of a single 
author, dissent may be multiple, as in the statement that: “Lowe’s dissents are 
complex” .21 The multiple definitions of dissent have led some authors to attempt to 
clarify what the referents for such terms as “dissent” and “heterodoxy,” traditionally 
used interchangeably, ought to be. For instance, Backhouse has proposed that 
heterodoxy should be defined as a subset of dissent. For him, dissent is prolonged 
controversy, while heterodoxy is the organized form of dissent that expounds a 
complete rejection of the received views of the discipline. This leaves open the 
possibility of classifying orthodox writers as dissenters attempting to change 
particular ideas in economics instead of engaging in their wholesale rejection.22
More important than how one ought to use the term dissent is how it has been 
used. In the history of economics the term dissent has served primarily as a rhetorical 
device for the writing of life histories. Historians of economics, often in the dual role 
of historian and economist, evoke tales of lone heroes battling the intolerant forces of 
orthodoxy. In this fold all authors become eligible to the rank of dissenter. It is said 
that “Adam Smith, Thomas Robert Malthus and David Ricardo would have been 
considered dissenting economists during their time as they tried to understand the 
broad new features of capitalism as it emerged during the late eighteenth century. 
Likewise, the marginalists were dissenters when they questioned the classical
16Even the historical context may be dismissed to validate the dissenting label, in the case of John 
R. Commons, “Whatever the status of Commons during his life, and whatever his own interpretation 
of the relationship between his work and orthodox economics, today the contributions of Commons 
appear as a literature of dissent -  dissent against certain tendencies in economic thought which, since 
his death, have become thoroughly ingrained in economics.” (Biddle and Samuels (1998), p. 41).
17Latzko (1998), p. 226.
18Boettke (1998).
19King (1998).
20Emmett (1998).
21Forstater (1998), p. 183.
22Backhouse (2004), p. 265 - 266.
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perspective.”23 The list of dissenters further includes James Buchanan, Friedrich 
Hayek, Frank Knight, J. M. Keynes24 and Milton Friedman, adding the comment 
that: “Many insiders are successful dissidents. In fact, being a successful dissident is 
one path to becoming an insider.”25 According to these authors, to dissent is to join 
this list of notables. Dissent thus becomes foremost a badge of distinction, devoid of 
historical content.26 It is not surprising that this literature has failed to register the 
emergence of dissent in the 1960s and 1970s as an interesting historical problem.
My focus is on the late 1960s and 1970s crisis of economics and in particular on 
the emergence of dissenting groups amidst the crisis. I treat the history of the 
discipline of economics as a social historical formation.27 To set up my research 
question and methodology, in this chapter I discuss two other literatures on dissent: 
the social history of religious dissent, and the social studies of science approach to 
dissent. I conclude by providing an outline of this thesis’ argument.
1.3 H istory o f religious dissent
The term dissent was first used to denote English and Scottish religious 
non-conformism.28 The most authoritative author on the study of seventeenth 
century religious dissent in its multiple connections with politics, literature, science 
and class was the historian Christopher Hill. His most important text on the subject 
was The World Turned Upside Down29 which constitutes my entry point to the 
history of religious dissent. My purpose in surveying this work is to showcase how one 
can approach intellectual dissent from a socio-historical perspective.
England in the 1640s saw the explosive spread of radical ideas, and the formation 
of groups known as Levellers, Diggers, Ranters and Quaker sects. Hill argues that 
radical ideas were not novel, in fact there is evidence for religious dissention and
23Holt and Pressman (1998), p. xi.
24Boetke (1998); Moss (1998); Emmett (1998); Chick (1998).
25Colander (1998), p. 56.
26Rider (1998), p. 166; Clark (1998), p. 267.
27Porter (2003), p. 5.
28The Oxford English Dictionary dates the first uses of the term to the late sixteenth and middle 
seventeenth century.
29Hill (1991).
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heresy from at least the Reformation period and even earlier in Continental Europe. 
Despite the overlap between the sixteenth century Lollards and Familists and later 
sectaries in their geographical location, class origins, and theological deviance, radical 
religious ideas only became a social force in the mid-seventeenth century. The source 
of the transformation was the breakdown of the bonds of loyalty and dependence that 
held feudal society together.30 A class of “masterless men” was being created out of 
the enclosure movement and early capitalist development. The list included cottagers 
and squatters on common lands, the itinerant trading population, rogues, vagabonds 
and beggars, and the working poor of London.31 Freed from the hierarchical hold of 
agrarian society, these men were responsive to radical ideas that questioned the 
theological justification sustaining the English monarchy and clergy.
The English revolution (1640s) and the Commonwealth (1650s) owed much to the 
“masterless men” for they staffed its paid army, the New Model Army. The army was 
the centre for debate which radicalized many of the sectaries that came to prominence 
in the following decades.32 The New Model Army became the first agency of radical 
politics when the Levellers attempted to take control of the army’s ruling council.33 
The radicals’ utter defeat, with the “Agitators” being arrested or killed, was a harsh 
lesson about the workings of the material world, one that informed later actions and 
beliefs of the sectaries.34
Thus in Hill’s account the formation of a class of “masterless men” was not a 
sufficient condition for the emergence of radical ideas and sects. It was only with the 
politicizing experiences of the New Model Army and the relaxing of religious control 
brought by the Republic that radical ideas began to be expressed. However, these 
were still sects and idiosyncratic preachers and not “the churches” we now identify 
with non-conformism. Self-conscious and organized dissent was a creation of the 
Restoration.35 After 1660 the Church of England sought to reassert its monopoly
30Hill (1991), p. 39.
31Ibid., pp. 40-44.
32The crucial role played by the New Model Army is a point Hill makes repeatedly in his writings, 
in Hill (1991), pp. 70-71; and in his biography of John Bunyan, Hill (1989), pp. 47-60.
33Hill (1991), p. 67.
34Ibid., p. 72.
35Hill (1989), p. 337.
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position but non-conformists had become too numerous and too powerful. The 
Restoration context meant that “tighter organization and discipline were forced on 
the congregations in order to survive. There were struggles within and between sects 
over conditions for church membership. Time and energy were consumed in 
discussing the conduct befitting a church member, in visiting and correcting 
backsliders, etc.”36 The disconnected sectaries were creating an identity and 
coalescing into national churches. “Excluded from politics and the universities, they 
nevertheless gained an identity as sects, and a greater identity as dissent.”37 
Following a few intervening decades of repression and deadlock, the Toleration Act of 
1689 conceded the right of non-conformists to worship.
Hill’s work is insightful in its treatment of the relationship between social change, 
radical ideas, and radical institutions. These are elements that my own research on 
dissenting economics will address. Interestingly, for Hill there was no deterministic 
link between any of these. To become a radical was as much a product of class origins 
as it was of social experience. Radical ideas and radical institutions, in this case 
post-Reformation non-conformist churches, were pragmatic accomplishments drawing 
on the social experiences of its actors.
In Hill’s social history, religious dissention was fused to politics in two senses. 
Dissention was a political achievement made out of victories and defeats during the 
Revolution and the Commonwealth. When radicals manoeuvred in alliances with 
Cromwell and between themselves in the New Model Army, radical communities and 
ideas took definite shape. With the Restoration radicals made the defensive move of 
redesigning their sects into churches, which were achievable only by creating a shared 
identity for what were once separate and distinct sectaries.
But religious dissention was also political in another sense, in that theology in the 
seventeenth century had a clear bearing on the organization of society. The heretical 
views of equating the Church of England with the Antichrist,38 the belief that law had 
been abolished by the non-conformist gospel or the view that physicians were out of
36Ibid., p. 342.
37Ibid., p. 346.
38Hill (1990), p. 157.
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step with the wisdom of God all carried a clear political rationale.39 At the core of the 
seventeenth century dissention was the opposition to the monopoly of the Church and 
of the professions (lawyers and physicians), the pillars of authority in English society.
Hill stresses the politics of religious dissent. We are pressed to abandon the 
prejudice of treating theology (and dissent) as an intellectual subject separable from 
the totality of social practices. Contemporaneously (and independently) to Hill’s 
research, the fields of the history and sociology of science also came to adopt a broad 
socio-historical perspective on the history of ideas. This literature, and the place that 
the study of dissent occupies in it, form the subject of the following section.
1.4 H istory and sociology o f dissent in science
1.4.1 T h e uses o f  d issen t
The last 30 years has brought a major redefinition to the fields of the history and 
sociology of science. The change comprised a departure from Mertonian sociology 
that spoke of science as an insulated field of knowledge production.40 It was also a 
rejection of the Whiggish history of science that celebrated genius and progress while 
ironing out discontinuity and uncertainty. It furthermore instituted scepticism 
towards justificationist philosophies of science.41 Under the new understanding, 
science was the unprivileged product of social practices, a social formation bound to 
the society that engendered it. A crucial resource for the reshaping of our 
understanding of science has been the study of dissent, “deviant science,” or “rejected 
knowledge.” Episodes of dissent with ensuing controversy, conflict and resolution, 
have been invaluable entry points to question some of the myths surrounding science.
Histories of dissent had traditionally been driven as studies of the dissenters’ 
“ideological biases, social influences, or ‘irrational commitments’ which led to 
departure from truth and reason” .42 In this mould, history reasserted science’s sense
39Hill (1996), p. 329; Hill (1974), p. 159.
40Restivo (1995), p. 99.
41 Rouse (1999).
42Wallis (1979), p. 5.
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of self-worth by reaffirming the veracity of later knowledge and by explaining the 
faults of the dissenter. This is what has been often called in the science studies 
literature a “participant’s account,” as it uncritically writes into the past the 
meanings of its author’s contemporary scientific culture. To overcome the biases of 
participant’s histories the new approach to science studies adopts a relativist stance, 
becoming “agnostic” to the tru th  status of claims, and attempting to place competing 
claims on the same footing. The new setting entails writing the past as the social 
negotiation of some claims into truth and scientific knowledge, and others into dissent 
and rejected knowledge.
H.M. Collins and T.J. Pinch’s study of the scientific certification of paranormal 
phenomena is a revealing instance of how dissent may be brought to inform our 
understanding of science in the making. The authors outline their goals as: to 
“analyze the tactics used by parapsychologists in their efforts to gain scientific 
recognition for their discipline and their findings, and the tactics used by orthodox 
scientists to deny them this stamp of legitimacy.”43 Collins and Pinch distinguished 
between two sorts of conflict, implicit and explicit, and two forums of debate, the 
constitutive and the contingent. The “implicit conflict” is one of silence, when a 
theory is rejected by being ignored, while “explicit conflict” is represented in 
controversies. The “constitutive forum” was Collins and Pinch’s label for scholarly 
mediums, i.e. journals, conferences, but also inclusive of the practices of theorizing 
and experimenting. The “contingent forum” comprises of those actions that 
philosophical orthodoxy would suggest do not impinge on the constitution of 
knowledge. The “contingent forum” may therefore include “the content of popular 
and semi-popular journals, discussion and gossip, fund raising and publicity seeking, 
the setting up and joining of professional organizations, the corralling of student 
followers” .44
The case studied by the authors, between parapsychologists and the scientific 
orthodoxy, was one of “explicit conflict.” Collins and Pinch were not interested in
43 Collins and Pinch (1979), p. 237.
44Ibid., pp. 239-240.
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reassessing the debate, in judging the reality of paranormal phenomena. Their 
primary concern was to trace the movements of the social actors. In this sense they 
found:
“full frontal” breakdown of the norms [of the constitutive and contingent 
forums]. In the constitutive forum we have found prejudice and other 
particularistic bases of belief openly endorsed. In the contingent forum, we 
have found items intended as substantive contributions to the constitution 
of scientific knowledge, rather than commentary and exposition.45
These boundary crossings underline the orthodox tactic that parapsychology should 
not be treated in the same way as science, even if it gained access to the “constitutive 
forum.” In this tactic the orthodox scientists opposed the parapsychologists’ attempts 
to metamorphosise themselves into scientists and fact makers, and thus to secure 
science’s “stamp of legitimacy.”
Collins and Pinch’s distinction between “constitutive” and “contingent” forums is 
a useful one. In a recent historical study of the dissenting ideas of Fred Hoyle, a 
renowned Cambridge physicist and science populariser, Jane Gregory took up this 
distinction to show how scientific actors may selectively and strategically travel 
between forums. As Gregory noted: “Hoyle might, in some contexts, have seen a 
distinction between his science and his fiction, he also, when it served his purposes, 
made explicit links between the two, breaching that boundary to capitalise the 
authority of the one and on the scope and reach of the other” .46 This analysis 
challenged the notion that popularisation is a by-product of academic practice. 
Hoyle’s life-from-space theory was first developed in the 1950s and 60s in the public 
domain, in newspapers and novels, and was later brought into academic forums for 
development and scientific certification. Once expelled in the late 1980s from 
scientific discourse, the theory went on to survive in public media.47
Both the study of parapsychology and of Hoyle’s cosmological biology focused on 
the communication of science. They addressed the manoeuvring between public and
45Ibid., p. 262.
46Gregory (2003), p. 39.
47Ibid., pp. 39-40.
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academic spaces in scientific controversies. They reveal in episodes of dissent how the 
resources of science, its forums, may be used strategically by different actors.
As a further example of the study of dissent in science, I wish to briefly discuss 
the work of Steven Shapin on phrenology. Shapin wished to question the conception 
that scientific knowledge “is generated, and acquires its objective character, by 
processes of disinterested contemplation” .48 His aim was to reveal the play of social 
interests in a rather esoteric episode of controversy, one over cerebral anatomy and 
the validity of phrenology C.1800-C.1830 in Edinburgh. Phrenology was dissenting 
science, a doctrine proposing a programme of social change and institutional reform, 
and favoured by an audience of high working-class and petty-bourgeois groups.49 
Phrenologists believed that the brain was the physical embodiment of the mind and 
that it was made up of separate organs responsible for distinct mental faculties. The 
power of a particular brain organ and mental faculty was linked and determined by 
the size of the organ, which was measurable by craniological examination, associating 
lumps in the skull to the organs. Since mental faculties where broadly considered to 
include behaviour and dispositions (for instance, criminal behaviour), phrenologists 
hoped to establish a naturalistic basis for social reform. Once “the innate constitution 
of an individual mind was scientifically diagnosed” the potential for improvement in 
individual behaviour could be envisaged.50
Shapin’s analysis of the debate revealed that the crucial object of the anatomic 
debate was to displace (on the side of phrenologists) or to preserve (on the side of the 
establishment) academic authority. Phrenologists were in want “to secure a 
naturalistic basis for one’s policies, and, thereby, credibility in society” .51 This was 
the motivation to “bet” (Shapin’s term) on a perceptual account that others would 
hopefully corroborate to phrenology’s advantage. But observation was also 
subordinated to the legitimating tasks at hand, i.e. it had to display a brain with no 
common origin of nerves and fibres, with multiple segmented organs as proposed by
48Shapin (1979), p. 139.
49Ibid., p. 145.
50Idem.
51Ibid., p. 168.
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phrenology. The academic establishment had to preserve established anatomical 
knowledge from the phrenologist revision, defending “the existing model of the brain 
as a reliable account of reality, and at the same time to expose the new, deviant 
account as deficient” .52 It was in the establishment’s interest to show no 
differentiation in the human brain.
The central theme of Shapin’s account of phrenology and the staple of what is 
know as the Strong Program of the Sociology of Science is the role of social interests 
in the development of science. In this account, observation and the accumulation of 
naturalistic knowledge is subordinated to the play of interests. Science is thus not a 
disjoint social field that follows rules of its own, in methodological or intellectual 
containment. Science is studied from a wider vantage point, that of societal conflict 
and interest.
Sociologists and historians of science have abandoned the conventional 
explanatory-set of scientific controversies punctuated by belief in the arbitration of 
the scientific method and that “scientists knew best.”53 The new explanatory agenda 
is predominantly an “outsider’s account” looking to wider society as the key for 
interpreting scientific disputes, and in opposition to the “participant or insider 
accounts” of the past. Where there was once a divide between science and society, the 
new narratives of science highlight the social embeddedness of scientific practice.
1 .4 .2  H istory  o f sc ien ce as p o litica l h istory
Among the exemplar works in the history and sociology of science is Steven Shapin 
and Simon Schaffer’s study of the contest between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes 
over Boyle’s air-pump experiments, Leviathan and the Air-Pump.54 A discussion of 
this work further clarifies what is entailed by an “outsider’s” approach to the study of 
dissent.
Shapin and Schaffer’s immediate focus was on the historical circumstances in 
which experiment arose as the privileged means to generate natural knowledge. For
52Ibid., p. 169.
53Wallis (1979), p. 5.
54Shapin and Schaffer (1985).
1. D issent in science 22
this they looked at Boyle’s researches in pneumatics and his controversies with 
Hobbes. The authors argued that previous historical treatments of the controversy 
between Boyle and Hobbes had been coloured by our contemporary scientific culture, 
biased towards Boyle’s side (the victor) in the controversy.55 For a member of our 
present experimental communities, Boyle’s arguments appear as self-evident while 
Hobbes’s as irremediably flawed. The experimental practices, that Shapin and 
Schaffer wished to discuss, were thus not regarded as problematic and in need of 
explanation. The authors suggested that to correct this cultural and historiographical 
bias the historian must perform a “Herculean” effort to distance himself from Boyle’s 
position. To give Hobbes a fair hearing and thus reveal the contingent nature of 
experimental practices, one must attempt an outsider’s account of the controversies.
In the mid-seventeenth century, natural philosophy was in a state of disarray and 
“scandalous dissention. Nowhere was scandal more visible than in the handling of the 
Torricellian phenomenon and related effects.”56 Boyle addressed the resolution of the 
Torricellian phenomenon through the construction of a mechanical device, an 
air-pump, whose workings would potentially lead to the evacuation of air from a 
recipient, and the creation of a vacuum within which different experiments were to be 
conducted. In 1660 Boyle published New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, 
comprising of forty-three trials made with the pneumatic engine.57 The New 
Experiments were however part of a wider agenda, namely the creation of the Royal 
Society and the experimental project that this organization stood for.
The purpose of experiments was to create matters of fact. There was a crucial 
boundary between the experimental matter of fact and its causes and explanation. 
Matters of fact were discovered not invented, they were not of man’s making but 
made by nature. The empiricists thus dramatised their lack of preconceived 
expectations and investment in the outcome of experiments.58 “Experimental
55Ibid., p. 4.
56Ibid., p. 80. The authors note on p. 41: “The ‘noble experiment’ of Evangelista Torricelli was first 
performed in 1644. A tube of mercury, sealed at one end, was filled and then inverted in a dish of the 
same substance. The resultant “Torricellian space” left at the top became a celebrated phenomenon 
and problem for natural philosophers.”
57Ibid., p. 40.
58Ibid, pp. 51, 67-68.
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practices were to rule out of court those problems that bred dispute and divisiveness 
among philosophers, and they were to substitute those questions that could generate 
matters of fact upon which philosophers might agree.”59
Thomas Hobbes, a prominent figure in both civil and natural philosophy, saw 
Boyle’s experiments and the Royal Society’s experimental philosophy in a different 
light. For Hobbes the scandals of natural philosophy could only be overcome by 
identifying and expelling from it “absurd metaphysical language.”60 Shapin and 
Schaffer took Hobbes’s famous civil philosophy tract, the Leviathan, as a work of 
natural philosophy to argue that:
In this book Hobbes took away vacuum on definitional, historical, and, 
ultimately, on political grounds. The vacuism Hobbes attacked was not 
merely absurd and wrong, as it was in his physical texts; it was dangerous. 
Speech of a vacuum was associated with cultural resources that had been 
illegitimately used to subvert proper authority in the state.61
He objected to the notion of incorporeal substance, “To Hobbes such talk of 
incorporeal substance was at once an absurdity of language-use, an impossibility in 
right philosophy, and one of the key ideological resources used in priestcraft.”62 His 
commentary on Boyle’s New Experiments rejected the vacuum explanations and 
provided alternative interpretations of the results predicated on plenist philosophy.
Hobbes’s objections amounted to a rejection of the experimentalist program. 
Philosophy for Hobbes was the practice of demonstrating how effects followed from 
causes or of inferring causes from effects. The experimental programme failed to 
satisfy this definition. He systematically refused to credit experimentalists’ claims 
that one could establish a procedural boundary between observing the positive
regularities produced by experiment (facts) and identifying the physical cause that
accounts for them (theories).63 Against these views, Hobbes’s model of philosophical 
practice was geometry, “In Hobbes’s dialogues, it is method, not matters of fact, that
59Ibid., p. 46.
60Ibid., p. 84, emphasis in original.
61Ibid., p. 91, emphasis in original.
62Ibid., p. 92.
63Ibid., p. 111.
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puts men right and that mobilises consensus. When empirical evidence, whether from 
observation or from experiment, is given a role in the dialogues, it serves to illustrate 
the conclusions reached by method, and not to determine belief.”64
For Boyle and his supporters, Hobbes’s influence was to be feared, he had a close 
friendship with the King, he was a leading exponent of mechanical philosophy, and he 
commanded a score of loyal followers. The supporters of the experimentalist project 
attacked Hobbes as a dogmatist. They argued that “Dogmatism inclined men to 
become “imperious,” to be unshakable in their convictions, and to be “impatient of 
contradiction.” It produced egotism and individualism, which is a “Temper of mind, 
of all others the most pernicious” .” In contrast, the experimentalists “were “modest, 
humble, and friendly” ; they were tolerant of differing opinions and worked collectively 
towards attainable and solid goals.”65
To connect scientific debates to wider socio-political conflict is one of the striking 
characteristics of “outsider’s accounts” in the history of science, and the crucial 
insight I draw from Shapin and Schaffer’s study. They note that the controversy 
developed in the early years of the English Restoration at the end of the twenty years 
of Protectorate and Civil War. In this setting it was fundamental to
outline ways in which the sects could be controlled and sectarian 
knowledge contested. This was a powerful constraint, since it was widely 
argued that knowledge itself was a source of sectarian conflict. So the 
proponent of any successful mode of pacific knowledge must both deny its 
tendency to promote dissension and also deny the basis of the sects’ own 
forms of belief.66
Hobbes was a religious dissenter and despite his friendship with the King, he was 
persecuted by the Church of England for his beliefs.67 For him, as outlined in the 
Leviathan, the King was the only source of law and assent, never the Church which 
alongside the professions represented sectarian interests. Hobbes argued that 
experiment shared the characteristics of priestcraft, and that Boyle made
64Ibid., p. 145, emphasis in original.
65Ibid., pp. 138-139.
66Ibid., p. 285.
67Ibid., pp. 293-295.
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experimenters into a new kind of clergy.68 Hobbes’s reliance on the philosophical 
method was a means to deny the multiplication of sectarian interests, 
experimentalists included.
The experimentalists presented their community as an
ideal society where dispute could occur safely and where subversive errors 
were quickly corrected. Their ideal society was distinguished by the source 
of authority the experimenters recommended. ( . . . )  No isolated powerful 
individual authority should impose belief. The potency of knowledge came 
from nature, not from privileged persons. Matters of fact were made when 
the community freely displayed its joint assent.69
Dispute was not just tolerated, it was necessary for establishing matters of fact. The 
experimenters were teachers on how to safely dispute. The equivalent of a civil war 
could be staged with no harmful effect. They proclaimed: “There we behold an 
unusual sight to the English Nation, that men of disagreeing parties, and ways of life, 
have forgotten to hate, and have met in the unanimous advancement of the same 
W orks”70 Theirs was a community that aimed at peace and had found out the 
methods for effectively generating and maintaining consensus; a community without 
arbitrary authority that had learnt to order itself.
Shapin and Schaffer argued that the history of science can be treated as political 
history. They provided three senses by which this claim may be sustained:
First, scientific practitioners have created, selected, and maintained a 
polity within which they operate and make their intellectual product; 
second, the intellectual product made within that polity has become an 
element in political activity in the state; third, there is a conditional 
relationship between the nature of the polity occupied by scientific 
intellectuals and the nature of the wider polity.71
Shapin and Schaffer masterfully fulfil their program, since they are able to show how 
the problem of knowledge was political, predicated in laying down rules and
68Ibid., p. 310.
69Ibid., p. 298.
70Cited in ibid. p. 306.
71Ibid., p. 332.
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conventions of relations between men in the intellectual polity; that knowledge so 
created became an element in political action in the wider polity (for instance, by the 
Church’s endorsement of the air-pump experiments); and finally that the contest 
among alternative forms of life and their intellectual products- depended upon the 
“political success of the various candidates in insinuating themselves into the 
activities of other institutions and other interest groups. He who has the most, and 
the most powerful, allies wins.”72
The consideration of power, and of scientific practice as political practice, has 
pervaded much of the recent work in science studies. Following Bruno Latour, 
constructing knowledge is akin to building an empire, a la Machiavelli, where one 
must ask: “With whom can I collaborate? Whom should I write off? How can I make 
this one faithful? Is this other one reliable? Is this one a credible spokesperson?”73 
For Latour as for actor-network theory (or sociology of translation) advocated by 
John Law and Michel Callon, allies are not just people but also things.74 Things, 
such as scallops, are actors enrolled into empire-networks in attempts to discipline 
them into collaboration, to interest them.75
I use the term political and ally in the course of this research in meanings more 
akin to Shapin and Schaffer’s than to the semiotics of Latour. Not least because of 
the nature of the controversies I discuss. It is useful to draw a distinction between 
laboratory studies and the doctrinal debate characteristic of controversies in 
economics between dissenters and mainstream. The latter, in so far as they target the 
polity of a discipline and its relationship to the state and the public, fall on the more 
conventional definition of politics. It is to better characterise and conceptualise how 
dissenting controversies relate themselves to the wider polity that I turn to the notion 
of boundary work.
72Ibid., p. 342.
73Latour (1987), p. 125.
74Callon, Law and Rip (1986).
75Callon (1999).
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1.4 .3  B ou n dary  work and th e  top ograp h y  o f  sc ien ce
I have suggested that the study of episodes of dissent is a privileged entry point to 
the contingent nature of scientific practices. I have also argued that the study of 
dissent allows for an outsider’s approach to the history of science, taking seriously the 
political character of scientific activity. In this section I bring together these elements 
in a methodological frame for my study, through a discussion of Thomas F. Gieryn’s 
concept of boundary work and of his proposed topographic metaphor.
The concept of boundary work has been advanced in science studies to describe 
the activity by which “scientists, would-be scientists, science critics, journalists, 
bureaucrats, lawyers, and other interested parties accomplish the demarcation of 
science from non-science.”76 In Gieryn’s first discussion of the subject, he identified 
boundary work as a “rhetorical style” native to the ideology of science. His primary 
goal was to compare strain theories of ideology developed from Talcott Parsons’s 
seminal work and interest theories associated with Karl Marx.77 Gieryn’ second 
thoughts on the subject abandoned discussion of boundary work as a rhetorical style 
to survey it as a theme in the work of sociologists of professions, social world theorists 
and historians of social classifications. It is Gieryn’s latest contribution on the subject 
that is of greatest interest for this thesis. In his 1999 book, Gieryn developed a 
methodology for the study of scientific controversies exemplified in case studies of 
boundary work.
For Gieryn there are two positions on the demarcation of science from 
non-science. The essentialist position argues “for the possibility and analytic 
desirability of identifying unique, necessary, and invariant qualities that set science 
apart from other cultural practices and products, and that explain its singular 
achievements (valid and reliable claims about the external world)” J 8 In opposition to 
this view the constructivists argue “that no demarcation principles work universally 
and that the separation of science from other knowledge-producing activities is
76Gieryn (1995), p. 394.
77Gieryn (1983), p. 782.
78Gieryn (1995), p. 393.
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instead a contextually contingent and interests-driven pragmatic accomplishment 
drawing selectively on inconsistent and ambiguous attributes.”79
Recent work in the sociology of science has raised doubts over the possibilities of 
defining a universal demarcation. Taking Karl Popper’s falsificationism as an 
exemplar of a universal demarcation principle,80 Gieryn notes that under Popper’s 
suggestion scientists are said to work out theoretical generalisations into statements 
that are falsifiable, i.e. that may be confronted with potentially contradictory 
evidence and thus refuted. A theory would be deemed unscientific under three 
instances: if it were unfalsifiable, if practitioners made no effort to refute the 
falsifiable claims, or if once falsified a theory was not rejected.81 Gieryn argues that, 
as a practical accomplishment of observation and experiment, falsification is unlikely 
to occur. Evidence in science is always permeated by interpretative ambiguities that 
are only ultimately resolved in social negotiation.82 In support of this claim, Gieryn 
alludes to the work of H. M. Collins and his concept of “experimenter’s regress.” To 
refer to a case studied by Collins, one begins by posing the question: what is the 
correct outcome produced by a gravity wave detector? To calibrate an experimental 
setting, to know that it is working properly is a source of major difficulties. The 
correct outcome “depends upon whether there are gravity waves hitting the Earth in 
detectable fluxes. To find this out we must build a good gravity wave detector and 
have a look. But we don’t know if we have built a good gravity wave detector until 
we have tried it and obtained the correct outcome! But we don’t know what the 
correct outcome is until... and so on ad infinitum.”83 We only know if an experiment 
is being truthful if we know what the truth is, experiments do not bear transparently 
on theory choice. As Gieryn argues, Collins’s work shifts the focus of our 
understanding of evidence in science, the question no longer laying on whether results
79 Idem.
80Gieryn argues that Robert K. Merton and Thomas S. Kuhn’s sociological and historical accounts 
of science are further instances of essentialism. Gieryn’s discussion highlights that both authors hold 
universal definitions of science: Merton presenting science as a field of knowledge production that 
once established is autonomous from political and social forces/influences; Kuhn presenting science as 
paradigmatic consensus (ibid., pp. 398-404).
81 Ibid., p. 396.
82Ibid., p. 397.
83Collins (1992), p. 84.
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can or cannot be replicated but how and why some replications are deemed authentic 
and authoritative while others are not. Evidence is arrived at only after a process of 
social negotiation.84
The absence of a universal demarcation warrants a new approach to the problem 
of science’s definition. There are always not one but many definitions for science, and 
these are subject to contention. The battle over the definition of science is not an 
extraordinary activity, but a rather frequent feature of scientific practice. As Pierre 
Bourdieu has noted:
In the struggle in which every agent must engage in order to force 
recognition of the value of his products and his own authority as a 
legitimate producer, what is at stake is in fact the power to impose the 
definition of science (i.e., the delimitation of the field of the problems, 
methods, and theories that may be regarded as scientific) best suited to 
his specific interests (i.e., the definition most likely to enable him to 
occupy the dominant position in full legitimacy) by attributing the 
highest position in the hierarchy of scientific values to the scientific 
capacities which he personally or institutionally possesses.85
According to Gieryn, one must stand outside the contested work of defining what 
is in and out of science, and watch as boundary work is played out in society. “The 
task of demarcating science from non-science is reassigned from analysts to people in 
society, and sociological study focuses on episodes of “boundary work”” .86 This is 
therefore an outsider’s approach.
It follows from this critique that science ought to be examined as a continuous 
labour of controversies and negotiations. Science must be first characterised by its 
emptiness, as a space, “one that acquires its authority precisely from and through 
episodic negotiations of its flexible and contextually contingent borders and 
territories. Science is a kind of spatial “marker” for cognitive authority, empty until
84Gieryn (1995), p. 398. There are other difficulties which impinge on essentialist projects of demar­
cation. Alongside the “experimenter’s regress” one ought also to note the role that tacit knowledge 
and learning by doing plays in scientific networks. Collins and Evans (2002) have recently argued for a 
redirection of science and technology studies towards studies of expertise and experience grounded on 
this crucial aspect.
85Bourdieu (1999), p. 34.
86Gieryn (1995), p. 405.
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its insides get filled and its borders drawn amidst context-bound negotiations over 
who and what is “scientific” .”87
To talk of science as a space of contingent boundaries is to appeal to a 
topographic metaphor.88 Following this metaphor, maps
do to nongeographical referents what they do to the earth. Boundaries 
differentiate this thing from that; borders create spaces with occupants 
homogeneous and generalized in some respect (though they may vary in 
other ways). Arrangements of spaces define logical relations among sets of 
things: nested, overlapping, adjacent, separated. ( . . . )  Most important, 
just as maps of earthly patches get drawn to keep travellers from getting 
lost, so maps of other worlds -  culture, for example -  are drawn or talked 
to help us find our way around.89
The practice of demarcating science from non-science is the practice of drawing 
such a cultural map, one that enlists a host of alliances that invest science with 
definition and authority. The mapping of alliances operates through “rhetorical 
games of inclusion and exclusion in which antagonistic parties do their best to justify 
their cultural map for audiences whose support, power, or influence they seek to 
enrol.”90 Similarly to Shapin and Schaffer’s history of the air-pump controversy, 
which Gieryn translated as a case study for his topographic frame,91 or to Hill’s 
account of radical ideas in the seventeenth century, because mapping culture is also 
mapping alliances, one is drawn into a history of science as political history. To create 
a social/cultural space, one engages in the politics of enlist allies, and excluding 
enemies. The language of map-making proposed by Gieryn is useful to frame history 
of science as political history.
In adopting the topographic metaphor as a methodology to study scientific 
controversies, I wish to note some of its advantages. An examination of one of 
Gieryn’s case studies may be useful to illustrate the insights brought by the
topographic metaphor. I have chosen his discussion of the 1836 competition for the
87Idem., emphasis in original.
88Ibid., p. 416, notes that this metaphor pervades the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz, as 
“culturescape”.
89Gieryn (1999), p. 7.
90Gieryn (1995), p. 406.
91 Ibid., pp. 424-429.
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chair of logic and metaphysics at Edinburgh University. The contest was between 
George Combe and William Hamilton. Combe was born to a family of Scottish 
brewers, after a humble beginning working as a clerk, he was able to fund his law 
studies in Edinburgh and established his own legal practice. He was the spokesperson 
of the phrenology theory, founder of the Phrenological Society and editor of the 
Phrenological Journal Hamilton was educated in medicine, while studying at Oxford 
he changed his interests to law and later practiced as an advocate in Edinburgh. 
However Hamilton was uncomfortable with his career as a lawyer and remained an 
active scholar, via his articles to the Edinburgh Review he gained a place amongst the 
Edinburgh literary elite.92
The resources for the historian to identify the maps of the two authors were the 
testimonials collated by the candidates in their bid for the Chair of Logic and 
Metaphysics at Edinburgh University. Gieryn extracted four pairs of cultural 
referents or in his terms “spaces”: expert knowledge/lay knowledge; mental 
philosophy/physiological anatomy; pure science/useful applications and 
science/religion; and he discussed how they could be represented in conflicting 
cultural maps.93
The Hamilton testimonials argued in support of the scholar’s expertise. They 
conceded that Hamilton’s work was comprehensible only to a handful of scholars, and 
that this stood as proof of the depth of his contributions. The authors of the 
testimonials, few in number, stressed their own credentials as scholars and their 
authoritative assessments of the candidate. The Combe testimonials, in contrast, 
compiled into a two-volume book published for the general public, comprised of short 
statements from scholars but also from professionals. The choice for many over few 
testimonials reflected phrenology’s conviction on popular participation. Phrenology 
spoke to the streets and to the young.94 Although development of phrenological 
theory remained the property of a few, fact creation was open to public participation.
92Gieryn (1999), pp. 134-135. Gieryn in this case study owes a significant debt to the work done by 
Steven Shapin on Edinburgh Phrenology, see p. 20 of this thesis.
93Ibid., p. 149.
94Ibid., p. 153.
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A second aspect of contention was the brain/mind relationship. Hamilton saw 
“mental faculties [as] processes of the mind at work, not physical states in the 
brain” ,95 moral philosophy was separate from anatomy. The tools of the moral 
philosopher were reflection and reasoning, not the examination of skulls. For Combe, 
mind and brain were one, and therefore so were mental philosophy and physiological 
anatomy. Inductive work was not only possible but indispensable to answer the 
questions posed by mental science. “Combe’s testimonials present phrenology as a 
complete science (because it brought mind and brain within a single compass), a true 
science (because it was founded on observations in nature), and a new science 
(destined to sweep Scottish tradition into the dustbin).”96
Thirdly, unlike Hamilton’s science that stood as separate and uninterested in 
application, in the Combe testimonials science is said to serve a practical purpose. 
Not only did phrenology call for people to participate in fact creation, it was also 
aimed at giving something back. It fed an understanding of individuals’ talents and 
limitations, and with this personal knowledge it promised personal development.
A final subject where Hamilton and Combe diverged was the relationship 
between science and religion. Phrenology impinged on the subject of religion as it 
re-conceptualised notions of free will and determinism and thus moral responsibility. 
It was potentially a science of morality, however, it refused to present itself as a 
challenger to religion, arguing that it was instead its assistant. In the testimonials 
supporting Combe’s bid for the Edinburgh chair, phrenology was presented settling 
matters of nature as a preamble to addressing matters of the divine. Hamilton’s 
testimonials make no allusion to religion. In Hamilton’s cultural map science and 
religion are too far apart to be discussed together, “they occupied well-bounded, 
amply distanced cultural spaces” .97 
Combe’s map
extend [ed] the frontiers of science outwards into once autonomous regions 
of politics, religion, metaphysics, and common sense, in order to get other
95Ibid., p. 157.
96Ibid., p. 160.
97Ibid., p. 178.
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audiences interested in his project. The old kind of science proffered by 
William Hamilton and the Edinburgh Review was so confined, so 
circumscribed, that huge chunks of Edinburgh society (and beyond) had 
no reason to be interested in it and no hope of actually entering its halls. 
Combe’s map stretched out a vast terrain for science, capacious enough to 
hold the masses of people now given a reason to learn about this science 
and even to become part of it.98
In contrast:
Hamilton’s testimonials in effect reproduced brick-and-mortar Edinburgh, 
preserving in cultural form geographic distances between the institutions 
of church and politics, preserving the space between scientific disciplines 
at the university, preserving the separation of the Royal Society from the 
Canongate slums. Science keeps its place, in the university and in the 
Royal Society, the preserve of a learned few.99
Gieryn ascribes the result of the contest, Hamilton’s victory, to the political 
times. The 1820s in Edinburgh had been years of political unrest with the Whig party 
facing the Conservatives, during which both Hamilton and Combe sided with the 
Whigs and their liberal reform. But in the 1830s with political power just secured, 
the Whig party wished to halt further political turmoil. Hamilton was thus able to 
enlist the party’s support in addition to that of the Church and the University status 
quo. The Church fervently refused to have “their religion “thrown into the character 
of a science.” God needed no additional evidence from facts.”100 Gieryn concludes:
Combe simply could not sell phrenology among those who had 
circumscribed science so narrowly, from their chairs at the university or 
from the Edinburgh Review - it took a different science to attract 
enthusiasts from elsewhere, a science pushing out into cultural domains 
(politics, religion, common sense) where it had not gone before, enrolling 
allies along the way. These allies, in their testimonials, then redrew for the 
town council a map of Edinburgh’s culturescape that must have been 
unsettling enough to make a vote against Combe easily justified.101
98Ibid., pp. 130-131, emphasis in original.
"Ibid ., p. 147.
100Ibid., p. 176.
101 Ibid., pp. 148-9.
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This case-study exemplifies how the topographic metaphor may be instrumental 
for the study of epistemic disputes. In Gieryn’s study of the Combe-Hamilton 
contest, the maps join the rhetorical (phrenologists’ attempt at convincing the church 
that it could benefit from their science), the symbolic (the rank of chair of 
metaphysics and logic as a site of authority), and the epistemic (anatomy and 
philosophical reflection) in the construction of allies and enemies in a particular 
historical context (Whig Edinburgh).
Unlike laboratory controversies, those centred on a theoretical assertion or 
experimental result, these debates delve into the doctrinal, on the identity of science 
and its disciplines. Disputes between dissenters and mainstream in economics are also 
contests of this kind, where scientific credibility is under challenge. Where both sides 
of the dispute contend for scientific credibility, we are faced with distinct cultural 
maps as providers of cognitive authority and meaning.
As Gieryn’s research attests, what lies in such cultural maps cannot be divined. 
There is no ahistorical master map from which all emerge, made of recurring cultural 
spaces. For instance, there is no reason to expect that the expert/lay knowledge 
distinction plays a role in all controversies. The maps are constructed from the 
statements of authors distinguishing themselves from other authors, from their 
rhetoric of difference, and thus given by the historical case. Such precepts yield an 
outsider’s account of scientific controversy.
1.5 T he m aking o f d issent in econom ics
I am forewarned by work in the social studies of science to reject essentialist 
definitions of dissent, as one ought to reject essentialist definitions of science and 
non-science. Dissent is a socio-political construction contingent to its historical 
context. With this outlook I see the present work as following the challenge set by 
Theodore M. Porter to historians of economics, to undertake what he terms cultural 
history:
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It refuses to take our own theories and standards of knowledge as 
self-evident, but asks where they came from, how they were embodied in 
institutions, and what meanings they have evoked to practitioners. Above 
all, cultural history cannot take the boundaries of a discipline, such as 
economics, as fixed or impermeable, but strives to situate it on a wider 
terrain as part of a broad historical dynamic.102
Attention to the problem of the shifting boundaries of economics as a historical 
subject is not new. For instance, Mary Furner’s Advocacy and Objectivity103 studied 
the emergence and crystallisation of professional values that came to define the 
American economics community. Furner chose “academic freedom cases” as a unit of 
analysis. By studying and comparing two separate “waves” of freedom cases, in the 
1880s and the 1890s, she was able to describe the evolution of professional values, and 
to show the emergence of a consensus on how a social scientist should behave. In the 
process,, what may have been acceptable for an economist in the early 1880s (for 
example publicly defending labour unions) became unacceptable in the late 1890s. 
Dissent is not a static concept, as Furner has convincingly shown with her notion of 
“permissible dissent.”104 Even in the course of two decades, neither “dissent” nor 
“permissible” were static concepts. However, and in stark contrast to Furner’s work, I 
have argued that most of the treatment of dissent in the history of economics has 
been opportunistic. This scholarship which I reviewed early in this chapter, has 
continuously sought to reinterpret the boundaries of science and dissent in accord to 
its presentist agenda. Using the distinction made in science studies and discussed in 
this introduction, such work on the history of dissenting economics is not concerned 
with studying how dissent is defined in particular historical contexts, studying 
boundary work; but rather seeks to create new, operative definitions for present day 
concerns, doing boundary work.
The subject of this thesis is the construction of dissent from circa 1960 to 1980 in
North American economics. I approach dissent and its controversies as instances of
102Porter (2004), pp. 165-66.
103Furner (1975).
104Permissible dissent is any action that may put an economist in a dangerous position with respect 
to the ‘outside world’ (of non-economists) but for which he will most likely receive the support of his 
peers, were he to be threatened by this outside world.
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boundary work, which following Gieryn may be interpreted as mapmaking in the 
“culturespace.” My research question is thus how did dissenters in USA economics in 
the 1960s and 1970s define their challenge, their cultural maps of economic science? 
My focus is on self-definition, on the dissenters’ making of their identity. This theme 
runs in the literature of religious and scientific dissent I have reviewed in this chapter. 
The prominence given to strategic or political elements in these studies scientific 
controversy highlights the dissenter’s role as an agent in her own history.
For my exploration into the making of dissent in 1960s and 70s American 
economics, I undertake a study of two groups that formed in this period, Radical 
Political Economics and Post Keynesian Economics. I will explore these two cases 
separately in two distinct parts to the thesis (Part II for Radical Economics, Part III 
for Post Keynesian Economics).105 Each part begins with an introduction to the 
dissenting group, discussing historical scholarship on their emergence and identity, 
and is concluded with a chapter surveying my findings on the process of dissenters’ 
self-definition.
My literature survey (chapter 2) on the history of the Radical Political 
Economics community locates its emergence in the late 1960s and in connection with 
the student radical movement. My review of this literature also reveals some gaping 
omissions on the tales of emergence, silences that are characteristic of participant 
accounts of history. The first of two substantive chapters on Radical Political 
Economics (chapter 3) explores the origins of radical economics in the American New 
Left. I show that radical economics was until 1971 a programme to be defined under 
the auspices of the Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE). I interpret the 
definition of radical economics as a challenge to the credibility of the economics 
profession, where political commitment was made to take a central role in knowledge 
making. In the following chapter (chapter 4) I explore controversies amongst the 
radicals over their participation in changing American society. In the 1970s, radicals
105The labelling of the groups is one of the historical subjects discussed in the thesis. In the text I 
capitalise both “Radical Political Economics”, “Post Keynesian Economics” and “Post Keynesians”, 
but I do not capitalise “radical economists” , as I have found these to be the most commonly used 
spellings in the relevant literature.
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at URPE became engaged in outreach work with political movements and these 
efforts forced a period of re-definition for their dissent. Prominent among the 
materials I use for my account of radical history are a series of interviews.106 The 
interviews provided me with an overall grasp of what the valuable documents were, as 
a road map to the radical literature and events, and they underpinned my 
interpretation of the radical texts.107 Secondly, the interviews allowed me to tap into 
facts not recorded in the documents, notably personal and organisational 
relationships that typically leave no written trail.108 My narrative of radical 
economics concludes in the late 1970s, I draw some conclusions (chapter 5) over the 
role of URPE in the history of radical economics and I extend my discussion on the 
process of making radical economics. It is based on the discussion of earlier chapters, 
that I show how radical identity changed from 1968 to 1978 and how the radicals’ 
challenge to mainstream economics amounted to a new cultural map. The 
controversy between radicals and mainstream is cast as a case of boundary work.
As I discuss historical scholarship on the emergence of Post Keynesian Economics 
(chapter 6) I identify an overwhelming body of literature reflecting on the intellectual 
origins of the group. The role that self-history plays in the debates between Post 
Keynesians is a starting point for my examination of their emergence. I’ve located 
their origins to the early 1970s (chapter 7) in connection with an influential 
interpretation of the capital theory debates between Cambridge Keynesians and 
neoclassical economists. In my account, the Post Keynesian community was formed 
by efforts of American dissenters to tie their research to what they saw as a 
revolutionary new theory emergent in the Cambridge work. I retell how in the 
mid-1970s Post Keynesians challenged the mainstream and formed into a 
self-conscious grouping. Focussing on a later and wider period extending into the 
mid-1980s (chapter 8) I discuss how different spokespersons within the recently 
created Post Keynesian camp, proposed conflicting strategies and identities to further 
the expansion of the group and its challenge to the profession. These later
106See Appendix A on the interview’s methodology, p. 285.
107Seldon and Pappworth (1983), p. 43.
108Ibid., p. 39.
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controversies often focused on the labelling of the group and I use debates over the 
label and its definition as an entry point to trace internal strife in Post Keynesian 
Economics. My research in the history of Post Keynesian Economics is informed 
primarily by archive research. I have found that the archival record in many respects 
contradicts the current understanding of Post Keynesian history. I conclude (chapter 
9) by relating my findings to other contributions in the history of Post Keynesian 
Economics. I also discuss how the controversies between Post Keynesians may be 
analyzed in the light of the concept of boundary work and outline what changes these 
brought to Post Keynesian identity.
In the concluding chapter 10 I reflect on the origins of the 1960s and 1970s crisis 
in economics. I compare the boundary work of radicals and Post Keynesians and its 
impact on the communities’ identity. Finally I discuss how the economics profession 
managed the challenge of the dissenters and how this response has brought about the 
isolation of dissenters from the core of the discipline.
Part II
R a d i c a l  P o l it ic a l  E c o n o m i c s
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2Introduction to Radical Political 
Economics
2.1 Participant histories o f R adical P olitica l Econom ics
Dissenting economics communities emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. However, we 
know little about the process of their constitution. How were dissenting identities 
constructed so as to join discontents into a challenge to the economics profession?
Nor do we know much about how the dissenting communities developed in their first 
years of existence. The goal of this chapter is to survey the historical literature on the 
first dissenting community that I research in this thesis, Radical Political Economics 
(RPE). Herein, I discuss accounts of radical economics’ emergence and outline how 
my own research may be related to their insights.
Most of the contributions to the history of Radical Political Economics can be 
found in introductory books, surveys or collections of essays written by radical 
economists. Authored by members of the radical community, these are not detailed 
historical enquiries. Instead, most provide only a brief background setting before 
tackling in greater detail contemporary concerns such as discussing new horizons for 
radical scholarship. It follows that, the presentist concerns of these accounts often 
impose upon their treatment of the past the consensual meanings of today. They 
should therefore be classed as participant accounts. This literature warrants a critical 
reading that isolates what is asserted from what is well sustained by evidence.
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2.2 T he “left academ ic”
It is unanimously acknowledged that Radical Political Economics was part of the 
1960s American surge of academic radicalism. In a volume surveying the growth of 
radical thought during the 1970s, Herbert Gintis wrote on the economics counterpart 
to this “cultural revolution.” His primary focus was to outline radicals’ views on 
theory, contrasting these to the economics mainstream. With regard to the why of 
RPE’s emergence, he wrote that it “was a direct response to the civil rights, antiwar, 
and feminist movements which shattered the post-World War II “consensus” .”1 
Gintis’s answer is in line with the accepted explanation for the broad radicalisation of 
American academia, an explanation applied to all disciplines, according to which 
radical thought was a response to the social movements of the 1960s.2
Similarly, Samuel Bowles and Richard Edwards have argued that radical 
economics emerged as “a critique of the forms of domination confronted by workers, 
women, and people of colour.”3 The left politics of American society was said to 
inform the radicals’ work in the design of research agendas, that “much of the 
research agenda of radical political economy has derived from involvement and 
commitment to these movements” ,4 or even by shaping the content of radical 
theories. As Victor Lippit has argued, radical economists “perceive the existence of a 
relationship between scholarship and class interests, and understand that a given 
social structure tends to support its dominant class interests as much through the 
intellectual environment it sustains as through other means.” Radical Political 
Economics is said to be scholarship committed to the disadvantaged or oppressed.5
While radical economists see their history beginning in the 1960s, others have 
pointed to a longer frame of reference. Notably, Frederic S. Lee has stressed the 
importance of considering the repression of American left-wing economics in the 
1940s and 1950s. According to Lee, repression brought about by McCarthyism was
1 Gintis (1984), p. 53.
2Oilman and Vernoff (1984) contains studies on other disciplines.
3Bowles and Edwards (1990), p. 4.
4 Idem.
5Lippit (1996), p. 5.
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coupled with the conservative ethos of American society that was pro-business and 
anti-government. At the level of the Universities, increased mathematisation and a 
system of loyalty oaths contributed to the exclusion of heterodox discourses. Marxism 
was said to have survived briefly in Communist Party Schools, which legislative 
action in the late 1940s soon forced into extinction. In the midst of repression, two 
publications resisted and contributed to extending interest in Marxian economics, the 
scholarly Science and Society and the magazine Monthly Review. For Lee, these 
publications bridge the repressed 1950s Marxism and late 1960s radical economics.6
While all authors concur on the importance of the 1960s social movements for the 
emergence of radical economics, they offer dissonant accounts on their role. For 
Bowles, Edwards, Gintis or Lippit, all prominent members of the radical community, 
the “movement” raised intellectual concerns that only the development of radical 
economics could satisfy. Because they tells us that only RPE could provide the 
answers demanded by the oppressed, it follows that the oppressed demanded the 
creation and have provided continued justification for the radicals’ existence. Lee 
takes a different view: the social movements permitted radical economics to break the 
cage cast by the mainstream,7 and were secondary to the formation of the group. For 
the author radical economics pre-dated the 1960s, laying latent in 1950s’ Marxism. 
Lee in his history did not make much of radicals’ activism for the formation of the 
group. He narrated a succession of meetings and institution-building efforts starting 
in 1965 with the joining of radicals across the U.S.A., but social movements seem to 
have played no role in these developments.8
Despite the recurring claims that radical economics is fused to political 
commitment and was born out of this connection, remarkably little exists on how this 
relationship has played itself out historically. How have these social movements 
communicated their concerns to radical economists? W hat kind of political work have 
radical economists been involved in? How have radicals’ political commitments
6Lee (2004a), pp. 179-180, 182-183.
7Although militantly a heterodox economist, Lee is not a radical and is best described as a Post 
Keynesian.
8Lee (2004a), pp. 187, 189.
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changed over time? What demands have these commitments placed on their academic 
work? These questions are never posed. For members of the group, for radical 
economists authoring their own history, that left politics was part of their work is 
self-evident and requires no scrutiny.
The radicals’ vagueness in detailing the content and workings of their political 
commitments is evident in reading Susan Fleck’s history of the Union for Radical 
Political Economics (URPE). The author interpreted the history of the Union as 
subservient to political concerns. URPE was created in 1968 and she notes that its 
“core purpose was and is to be an alternative professional organization for left 
political economists and an intellectual home for academics, policy-makers, and 
activists who are interested in participating in a left intellectual debate on theoretical 
and policy issues” .9 Fleck highlighted how commitment to the “movement” was part 
of the stated purposes of URPE. Of the three objectives presented in the Union’s first 
prospectus, the second referred to developing “new course and research areas which 
reflect the urgencies of the day” and the third that “political economics should be 
sensitive to the needs of the social movements of our day”.10 Fleck asserts that the 
creation of caucuses within URPE was the product of activist demands. A Women 
Caucus was formed in 1971, a Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Caucus formed in the early 
1980s and a Third World Caucus founded in the late 1980s. These were created to 
voice the adherents’ concerns inside URPE, reshaping its research agendas and 
debates, to lobby for new emerging political concerns.11 Fleck’s history of URPE 
publicizes the radicals’ left politics but is elusive on details and evidence. While she 
mentions the importance of “activist demands” for instance in the formation of the 
caucuses, we are not told in what activist activities radicals were involved, and in 
what way the caucuses were designed and functioned to support these activist 
concerns.
9Fleck (2003), p. 24). Fleck first wrote her account as an introduction to URPE to be posted on 
the organization’s website (Fleck in www.urpe.org), since then she has published several versions of 
her account but these do not vary substantially (Fleck (1998, 2003)).
10Fleck (2003), pp. 24-25. For the sake of completeness the first objective of URPE was “to promote 
a new interdisciplinary approach to political economy which includes also relevant themes from political 
science, sociology and social psychology” (Ibid., p. 24.).
11Ibid., pp. 25-26.
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The recurring references to political commitment as informing radicals’ work 
ought to be contrasted with the more contentious subject of into which economics 
tradition RPE should be classed. This classification problem seems connected with 
the radical economists’ uneasy relationship to Marxian economics and its canon. 
Radical economists often note some intellectual debt to Marxist scholarship in 
shaping the field’s early development, namely “The work of three American Marxists 
-  Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy and Harry Magdoff -  as well as German-born but 
American-educated Andre Gunder Frank and the Belgium Marxist Ernest Mandel 
played an important early role in the formation of ideas that became known as radical 
political economy”.12 But most radical economists are reluctant in taking on the label 
of Marxists, and when kinship between radical economics and Marxism is established, 
it is accompanied by many disclaimers.13 There is substantial criticism of Marxist 
scholarship, the underlying claim being that: “much of received doctrine in European 
Marxism was merely the result of the dominance of Soviet-style preconceptions 
relevant to an earlier era and not necessarily applicable to advanced capitalism in 
general nor to the United States in particular.”14 The social reality of American 
capitalism is seen as demanding an abandonment of “traditional Marxism.”15 
Radical economists critique “traditional Marxism” for sharing some of the 
shortcomings of neoclassical economics. They argue that old Marxism holds a 
restrictive view of the economy, limited to the factory or the market which are 
portrayed as a mere loci for an economicist rationale. In contrast, Radical Political 
Economics studies the appropriation of nature, a broad system of political and 
cultural relations of which schools, families and communities are also part. Radical 
economists also critique the view that the individual precedes and is independent of 
the economy. Their argument is that the economy produces goods, services and 
fundamentally also individuals.16 As a result of the contested overlap between radical
12Barone (2004), p. 3.
13Significantly, and in opposition to those closer to Marxism, some radicals argue that institutionalism  
should be seen as the defining intellectual influence in radical economics, with a deliberate focus given 
to institutions and the social environment as shaping economic activity (Lippit (1996), p. 7).
14Gintis (1984), p. 55.
15Also referred to as “official” , “fundamentalist” or “orthodox” Marxism, see Sherman (1987).
16Gintis (1984), pp. 55-56.
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economics and Marxism, histories of Marxian economics are mute to Radical Political 
Economics.17
The majority of radical authors argue that a plurality of traditions converge in 
radical economics:
First, there is the classical tradition, with emphasis on David Ricardo and 
the neo-Ricardian tradition, especially in the work of Piero Sraffa. Second, 
there is the Marxist tradition, taken as a set of powerful hypotheses, but 
not as an eternal truth. Third, there is the left Keynesian tradition and 
the post-Keynesian writers, such as Joan Robinson. Fourth, the radical 
paradigm has been strongly affected by the institutionalist economics of 
Thorstein Veblen. All of these traditions have merged to some extent in 
modern radical political economy, in different proportions in different 
writers18
The suggestion is that radical political economics ought to be characterised as a 
diverse whole that includes Marxist analysis, institutional, left Keynesian and social 
economics. But there is no genealogy of authors that radical economists may 
consensually accept as their intellectual forefathers; and each radical economist claims 
his own influences.
For most dissenters intellectual diversity is a weakness in want of explanation. 
According to Lee it was the 1950s repression preventing the teaching of Marxism, 
that produced in some radical economists’ work an uneasy mix of neoclassical 
economics tools and Marxism. Most of the radical economists had only been trained 
in neoclassical economics and knew very little of Marxist economic theory. Equally 
important in Lee’s explanation of RPE’s diversity, was that it mirrored the political 
culture of the 1960s:
many college activists in the New Left movement were also interested in a 
plurality of non-Marxian ideas, such as existentialism and anarchism. At 
the same time, they restricted their interest in Marx to his concept of man 
and alienation and adopted an American radicalism that railed against 
large corporations, Wall Street, and the exploitative nature of free 
enterprise and the status quo. As a result, they preferred to call
17Howard and King (1991); Eatwell, Milgate and Newman (1990).
18Sherman (1987), p. 4.
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themselves radicals or leftists as opposed to Marxist or socialist (which 
were felt to be narrower and less inclusive).19
While Lee found the origins of diversity in the radicals’ education, others have 
suggested it has been a more recent development. They argue that “radical economics 
was led to differentiation “as theoretical sophistication grew”.”20 There is reassurance 
in this explanation of diversity, as it is ascribed to theoretical progress. Overall, and 
as in the case of the radicals’ commitment to left politics, it seems the origins and 
history of radical economics’ intellectual diversity have been only marginally explored.
Distinct from the participant accounts I have reviewed so far, was Paul Attewell’s 
Radical Political Economy since the Sixties.21 Attewell was not a radical economist 
writing the history of his community, instead he studied the subject from the vantage 
point of the sociology of knowledge. His approach was markedly analytical. It 
progressed in two stages: beginning with the definition of a stylised radical agent and 
an environment within which this agent must act; followed by an argument on how 
the characteristics of radical economics arose from the interplay of his radical agency 
and environment.
Attewell began by constructing what he called “a homunculus, a hypothetical left 
academic” that was characterised by three fundamental goals distinguishing him from 
“apolitical colleagues.” The first characteristic was the left academic’s adherence to 
Marxism, from which followed efforts to preserve it as a scientific paradigm. Secondly, 
the left academic was said to hold a belief in social improvement, which prompted his 
moral and evaluatory analyses of social phenomena. Finally, the left academic was 
said to analyse emerging social events; Attewell defined him as a commentator on 
contemporary affairs.22
In Attewell’s setting, the left academic was a player with defined goals facing 
“obstacles” inherent to the academic environment. He was described as acting in the 
midst of “tensions” and “paradoxes” operating both internally and externally to
19Lee (2004a), p. 188.
20Flaherty (1987), p. 36.
21 Attewell (1984).
22Ibid., pp. 17-20.
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theory. Outside the field of theory, the agent was faced with inter-paradigmatic and 
group hostility - the academic environment, being structured into exclusive 
solidarities, would be inherently hostile to the left-wing academic. The primary 
tension inside theory was set in the language of Thomas Kuhn’s paradigms, a shock 
between maintaining the Marxian paradigm in the face of new phenomena and the 
goal of addressing these in morally charged judgment.23
Attewell deduced from the described axiomatics, defining agency and the 
environment in which it acts, some of the general characteristics of Radical Political 
Economics. He singled out as in need of explanation radical economics’ empirical 
character, its stress on periodisation and its departure from Marxism. The strong 
empirical character of American radicals’ work, which Attewell compared with the 
abstract theoretical work of British socialists, was explained with reference to the 
academic environment that the left-wing American faced. According to Attewell, 
shows of technical competence shielded the left academic’s work from the hostile 
establishment.
The radicals’ emphasis on periodisation was another artefact that Attewell’s 
analysis accounted for, and it arose from the left academic’s goal of preserving the 
Marxist paradigm from criticism (what Attewell labels a tension inside theory). By 
breaking capitalism into different periods, Marx’s relevance could be asserted for 
earlier stages of capitalism while radical economics’ contributions were shown to 
address later ones, namely the new stage of American monopolist capitalism.24 
Radical economists were thus able to present new perspectives on the economy 
without discarding Marx and Marxism as flawed.
Attewell further explained radical economists’ departure from traditional 
Marxism in terms of the left-wing academic’s goal of securing a moral bite for his 
work. In explaining changes in theories of imperialism, Attewell argued that the 
choice of a nationalist definition of wealth: “wealth belongs to the natural owner by 
right of residence” ; instead of the traditional Marxist conception of wealth as a
23Attewell implicitly assumes that new phenomena invariably contradict the Marxian paradigm. 
Ibid., pp. 21-36.
24Ibid., p. 31.
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product of labour, catered to the moral metaphor of imperialism as theft.25
Despite Attewell’s insightful composition of general characteristics of radical 
economics from an idealised depiction of the radical academic, the study suffered from 
several shortcomings. Given my focus on the emergence of dissent it is problematic 
that Attewell’s sociological frame was never justified and was imposed a priori. We 
are not told how the “left academic,” the base for his idealisation, came to be.
Instead the author must rest his claim on a “hypothetical left academic.”26 As noted 
in a review of Attewell’s book, these failings arise from a lack of historical detail.27 
The author approached radical theory through his ideal academic and never related it 
to the real (historical) academics that developed it. Attewell also studied the 
characteristics of particular branches of radical economics, under the headings of 
imperialism, dependency and crisis theories, “the labour process and the firm” and 
“theories of economic segmentation and poverty” . But these accounts of sub-fields of 
radical theory read as testing grounds for the conceptual framework, the sub-fields of 
radical economics appear as largely disconnected, beyond their role as further raw 
material for Attewell’s sociological exploration. Perhaps for these reasons Attewell’s 
book was ignored by radical economists and was reviewed only in sociology journals.28
It is interesting to note that Attewell revisits many of the themes found in radical 
economists’ brief historical reflections. The author’s concept of moral drive as a 
distinctive characteristic of the left academic echoed the stress given elsewhere to 
activism. The author repeated the argument held by radicals that it was political 
engagement that directed their research. The theme that radical economics is the 
product of a mix of intellectual traditions was also noticeable in Attewell’s account 
when he considered non-Marxist radical work, for instance the radical institutionalist 
dual labour market theory.29 Attewell largely accepted as unproblematic what I have 
called participant accounts of the history of radical economics, in effect they seem to 
be the unacknowledged source for Attewell’s characterization of the left academic.
25Ibid., p. 34.
26My emphasis.
27Riddell (1986), p. 435.
28Riddell (1986), Banuri (1986).
29Attewell (1984), pp. 44-53.
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2.3 E xternalizing th e  history o f R adical P olitica l 
Econom ics
The primary aim of my research is to explain the emergence of dissent in 1960s and 
1970s American economics. For this endeavour existing scholarship on the history of 
dissenting groups provides guidance, but one that must be carefully scrutinised. We 
are offered participant accounts, informally written by radical economists and lacking 
in historical evidence. Their authority is that of self-examination and of first-person 
testimony. These histories are likely to present myth as history and to impose on the 
past the definitions that the radical community now holds as unquestionable, and 
which I wish to research as contingent and constructed. The only major book-length 
research in the history of radical economics, although not written by a radical 
economist, accepted the radicals’ contemporary self-definition and rationally 
reconstructed their theory development on that basis. Attewell manifestly replaced 
the history of radical economics with an analytical exploration.
Even if participant accounts are unsuited to provide clues as to the history of the 
construction of radical economics, they nonetheless effectively highlight what lies 
most prominent in radical identity. Two themes stand out from my reading of this 
literature: radicals’ closeness to the political left-wing, in particular, the social 
movements of the 1960s; and Radical Political Economics’ intellectual diversity.
Radical Political Economics is at times deemed Marxist, Institutionalist, 
Keynesian, or all of the above. The diversity it exhibits is taken by commentators as 
inevitable, something either inherent to the progress of ideas, or an outcome of the 
radicals’ education. In either case, we are never shown how intellectual diversity 
developed. It is quite remarkable that we know so little of the content of the radicals’ 
early debates, and virtually all references to controversies between radicals are 
post-1980.30 While Lee offers a thorough chronology of meetings between radicals up
30For instance, see Norton (1992) for a survey of radical crisis theory and Ruccio (1992) on radical 
work on debt and development. Understandably, more current surveys make even less note of radicals’ 
work in the 1970s and focus exclusively on the 1980s and 1990s, see Barone (2004).
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to URPE’s creation in 1968, details on the content of the radical meetings are thin.31 
The literature leaves us uncertain about the intellectual landscape of radical 
economics prior to 1980.
No subject is more important for radicals than their politics. It is in politics that 
radicals locate their emergence, namely in their connection to the 1960s social 
movements. Yet, the details of this relationship are never elaborated. For instance, 
although Lee references the early involvement of Michigan radical economists with 
the student activist Radical Education Project in the mid-1960s, we are not told how 
it shaped radical economics.32 At the level of URPE history, little evidence is given of 
activist demands shaping the organisation’s everyday activities, one of its stated 
aims. In what ways did activist demands inform the radicals’ work? How did 
activism prompt radicals to organize a Union with its own journal, newsletter and 
annual meetings, as Fleck has suggested? These questions form a suitable starting 
point for my inquiry. I must begin by revealing what the relationships were, if any, 
between the sixties social movements and emerging radical economics. This is the 
subject of the following chapter.
31 Lee (2004a), p. 187-190.
32 Lee (2004a), p. 187.
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The radical challenge to economics
3.1 Students, radicals and the econom ics profession
Radical economics emerged in the U.S.A. in 1968 with the creation of the Union for 
Radical Political Economics (URPE). While in agreement with the historical 
literature that traced the origins of radical economics to the 1960s,1 the present 
account is distinct from earlier works by placing radical economics’ emergence as the 
outcome of the creation of URPE. It was the success of URPE as a union of 
discontent young economists that urged the enunciation of a new kind of economics.
I describe the process of making radical economics in the interplay of three 
histories: the history of student radicalism, the history of URPE and the history of 
the debates between radicals and the mainstream. I begin by reviewing the history of 
student radicalism separately, taking as my sources the secondary literature on the 
1960s and the New Left. The histories of URPE and of the radicals’ controversies 
with the mainstream nest into the high point of student protest, from 1966 to 1970. I 
deal with the two histories together to show how URPE’s mission became the 
creation of a radical economics to challenge the economics profession. My discussion 
shows how the radicals’ controversy with the mainstream was related to the growing 
tensions and conflicts that then pervaded American society. I further look at how the 
dispute between radicals and mainstream economists quietened in the period of 
decline in student unrest, post-1971, examining some notable cases of hiring and
firing of radical economists.
1 As shown in the previous chapter.
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3.2 A  three-period  history o f student radicalism
The background to the history of radical economics’ emergence is the student protest 
movement of the late 1960s. Although the history of Radical Political Economics 
proper begins only in 1966, the later period in the history of this movement, it is 
important to reach further back to capture the intellectual development of student 
radicalism. The intellectual origins of the New Left help explain some of the 
paradoxes in the history of radical economics.
I introduce a three-period history of the student left.2 It will allow me to make 
three points. The first was that sixties radicalism had its intellectual origins tied to 
American liberalism. Secondly, the protest over the Vietnam War transformed 
student radicals into a national political force while deepening their criticism of 
American society. By 1968, self-confident of their political clout, radicals began 
calling for revolution. Thirdly, as the 1960s generation of radicals graduated from 
University and as the Vietnam conflict began to cool into a victory for the Vietcong, 
the momentum of student unrest was broken and waned leaving the campuses devoid 
of radical activity.
3 .2 .1  P artin g  w ays w ith  liberalism  (1961-1965)
The radical student movement in the U.S.A. was from its inception labelled “New 
Left” in a reference to the contemporary British experience.3 The adoption of the 
label may seem paradoxical. For unlike Britain, where 1950s and 1960s young radicals 
were breaking with a still influential Marxist Left, in the United States there was no 
active left wing. The 1950s McCarthyism had effectively decimated left of centre 
politics.4 The intellectual and organizational origins of the American New Left were
2My periodisation of the history of the New Left owes much to Kirkpatrick Sale’s history of Students 
for Democratic Society (Sale (1974)). The author noted four periods in SDS history: 1960-62 -  
reorganization; 1962-65 -  reform; 1965-68 -  resistance; 1968-1970 -  revolution. Sale’s scholarship is 
sometimes criticised for being overly brief in analysis, but it remains invaluable as a source of primary 
materials on SDS since the author poured into his account much of the organization’s office archives.
3Buhle (1998), p. 545.
4On the repression of the left, see Caute (1978), pp. 161-223; on the resulting destruction of the 
Communist Party-USA, see Steinberg (1984), pp. 261-292.
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not the Old Marxist Left.5 The “New” in the New Left label was posed in opposition 
to American liberalism.
American student radicalism had its intellectual and institutional origins in 
liberalism. The early 1960s radicals were born into well-educated, liberal-minded 
families.6 They “were frequently the democratically bred, intelligent children of highly 
educated parents. . . .  They believed in the intrinsic value of education and came to 
college with the expectation that in it reposed value and virtue” J  The early radicals 
were also overwhelmingly students of the social sciences (sociology and history, but 
also a large number from economics). Involvement in radical activism by students 
from other subjects came only later in the 1960s and was never as widespread.8
The major student New Left organisation, Students for Democratic Society 
(SDS), grew from the liberal political camp, created at Ann Arbour, University of 
Michigan, in I960.9 In one of their earliest activities, beginning in 1960, members of 
SDS travelled in their summer breaks to the American South and participated in the 
“freedom rides” and voter registration campaigns, opposing racial discrimination.10 
Students’ reports from the South reflected their belief in liberal values but also voiced 
a sense of bankruptcy towards its practice. As Kirkpatrick Sale commented in his 
history of SDS, “the sham and the shabbness of the liberal tradition in which they all 
had grown up was slowing coming to be felt” .11
The civil rights campaigns led SDSers to reassess their politics. They coined their 
alternative to liberalism, “radicalism.” The statement of the new political philosophy
5Isserman (1987).
6Lipset and Altbach (1969), pp. 216, 128. Some would also add the adjective “affluent,” for instance 
Sherkat and Blocker (1994).
7Horowtiz (1986), p. 13. The literature on student activism and radicalism is overwhelming; 
Keniston (1973) provided an annotated biography of over 300 sociological and psychological studies 
done in late 1960s and early 1970s.
8In the early years of SDS, up to its expansion in 1965, the centers of activity were the large public 
and private universities of the American Northeast. State universities particularly in the American 
Mid-West became increasingly important later on. The history of the radical movement in these public 
institutions is in many respects distinct from that of the private ones, on this subject see Heineman 
(1993).
9 The students led by A1 Haber renamed and reorganized the student branch of the League for 
Industrial Democracy (SLID), a liberal society devoted to cultural and educational activities. Robert 
Allen (Al) Haber was a sociology graduate student, son of Michigan economics department’s member 
Bill Haber, once an active member of the League for Industrial Democracy. (Horowitz (1986), p. 17).
10Sitkoff (1981), pp. 97-126.
11 Sale (1974), p. 17.
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was enshrined in the Port Huron Statement (1962). This manifesto drew on the 
values of humanism, individualism and community, to call for “participatory 
democracy.”12 The SDS leadership in 1963-64, bolstered by their civil rights 
experiences, was planning to apply the bottom-up strategies of the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)13 to the American North, to fight 
poverty and political alienation. In the summer of 1964, SDSers began “The 
Economic Research and Action Project” (ERAP). Radicals moved to local 
communities where they lived and organised with the goal of leading the poor to 
political action. ERAP was abandoned in 1965 (although two projects at Newark and 
Chicago continued into 1967). Radicals found it difficult to reach the poor and to 
spur them into self-organisation and sustained political work. In contrast to their 
initial grander prospects, they had achieved only small scale lobbying in improving 
the bureaucracy -  helping local people claim benefits, talking to landlords, e tc .. . 14
Thus, the beginnings of student radicalism were made outside the Universities, 
first participating in the civil rights campaigns, later in the ERAP projects in the 
urban North. Radicalism was designed as the politics of popular participation. It was 
the voluntarist ideal of collectively curing the ills of American society.
3 .2 .2  V ietn am  W ar and revolu tion  (1965-1970)
Radicals only began to focus their political activity in the Universities when the 
Vietnam War took centre-stage. This happened in 1965, following the February 
Presidential decision to bomb North Vietnam and pour thousands of troops into the 
conflict. The first of many “teach-ins” in American Universities on the subject of 
Vietnam was held at the University of Michigan on the 2Ath of March 1965.15 In a few 
days, teach-ins spread across the colleges. The most famous took place at Berkeley
12Ibid., p. 50.
13The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was created in 1960 in the early years 
of the sit-in movement (Sitkoff (1981), pp. 91-4). It was an independent organization run by young 
black youth, and was responsible for some of the bravest activities of the civil rights campaign, from 
the “freedom rides” to “voter registration.” Later in the decade it was home to the first calls for Black 
Power (Carson (1981)).
14Sale (1974), pp. 143-144.
15The “teach-in” was agreed with the University administration to replace the earlier call for a mass 
strike instigated by faculty (Lipset and Altbach (1969), p. 203).
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with an attendance of 35,000 and lasting for 36 hours. In April 1965 SDS organized 
its first demonstration against war in Washington, it drew about 25,000 people and 
launched SDS to national recognition. In weeks SDS membership multiplied from 50 
chapters in December 1964, it had 95 in May and by December 1965 there were 124.
President L. B. Johnson in order to increase troop numbers in Vietnam in 1966 
reformed the selective service system which decided who should be sent to fight 
overseas. The new system refined the student exemption, with only the top half of 
the class (ranked by grades) being given exemption from military service. The 
student radicals responded with the new tactics of sit-ins and burn-ins (burning draft 
cards) causing greater disruption to campus life. Significantly, soon after, the 
National Mobilisation Committee was created as an umbrella organization for 
anti-Vietnam War groups. In the Spring of 1967 it successfully organized two major 
rallies in New York and in San Francisco.
In the teach-ins, sit-ins, burn-ins, the “in” was typically the campuses, and the 
Vietnam conflict primed radicals to a critique of the University. The complicity of 
University administrations with war-related agencies was revealed throughout the year 
of 1967.16 The criticism of the Universities led radicals to experimenting with “Free 
Universities,” an institution that could be free from the constraints of the academic 
establishment and would address issues that would otherwise be taboo, prominently 
the war. The first Free Universities in the fall of 1965 were at Berkeley, Florida, New 
York, and Chicago, by 1966 there were 10 and by 1970 they were said to number 500.
The year of 1968 needs to be singled out in the history of the student movement. 
It was a watershed year for campus militancy and the politics of the student 
movement.17 From 1968 “revolution” became the catchword, the ultimate goal of 
radical activity. Developments at the national political scene were surely one of the 
causes for this change. In late January, at the Vietnamese Tet holiday, the army of 
North Vietnam launched a massive attack on U.S. forces in the South, taking for a
16The most explosive case involved the University of Wisconsin and Dow Chemicals (manufacturers 
of infamous Agent Orange) recruiting in campus in October 15, 1967 (Sale (1974), pp. 369-374).
17This is recognized across the literature on the period, for instance Morgan (1991), Isserman and 
Kazin (2004), Gitlin (1987), but the argument is more forcefully made in Unger and Unger (1988).
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few weeks many of the U.S.A. held cities. The aftermath of the “Tet Offensive” was 
to discredit President L. B. Johnson’s foreign policy, already strained by three years 
of growing anti-war sentiment. A poll in March showed that either Republican 
candidate Richard Nixon or Democrat hopeful Robert Kennedy would beat the 
President in the coming elections.18
Alongside Vietnam and the uncertainties of electoral politics, civil rights protests 
continued to flare. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s efforts had moved from the problems of 
southern race segregation to those of poverty. King was in 1968, advocating a 
“democratic form of socialism” while calls for Black Power and Black Nationalism 
were becoming more and more prevalent, from Oakland, Chicago and New York. In 
April King was assassinated and in response protests and riots erupted in 120 cities.19
In June Robert Kennedy was killed. With Kennedy’s death it was expected that 
the 1968 Democratic Party Convention in Chicago would choose pro-war Hubert 
Humphrey (Vice-President to Johnson) as the Democratic presidential candidate. At 
the occasion of the convention a protest was organised by the umbrella body of 
anti-war groups, the National Mobilisation Committee.20 The protesters were met 
with disproportionate force by the Chicago authorities. Over 12,000 city policeman, 
6,000 national guardsmen and 7,500 regular army troops were mobilized. The 
aftermath of the street battle was 200 injured and 500 arrests.21
The events caught the media’s attention:
The main feature of the August 29 NBC Morning News was a poetic 
montage of the previous day’s convention “highlights.” Back and forth 
NBC cut from the convention hall celebrations that followed Hubert 
Humphrey’s first-ballot victory to footage of protesters being beaten, 
clubbed, maced, and gassed by hordes of clearly enraged, out-of-control 
policemen. They showed this while the conventioneers cheered and 
paraded and sang. They showed the “kids” being knocked to the ground,
18Isserman and Kazin (2004), p. 232.
19Ibid., pp. 233, 235; Morgan (1991), p. 55.
20 Prominent in the protests were the Yippies or Youth International Party, a group of anti-war 
protesters that politicised the counter-cultural figure of the hippie. Their protests were characterized 
by carnavalesque techniques of burlesque, clowning and ridicule. In Chicago, they nominated a live 
pig, called “Pigasus” , as their presidential candidate (Urgo (1998), pp. 918-19).
21Isserman and Kazin (2004), p. 241.
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kicked in the face while delegates whooped and hollered with joy. NBC 
cut back and forth, back and forth, from the terror in the streets to the 
festivities that followed Hubert Humphrey’s victory.22
The Democratic convention not only applauded Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley’s 
repression of the protests but elected Hubert Humphrey, the establishment figure, as 
presidential nominee. For the radicals that went to Chicago who were already 
disillusioned with electoral politics, the events signified the need for harder tactics to 
fight the government and its policies, “more and more people were concluding that 
simple parades and orderly rallies were no longer enough.”23
Chicago was a major event,24 one that would have crucial repercusions for the 
history of radical economics, as I will show later. In December of 1968 the Chicago 
Study Team of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence 
published a report on the August police response. The Walker report, as it became 
known, attached the label of “police riot” to the Chicago events, attributing the 
responsibility for the violence to spontaneous acts of individual policemen. Late in 
1968, recently elected President Richard Nixon’s attorney general, John Mitchell, 
“charged Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden, David Dellinger, Bobby Seale, Abbie Hoffman, 
Jerry Rubin, and . . .  National Mobilisation Committee marshals Lee Weiner and 
John Froines for conspiring to cause a riot, a charge that carried a penalty of up to 
five years in jail. Their trial would become the cause celebre of 1969.”25
Around the world student unrest was on the rise. There were massive protests in 
West Germany, Italy, and famously in Paris in May, where students and mass strikes 
drove the country to a halt.26 The opposition to the war in Vietnam may have made 
student radicals into a national political player, but it was the growing conflictual 
temper of American society27 and the examples of student power elsewhere in the
22Farber (1988), p. 251.
23Ibid., p. xv.
24The events were captured by Norman Mailer’s pen in M iami and the Siege of Chicago.
25Farber (1988), p. 205. The trial began in September of 1969 and concluded in February of 1970 
with the defendants being found guilty. But in November 1972 the Court of Appeal reversed all 
convictions on the grounds of misconduct by the Judge and the Jurors. For a first-person account of 
the trial see Hayden (1970).
26Katsificas (1987), Fraser (1988).
27W hat Isserman and Kazin (2004) aptly called a “civil war.”
3. A political divide 58
world that convinced radicals that revolution was at hand. The events at Columbia 
University in April 1968 testified to this new mood. Over the issue of constructing a 
gym on land then occupied by Harlem’s poor residents, students took over University 
buildings. They held their ground against the administration for seven days with 
support from a student strike, and were only ousted when police violently removed 
them at the Columbia University administration’s request.28
Over the late 1960s the leadership of SDS broke into warring factions.29 The 
leadership and older radicals at SDS redirected their efforts away from the campuses 
and into revolutionary politics. Yet, the bulk of the SDS activists followed none of the 
revolutionary factions, they set up independent local groups or joined national 
organizations such as those against the war in Vietnam.30 Despite the SDS splits, 
student radicalism intensified in 1969-70. The main drive for continued student 
activism was the anti-war movement. “In 1967, 35 percent of students identified 
themselves as “doves” ; by 1969 the proportion grew to 69 percent” .31 In July 1969, 
antiwar protesters proposed a “moratorium on business as usual,” choosing October 
15 1969 as a day for mass strike, national demonstrations and door-to-door 
canvassing, picketing and, leafleting.32 The initiative was meant to be repeated every 
month while increasing the days of action by a day per month. Vietnam Moratorium 
committees were created in campuses and cities throughout the country to prepare 
for the October mass action. The resulting protest was a success, “it was a display 
without historical precedent, the largest expression of public dissent seen in this 
century”33 drawing millions of Americans to the streets in all major cities, and to
28 On the Columbia events see the account by reporters to  the Columbia Spectator collected in Avorn
(1969).
29Beginning in June 1968 the SDS leadership called for the construction of a radical revolutionary 
movement and the organization was soon split over the tactics to be adopted. From the program 
“Towards a Revolutionary Youth Movement” came the RYM group (Elbaum (2002), p. 70) which in 
1969 expelled Progressive Labour (PL) (Elbaum (1998), p. 472). PL however kept the SDS name. 
There were at the close of 1969 two SDS, one based in Chicago and one (PL’s) based in Boston. 
Finally, the Chicago group split into the Weathermen and RYM II. The Weathermen would soon go 
underground and be responsible for 12 bombings in the following years, dissolving in 1976 (Chepesiuk 
(1995), p. 224). RYM II was short lived and dissolved in 1971.
30Halstead (1978), p. 467.
31Horowitz (1986), p. 22.
32Halstead (1978), p. 473.
33Life Magazine cited in Halstead (1978), p. 488.
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absenteeism in high schools, junior high and elementary schools. The following 
month’s moratorium days, in November, were accompanied by a national 
demonstration in Washington D.C., the biggest up to that date.34
In terms of the number of institutions affected and students involved, the high 
point of student activism was 1970. On April 30th President Nixon announced that 
American and South Vietnamese ground forces were moving against North 
Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia. For the anti-war protesters it represented 
another escalation in the American imperialist war in Southeast Asia. Overnight there 
were demonstrations in several campuses and calls for nationwide demonstrations. 
Protests turned to upheaval when on May 4th at the Kent State University campus in 
Ohio, a student protest was targeted by National Guardsmen’s bullets. Four students 
were killed and nine were injured. On May 14th police at Jackson State College in 
Mississippi fired at and killed two black students and wounded 12 more.35 “The strike 
movement, initiated to protest the American military invasion of Cambodia, 
immediately increased: 4,350,000 students at 1,350 universities and colleges 
participated in demonstrations against the shootings and escalation” ,36
From 1968 to 1970 campuses were at fever pitch, with occupations, strikes, 
sit-ins, teach-ins, destruction of property, all increasing in intensity and with no sign 
of abating. The protests put student-faculty-administration relations under strain. 
Although the professoriate was never as critical to student protest as the general 
public, it was sternly opposed to the hard tactics of post-1968. In 1969, seventy-seven 
percent of the faculty felt that students disrupting the functioning of a college should 
be expelled or suspended, although only a quarter thought that demonstrations had 
no place on campuses.37 Therefore what is significant in this period is not only the 
increasing calls for “revolution” with its new weaponry of protest but also the 
growing stress this placed on the universities.
34The idea of continuing the moratorium was abandoned after the November success, but its organi­
zational structure remained in plane and would prove to be crucial for the continuation of the anti-war 
protests.
35Peterson and Bilorusky (1970), p. 1.
36Heineman (1992), p. 201.
37Ladd and Lipset (1975), pp. 34-35.
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3.2.3 Demise of campus activism (1971-1974)
The protests increased in number and participants during 1969 and 1970, but the 
increase in numbers concealed a change in the nature of the major movement spurring 
student protest, the antiwar campaign. Not unlike the SDS splits, in the Summer of 
1970 the National Mobilisation Committee, the antiwar campaign’s united front, 
dissolved in a crisis of infighting.38 The Vietnam Moratorium Committee became the 
dominant organization of the 1969-1970 antiwar drive, its “goal was to galvanise and 
express a broad, moderate, majority position against the war”39 and the media began 
to endear the liberal wing of the antiwar movement. The new student participants in 
the antiwar campaign were “not radicals, not hippies, neither rebels nor 
revolutionaries, they were nonetheless prepared to take up a cause that both SDS and 
the McCarthy campaign had let slip away”.40 Notably, after May 1970, college 
militancy followed in proportion to the Vietnam draft,41 which steadily decreased 
under Nixon’s strategy of withdrawing soldiers while intensifying the bombing of 
North Vietnam.42
Dissent over the war became in 1971 a majority position in America, a poll in 
mid-April showed that sixty percent of Americans favoured withdrawal even if it 
meant the fall of the South Vietnamese government, and fifty-eight percent found 
America’s War in Vietnam to be morally wrong.43 The largest antiwar demonstration 
in American history, brought in April 24 1971 half a million people to the streets of 
Washington, D.C..44 At the forefront of the April 1971 demonstration were the 
Vietnam Veterans Against the War (WAW). Days before the demonstration,
38The National Mobilisation Committee broke into two separate organizations, the single-issue Na­
tional Peace Action Coalition and the multi-issue National Coalition Against War, Racism and Re­
pression (Hopkins (1992), p. 72).
39Zaroulis and Sullivan (1984), p. 257.
40Ibid., p. 258.
41 Elbaum (2002), p. 36. One should also note that the Nixon administration in the aftermath of 
the 1970s protests moved to create a new set of guidelines that schools had to abide to retain their tax  
exempt status, which put pressure on University administrations to clamp down on student protest, 
while also asking the FBI to intervene undercover in campuses (Halstead (1978), p. 580).
42By 1972 the US troops presence was down to 24,000 from a high of over 500,000 in 1969 (Ruane 
(2000), p. 127).
43Halstead (1978), p. 600.
44Hunt (1999), p. 116.
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veterans camped in Washington’s Mall and from there sent “squads” to lobby 
Congress, enact guerrilla theatre, and to talk to people on the streets.45 Gauged by 
the media’s reaction, the Veterans participation struck an emotional cord in the 
American public. A Pennsylvania newspaper compared in terms of effects on public 
opinion, Washington’s massive demonstration with the veterans’ protest: “It is 
doubted that this great outpouring of conscientious men and women will influence the 
thinking of the nation even nearly as much as the appearance of 900 warriors for 
peace in their battle attire.”46 Bringing further strain to the war effort were the 
desertions and resistance by soldiers at home and in Vietnam.47 In 1971 the veteran 
and the soldier had replaced the radical student as the face of resistance to the war.
After a presidential campaign where the antiwar movement, liberal and 
moderate, coalesced around the anti-war Democratic Party bid of McGovern, Nixon 
signed in January 27 1973, the Paris Accords with the North Vietnamese. Though 
the Paris Accords inscribed a full withdrawal of American forces, the war continued 
with the US backing of the South Vietnamese regime. Hostilities effectively only 
ended when in 1975 North Vietnam decisively invaded the South. Without a clear 
military presence only the left-wing, outside the campuses and disconnected from the 
larger and moderate anti-war movement, protested against the continued aggression.
By mid-1970s the campuses were changing. The seventies student was a world 
apart from the sixties one.48 Reflecting on the changes operating over the student 
population in the course of the decade, personnel and administrators at 586 colleges 
were asked in 1978 to describe how students had changed since 1969-70. A majority 
of the sample found students to be more “career-oriented,” “better groomed” and 
more “concerned with self,” while less “radical” and less “activist.”49 The perceived 
change was corroborated by a decreasing number of student protests and by the
45Halstead (1978), p. 605.
46Cited in Hunt (1999), p. 116.
47Prom 1966 to 1971 desertions and AWOL rates increased nearly 400 percent in the army, three 
times higher than during the Korean war. “For every one hundred soldiers in 1971, seventeen went 
AWOL and seven deserted, the highest rates in army history. . . .  In underground parlance, the armed 
forces were becoming the “armed farces”” (Anderson (1992), p. 111).
48Altbach and Cohen (1990).
49Levine (1980), pp. 7-8.
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changing nature of students’ campus organizations, i.e. with a decline of ideological 
politics on campus (be it left or right in orientation). The proportion of students 
participating in demonstrations had also fallen, from twenty-eight percent in 1969 to 
nineteen percent by 1976.50 Even more significantly as evidence of the disappearance 
of radicalism from the campuses, the emphasis of student protest had changed from 
external issues such as the Vietnam War or civil rights, to internal campus issues, 
namely fees, financial aid or college facilities.51 There were also changes in tactics: “a 
decline in use of tactics familiar from the sixties -  building takeovers, strikes, 
demonstrations, and the destruction of property. W hat has taken its place are 
litigation and tactics ranging from lobbying and use of grievance procedures for 
educating the public and fellow students via seminars and research reports” ,52 The 
inquests of the mid-to-late 1970s bore evidence of a quieting of campuses and a 
transformation of its protest culture away from radical subjects and tactics.
3.3 T he challenge o f Radical P olitica l Econom ics
The seminal group of radical economists was composed by Michigan SDSers. Their 
early political development as radical students of economics fitting neatly into the 
history of radicalism I have reviewed. Where the two stories began to diverge was c. 
1968 when the radicals took on a professional career and abandoned their student 
status. It was with the advent of this change that the Union for Radical Political 
Economics (URPE) was founded. From 1968 with the creation of the Union, the 
history of the economics radicals ran parallel to the history of student radicalism but 
the relationship between the two is no longer obvious and merits closer scrutiny.
URPE was originally a modest enterprise. But by 1969 radicals began to envisage 
a more ambitious future for their Union, as they fashioned a challenge to the 
economics profession. Radicals engaged in the design of a paradigm to compete 
against the mainstream and ultimately to displace it. It is revealing how this process
50Ibid., p. 39.
51 Exceptions were the campaigns against South Africa’s apartheid in the research-oriented universi­
ties of the Northeast and Pacific Coast (Levine (1980), p. 42).
52Ibid, pp. 42-43.
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interacted with the growing tensions inside campuses in the early 1970s when the 
student protest reached unprecedented intensity. The mainstream was made to 
respond by the nature of the radicals’ attack, since it was made publicly and 
scandalously. The mainstream’s response is another subject of this section.
Ultimately I want to conclude by comparing the two strategies, the radical challenge, 
and the mainstream response, and see how they match with the social context in 
which they were raised.
3.3.1 Origins of the Union for Radical Political Economics 
(1965-1968)
Michigan economics students were active in SDS from its inception. They participated 
in national activities, notably in the 1964-65 ERAP projects, but also in local politics 
such as student government, and in the anti-war protests beginning in 1964.53 It was 
around the anti-war protest that the history of radical economics began. President 
Johnson in 1966 revised the selective service system, Universities were expected to 
calculate rankings for male students and make these available to the military so that 
the lower half of ranked students be sent to fight in Vietnam. In 1966 many of the 
radical students of economics at Michigan were doing graduate research (they were 
the older generation of SDSers) and were employed as teaching assistants for 
undergraduate courses.54 They sided with SDS demands that the University oppose 
the new selective system. They proposed that the administration refuse to compute 
the male ranking, so that the information required by the draft would be unavailable. 
The radical group pledged to withhold grades if “our judgment would serve to send 
people to be killed and kill in Vietnam.”55 The University authorities reacted with 
the threat that if grades were not produced by the teaching assistants, failings would 
be awarded to all students and rankings calculated on that basis. On the eve of the 
final exams the group of teaching assistants decided to hand-in the grades.56
53Interview with Michael Zweig, Barry Bluestone, 2003; Harvard Law Review  (1969).
54The Michigan group included John Weeks, Howard Wachtel, Sander Kelman, Barry Bluestone, 
Michael Zweig and Eric Chester (not all teaching assistants).
55Interview with Michael Zweig, 2003.
56Brazer (1982), pp. 248-9.
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It is important to note that the conflict did not represent disaffection with the 
economics faculty. In the 1966 episode, some faculty members came to the radicals’ 
defence, in particular Daniel R. Fusfeld.57 In Michigan there was no hostility to the 
radicals’ actions and their questioning of the status quo. Some faculty members like 
Dan Suits and Fusfeld tolerated it and at times encouraged it, since for them it 
represented a revival of an inquiring attitude towards society crushed by 
McCartyism.58 This pattern was not unique to Michigan, in fact University faculty 
were generally more critical of the war than the general population. A majority of 
faculty advocated in 1966, a disengagement from Vietnam and fifteen percent took 
the radical position of immediate withdrawal.59
The Michigan radicals that had been joined together in 1966 to fight the selective 
service system began to act cooperatively within the economics department. In 1967, 
they petitioned for changes in the curriculum and for greater student involvement in 
departmental affairs.60 They were mobilising for greater student participation in the 
administration of the faculty and for the teaching of subjects that matched their 
political concerns, such as the economics of war and imperialism.
When in 1967 the “Free University Movement” reached Michigan the radicals 
organized a seminar on Modern Political Economy. In these meetings they drew a 
plan of future activity: “exploring new issues, ideas and approaches to economic 
problems and related social issues”; of the new issues “Imperialism and Foreign 
Economic Policy of the United States” , “National Planning in the United States”, 
“Contemporary political economy” and “Centralization versus Decentralization in 
Economic and Political Affairs” were the main headings that prompted questions for
57Daniel Ronald Fusfeld was born in 1922 in Washington D.C., USA. He graduated from George 
Washington University in economics and has a PhD from Columbia University (1950). He taught at 
Hofstra College (1947-56), Michigan State University (1956-60) and from 1960 until his retirement in 
1984 at the Universty of Michigan. He authored two successful books, one in the history of economics, 
The Age of the Economist (1966) running into seven editions; and a textbook, Economics (1972) with  
five editions. His major research work was The Political Economy of the Urban Guetto (1984).
58Some older Michigan faculty would in fact join the younger radicals in their interest for radical 
scholarship and participating in radical activities, Fusfeld and Locke Anderson created a course on 
Marxian and Neo-Marxian Economics in 1970 - Economics 558 (Brazer (1982), p. 251).
59Armor et al (1967), p. 172.
60Interview with Michael Zweig, 2003. Brazer (1982), p. 251.
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further research.61 Although Frederic S. Lee’s history of the emergence of radical 
economics seems to suggest that the 1967 meetings were occasion to debate a new 
approach to economics,62 no such positive program was put forward. The young 
radicals were merely listing the subjects they deemed the academic profession had 
failed to address.
By 1967 the fostering of bonds between radicals along professional lines was well 
established within SDS. In the late 1960s, some of SDS’s seminal and more 
intellectually oriented members had become marginalised from the student 
movement, from its progressively more violent tactics, and appeal to the irrational.63 
The so-called “old-guard” of SDS looked for means to remain politically active in a 
new environment, no longer as students but as professionals and academics. The New 
University Conference was created in 1967 with that goal in mind and amongst its 
members were some of the future founders of URPE.64 The New University 
Conference program was to:
1. Organize local chapters across the nation to help overcome the 
isolation and impotence now afflicting campus-based radicals [and] 
to: define their political roles on and off campus; engage in mutual 
support and self-criticism concerning teaching and intellectual 
activity; create centers for radical initiative on the campus.
2. Encourage the formation of radical caucuses within professional 
disciplines and associations.
3. Organize so that we may eventually be prepared to defend campus 
radicals against politically motivated harassment and firings.
4. Aid in establishing a new magazine of analysis and research for the 
movement.
5. Form alliances with student activists seeking to expose and dislocate 
university collaboration in war research and social manipulation, and 
join with black and white radicals who are demanding that the
61Wachtel and Vanderslice (1973), pp. 14-15.
62Lee (2004a), p. 187.
630 n  this connection no one more vocal then Harvard’s Todd Gitlin, see Gitlin (1987)(Personal 
Communication John McDermott, 12 September 2005).
64 Lee suggests that the link between radical economics and SDS was the Michigan run Radical 
Education Project beginning in 1965 (Lee (2004a), pp. 184, 187). However, over my interview work I 
have been able to corroborate this claim (interview with Barry Bluestone, Michael Zweig, 2003).
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universities become responsible to the needs of the black 
communities which surround them and from which they now seek 
protection, not insight.65
As in the history of student radicalism, 1968 was a crucial year for the history of 
radical economics. Economics students were amongst the youth at Chicago in August 
1968, and they were convinced by the year’s events that new forms of action were 
warranted.66 It was with the backdrop of a year of increasing confrontation that a 
group of a dozen students of economics met in Ann Arbor in September 1968 on 
returning from the Chicago Convention. In near conclusion of their degrees or about 
to take their first academic jobs, they met with the goal of creating some institutional 
arrangement that would allow them to keep in contact and continue work on the 
economics of their radical subjects.
The group meeting in Ann Arbor in September 1968 decided that an organization 
of radical economists should be formed. They were reacting to the much feared 
prospect of their dispersion: “If we remain scattered throughout the country it will be 
difficult to avoid the “creeping socialization” of the university or government office. 
Money for research and jobs is plentiful for those activities that support the status 
quo. Our task as an organization, is to provide a strong counter-weight to the 
pressures of society.”67 There was, in the decision to create a Union, a departure from 
the organizational plans voiced at the February 1967 Free University meetings. Then, 
opinions had been divided between pursuing “the traditional academic roles of 
teaching and research” or “dedicate ourselves to political organizing?”68 and their 
proposed tactic had been to “find an amenable economics department and locate 
ourselves in it”.69 By late 1968 these economics radicals were firmly set on an 
academic career and saw as unlikely the prospect of finding a single department to 
base themselves.
The label given to their organization, Union for Radical Political Economics, was
65Sale (1974), pp. 412-3.
66Interview with Laurie Nisonoff, 2003.
67URPE Secretariat (1969), p. 174.
68Wachtel and Vanderslice (1973), p. 16.
69Ibid., p. 15.
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the subject of some reflection. “Union” was preferred over “Association” since it 
reflected the basic objective of the group, to “unite” like-minded radicals. It was felt 
that the Union should be “political.” The apolitical character of the economics 
profession was at the core of radicals’ critique in 1968, they argued that the 
profession was politically disengaged and silent over the urgent social concerns of the 
time. “Political Economics” was clearly preferred over “political economy.” Political 
economy recalled David Ricardo and Karl Marx and an older sort of economics, also 
at this time, no radical felt strongly identified with Marxism and that label might be 
open to this mistaken interpretation. It was further felt that it should be a union “for 
radical economics” and not a union “of radical economists,” since from its inception it 
was desired that URPE welcome activist oriented individuals with an interest in 
economics.70
The label, Radical Political Economics, as the above comments make clear, was 
carefully carved out to be distinct from political economy of the Marxist or 
neoclassical type. But there wasn’t at the time any assurance that such a proposal 
would attract a following. URPE’s future was uncertain. Was it to be a mere liaison 
group? Or was it to function as an independent professional organization? URPE’s 
fortune was clarified later in 1968 and once again in close relation to the August 
events in Chicago.
The Chicago “police riot” divided the nation, on one side those supportive of the 
police response, on the other denunciation.71 The same divisions were evident in the 
economics profession. The American Economic Association (AEA) had planned to 
hold its annual meeting in Chicago in December 1968, and President-elect Kenneth 
Boulding72 was faced with demands by many AEA members to move the meetings 
away from the city as a symbolical gesture of condemnation for the police brutality.
70 Interview with Barry Bluestone; Arthur MacEwan, 2003.
71 Even within the Democratic Party, Farber (1988), p. 205.
72 Boulding was a renowned pacifist (religiously a Quaker) and was director at the University of 
Michigan of the Center for Conflict Resolution. “’My own first reaction after watching the police 
action in Chicago on television,’ he [Boulding] confesses, ‘was to mail my presidential address rather 
than go to Chicago.’ On further reflection, however, Boulding decided that a meeting in Chicago would 
provide an ideal forum for the economics profession to discuss the problems that infect U.S. society 
and seem to be impelling it increasingly toward violent conflicts.” (Business Week (1969), p. 80).
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Wrestling with the financial consequences of a change of venue, Boulding decided to 
keep the meetings in Chicago but added “that the decision to hold the meeting in 
Chicago in no way constitutes an endorsement, explicit or implicit, of last summer’s 
actions by the city of Chicago, its officials, or the demonstrators.”73
The AEA meetings besides hosting a number of scholarly sessions, played (and 
play to this day) a crucial role as a market for jobs where graduate students and 
hiring universities met. In December 1968, at the same time as the official Chicago 
meeting of the AEA, an alternative gathering took place in Philadelphia. The 
meeting called the Grey Market, was organized by Professor Lawrence R. Klein and 
Donald W. Katzner from the University of Pennsylvania74: “we are offering an 
alternative that simultaneously permits economists to boycott Chicago without 
disrupting the traditional market for new placements.”75 To assure a job market 
outside Chicago was the prime concern of the Grey Market.
The Grey Market was held at the Sheraton Hotel in Philadelphia from the 19th to 
the 21st of December. Besides the job market there were also two sessions on Friday 
20th with papers by graduate students. There were about 400 persons in attendance 
and over 100 institutions registered with about 250 jobs on offer and 357 jobs 
applicants listed.76 The meeting was deemed a success by the organizers: “Last 
December’s Grey Market turned out to be so successful that we are considering a 
suggestion to the American Economic Association that the annual' slave market for 
economists be separated from the traditional convention.”77
73 However the voices of discontentment did lead the Executive Committee of the AEA to poll its 
members concerning the 1972 meeting of the Association, also planned for Chicago. Of the pool 3498 
voted for a change in location, 2911 voted to hold the meeting in Chicago (American Economic Review  
(1969a)).
It should also be noted that the AEA held its annual convention under the auspices of the Allied Social 
Science Associations, and while it refused to change venue, other smaller organizations of economists 
did not follow its decision. Notably, the Econometric society held its annual meeting in Evanston, 
Illinois, just outside Chicago.
74My account of the Grey Market is based on materials from Professor Katzner’s personal archives 
which he kindly made available to me.
75“An alternative to Chicago” , November 12, 1968, by Donald W. Katzner and Lawrence R. Klein. 
Donald W. Katzner personal files.
76The universities that joined included University of Pennsylvania, University of Michigan, Harvard 
University, M.I.T. and Stanford University.
77Letter from Lawrence R. Klein and Donald W. Katzner to “Participants in the Grey Market” , 
January 15, 1969. Donald W. Katzner personal files.
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URPE joined the Grey Market and held its own conference parallel to the 
meeting.78 This was made possible through contacts established in joint radical 
activities (at the already noted seminars of the Free University) and by similar 
professional interests. One informant recalls that the contact to secure URPE’s place 
at the Grey Market was made through Ben Harrison and Norm Glickman, both 
graduate students working at the University of Pennsylvannia on labour economics.79
The significance of the Grey Market for URPE was that it provided a unique 
opportunity for recruiting members.80 This was a protest meeting against the officials 
of the economics profession, seen as pandering to the oppressive political 
establishment. The meeting’s participants were likely to be receptive to a Union for 
radicals in economics and in fact many keenly joined URPE. Within three months of 
its creation URPE had over 300 paying members and a mailing list with over 800 
names.81 Early in 1969 and from Ann Arbour, Michigan, URPE began publishing the 
Newsletter of the Union for Radical Political Economics and the Review of Radical 
Political Economics, the former as a means to communicate to the membership the 
Union’s activities and internal debates, the latter as an outlet for Radical Political 
Economics research.
3.3.2 Defining Radical Political Economics (1969-1971)
The radicals’ first statements on their motives for creating a Union for Radical 
Political Economics and on the future of their efforts were contained in the 1968 Grey 
Market’s conference papers.82 In late 1968 the common root of the radicals’ critique 
of the profession was not the inadequacies of economic theory, but the irrelevancy of 
the subjects addressed by economists. They made note of the profession’s silences:
78 A small contingent was sent to  the official AEA Chicago meetings to advertise the recently created 
Union (Michelson (1969)). Interview with Michael Zweig, 2003.
79Interview with Barry Bluestone, 2003.
80According to Lee (2004a), p. 189, a conference was held at MIT in November 1968, prior to the 
Philadelphia meetings, which had already been a success in recruiting members for URPE.
81Bluestone (1969), p. 5.
82The publication was supervised by Barry Bluestone and Howard Wachtel, co-directors of the URPE  
Secretariat. Other members of the Secretariat participated in the editing and compilation: Barry 
Herman, Paul Gingrich, Craig Morgan, Lloyd Atkinson, Mary Huff, Larry Sawers and Virginia Morgan. 
It contained papers by Daniel R. Fusfeld, Victor Perlo, Michael Zweig, Stephan Michelson, Charles K. 
Wilber, James H. Weaver, Leroy P. Jones, Tom Standish and Rick Wolff.
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“How frequent are articles which deal with the economics of racism, poverty in the 
American economy, international imperialism, or the real economics of defense?”83 
For radicals this signified that “modern economics deceives itself when it insists it is 
value-free.”84 It is striking that radicals were willing to accept the tools of 
conventional economics, they clarified that: “This is not to say that we deny the 
value of some of the tools and concepts of modern economics, but is said to question 
the importance of the problems to which these props are applied and the uncritical 
way in which the neat tools of economics are inappropriately used.”85
In 1968 at the Grey Market conference there were some dissonant voices, 
extending the critique of the profession to an attack on the whole of economic theory. 
Michael Zweig’s “New Left Economics”86 began by noting that the critique of 
economics had as its starting point a critique of contemporary American society as 
racist and imperialist.87 It followed that standard economics was to be judged either 
useless for the construction of a decent society or, what was worse, supportive of the 
status quo.
Zweig established a correspondence between the apparatus of economic theorising 
and its political content. He argued that the fault was in marginalism:
Marginalist analysis can be pernicious as well as irrelevant. The spirit of 
marginalism is one of small adjustments on the periphery of some large 
aggregate whose fundamental and overall character is not an issue. (This 
spirit is particularly well suited to the bureaucratic mind.) But the larger 
questions are almost never asked. The spirit of marginalism is ill suited to 
radical questioning of the precepts of economic and social arrangements, 
and it is equally ill suited to deep, revolutionary change.88
83URPE Secretariat (1969), p. 173.
84 Idem.
85Idem.
86Michael Zweig was born in Detroit in 1942. He studied economics at the University of Michigan 
(BA and PhD in 1967). He joined the faculty of the State University of New York at Stony Brook in 
1967 and has taught there since. In 1999 he founded the Center for the Study of Working Class Life, of 
which he is Director. His major works are Religion and Economic Justice (1991), The Working Class 
M ajority: A m erica’s B est K ept Secret (2000).
87Zweig (1971b), p. 67. The paper had first appeared in the published Philadelphia 1968 conference 
papers, and was probably the most cited article on radicals’ early critique of the mainstream. It was 
one of the few contemporary texts included in Mermelstein (1970) which surveyed the history of radical 
critiques of economics. I cite from its reprint in July 1971 in the Review of Radical Political Economics.
88Ibid, p. 68.
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Zweig challenged economics’ alleged neutrality, he argued that “standard economics 
violates neutrality by militating against asking and answering certain radical 
questions. Economics is not, and cannot reasonably be expected to be, neutral.”89 
Although the subject of what questions economics posed was central to Zweig’s 
critique, he went further than most by arguing that questions were not being posed 
because of the theory that underlined economists’ research. For him, it was at the 
level of its theory that the economics profession’s faults lay.
The significance of Zweig’s “New Left Critique of Economics” can be gauged by 
having occasioned the first article of the Review of Radical Political Economics, 
authored by John Weeks.90 Week’s article was a response to Zweig stating what was 
probably the dominant view among radicals in 1968-69. He argued that it was 
economists themselves who were the source of conservatism and not the tools or 
theories of economic science. He argued that,
the failure of marginal analysis is that it is used by those who through 
“explaining” how the economy works, seek to justify things as they are.
. . .  It is the politics of economists, not the techniques of economists that 
makes this so. It is not because marginal analysis is reactionary that 
economics supports the status quo, it is because
economists are reactionary and choose and use their questions, tools, and 
governments accordingly.91
Weeks found that the profession gained from the existing social and economic 
order, for him “the practitioners of standard economics are part of an economic and 
social elite, and therefore can no more be expected to develop and encourage radical 
analysis than businessmen as a group can be expected to advocate workers’ control of 
production”; “they draw their wealth and influence from these social institutions” ;92 
and thus have a vested interest in maintaining them.
Both Weeks and Zweig were trying to reason what they saw as the economics 
profession unwillingness to address the pressing questions of the time, particularly
89Ibid, p. 73.
90Weeks (1971)
91Weeks (1971), p. 75, emphasis in original.
92Ibid., pp. 75-76.
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those in connection with war, imperialism and poverty. They offered contrasting 
answers to the problem, one focusing on the content of theory, the other on 
economists’ commitment to the status quo in their status as intellectual elite. 
Radicals’ critique of economics was thus, in 1969, not consensually established.
The focus of the radicals’ activities in URPE’s first years of activity, from 1969 to 
1971, was the creation of radical courses and the organization of conferences where 
they could discuss their research. The outcome of these activities was a change in the 
relationship between radicals and the mainstream of the profession. Alongside which, 
the original call for a change in the questions of economics was replaced by talk of an 
emerging radical approach to economics.
Contemporaneous with the high point of student protest, as I have noted 
previously, 1969 and 1970, and bolstered by the creation of URPE, the first radical 
courses in economics were set up. The most noteworthy of these courses was created 
at Harvard University.93 It followed earlier experiments with radical courses at 
Harvard. In the fall of 1968, students had designed the course Social Relations 148 
“Social Change in America,” and in the spring of 1969, Social Relations 149 “Radical 
Perspectives on Social Change.” The faculty dismissed the courses, “Soc Rel 148-9 is 
a disgrace to scholarship” , one professor told the New York Times.94 The social 
relations course broke new ground for similar initiatives to follow from other 
departments. Starting in the spring of 1969 “Social Sciences 125 -  The Capitalist 
System: Conflict and Power” was offered on Harvard’s General Education program. 
The course was run by twelve graduate students and young economics faculty (Arthur 
MacEwan officially as the course proprietor, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, and 
Thomas Weisskopf) sharing both the lecturing and the section meetings. The junior 
faculty radicals had demanded that the course receive economics credits; though there 
was some support from the tenured faculty, the majority opposed their proposal. The 
course was a useful focal point for radical work, for which they had no training, and
93 There were reports of other courses at Michigan and New School in NY (Newsletter (1970) and 
U RPE Collective -  New School (1971)).
94Nossiter (1969).
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for which there was no blueprint.95 The course served to draw more students into the 
radical project. According to an informant’s recollection there were about 150 
students taking the course, with around twelve MIT undergraduate and graduate 
students, although not all from economics.96
Significantly, beyond their curricular content, radical courses were also a stage for 
new pedagogies. The desire for social transformation and liberation was brought to 
bear on the relationships between teacher and students,97 radicals noted that: “It is 
necessary for our own liberation as well as for the student’s welfare to break down 
authoritarian relations in the classroom.”98 Grading was seen as serving the interests 
of the status quo: “The principal external consumers of the information contained in 
the grades are employers and graduate schools, who need to identify the students 
they most prefer and the ones they least prefer. Grades provide employers and 
graduate schools with a costless means of ranking students for their own purposes” ."
Alongside the emerging radical courses, the other major initiative by radicals 
during this period was the organization of regional conferences on radical subjects. 
The first was a “Middle Atlantic Conference” that took place in Washington, 
prompted by President Nixon’s inauguration on January 18th 1969.100 The morning 
sessions were devoted to critiquing Nixon’s economic program and discussing 
alternative economic development strategies. The afternoon sessions dealt with 
reformulations of economic theory. Interestingly, the final session of the meeting was 
concerned with the role of political economists. Opinions were divided between those 
that thought that the focus should be on research (developing a new approach to 
economics in research oriented institutions) and those that argued that efforts should 
be concentrated on teaching (radicalising students in teaching oriented
95 A book of original and reprinted texts from Soc 125 was the immediate result of this effort, Edwards, 
Reich and Weisskopf (1972).
96Interview with Laurie Nisonoff, 2003.
97The Radicals’ focus on education led them to a study of its economics, for instance Bowles (1971) 
and notably Bowles and Gintis (1976).
98Edwards and MacEwan (1970), Ip. 361.
" ib id ., p. 362. As an alternative to grades the Harvard Soc 125 staff would write evaluations of 
students’ work and meet with them to discuss their progress.
100Lee notes over six conferences that year, held at American University, MIT, University of California 
at Berkeley, University of Michigan and Oberlin College ((2004a), p. 190).
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institutions).101
In 1969 there were two URPE chapters in the Boston area, one at Harvard and 
the other encompassing MIT and the other campuses. The two chapters ran a 
conference at the MIT Student Centre on the 1st and 2nd of November, entitled the 
“New England Regional Conference”. The major theme of the conference was “the 
construction of an alternative paradigm.”102 The main speaker was Paul M. 
Sweezy,103 and he suggested that Marxism could provide the necessary theoretical 
alternative to orthodox economics. He contrasted Marxist theories of imperialism 
with the mainstream’s inability to explain the growing gap between rich and poor. 
Sweezy also emphasized the need to think beyond a critique of orthodox economics: 
“We must all pass through a stage of ridding ourselves of the brainwashing we have 
received in graduate schools, but new theoretical research must free itself from the 
framework of traditional economics to construct the convincing alternative which is 
essential to the success of any radical movement.”104 The other session of the 
conference that was reported in some detail in URPE’s Newsletter was devoted to 
imperialism, chaired by Arthur MacEwan with Harry Magdoff, Michael Tanzer, 
Stephen Hymer, Stephen Resnick and David Schecter.105
In the summer of 1969, from August 24th to 31st in Charlevoix, Michigan, began
101 Weaver (1969a), p. 4. In the following years radicals would take up jobs in liberal arts colleges or 
non-research oriented institutions where they would have greater freedom to design courses and work 
closely with students even if at the cost of doing research (interview with Arthur MacEwan, 2003).
102 N ewsletter (1969a), p. 1.
103Paul Marlor Sweezy (1910-2004) studied economics at Harvard (BA in 1932, PhD in 1937). He 
taught at Harvard from 1938 to 1942. In this period he wrote two famous articles, “Expectations 
and the Scope of Economics” in the Review of Economic Studies (June, 1938) and “Demand Under 
Conditions of Oligopoly” in the Journal of Political Economy (August, 1939). On his return from 
military service in the Second World War, Sweezy abandoned his academic career. He founded with  
Leo Huberman in 1949 the Monthly Review  -  An Independent Socialist Magazine. He was famously 
imprisoned in the late 1950s for refusing to collaborate with the McCarthy “witch-hunts.” His major 
works were The Theory of Capitalist Development: Principles of Marxian Political Economy (1942); 
Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order (with Paul Baran, 1966) 
and On the Transition to Socialism  (with Charles Bettelheim, 1971).
104N ewsletter (1969a ), p. 2. The paper was of some significance, it was published in the Monthly 
Review  in January 1970 and in the 1970 spring issue of the RRPE, finally it was republished in the 
very important July 1971 R R P E  issue, Sweezy (1971).
105The presence in the “New England” conference of the two editors of the Monthly Review (MR),  
Paul Sweezy and Harry Magdoff, did not indicate an endorsement of the MR  brand of Marxism. There 
was deep admiration for M R ’s combativeness in particular during the academic repression of the late 
1950s. However, there were no close intellectual ties between MR  and the radicals. Although some 
radicals published in the MR, there was never extensive collaboration or explicit endorsement of the 
MR-line (interview with Arthur MacEwan, Richard Wolff, 2003).
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an URPE tradition, its Summer Conference.106 The decision to meet in the summer 
had been made in December 1968 at the Grey Market. The Summer Conference was 
devised as the great annual event of the organization, the occasion for all members to 
meet and discuss economic theory and political practice. On the intellectual level the 
conference was not a success with new members feeling that they had not been 
adequately introduced to radical economics,107 but on the personal and social levels it 
fulfilled the expectations. URPErs brought their families to the conference and some 
of the time was spent in parties and other recreational activities, such as playing 
music. Radicals still recall the early Summer Conferences with great fondness.108 The 
Summer Conference shows that URPErs were bound not only by similar intellectual 
interests but also by ties of friendship and cultural affinity, bonds of identity that 
predated any clearly drawn intellectual program.109
Out of this flurry of activity it is apparent that talk of an alternative approach to 
economics began to take hold of the radical group. Radicals were moving from a 
critique of economics’s defective choice of subjects, ignoring the real social concerns of 
the age, to a critique of the content of economic theory. At the 1969 AEA meetings, 
the Harvard radicals introduced their Soc 125 course as the beginning of a new 
approach to economics.110 The Harvard radicals dismissed the traditional curriculum: 
“Our effort to develop a new curriculum is motivated by the conviction that the 
orthodox approach to economics cannot deal with the important problems of modern 
society. . . .  The marginalist approach is useful only if, accepting the basic 
institutions of capitalism, one is primarily concerned with its administration.”111 At 
the close of 1969 radicals were identifying structural faults in economics and stating
the need for an alternative.
106The URPE summer conferences are held to this day, always at a location that permits a mix of 
recreation, theoretical and political debate. Their role in the history of radical economics was significant 
primarily for the later years of the group, which I will discuss in the next chapter.
107Hinckley (1969).
108Interview with Jim Crotty; Laurie Nisonoff, 2003.
109Music was a crucial element in the sixties culture of protest, in particular in the folk genre, Denisoff
(1970).
110Edwards and MacEwan (1970). It was followed by a discussion with Paul M. Sweezy, Phillip 
Saunders, and John R. Coleman. In a similar introductory mode Zweig (1972) presented a principles 
course in economics integrating radical and conventional analysis.
111 Edwards and MacEwan (1970), p. 352.
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In a July 1971 issue of the RRPE , entitled “On Radical Paradigms in 
Economics,” the design of an alternative approach gave way to the design of an 
alternative paradigm. The introductory paper of the volume by Gerald E. Peabody 
surveyed Thomas S. Kuhn’s work on the history and philosophy of science. In Kuhn’s 
conceptual framework the history of scientific disciplines was a history of paradigms, 
model ways of solving problems. Peabody noted that: “Each paradigm in succession 
allows an account of a wider range of natural phenomena or an account of previously 
recognized phenomena with greater precision.”112 The goal of the special issue was to 
“call for such a revolution in the paradigm that provides the world view for current 
economic thought” .113 While an “alternative approach” need not displace the 
orthodox approach, when radicals named their critique an “alternative paradigm” , 
they began to envisage the displacing of orthodox economic theory.
The special issue of the RRPE  explored the definition of an alternative (radical) 
paradigm for economics. The major elements of the debate were economics’ input to 
a progressive change in American society and the interplay between power (in society, 
in the profession) and ideas. It called for radicals to show the weaknesses of standard 
economics and provide a solution to transcend its shortcomings. This was very far 
from URPE’s seminal 1968 prospectus that aimed its critique at the profession’s 
silence on the problems of American society but still accepted the tools of economics.
In the RRPE  special issue the radical paradigm was named a “paradigm of 
conflict” :
A paradigm of conflict asserts that for each conflict there is a grouping of 
the members of society into a small number of classes. The class position 
of an individual is determined by some objectively verifiable relation to 
the issue of conflict, although the individual need not himself be aware, or 
conscious, of his class status. A society is characterized by the conflicts it 
contains, and consequently by the class structures associated with these 
conflicts114
While acknowledging that Marxism was the best know elaboration of this paradigm,
112Peabody (1971), p. 1.
113Ibid, p. 1.
114Zweig (1971a), pp. 48-49.
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Zweig argued it was not the sole one:
Radical political economy based on a paradigm of conflict need not be 
Marxist in its analysis of the source of conflict. For Marxists the conflict is 
ultimately rooted in a labor theory of value. Such a theory of value gives 
rise to concepts of exploitation, surplus value, and other substantial and 
irreconcilable (under capitalism) characteristics of antagonistic class 
relations fundamental to Marx. Those who reject the labor theory of value 
see other roots of conflict endemic to capitalism.115
At the forefront of the radicals’ criticism, marginalism was replaced by the 
concepts of “harmony” and “equilibrium” to describe bourgeois economics’ 
structuring principles.116 Zweig portrayed economics as informing people’s views of 
the world, as an ideology, that precluded people’s revolutionary action. He argued 
that:' “To bourgeois economists, such non-marginal, systemic attacks are irrational 
and uncomprehensible in economic terms. They have no intellectual or formal 
analytic tools to deal with such behavior.”117
The interplay of “knowledge” and “life” was crucial for the radicals’ new critique. 
For radicals “knowing” had become associated to the aims of prediction and control, 
that in economics had become known as “positive economics” (Milton Friedman is 
referred to as the “archetypical social scientist”118):
The kind of society that comes to be viewed as good, perhaps even as 
natural or real, is an orderly and predictable and controllable society.
Getting to work on time every day, functioning smoothly as part of an 
administrative structure, showing proper respect for expertise -  all 
become types of behavior that are necessary to be a successful part of 
society. The way to live is to be machine-like. Ergo, the best society 
would be like a machine.119
U5Ibid., p. 50.
116The term “bourgeois” took the place of the more commonly used terms of “conventional,” “stan­
dard,” “orthodox,” “contemporary,” denoted Zweig’s belief that “‘conventional’ economics is rooted 
in bourgeois ideology, and deserves an adjective which reflects that fact. One point of this paper is 
the demonstration of these roots and a challenge to the notion that economics is value-free” (Zweig 
(1971a), p. 43).
U7Zweig (1971a), p. 45.
118Behr et al (1971), p. 18.
n 9 Ibid., p. 22.
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Detachment was not to be desirable, to be objective was seen as doing violence to the 
researcher, since
In choosing to be a scientist and to participate in this interaction as 
observer, the would-be scientist must decide whether she can accept the 
bounds to be placed on her experience, spending most of her working life 
in the role of objective, rational woman, alienated by the scientific mode 
of inquiry from being able to experience the observed, the Out-There, in 
more meaningful ways.120
Radicals called for empathy with society and its ills. Society should be experienced 
subjectively if it was to be experienced at all.
To join “life” and to create a new kind of knowledge the radical paradigm also 
inscribed a radical ethics prescribing “living a radical political economics.”121 In this 
ethics for radical economists, the connection with students was highlighted: “Students 
in colleges and universities today are the mind-workers, the human capital, the 
technocrats, the “new working class” of tomorrow. Our capacity to create a radical 
consciousness in large numbers of students is essential to the future success of 
revolutionary change in this country.”122 Radical economists should assist the 
intellectual and political development of students. Equally important was a plan to 
reshape the University, to free it from oppression and commit it to liberation:
all authoritarian institutions must be eliminated from the classroom, 
starting with grades. As long as the teacher retains the power to give 
grades, there can be no equality in relating to students. All 
decision-making in the classroom must be put on a democratic basis, and 
we must look into ourselves and work to eliminate our own authoritarian 
and elitist attitudes.123
They proposed to limit lectures and written materials and to privilege direct contact 
with students. These proposals reflected work already done by radicals over the 
previous two years, namely with the radical courses coupled with attempts at
reforming student assessments.
120Ibid., p. 25.
121 Ibid., p. 39.
122Ibid., p. 35.
123Ibid., p. 36.
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The radical ethics warned against the confinement of radicals to the campuses. 
Radicals should seek to link themselves to political groups, to engage in organizing in 
their communities, “to find out what the basic problems are with which they are 
dealing, and then organize and participate in research projects designed to provide 
information and analysis needed in the community organizing campaign”.124 In their 
radical ethics, the political economists should not seek to control the movement by 
appeal to their expertise. Instead the ultimate goal was to learn how to serve the 
movement. They argued that “Unless we are involved in a political movement 
engaged in the struggle for social change, and therefore know the needs of that 
movement, see strategies succeed and fail, see analyses proved correct and incorrect, 
we are almost certain to be irrelevant to struggles going on.”125
Radicals rejected objectivity. Their notion of objective was the objectification of 
subjects in accord with the interests of the status quo, necessary for maintaining a 
“machine-like” social system. To recover subjectivity, “life” alongside “knowledge”, 
the radical had to break with the established norms of academe. The power structure 
of the classroom had to be abolished, and the radical had to move closer, as a 
participant-observer, to political movements. Radical economics was thus defined as 
knowledge with the purpose “of being destructive, non conservative, of the existing 
social order”126 of assisting revolution.127
Much had changed from the 1968 conference papers to the 1971 special issue of 
the RRPE. Radical Political Economics was presented in 1971 as a paradigm, and 
consequently as an alternative to the prevailing economic theory. Parallel to this 
development was the belief that the behaviour of the profession was structurally 
bound with its paradigm, they were one and the same, scientific framework and 
politics overlapping. Even those that earlier held a dissociation between the politics 
of economics (the theory) and the politics of economists (the profession), came to the
view that conventional economics should be discarded for a radical alternative. Weeks
124Ibid., p. 36.
125Ibid., p. 37.
126Ibid., p. 30.
127Zweig (1971c), p. 84.
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in 1972 recanted his earlier views:
He [Zweig] is absolutely correct in saying that my analysis took appallingly 
little account of the role of capitalist institutions in conditioning our 
thoughts, as well as controlling our lives. The adequate understanding of 
these institutions is something which my formal training insured I would 
not learn, and while I feel I have liberated my thinking a bit, I have no 
pretentions to adequate understanding. It is clear that Mike has gone 
much further than I, and I have much to learn from him and others.128
3.3.3 Responses to the radical challenge
Radicals were fashioning themselves as challengers of the status quo. This is evident 
in the growing talk of a “new approach to economics” and later of an “alternative 
paradigm.” A divide was deepening between the young radical academics and the 
profession’s elders. It was fed by changes in the faculty’s attitudes toward student 
protest circa 1968-69, and by radicals enthusiasm in face of growing unrest. The 
campus unrest transformed faculty sympathy to disgust,129 while convincing radicals 
of the possibility of change to academia and larger society. Feeling the support of the 
campuses in uproar, the URPE radicals began to think about confronting their 
profession, notably at the AEA annual meetings.
Radicals argued that the AEA should be challenged for its silence over the 
war,130 the profession’s racism and sexism, and the elitist way in which the job 
market was organized. In the fall of 1969, following the November New England 
Conference, URPE’s Newsletter carried an item entitled “Confronting the AEA.” It 
began provocatively: “Should URPE demand ten million dollars in reparations from 
the AEA for the brainwashing its members have received at the hands of the
128Weeks (1972), p. 121.
129Caute (1988), p. 334. For instance, at Harvard University, conflict escalated in April 1969 when 
students seized the University Hall and were ultimately expelled by police intervention, this had until 
then been a peaceful campus. The conflict was traumatic in deepening the divide between radicals and 
conservatives in the faculty (Eichel et al. (1970)).
130At the 1967 AEA business meeting unidentified members proposed that the Association poll its 
members concerning the war and take a position on it. The Executive Committee was charged to 
consider the proposal and concluded the following year that the AEA should “reaffirm strongly the 
wisdom of the founders of the Association in . . .  prohibiting the Association as such from taking an 
official stand or committing its members to any position on economic questions” (American Economic 
Review  (1969b), p. 575).
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profession?”131 URPE planned to hold parallel sessions to the AEA meetings and 
added: “All members of URPE should come to New York prepared to pose searching 
questions to the official speakers and discussants; a real counter-presence depends 
upon the actions of all. Come to the URPE suite throughout the convention to keep 
informed of what is happening.”132
A year before URPE had been announced at the Philadelphia Grey Market 
meeting, boycotting the official AEA Chicago meeting. In 1969 at the AEA’s 
Business meeting: “a group of approximately twenty-five members of “a group of 
radical economists” filed into the meeting room. Their spokesman, Harvard’s Arthur 
MacEwan, demanded, on behalf of the group, that he be permitted to present a 
statement to the meeting.”133 The statement read:
Economists in the United States work as a group and work contrary to the 
interests of the masses of people. The affluence and the power of the 
economists derive from their support of the elite, the elite which controls 
the institutional structure and the sources of power that perpetrate and 
reproduce the oppression of millions -  the economists are the sycophants 
of inequality, alienation, destruction of environment, imperialism, racism, 
and the subjugation of women.
( . . . )  economists do not merely praise the system; they also supply the 
tools -  indeed, they are the tools -  instrumental to the elite’s attainment 
of its unjust ends. They show how to manipulate people so that the 
system’s hinges are smoothly oiled.
( . . . )  the A.E.A. plays directly destructive roles in our society. It serves to 
insure the perpetuation of professionalism, elitism, and petty irrelevance.
It serves to inhibit the development of new ideas, ideas which are 
reflective of social reality.
Our conflict with the A.E.A. is not simply an intellectual debate. The 
A.E.A. cannot lessen our condemnation by their willingness to partake in 
debate, or by their willingness to provide a room to radical economists at 
this meeting. Our conflict is a basic conflict of interests. The economists 
have chosen to serve the status quo. We have chosen to fight it.134
131 Newsletter (1969b), p. 1.
132Ibid., p. 2.
133American Economic Review  (1970), p. 487.
134Ibid., pp. 488-9.
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Thus, in scandal, the radicals announced their challenge to the profession.
The protest occasioned interest in the radicals and their economics. In less than a 
year the Journal of Economic Literature had commissioned and published a survey 
on radical economics. The text authored by Martin Bronfenbrenner, was impressively 
competent in its depiction of radicals’ work. Bronfenbrenner drew upon URPE 
publications and captured many nuances that were lost to later commentators. For 
instance, he distinguished URPE economists from the Monthly Review group,135 and 
he noted radicals’ concentration in the field of economics of education.136 
Understandably, because radical economics in 1969-70 was in a process of definition, 
Bronfenbrenner did not have much to survey and he often ran into tangents in the 
history and ideology of radicalism and socialism, with little bearing on the immediate 
subject matter. The survey was not a critique of radical economics. There were 
criticisms but these were levied on particular authors and papers.137 At times, 
Bronfenbrenner was also unashamedly complimentary: “Like too few of the rest of us, 
radical economists take their teaching seriously.”138
Bronfenbrenner’s conclusions in 1970 reflected the hallmark of later responses to 
radical economics. Firstly, that “Radical economics should be recognized as a 
legitimate field of concentration in the study and practice of economics.”139 Secondly, 
that the profession “require, and should continue to require, exposure of radical 
economists to orthodoxy”.140 The author expected that “the rise (or revival) of 
radical economics in America has far to go before it recedes” and he argued that this 
growth should occur within the profession and without antagonisms.
Radicals from 1969 kept a presence at the AEA meetings.141 They were present 
in 1970142 but what is worthy of note is their participation in the 1971 meetings. The
135Bronfenbrenner (1970), p. 758.
136Ibid., p. 755.
137Ibid., pp. 763-764.
138Ibid., p. 757. Bronfenbrenner was perhaps unique in being simultaneously a member of URPE  
and of the right-liberal Mount Pelerin Society.
139Ibid., p. 765.
140Idem.
141 In 1969 radicals organized a session on the “Economics of Imperialism” with papers by Richard D. 
Wolff, Theotonio dos Santos, Harry Magdoff, and with discussants Stephen Hymer, Victor Perlo and 
Arthur MacEwan. The session was published in the meetings’ Papers and Proceedings.
142Notably Gintis (1971) and Gurley (1971), of which more will be said later.
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President-elect of the AEA for 1971 was John Kenneth Galbraith, a noted critic of 
mainstream economic theory.143 Galbraith’s programme for the meetings showcased 
radicals’ work. There were sessions on the “Military-Industrial Complex,” “Some 
contradictions of Capitalism,” papers on “taxation of the rich,” radical education and 
the political economy of women. The 1971 Richard T. Ely lecture was delivered by 
the critic of American economics, Joan Violet Robinson144 and Galbraith gave a 
special luncheon in honour of Gunnar Myrdal, an author renown for his analysis of 
race relations in America and the role of ideology in economic theory. At the business 
meeting under Galbraith’s chairmanship, a group of women (including several URPE 
radicals)145 motioned the AEA with the accusation of making economics “a man’s 
field” and called for greater equality in training and hiring of women economists. It 
was proposed that a Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession 
(CSWEP) be created to investigate the extent of gender discrimination. With 
Galbraith’s support the motion was passed and the committee set up.146 In 
Galbraith’s Presidential Address, delivered in 1972,147 he gave pride of place to the 
radicals, “the main problem with orthodox economic ideas -  which Galbraith asserted 
were under attack from a ‘new and notably articulate generation of economists’ -  is 
the separation of power from its subject.”148 “In a press conference, [Galbraith] 
encouraged so-called non-establishment economists to ‘get their ideas met by making 
their demands painful’.”149
It is clear that Galbraith was sympathetic to the radical cause, and he should not
143John Kenneth Galbraith was born in 1908 in Iona Station, Canada. He received a B.Sc. from the 
Ontario Agricultural College (1931) and a Ph.D. in economics from University of California at Berkeley 
(1934). He taught at Berkeley and Princeton before moving to Harvard where he became a Professor 
in 1949, retiring in 1975. Galbraith was editor of Fortune magazine from 1943 to 1948 and published 
in popular periodicals such as The New York Review of Books, The New Yorker and The New York 
Times Magazine. He was an active participant in Democratic Party politics, adviser to President J.F. 
Kennedy and Ambassador to India from 1961 to 1963. Galbraith was a prolific and popular writer, 
from his many books, The Affluent Society (1958) and The New Industrial State  (1967) stand out as 
the most influential.
144In a curious intersection between the histories of the two dissenting groups, Robinson’s lecture had 
a profound impact for the history of Post Keynesian Economics.
145Interview with Laurie Nisonoff, 2003.
146In the same meeting Galbraith opposed a motion condemning the US war in Indochina, as a 
violation the Association’s Charter (American Economic Review  (1972)).
147Galbraith (1973).
148Jones (1972).
149Harbron (1972).
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be taken as representative of the profession at large.150 Therefore, the radicals’ 
prominence at the 1971 meetings should not be taken as the profession’s endorsement 
of radicals and their critique. Rather, the significance of the 1971 meeting was that 
Galbraith offered the radicals a platform that ensured the remainder of the profession 
would hear their challenge, take it seriously and respond.
Interestingly, the most explicit response to the economics of the radical left was 
authored by a visiting Swedish economist, Assar Lindbeck. In his 1969-70 visit to the 
US, Lindbeck had been impressed by the economic arguments of the New Left . 
students. In a book entitled The Political Economy of the New Left: An outsider’s 
view, he looked to outline the content of New Left economics and to show its 
shortcomings from the neutral position of a non-American. Lindbeck was not clear 
about his sources, he seldom made references, but in his introduction he noted three 
compilations of New Left texts. Only one of these contained any texts by URPErs, 
notably Zweig’s “New Left critique of Economics” , it is thus not surprising that 
Lindbeck only partially debated radical economics. That the book should not be seen 
as a response to radical economics was noted by Paul A. Samuelson in the book’s 
foreword and by at least one of the book’s reviewers.151 Nonetheless in a section 
titled “New Left’s Critique of ‘Traditional’ Economics” Lindbeck’s comments do 
touch some of the radicals’ (Zweig’s) critical claims. He correctly noted the radicals’ 
critique of marginalism and the profession’s alleged neglect of the “interaction 
between economic and political factors.”152 Lindbeck in a style characteristic of his 
“outsider stance” both accepted and rejected the criticism. He adjudicated that not 
enough work had been done on important social ills (prominently racism, poverty and 
war) the source of the New Left’s concerns, though Lindbeck then added that 
economists were beginning to address these subjects.153 He also denied the radicals’ 
claims by arguing that much of economics research was already relevant to address
150In fact some AEA members were angered by his handling of the 1971 meetings, Arthur Okun 
bolted: “It was the worst thing I ever saw.” (Collier (1973)).
151Samuelson (1971), p. xvi; Heilbroner (1972), ft. 1.
152Lindbeck (1971), p. 17.
153Ibid., pp. 23, 25.
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those problems but was merely not being adequately translated to the public.154
For Lindbeck, the radicals’ critique was grounded on two misunderstandings. 
Firstly, they failed to recognise that “economists are economists only and not also at 
the same time sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, philosophers, and so on 
(or social reformers or even revolutionaries).”155 Secondly that radicals 
misunderstood the distinction between positive and normative economics, Lindbeck 
illustrated:
It is, of course, possible to study the effects on prices and quantities in the 
oil industry of a tax on gasoline, regardless of our feelings about the tax or 
about the oil industry, for that matter -  an example of positive economics.
The only subjective element in positive economics is, in principle, the 
choice of topic156
According to Lindbeck, within the boundaries of positive economics, separate from 
normative economics and other social sciences, economists could produce objective, 
apolitical work.
It is striking that Lindbeck’s response to the radical critique echoed similar efforts 
by other authors. Typically the stage for these reflections were the sessions at the 
AEA annual convention. One instance of debate that I wish to single out occurred in 
a session, “The state of economics: the behavioral and social sciences survey” , devoted 
to a report on the economics profession.157 The debate over the report is worthy of 
note because it directly addressed radical economics as an approach intended to 
reform the practice of economics, as an alternative to conventional economics.
The radical commentator was John G. Gurley.158 Gurley’s main objection to the
154Ibid., p. 23.
155Ibid., p. 22.
156Ibid., p. 26.
157It was part of a series reviewing the various behavioural and social scientific disciplines and provid­
ing advice to administrators on the needs and opportunities for their development, aiming for a new 
policy for science. The reports were organized under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences 
and the Social Science Research Council (Riecken (1971), p. 43). The report is of some historical 
significance since it bore the ambitious plan of expanding doctoral programs in economics, a projected 
trebling of doctorates in ten years (Barber (1996), p. 23).
158Gurley is an interesting case of an established economist, just ending his term as editor of the 
American Economic Review, who converted to the radical cause. John G. Gurley was born in 1920. 
He studied economics at Stanford (BA in 1943, PhD in 1951). He was fellow at Brookings (1954- 
61) and taught at the University of Maryland (1953-61), in 1961 he joined Stanford University where
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report was that it had ignored radical economics. Gurley claimed that the report 
reproduced mainstream economics’ distorted conception of reality, “short on social 
relevance, precisely because its ruling paradigm -  its conceptions of the world -  
excludes power, conflict, and disruptive change within a historical setting -  that is, 
because it excludes a large part of reality.”159 For Gurley the political economist, 
unlike the conventional one, “studies economic problems within the historical context 
of ruler-subject relations, . . .  he actively takes the side of the poor and the powerless, 
and he generally sees the system of capitalism as their oppressor.”160 Gurley’s 
argument is close to the “paradigm of conflict” onto which radical economists 
converged by 1971.
Gurley concluded his attack by arguing that conventional economics’ irrelevancy 
was carried into the report, “instead of worrying so much about national data 
systems, research money from foundations and the government, computer facilities, 
and research techniques, pay more attention to the economic implications of the fact 
that the United States is heavily involved as the dominant power in a hierarchical 
international capitalist system.”161
One of Gurley’s discussants, Robert L. Heilbroner was sympathetic to what he 
interpreted as the radicals’ main goals: “to widen and deepen the range of what is 
called economic analysis.”162 Yet, despite Heilbroner’s stated sympathy towards 
radical economics, he argued that the definition of the goals of economics was not a 
task for economists: “here, fortunately, the professional competence of the economist 
comes to an end, and he can do no more than take his place within the polity, to urge 
whatever goals -  equality, freedom, growth, ecological balance and whatever -  he 
seeks for society.”163 For Heilbroner, an economist abandoned his field of professional
he remained until his retirement. Gurley was editor of the American Economic Review  from 1962 
to 1968. In the earlier part of his career Gurley wrote extensively on monetary theory, Money in a 
theory of finance (with Edward S. Shaw, 1960). After joining the radical group, he turned to research 
on comparative economic systems and the economic history of China, worthy of note is his book 
Challengers to Capitalism: Marx, Lenin and Mao (1975).
159Gurley (1971), p. 54.
160Ibid., p. 55.
161Ibid., p. 62.
162Heilbroner (1971), p. 66.
163Ibid., p. 67.
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competence once he turned to advocacy. He raised other criticisms, namely that 
radicals failed from “over-generalization,” he questioned: “Is it capitalism alone -  as 
the radical economists seem to maintain -  that is responsible for the ills of racism, 
alienation, exploitation, bureaucratic indifference, etc.?”164 Heilbroner noted the 
radicals’ lack of scientific precision, when spreading “a humanist-sounding gloss over 
areas of . . .  ignorance,”165 heading his list of radicals’ imprecise terms was “the 
people.”
Another of Gurley’s discussants, Robert M. Solow,166 was more strongly worded 
against radical economics. In Solow’s view the omission of radical economics from the 
report would only be at fault if “the body of radical political economics is so large 
and so important that it demands mention... Radical economics may conceivably be 
the wave of the future, but I do not think it is the wave of the present.”167 Solow 
went on to criticise radical economics: “I think that radical economics as it is 
practiced contains more cant, not less cant; more role-playing, not less role-playing; 
less facing of the facts, not more facing of the facts, than conventional economics.”168 
The author took issue with the radicals’ claim that they had an alternative 
paradigm: “It is more a matter of posture and rhetoric than of scientific framework at 
all” , he continued: “the function of a scientific paradigm is to provide a framework for 
‘normal science.’ But there is little evidence that radical political economics is 
capable of generating a line of normal science, or even that it wants to.”169 Solow 
listed the kind of questions that might be seen as part of the normal science activity 
of the radical economics paradigm, but which he argued radicals had failed to 
address. For instance, Solow singled out a statement by Gurley where he asserted 
that shares in national income to workers and property owners were determined by 
the relative power of the two groups, and then questioned: “Am I to presume from
164Ibid., p. 66.
165Idem.
166Robert Solow was born in Brooklyn in 1924. He earned a PhD from Harvard University in 1951. 
Solow taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) since 1950. In 1987 he received the 
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics.
167Solow (1971), p. 63.
168Ibid., p. 63.
169Ibid., p. 64.
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this that there are studies of time series that show that short-run fluctuations in 
distributive shares reflect short-run fluctuations in the distribution of power in 
society?”170 Solow dismissed the radicals’ claim of the existence of an alternative 
Kuhnian paradigm by pointing to the absence of any “normal science” activity, the 
puzzle solving Kuhn identified as the habitual activity of scientists.171
Solow stressed the need for quantitative investigation (“calculations”) and he 
found that radicals were disdainful of this sort of enquiry, he added with irony: “And 
when and if any of them [calculations that would prove the radicals’ assertions] is 
done, you know who will do it -  some poor damned graduate student in some 
conventional department, supervised by some conventional professor of conventional 
economics.”172 For Solow, scholarship was the interplay of “knowledge of technique 
and acquaintance with data”173 which he found absent from the work of the radicals.
In the early 1970s Solow took up the role of paladin for conventional economics. 
In another article entitled “Science and ideology in economics,” he responded to some 
of the radicals’ criticisms, “the questions [that] confront any teaching economist these 
days who talks to his students and reads the handwriting on the wall” .174 Solow 
accepted that new urgent subjects had emerged in the late 1960s, but he asked for 
patience towards economic science:
It takes time for middle-aged men to change their research interests and 
their teaching, and it may take even longer for them to drum up any 
interesting and useful things to say. The theoretical analysis may be 
difficult, and statistical data are rarely available about something that has 
just now reared up in public consciousness.175
Solow also accepted that economists avoided the “dangerous” questions, those that
170Idem.
171 Solow’s claim was not unreasonable, as my review of the literature on the radical paradigm attests, 
radicals preferred to present their challenge in treatises describing the distinctive features of their 
paradigm over producing exemplars of it.
172Idem.
173Ibid., p. 65.
174Solow (1970), p. 94. The article was initially intended as a response to Heilbroner (1970), an 
article in the same issue meant to reflect the radicals’ critique. However, Solow is responding to  more 
than Heilbroner’s narrower interpretation of the radical critique. It is likely that Heilbroner and Solow 
were chosen to be Gurley’s discussants because of their prior reflections in Public Interest.
175Solow (1970), pp. 95-96.
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may challenge the system. But he found two good reasons for this: most such 
subjects were outside economists’ competence, and some questions were prohibitively 
difficult to answer:
A study of “the size and distribution of the benefits of the war economy 
by socioeconomic grouping” scares me more by its impossible difficulty 
than by its possible subversiveness. I doubt that the data are available to 
do such a study with the rigor and precision that the profession now 
demands.176
Solow argued for the avoidance of the difficult subjects as a virtue. The profession’s 
demanding standards could not accept such “vague and unanswerable” explorations.
Solow defended the profession’s standards of objectivity, a frequent target for 
radicals and students. Solow accepted that despite professional standards some 
ideology crept into economists’ work,177 but also that the taint of ideology could be 
avoided if economists chose answerable questions. Characteristically, Solow did not 
reject the criticism; he sought to show how the problem could be contained:
It is a little hard to see how ideology sneaks into an attempt to discover 
how purchases of frozen orange juice respond to changes in price (even a 
socialist planning board might want to know that), or -  to take something 
more specifically capitalist -  how the plant and equipment spending of 
corporations is related to their sales and profits, interest rates, stock 
prices, taxes and other things.178
It was possible “to make social science as nearly value-free as it is possible to be”179 
by fostering professional criticism. Radicals were thus invited to participate in the 
professional community by respecting its rules, the profession’s “standards of rigor, 
precision, and reliance on systematic observation interpreted by theory” . They should 
abandon their “looser kind of discourse in which propositions are not supposed to be 
tested or testable, and it is never clear what kind of observation would definitely
mark a hypothesis as false.”180
176Ibid., p. 98.
177Ibid„ p. 99.
178Ibid., p. 100.
179Ibid., p. 101.
180Ibid., p. 102..
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There were further exchanges between radicals and conventional economists at 
the AEA meetings, but these did not yield such wholesale assessments as the ones 
just reported. One such instance, occurred at the 1971 AEA meetings in a session on 
“Taxation of the Poor and the Rich.” The primary piece of the session was by radical 
David M. Gordon181 and in it he critiqued traditional tax incidence theory.182 
Gordon began by dismissing the possibility of major changes in the distribution of 
income under capitalism, but nonetheless he designed a program for the elimination 
of inequality.183 The goal was to produce changes through time as measured by Gini 
coefficients, and he further calculated the needed yearly change in the coefficient for 
the elimination of inequality over a period of 25 years.
Commenting on Gordon’s proposal were Robert J. Lampman and Henry J.
Aaron. Their assessments were akin. It was felt that Gordon’s paper was marred “by 
a tendency, common, I regret to say, in work of radical economists, to substitute 
exegesis for analysis.”184 The critics found radical economics lacking both in its 
analysis of the role of taxation in the capitalist system, but also and principally in its 
design of policy. They felt Gordon had not done enough work on the means to 
achieve his policy goal, which made the whole proposal objectionable:
I cannot agree with his implication that the goal should be pursued 
without regard to its cost. I gather that radical economics identify 
elimination of inequality as a prime goal. But, at the risk of being terribly 
irrelevant, I suggest that it is reasonable to ask what headlong pursuit of 
that goal may cost or gain us in terms of other goals. Further, I would like 
to know what policies would have the greatest cost-effectiveness.185
Gordon’s critics were calling for more detailed calculations of the radical proposals.
181 David M. Gordon (1944-1996) was born into a family of economists, his father a famous macroe­
conomist and once President of the AEA, his mother well-known for her contributions in economics of 
employment and welfare. He received his training at Harvard University (BA in 1965, PhD in 1971). 
He was a researcher at the NBER until 1973 when he joined the Graduate Faculty at the New School for 
Social Research. His most famous works are Segmented Labor, Divided Workers: The Historical Trans­
form ation of Labor in the United States (with Richard Edwards and Michael Reich, 1982), Beyond 
the Waste Land: A Democratic A lternative to Economic Decline (with Samuel Bowles and Thomas E. 
Weisskopf, 1983) and A fter the Waste Land: A Democratic Economics fo r  the Year 2000  (with Samuel 
Bowles and Thomas E. Weisskopf, 1991).
182Gordon (1972), p. 322.
183Ibid., p. 325.
184Aaron (1972), p. 333.
185Lampman (1972), p. 322.
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They rejected the grand systemic questions posed by the radicals over what they saw 
as the empirics of precise, quantitative details.
The self-appointed spokespersons for the “conventional theory” that radicals had 
attacked responded to the criticism by first denying the existence of competing 
paradigms, and secondly by reaffirming economic science’s objectivity in its 
independence from ideology. In their response the relevance of economic science lay in 
its patient and precise “calculations,” in its modest and contained questioning. Both 
for the radical critics as for those defending traditional economics this was a debate 
over the boundaries of economic science, of its place in reference to such entities as 
politics and objectivity.
3.4 T he resolution o f the radical challenge
Allies are indispensable players in scientific disputes. As Radicals distanced 
themselves from the remainder of the profession, making the profession into the 
enemy, they adopted the “movement” as their ally. Primary to this liaison with the 
political left movements were the students. Through curriculum and grading reforms, 
through outspoken advocacy for social revolution in the classrooms, the radicals 
sought to enlist the support of their activist students. This was not a surprising 
choice of ally, the students since 1969 had assisted the radicals’ setting up of the first 
radical courses. The student protests had never been as widespread as in May 1970, 
when the radicals were writing their challenge into paradigmatic form.
The mainstream on the other hand was primarily accommodating and reassuring. 
The mainstream sought to contain public controversy and to impose the conventional 
mode of debate in the profession, formally immune to political partisanship. This 
defence of economics appealed to those who required reassurance on the profession’s 
objectivity credentials.
The focus of this section is to show how decisive the allies were in settling the 
dispute. After 1971 there was a rapid decline of student protest. It shows that despite 
the radicals’ failure to supplant the mainstream of the profession, which may be
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deemed a mark of defeat, the record was puzzlingly mixed, and the radicals were not 
without their victories.
3.4.1 Rejecting the radicals
Early in the 1970s there were signs that radical economics was successfully effecting 
change in the economics profession. Paul A. Samuelson, one of the most prominent 
figures of post World War II economics and author of the textbook that dominated 
the teaching of economics for over four decades, felt in the early 1970s that he should 
change his portrayal of Marx. Arjo Klamer noted in his comparative study of the 
editions of Samuelson’s Economics, that in the 7th edition of 1967, Marx was 
mentioned briefly in a short historical summary in the introduction:
Thus almost as halfway point [in the history of economics], there appeared
the massive critique of capitalism by Karl Marx A billion people,
one-third of the world’s population, blindly regard Das Kapital as 
economic gospel. And yet, without disciplined study of economic science, 
how can anyone form a reasoned opinion about the merits or lack of 
merits in the classical, traditional economics?186
In the 9th edition of 1973, a chapter on the history of thought had been added 
(“Winds of Change: Evolution of Economic Doctrines”) where greater attention was 
devoted to Marxism.187 And in a rewritten introduction, a new statement on Marx 
was added:
It is a scandal that, until recently, economics majors in economics [sic] 
were taught nothing of Karl Marx except that he was an unsound fellow.
. . .  In this edition I have tried to treat Karl Marx as neither God nor 
Devil -  but as a secular scholar whom half the world’s population deem 
important. The rudiments of mature Marxism, as well as the insights of 
the resurrected young Marx, are newly discussed in this revision.188
The change in Samuelson’s Economics did not go unnoticed by contemporaries. They 
were surprised by Samuelson’s new assessment of Marxism: “Marxism may be too
186Cited in Klamer (1990), p. 150.
187Ibid., p. 143.
188Cited in Klamer (1990), p. 150.
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valuable to leave to the Marxists. It provides a critical prism through which 
mainstream economists can -  to their own benefit -  pass their analyses for audit.”189 
It was remarked that Samuelson had broadened the scope of economic inquiry to 
“questions that border upon such related disciplines as sociology, anthropology, 
political science, psychology and history.”190
Samuelson’s revised textbook bore the imprint of the radical critique. The radical 
critique was also reflected in the syllabus of the “economics principles” courses. For 
instance at Columbia University in addition to Samuelson’s textbook, teachers were 
reported to have used David Mermelstein’s collection of radical texts, with writings 
from such diverse authors as Paul Sweezy, Paul Baran, Ernest Mandel, Herbert 
Marcuse, Karl Marx, Galbraith and Oscar Wilde.191
It would be contentious to argue that these developments represented a major 
transformation (radicalisation) of the profession; in fact some saw it as mere 
“seasoning” of a larger banquet:
None of the senior faculty at Columbia objected to the introduction of 
radicalism into the economics curriculum. “We’re very glad to have some 
unorthodox teaching around,” said Prof. Harold Barger. “Suitable 
seasoning is very desirable. Of course, if someone told the senior faculty 
we’d have to teach nothing but Karl Marx, I think there would be a 
revolt.”192
Although the textbook and course content changes bore evidence to the 
profession’s acceptance of radical subjects, it was not the mark of wholesale or 
wholehearted approval. As young radicals began to be considered for tenure (usually 
after 7-8 years of contract) most saw it refused, while others were denied renewal of 
their contracts. The most publicised of the clashes over hiring between radicals and 
mainstream economists happened at Harvard, with Samuel Bowles as the
protagonist.193
189Cited in Brazelton (1977), p. 117.
190Brazelton (1977), p. 115.
191Mermelstein (1970). The book ran a number of editions throughout the decade, with a final third 
edition in 1976.
192Salmans (1970), p. S3-2.
193Samuel Bowles born in 1939, earned a BA from Yale Unversity and PhD from Harvard (1965). He 
was Assistant Professor at Harvard (1965-71) and Associate Professor (1971-74). From 1974 Bowles
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Bowles joined the Harvard faculty in 1965. On his arrival, Bowles did not hide his 
radical convictions; he refused to sign the State teacher’s loyalty oath and was 
threatened with dismissal.194 Bowles opposed what he saw as “an interference with 
freedom of speech” and succeeded in defeating the University authorities, remaining 
in the economics faculty. For this he benefited from “very encouraging support from 
my own department and elsewhere.”195
When Bowles was being considered for tenure at Harvard in 1972-73, he was not 
greeted with the same broad support he enjoyed on occasion of his opposition to the 
loyalty oath. He received the sponsorship of three of the best known members of the 
department: Wassily Leontief, Kenneth J. Arrow and Galbraith. “Yet despite such 
impressive backing, Bowles’ promotion was turned down by a vote of the whole senior 
faculty.”196
The head of the Harvard department, James Duesenberry, at the time defended 
the decision as follows: “We haven’t made a tenure appointment in four years . . .  
even though we have two positions open. . . .  When we make a tenure appointment, 
we are looking for the best appointment we can make from anywhere (not just from 
within the department).”197 Duesenberry accepted that the decision was tantamount 
to an assessment of radical economics: “We have people here who are claiming to have 
a substantial set of new developments. I simply have to say that, in my opinion, the 
amount of evidence they have put on the table has just not been that significant.”198 
Duesenberry voiced the standard assessment held by conventional economists. Radical
has been Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. His major works 
are Schooling in Capitalist America: educational reform and the contradictions of economic life (with 
Herb Gintis, 1976); Beyond the Waste Land: a democratic alternative to economic decline (with David 
Gordon and Thomas Weisskopf, 1983); Democracy and Capitalism: property, community, and the 
contradictions of m odem  social thought (with Herb Gintis, 1986); and Recasting Egalitarianism: new  
rules fo r  communities, states, and markets (with Herb Gintis, 1998). He is the son of Chester Bowles 
(1901-1986) former governor of Connecticut, Ambassador to India and Nepal under President Harry S. 
Truman, undersecretary of state under President Kennedy and then Ambassador to India until 1969.
194 Loyalty oaths were instituted during the 1950s witch-hunt years, as historian Helen Schrecker has 
shown “Almost every state, whether or not it investigated its universities or had them investigate 
themselves, imposed some kind of a loyalty oath on its teachers. . . .  By the late fifties, thirty-two 
states required loyalty oaths” (Schrecker (1986), p. 116).
195New York Times (1966), p. 9.
196Lifshultz (1974), p. 28. Bowles received five votes for tenure out of a 24 full professors of the 
department at the time (Kennebec Journal (1973)).
197Kennebec Journal (1973).
198 Idem.
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economics was seen as “negligible,” not to be rejected, but to be “neglected.”199 
Bowles was not the only radical at Harvard that failed to be reappointed with 
tenure. Soon after, the department decided not to reappoint Arthur MacEwan 
prompting an outcry by graduate students. But contemporaneously, the student 
protest seems to have succeeded in reversing a similar decision made on Herbert 
Gintis.200 As I have shown, Harvard was home to one of the largest groups of radical 
graduate students and young faculty. Although some students remained in the 
graduate program, the dismissals effectively dissolved the radical group.
Following the very public case of Bowles, a string of cases of non-renewal of the 
radicals’ contracts occurred in 1974: four from San Jose State University, one from 
Lehman College (CUNY) and one from the University of Massachusetts -  Boston.201 
The events at San Jose in California were particularly shocking, since it was seen as a 
centre for radical scholarship in the West Coast. The dismissals there came from an 
administrative decision, contravening a previous departmental vote.202 The URPE 
steering committee interpreted the firings as politically motivated: “The firings are an 
attempt to get at those teachers who have good and close connections with students -  
at those who point the finger at capitalism.”203
In response to the growing threat placed on the radicals’ employment URPE 
staged a protest at the AEA meetings in San Francisco, December 1974. “About 60 
radical economists, representing the Union of Radical Political Economists [sic], 
picketed the economic association presidential address late Sunday to protest the 
firings chanting such slogans as “they say cutback, we say fight back” ” ,204 To expect 
some form of response from the AEA was not unreasonable, the previous year John 
G. Gurley had been elected to the Vice-Presidency of the association and Paul M. 
Sweezy to its Executive Committee. Furthermore, the Association’s acting president 
for 1974 (and therefore presiding over the proceedings) was Robert Aaron Gordon,
199Solow (1971), p. 63.
200Lifshultz (1974), pp. 28-29.
201 Golden (1975), p. FI.
202Rowe (1974), p. D6.
203Cited in Golden (1975), p. FI.
204Rowe (1974), p. D6.
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father of David Gordon, a radical at the New School for Social Research.
With no stated endorsement from URPE, William H. Behn and Henry M. Levin 
(both colleagues of Gurley at Stanford, and the latter a former collaborator of Bowles 
on the economics of education) presented to the meeting four proposals on the 
subject of hiring. The last and most ambitious of the proposals urged “economic 
departments to take immediate measures to attract and hire permanent (tenure 
track) economists working in the Marxian economic paradigm” ,205 It was found to be 
out of order and was never subject to discussion. The first resolution dealt with 
political discrimination of students. It required that student files (particularly 
reference letters) be open to faculty members designated by the students and that 
departments refuse to collaborate on enquiries into the political views of students. It 
was passed with majority support. The second resolution called for more extensive 
publicity of job openings (effectively through a more frequent publication of the 
AEA’s Job Openings for Economists), and for all departments to post their job offers; 
while the former was rejected, the latter part of the resolution was accepted.
For the purpose of the current argument the third resolution was the most 
significant, as it dealt with political discrimination in hiring practices and made direct 
reference to the events at San Jose State University and Lehman College as the most 
recent cases of discrimination. The proposal read: the AEA “shall establish a 
standing committee, the Committee on Political Discrimination, whose members shall 
be appointed each year by the President of the Association to collect information on 
issues of fact in cases involving termination of employment for alleged political 
reasons.”206 Not surprisingly, the third proposal proved to be the most 
controversial.207 The reference to San Jose and Lehman College was deleted early on 
in the debate, with the assent of Behn and Levin. Discussion raged on between those 
that agreed with the creation of the Committee on Political Discrimination and those
205American Economic Review  (1975), p. 442.
206Ibid., p. 444.
207In the 1972 meetings there had been a motion denouncing political discrimination and asserting 
the Association’s strong condemnation of political discrimination against radicals in hiring decisions or 
government grant allocation (American Economic Review  (1973a)). But it had not been accompanied 
by direct action by URPE neither did it produce such a clear result as the 1974 creation of the 
Committee on Political Discrimination.
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arguing that the committee would be replacing the functions already held by the 
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and thus felt that efforts 
should be concentrated in allowing the AAUP to work more effectively. But finally, 
the Behn and Levin proposal prevailed, voted and passed by the majority.
As outlined in the resolution, the President of the AEA would choose the head of 
the Committee, and Robert A. Gordon appointed Kenneth J. Arrow.208 The 
Committee did not report until 1976 and then it did so to the Executive Committee 
but not to the Business Meeting.209 In the 1975 meetings David Gordon on behalf of 
the committee, produced a statement “entitled ‘Taking Political Discrimination 
Seriously’ and proposing a resolution that would broaden the functions of the 
Committee,”210 but a discussion of the proposal was considered out of order for not 
having arrived in the regulatory thirty days in advance to the meeting. In 1976 and 
having run for two years, the committee had a total of eight cases under investigation, 
it reported: “Two investigations have been completed and final reports transmitted to 
the individual faculty member, his or her academic department, the institution’s 
president, and the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). The 
Committee found no definitive evidence of political discrimination in either case.”211 
Arrow explained that there was great difficulty in determining whether discharges 
resulted from political beliefs, the quality of a professor’s work, or the recession, 
which had forced some colleges to lay off faculty members.212
The proposed extension of the functions of the committee made in 1975 by David 
Gordon entailed conducting a study on the extent of political discrimination in the 
hiring practices of departments, modelled on a similar survey study conducted by the 
Committee on the Status of Women in the Economic Profession (CSWEP). Despite 
Gordon’s urgings213 the executive committee only accepted the study in December
208Golden (1975), p. FI.
209 American Economic Review  (1977).
210American Economic Review  (1976), p. 444.
211 American Economic Review  (1977), p. 439.
212Epstein (1976), p. A29. The radicals acknowledged the effects of the recession leading to reduction 
in faculty numbers, but warned that this would serve as a cover for pursuing political firings (Newsletter 
(1974b), p. 5).
213American Economic Review  (1977), p. 441.
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1977, with a funding allocation of $10,000. The study was never conducted with the 
judgment that the funding was insufficient. By 1977 the Committee on Political 
Discrimination was no longer investigating cases of dismissal and was forwarding all 
complaints to the AAUP.214 Later in the decade according to Jordan Kurland, the 
acting general secretary of the AAUP, the number of cases of dismissal began to 
fall,215 and the Committee on Political Discrimination stopped reporting to the 
Executive Committee, effectively since 1979.216
The aftermath of the dismissals and the slow and ineffectual response by the 
AEA (elusive in its conclusions and thus unwilling to become involved) only gave 
credence to the radicals’ suspicion towards the profession. To preserve their jobs, the 
formerly outspoken radicals were attempting to go unnoticed:
With university jobs generally scarce these days, some so-called “closet 
radicals” have tried to sneak onto campuses by sending in job resumes 
that hide their radicalism. Others, who already have jobs, try to keep 
their jobs by having mail from the Union for Radical Political Economics 
sent to their homes rather than to the office, where anti-radical 
department chairmen might notice. 217
The dismissals of radicals occurred contemporaneously to the decline of student 
power, the radicals’ closest allies. Although the relationship between the two is not 
always explicit and direct, the record of contract renewals and dismissals, a mix of 
success when accompanied by student unrest or failure when not, sustains this 
connection.
Only when student unrest was credible would departments and administrators 
reverse dismissal decisions. In the early 1970s a large number of radicals converged 
onto Yale’s graduate program:
Joined by several younger faculty members, the students began an 
independent study group to read Capital and subsidiary texts. While
214American Economic Review  (1978), p. 450.
215Epstein (1976), p. A29.
216Lee (2004b) has researched a larger number of cases of dismissal and what can only be termed bul­
lying of radicals by the establishment. I have focused here on the major cases, those that reverberated 
into the AEA meetings and that led URPE to protest actions.
217Golden (1975), p. FI.
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pursuing their own self-education, the students asked the Department to 
offer a number of courses where the problems of imperialism, 
underdevelopment, Marxian economics, and the history of economic 
thought could be studied in a formal basis. The students also urged the 
Department to hire interested and competent faculty to teach these areas 
not only in the immediate future but also for the long run.218
The faculty responded in 1971 by asking third-year graduate student David Levine to 
teach a course in the History of Economic Thought and an undergraduate level course 
on Marxian economics.219 When Levine left for a year in 1972, students circumvented 
the conventional economics courses by exploiting a loophole in Yale rules. They 
designated their radical work a tutorial and found a sympathetic faculty member to 
supervise. That year over 40 tutorials in the same subjects mushroomed at Yale. On 
Levine’s return and given the growing student pressure, the economics department 
hired him as an assistant professor. It is unlikely that the hiring of Levine would have 
occurred without the graduate students’ actions.
3.4.2 Radical departments
Denied tenured posts at the elite institutions where they had obtained their PhDs, 
many radicals had to find employment in less prestigious Universities or in liberal arts 
colleges where there was very limited opportunity for research. Dispersed throughout 
the country, a number of radicals managed to cluster in departments where radical 
graduate programs could be designed and radical research along academic lines could 
be pursued.
The legacy of the dismissals and of the falling student radicalism did not prompt 
the radicals’ exclusion from the profession but their migration from the elite 
campuses to less affluent institutions. The most important achievement of the 
radicals, and one that I wish to narrate in some detail, was the concentration of
218Lifshultz (1974), p. 53.
219A major political event at New Haven at this time may have strengthened the radicals’ bargaining 
power. Bobby Searle (co founder with Huey Newton of the Black Panthers) and other Black Panther 
members were accused of the killing in 1969 of a Panther member under the suspicion that he worked 
for the FBI. On May Day 1970 at the New Haven Green more than 15,000 protested at the trial 
coinciding with the national protests over the bombings of Cambodia (Katisificas (1987), p. 118).
3. A  political divide 100
radicals at the University of Massachusetts -Amherst (U.Mass.- Amherst). This has 
remained the most important centre for radical research.
Amherst lies 90 miles west of Boston, the hub of the “five colleges”: 
U-Mass-Amherst, Amherst College, Hampshire College, Smith College and Mount 
Holyoke College. The University of Massachusetts at Amherst was originally and 
until 1931, the Massachusetts Agricultural College. In 1970 Amherst was still a 
mainly rural community, “a cow town” ,220 an unlikely destination for urbane radical 
intellectuals.
The origins of a radical centre for research at Amherst are closely connected with 
the major affair of dismissal of a radical, that of Samuel Bowles in 1973. Since 1967 
the U.Mass.-Amherst department had been in a state of turmoil. It had repeatedly 
received poor assessments by external committees (in 1967 and again in 1971) despite 
an investment in hiring “high flyers.” The hiring policy undertaken seems to have 
focused on “mathematical economists, . . .  to the avoidance of such traditional fields 
as macroeconomics, public policy, monetary theory, and economic history” ,221 which 
angered many in the faculty. In 1971-72 alongside the disputes over hiring that split 
the faculty, another conflict was added over the firing of a radical teacher, Mike Best. 
The University administration sidestepped the department and decided not to renew 
Best’s contract. The head of the department saw the interference as undermining the 
department’s authority and his own, and resigned.222
In a move to solve the divisions in the economics department, the Dean of the 
faculty, Dean Alfange, was nominated acting head of the Economics Department. 
Noting a fall in the number of undergraduates in economics, Alfange came to agree 
with the criticism that hiring had been too narrowly focused.223 In justifying his own 
hiring policies, Alfange approvingly referred to Galbraith’s 1972 Presidential Address 
and his denunciation of a “new despotism,”
which “consists in defining scientific excellence as whatever is closest in
220 According Herbert Gintis, this is to be taken literally, he recalls that in the 1970s there were cows 
grazing around the campus (interview with Herbert Gintis, 2003).
221Lifshultz (1974), p. 30.
222Ibid., p. 30.
223Lifshultz (1974), p. 52.
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belief and method to the scholarly tendency of the people who are already 
there. ...” Because of this I had no doubt that the Department needed to 
be broadened and balanced in order to reflect more widely the professional 
views that are held in the discipline at large.224
After Best’s dismissal, Alfange may have also wanted to dispel the image of a 
department hostile to radicals and engaged in political firing.
Bowles had taken a year off from Harvard in 1972-73 and was at 
U.Mass.-Amherst’s Labor Center. Predicting the problems he would face with the 
upcoming “tenure or out” decision, Bowles showed interest in joining the 
University.225 His bargaining power was patent in that he did not ask for a job but 
rather for a centre of radical research: “Bowles pointed out that one of the greatest 
obstacles to the development of radical scholarship in economics was that academics 
interested in its development were scattered and isolated from fellow colleagues” .226 
Bowles thus suggested that alongside his hiring with tenure, the department should 
also hire Herbert Gintis,227 Richard Edwards,228 Stephen Resnick,229 and Richard 
Wolff,230 the first two from Harvard, the other two at the time teaching at City
225Walsh (1978), p. 34.
226Lifshultz (1974), p. 52.
227Herbert Gintis born in 1939, earned a BA in Mathematics at the University of Pennsylvania, and 
an MA and PhD in Economics at Harvard (1969). He taught at Harvard from 1969 to 1974 as Lecturer, 
becoming Associate Professor Economics in 1973. Joined U.Mass-Amherst in 1974, where he was Asso­
ciate Professor until 1976 then becoming Professor. Some of his major works are “A Radical Analysis 
of Welfare Economics and Individual Development” in Quarterly Journal of Economics (November 
1972); Schooling in Capitalist America: educational reform and the contradictions of economic life 
(with Bowles, 1976); Democracy and Capitalism: property, community, and the contradictions of mod­
e m  social thought (with Bowles, 1986); and Recasting Egalitarianism: new rules for communities, 
states, and markets (with Bowles, 1998).
228Richard Edwards born in 1944, earned a BA from Grinell College (1966), and an MA and PhD  
at Harvard (1972). He taught at U. Mass-Amherst from 1974, from 1982 as Associate Professor. 
He moved in 1991 to the University of Kentucky to take the post of Dean to the College of Arts 
and Sciences, and in 1997 joined the University of Nebraska’s College of Business Administration as 
Professor of Economics. His major works are Contested Terrain: the transformation of the workplace 
in the twentieth century (1979); Segmented Work, Divided Workers: the historical transformation of 
labor in the United States (1982); and Rights at Work: employment relations in the post-union era 
(1993).
229Stephen Resnick was born in 1938. He earned a BS at the University of Pennsylvania and a PhD  
from M.I.T. (1964). Was associate professor at Yale (1963-71) and at City College - CUNY (1971-73), 
since 1974 he is Professor of Economics at U.Mass-Amherst. In 1989, he was one of the founders of the 
journal Rethinking Marxism. His major works are Knowledge and class: a Marxian critique of political 
economy (with Richard Wolff, 1987); Bringing it all back home: class, gender, and power in the m odem  
household (with Richard Wolff, 1994); and Class theory and history: capitalism and communism in the 
USSR (with Richard Wolff, 2002).
230Richard Wolff was born in 1942, earned a BA at Harvard, MA at Stanford, and a PhD from
3. A political divide 102
College New York.231 Like Bowles, Gintis, Resnick and Wolff were hired into tenure 
track positions (the exception was Edwards who had just finished his PhD).
As Alfange faced criticism for the hiring of radicals, his comments in a 
memorandum once again resonated Galbraith and the radicals’ appraisal of the 
profession:
It seemed to me impossible . . .  for the department to continue to remain 
insensitive to the ferment taking place within the discipline of economics, 
in which a substantial number of economists -  including some of the most 
prestigious members of the profession -  were challenging the dominant 
neo-classical paradigm and calling into question the ability of the 
profession utilizing that paradigm adequately to deal with many of the 
most urgent social problems in the nation and the world.232
The new radical presence did not help the Department of Economics to settle 
into an acceptable modus vivendi, one of the reasons why Alfange had taken over as 
head of department. In 1975 the New York Times carried a letter evidencing an 
environment of suspicion:
The letter charged that two conventional economists were being blocked 
from receiving tenure by radicals who “occupied a commanding position 
in the department.” The letter also accused the radicals of seeking to 
create vacancies in order to fill them with economists of “their own ilk.”
Later, the department chairman at the time, Norman D. Aitken, a 
non-radical, wrote a letter of rebuttal to the Times noting that the two 
conventional economists in question had, in fact, won tenure.233
A year later, a formal agreement was reached that would finally bring an end to 
the disputes. The agreement specified by name the people who were to hold positions 
of responsibility, crucially on the department’s committee responsible for hiring. The
Yale (1969). He taught at City College - CUNY (1969-73), and since 1974 he is Professor at U.Mass- 
Amherst. Wolff in his research cooperates with Stephen Resnick, for his major works see the previous 
footnote. Along with Resnick he was one of the founders of the journal Rethinking Marxism.
231 City College “enrolled more African Americans and Puerto Ricans students than any other “inte­
grated institution of higher education in the United States” . In 1970 the school had adopted a new 
admissions program which favored the enrollment of pupils from inner city high schools (Roff, Cuc- 
chiara, and Dunlop (2000), p. 120). This made it an attractive location for radicals seeking to move 
closer to the lower classes (interview with Richard Wolff, 2003).
232Lifshultz (1974), p. 52.
233Walsh (1978), p. 35.
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agreement included a hiring plan, identifying the specialities of the new department 
members to be recruited, and setting a ratio of radicals to nonradicals at roughly 
three to seven.234 Helping to settle the fighting was also the naming of a new 
chairman, Donald Katzner, who had arrived at U.Mass after the radicals and had not 
taken part in the conflicts.
By 1976 the department of twenty-five members had ten who despite their 
differences would accept the label of Marxists. They were the largest and most visible 
group of radicals in academia at the time. Since this group included some of the 
best-known American radicals, graduate students with strong credentials were 
attracted to the department, which pleased some conventional economists in the 
department and the University administration.235
Although U.Mass-Amherst hosted the most publicly visible and influential group 
of radical economists, it was not the only place where radicals were able to maintain 
radical courses and a radical graduate program. Other departments that merit 
reference were located at the American University in Washington D.C. and at the 
New School for Social Research in New York. As evidenced by the geographical 
distribution of these departments and despite the high mobility of academics, Radical 
Political Economics remained in the early 1970s primarily Eastern and Northeastern 
based.236 On the West Coast there were also groups of radicals at Stanford 
University237 and at the University of California at Riverside,238 but the role played
234Ibid., p. 35.
235Ibid., pp. 34-35.
236It is significant that in 1971 a section entitled “Way Out West” was created in the URPE N ewsletter 
with the explicit goal of voicing the problems of Western members and connect them to the strongly- 
bound radical economics movement in,the East and Midwest (Clement (1971)).
237At Stanford University in 1975 and “following a four year student struggle, the economics depart­
ment established a field in “Alternative Approaches to Economic Analysis”” (N ewsletter (1975b). The 
department counted with John Gurley, Duncan Foley and Don Harris who had in that year become a 
tenured faculty member. Although this was a small group in a large department it counted with the 
support from radicals in other departments, namely Anthropology, Education and the Food Research 
Institute. See also Christiansen (1974).
238At the University of California -  Riverside, acceptance of radical economists was won after a 
two-year battle. The most prominent radicals there were Howard Sherman and E. K. Hunt. The 
department’s chairman Roger Ransom commented on at the presence of 3 radicals in the 11 strong 
department, “I don’t think that makes our department radical . . . b u t  it ’s more than a sidelight.” . 
Ransom’s assessment of the radicals was that ‘“I think the radicals are weak on analysis.. .  but they 
are very strong on laying out the issues and this turns students on .’ As a result they swarm to the 
radicals’ classes” (cited in Trombley (1975)).
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by radicals in these departments was marginal and precarious.
The creation of the radical departments shows that in the mid-1970s some of the 
radicals’ most effective allies were older and established colleagues. These more 
conventional economists appreciated the radicals’ criticism of the profession and 
though not necessarily endorsing the radical project for the transformation of the 
profession, they found it merited consideration and debate. This support was most 
visible in the hiring of the Amherst radicals. Alfange received
letters and telephone calls from four past presidents of the AEA (one of 
whom had won the Nobel Prize for economics, another who would receive 
the same award within the year), a former editor of the American 
Economic Review, and several other well known names in the discipline.
They all certified that, although the candidates they proposed were indeed 
radical, they were highly qualified and competent economists. They all 
strongly urged Alfange to make the appointments.239
At the New School for Social Research the radicals counted upon the support of 
Robert Heilbroner and at Stanford upon that of former AER  editor John G. 
Gurley.240 Older and established colleagues were unlikely allies if one considers that 
the radical challenge sought to undermine the establishment’s credibility. Yet, the 
radicals were also in their challenge invested as the spokespersons for a generation 
that more left-leaning established colleagues admired.
By 1975 radical economics was thus no longer a feature of Harvard, MIT or Yale 
but a major voice coming out of U.Mass.-Amherst, New School and less prominently 
of American University, Stanford University and U.C.-Riverside. The departments 
mentioned were “radical departments” in so far as they supported radical research 
and despite radicals being always in a minority position. In these new homes a second 
generation of radical economists would be trained into the 1980s. However, these were 
not perfect and eternal havens for radicals. Opposition from many of their 
conventional colleagues would periodically flare, most notably at U.C.-Riverside in
239Lifshultz (1974), p. 52.
240 Gurley although not involved in URPE and much older than the majority of radicals became a 
spokesperson for radical political economics in the AEA.
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the mid-1980s.241 Many mainstream colleagues continued to see radicals as an 
illegitimate competitor for scarce jobs, and tensions would recur when that most 
valued of prizes in American academia was at stake: tenure.
3.5 The academ ic politics o f radical econom ists
In this chapter I have explored the interplay between student radicalism, the making 
of radical economics and the mainstream’s response to the radicals’ emergence. It 
may seem that I have arrived back at where I started, participant accounts’ locating 
the emergence of radical economics in the New Left. W hat I want to show in a new 
light is the claim that radicals were the spokespersons of the sixties’ left movement, as 
these same participant accounts assert. One should be wary not to overplay the 
radicals’ own claims of being the spokespersons of sixties political dissention.
Radical Political Economics began in a modest tone with the call for economics 
to address what radicals saw as the pressing problems of American society. It was not 
a new economic theory, it was a divide made to distinguish those that cared for 
politics and took it seriously, and those that preferred to ignore it. Yet, American 
society and the campuses were in “civil war” in 1968-70 and the radicals’ early 
political divide was soon developing into something else. Radicals sharpened their 
differences with the remainder of the profession, further elements were added to strike 
the distinction, objectivity and neutrality were criticised, subjectivity and 
partisanship promoted. These features were named as elements of the paradigm of 
conflict, to replace the traditional, conventional paradigm of the profession. This 
paradigm carved out a clear identity for the Radical Political Economics community. 
It effectively prescribed how they were to act: reforming the Universities, displacing 
the authority of their conventional colleagues, and militanting for social revolution.
The process of increased differentiation was contemporaneous with the rise of 
student unrest, and it benefited from some student support. Yet, the battle was 
fought between professional academics, with academic weapons, conferences, papers,
241 Interview with Robert Pollin, 2003.
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courses; and its objects were paradigms, and epistemologies. It was a faculty war, and 
the politics which radicals employed were much more academic than they portray 
them to be. The students (and the “movement” generally) were enlisted for support 
but were not the authors’ of RPE’s definition, nor is it clear how they may have given 
even a limited input to the definition. The image I wish to convey is that of 
academics reaching out to the students, in contrast to the participant account’s view 
of social movements reaching into economic science, and dictating the transformation.
The 1971 AEA annual meeting was the climactic moment to the radical challenge 
and the crisis of credibility they championed. The mainstream of the profession, in its 
response to the radicals, took to defend the standards of science. It downplayed the 
existence of divisions and of ideology, trying to guide economists on how to insulate 
economics from politics. The conventional economists hoped to close ranks to 
preserve the professions’ credibility, and scientific status. The radicals hoped to use 
the radical students and their protests to wedge a transformation of the university.
Contrary to the radicals’ expectations the student turmoil was short-lived, dying 
at the close of the Vietnam War and the move of the radical leadership into 
revolutionary politics. As a result, radical economists were pushed to the margin of 
the profession. Once facing renewal of contracts, with possibility of tenure, they were 
dismissed. In some limited contexts, radicals succeeded in their battle for jobs, 
preserving continuation of radical research at U.Mass -  Amherst, New School for 
Social Research, American University, Stanford, UC-Riverside.
In the following chapter, I discuss another important dimension to mid-1970s 
events. I will show that radicals were not merely pushed aside. Their political 
commitments demanded that they abandon their academic critiques and employ their 
economics for the benefit of the left-wing movements then mushrooming in the 
U.S.A.. It was these developments at URPE that shaped the radical economics 
group’s internal structure and forced its intellectual redefinition away from the 
“paradigm of conflict” they had constructed by 1971.
4Economics with the people
The fragmenting of radical identity in the 1970s
4.1 T he U nion o f Radical P olitical Econom ics in the  
1970s
The historical literature on the U.S.A. in the 1970s is dwarfed by the voluminous 
debates over the 1960’s political and popular culture.1 Typically the 1970s are 
portrayed as a decade without a “personality,” somewhat of a transition between the 
liberal and radical 1960s and the conservative 1980s. Because it appears as a 
watershed period in American history, of major shocks and cultural and political 
transformation,2 it merits closer scrutiny than it has been subject of. To look at 
history by decades is a rather arbitrary device but one that suits well my material, 
particularly if I am allowed to tweak the start and end of the 1970s. For the purpose 
of my story, the decade began in 1972 and ended in 1978.3
The focus of this chapter is on the Union for Radical Political Economics 
(URPE) and 'debates during the 1970s. Although radicals remained active researchers 
and continued to advance accounts of the workings of the economy, such activity was 
not as important in redefining what Radical Political Economics was as the Union
activities. It was not to the radical departments being formed in the mid-1970s4 that
1On the sixties there are several useful histories, for instance in this thesis I have drawn extensively 
from Isserman and Kazin (2004) and Morgan (1991). For the seventies only Schulman (2001) is worthy 
of note.
2Slocum-Schaffer (2003), p. 203.
3 It has been argued that like 1968, the year of 1973 was a watershed year, when a myriad of events 
seem to conflate and suggest to the historian a turning of the historical tide (Hollinger (1997), pp. 
338-339).
4See section 3.4.2 of this thesis.
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radicals turned to for a definition of radical economics or of what it was to be a 
radical economist. URPE had housed the work of defining the radical paradigm, it 
was again stage to a new transformation of radical identity. In the early 1970s radicals 
expected that a revolutionary moment was in the making and thus believed that the 
real political organizing lay alongside the popular movement. To connect with the 
nascent revolutionary movement, outreach work became for the active membership of 
URPE the crucial activity that defined the radical economist. URPE was throughout 
the 1970s more than a professional organization, as it undertook a programme of 
pamphlet writing and support for social movements. The tasks of this chapter are 
first to show how and why the outreach work was set up, providing also a description 
of its content. Secondly, I will chronicle the end of the outreach work and assess its 
consequences for the radical Union and for the definition of radical economics.
The history of the radicals’ activism in the 1970s has not yet been told. One 
likely explanation is because it is more than a history of academic institutions. Being 
a history of academics’ involvement with the public it fades from the historian’s 
outlook. It does not register in scholarly articles or conference meetings and evidence 
must be sought elsewhere, in correspondence, interviews, newsletters and pamphlets 
(some of which are not collected in libraries). The second difficulty is in the analysis 
of the actors in play. A radical economist may have a clearly defined identity in the 
professional and academic community but when he travels to the activist arena there 
is no single translation of his identity, will he be a Democratic Socialist, a Marxist 
Leninist, a Maoist, a populist? How are we to understand a radical economist’s 
actions, interests and commitments in this public/political context? As I will show 
throughout this chapter this is not only a problem for the historian, but also the 
crucial difficulty radical economists had to face in their outreach efforts. Their 
problem was how to keep the radical economics identity alongside the many identities 
native to the activist community?
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4.2 Outreach over academ ia (1972-75)
Radical student protest was never as widespread as in the aftermath of the 1970 
invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent Kent State and Jackson State College 
killings. And in 1971, radicals achieved professional recognition at the AEA meetings 
under J. K. Galbraith’s Presidency. Yet, in 1972 radicals decided to change URPE’s 
focus away from academia. The new emphasis originated projects directed at the 
wider popular movements. They intended to inform political practice with radical 
research and at the same time infuse political relevance into radicals’ research. The 
radicals’ Union abandoned earlier engagement with the professions’ mainstream and 
Association. Radicals embraced a new community of reference.
The Newsletter of the Union for Radical Political Economics (henceforth 
Newsletter) provided the main outlet for debate and the reporting of activities by the 
Union. While in 1969-71 the Newsletter was populated by reports of new courses and 
pedagogical debate,5 from 1972, the pages of the Newsletter were increasingly filled 
with reflections on political strategy and reports of activities with mass movements.
In this section I survey the content of these discussions and their interplay with the 
outreach activities of the Union.
4.2.1 Taking over the AEA or Movement Coordinating
In November 1971 the article “The University and Socialism” authored by Frank 
Ackerman,6 appeared in the Newslettter. Although it was not originally written for
5Some of the pedagogical debates were transferred to the Review o f Radical Political Economics, 
worthy of note is the Winter of 1974 issue with papers on “The Content of Introductory Economic 
Courses” and “The Social Relations of the Classroom”. Many radicals had expertise in the economics 
of education and pursued their research along these lines. The content of the earlier N ewsletter articles 
and the Review  ones were however distinct, the former more akin to announcing or reporting activities 
and listing course contents (mainly as templates for similar efforts elsewhere), the latter as analysis of 
the sociology and economics of education.
6Frank Ackerman earned his BA. in Mathematics and Economics from Swarthmore College in 1965 
and a PhD in economics from Harvard University in 1975. He has taught at University of Massachusetts 
-  Amherst (1982-83); University of Massachusetts -  Boston (1984-85); and Tufts University (from 1995). 
He was original editor of Dollars and Sense from 1974. He is a member of the Global Development and 
Environment Institute at Tufts and has written extensively on environmental issues, notably, Why do 
We Recycle? Markets, Values and Public Policy (1997). He has also written on economic methodology, 
The Flawed Foundations of General Equilibrium: Critical Essays in Economic Theory (with Alejandro 
Nadal, 2004).
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URPE its publication as the main piece in the November Newsletter bears proof of an 
interest in Ackerman’s political theorizing.7
In the text Ackerman rejected 1960s “new working class” or “youth as class” 
theories that placed academic radicals in a critical location for sparking social 
revolution.8 The author expounded a refusal to identify a single revolutionary group:
Some groups on the left identify some segment of society, such as 
blue-collar industrial workers, “youth,” or black and third-world 
communities, as the crucial link in a socialist movement. Because the 
crucial group is most oppressed, most aware of the shortcomings of 
capitalism, and/or because it is in vital position of power, it is argued that 
that group must lead the movement, and other groups must be 
subordinate of, perhaps subordinate to, the leading group.9
Ackerman expounded an alternative approach to building a revolutionary movement. 
Since all sectors of the population experienced the tensions inherent to capitalism, 
they all had a revolutionary potential. This outlook gave action in the Universities a 
legitimate revolutionary status, though no longer a central one: “Capitalism has 
growing need for the products of universities -  ideologies and ideologues, researchers, 
technicians, administrators, and generally well-socialized, skilled, white-collar 
workers.”10
Ackerman’s strategy towards socialism reflected the views of many URPErs that 
saw their professional commitments as compatible with the struggle for revolution. 
The December 1971 meetings of the AEA gave URPErs reasons to be optimistic 
towards change in the academic establishment. The meeting organised by Galbraith 
had a significant radical representation in its program, the URPE Women’s Caucus 
had successfully assisted the birth of CSWEP, and an Anti-Samuelson pamphlet 
distributed in the meetings had been well received.11 In the aftermath of December 
1971, some argued in “An Action Program for URPE” that the Union should engage 
with the AEA more forcefully. It was felt that “There are no doubt many
7It was first published in Upstart of the University Radical Union at Harvard.
8Ackerman (1971), p. 3.
9Ibid, p. 1.
10Ibid. p. 2.
n Behr et al (1972), p. 16. On the meeting, see page 83 of this thesis.
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[economists] who are against racism, imperialism, and the other manifestations of 
capitalist exploitation. If we can ally with them on this basis then we can more 
effectively support the struggles of the oppressed peoples and isolate the 
Samuelsons.”12 Three areas of activity were recognised: “ongoing fights against 
bourgeois (pro-capitalist anti-people) ideas in economics, especially in the 
introductory economics courses”; “ongoing activities around jobs for economists 
where the principal effort would be in URPE taking leadership in faculty and 
graduate student union drives” ; and “use the annual AEA meetings politically to 
supplement the above ongoing activities”.13 According to this view, URPE should 
provide assistance and advice in: writing pamphlets on theoretical subjects for 
inclusion in introductory courses (in the absence of a radical economics introductory 
book); reaching publishers to indicate the existence of a market for radical economics 
books; and “trying to win control of the AER [American Economic Review] away 
from the elite schools and into more progressive hands.”14 The authors saw events in 
the History and English academic associations as exemplars: “radical groups in 
history and English are organized in caucuses and have been successful in fighting for 
changes in their annual meetings. For example, the Modern Language Association 
(MLA) has had a radical candidate elected to be president of the association”.15
The “An Action Program for URPE” just outlined, was intended for discussion 
at the 1972 Summer Conference and to serve as a guide for a transformation of 
URPE’s focus. While in the past URPE had served mainly as a forum for debate and 
protest against the AEA, the authors of the Action Program in 1972 felt the time had 
come to “take over the AEA.” However, at that Summer Conference16 a very different 
organizational line was adopted, embodied by the creation of the Movement 
Coordinating Committee.17 Its manifesto identified five kinds of audiences deserving
12Ibid., p. 16.
13Ibid., p. 15.
14Ibid., p. 19.
15Ibid., p. 20.
16URPE holds since its inception a scholarly annual conference at the Allied Social Sciences Associ­
ations meetings and a Summer Conference yearly in July/August. The Summer Conference is a place 
for making decisions and electing officials.
17N ewsletter (1972).
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distinct responses by URPE. The first were “libraries and liberals” for which the 
article dryly announced URPE had nothing to offer. Their advice to the second 
audience, “teachers that see political activism as talking,” was that they should get 
their students to see revolt as necessary for changing the outside world. Thirdly came 
“radicals doing standard research,” for these URPE should show them how to draw 
radical implications from their research. The forth audience were “radicals doing 
radical research” and the Union’s contribution was to make their results more widely 
know. Finally came those members involved in direct action, to which URPE should 
provide information and support. In practice the Movement Coordinating Committee 
called for the organization of workshops and teach-outs, alongside the publishing of 
pamphlets, and literature for wide distribution. Thus in practice the efforts were 
focused towards the latter three kinds of audiences identified.18
That the majority of URPE members endorsed the Movement Coordinating 
Committee in the Summer of 1972 is evidence that the goal of radicals “taking over 
the profession” (as proposed earlier that year) held little currency. In the light of 
Movement Coordinating radicals were not only (or even primarily) professionals, 
radicals were activists and it was felt that more should be done in support of this 
role. URPE was asked to extend its activities as a forum for radical scholarship to 
providing support for mass direct action. The idea was not new, since URPE’s 
seminal conference in Philadelphia in 1968 there had been support for the radical 
economist as an advocate.19 Radical economics informing the social movements and 
showing the way to revolution was after all central in the radicals’ self-definition. It 
was radical economics’ usefulness for revolution that justified it over conventional 
economics.20 Yet prior to 1972 no initiative had been taken to institutionalise the 
radicals’ alleged connection with the social movements. URPE had remained a
18The list of desired subjects to be addressed was extensive: state and local loans, US government 
savings bonds, housing, rent and rent controls; do white collar workers benefit from imperialism?; Nixon 
strategy for education; radical guide to transportation; worker security; pensions compensation; health 
and safety; police repression of workers’ organizations; Nixon’s new economic policies; inflation and 
unemployment; military-industrial complex; pollution -  who pays?; welfare- who pays?, who benefits?; 
and crime -  who pays? ( N ewsletter (1972), p. 4).
19Wolff (1969).
20See discussion in p. 76 of this thesis.
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professional association, organising conferences and publishing a scholarly journal.
The dismissals of radicals could not have been the factor for the transformation 
of URPE’s organising, for these would only be acutely felt later, in 1973-74.21 The 
change in URPE’s focus came at a high-point of optimism (although it was to prove 
itself short lived), when a consensus had been achieved on the nature of Radical 
Political Economics, and in the aftermath of the AEA 1971 meetings. URPE’s 
outreach vocation reflected an additional factor, namely the ideological evolution of 
the New Left (the SDS graduates) in the early 1970s towards working class politics. 
What several commentators of 1960s and 70s politics, former-SDSer and Harvard 
alumnus Todd Gitlin being probably the most vocal amongst them, characterised 
with dismay as the end of the New Left and the post-1968 conversion of radicals to 
the Old Left.22 The conversion was ideological,23 first from 1968 calling for revolution 
in America and in the early 1970s, at the high point of social unrest, by adopting 
Marxist-Leninism as a guide to revolutionary practice.
The ideological reshaping has been portrayed as sweeping through many political 
denominations and organizations, and not just as the chosen path of former SDS 
radicals leaving academia. “After battering legal segregation and winning formal 
voting rights in 1964-65, veterans of the civil rights movement turned their attention 
to battles for economic equality and political empowerment” ,24 such was the new 
direction taken by Martin Luther King Jr. prior to his assassination in 1968. Deemed 
by FBI’s J. Edgar Hoover as “the greatest [single] threat to the internal security of 
the country” ,25 the Black Panther Party, even though not clearly a Marxist 
organization, combined strands of black nationalism and Marxism in an eclectic mix:
[The Black Panthers] were the most prominent revolutionary organization 
in the country during the key transitional years 1968-71, and they proved 
to be the most important single organization in the transition of thousands
21 Although the dismissals of radicals and the demise of student power would clearly become factors 
in U RPE’s intensification of its activism efforts in 1973-75.
22Gitlin (1987).
23Despite noted affinities with the Marxist Left, New Lefters in their endorsement of Marxism did 
not join the traditional organizations of the Old Left, such as the CPUSA or the SWP. Instead, they 
created their own, of which more later.
24Elbaum (2002), p. 46.
25Cited in Elbaum (2002), p. 28.
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of activists from New Left radicals, Black Power advocates or Third World 
militants to partisans of Third World Marxism and Leninism.26
Following the testimonies of those involved, the adoption of Marxism-Leninism 
arose from their efforts to understand and oppose the US war in Indochina: “Of all 
traditions within Marxism, it was Leninism that placed the most emphasis on the 
imperialist nature of twentieth-century capitalism, on the revolutionary potential of 
national liberation struggles, on the legitimacy of armed struggle, and on the primacy 
of building solidarity with oppressed peoples.”27 In a sense these radicals learned 
their Marxism from the Vietnamese, from the Chinese and from the Cubans whom 
they admired for their struggle against American imperialism.28
The new emphasis on the people and the working class seemed vindicated by 
events in American society. A new resurgence in union militancy led to unexpected 
shows of force. In 1969 in Detroit a combative League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers was created and in New York the concerted actions of 15,000 workers shut 
down all bridges bringing the city to a grinding halt.29 Even the patterns of student 
protest seemed to bear proof of the revolutionary potential of the working class, 
“while student protest ebbed at the more elite universities after 1970, antiwar and 
other demonstrations spread further (if less spectacularly) at community colleges and 
high schools with higher percentages of working class youth.”30
Radical economists took leadership roles in some of the left-wing formations 
mushrooming in the early 1970s. Although the radical economist had been defined as, 
a scientist-activist, his actions had been contained to the academic arena; radicals 
now sought to live out the scientist-activist in a new community. These URPErs 
urged a redefinition of their Union. The Movement Coordinating Committee was 
URPE’s first response to the new ideological landscape, but after just a year of 
activity its record was dismal. According to its critics, where local committees had 
been organised they had failed to function:
26Ibid., p. 65.
27Ibid., p. 43.
28Interview with Michael Zweig, 2003.
29Elbaum (2002), pp. 28, 47.
30Ibid., p. 47.
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At best, some literature was put out and some speakers directed to needed 
places, but this failed to develop into a consistent and effective 
instrument. URPE people, ourselves and the movement co-ordinators 
included, tended to remain remote from the every day work of building 
movements for social change. Therefore, our written work and oral 
presentations tended to be general and abstract, in the sense that the 
work did not fit well into the particular political-ideological-informational 
needs of the people requesting help.31
In their October 1973 analysis of the Movement Coordinating’s failings, Steve 
Rose and Michael Zweig imputed the failure of the committee on URPE’s misguided 
insistence on acting as a professional organization. They argued that URPE should 
create a presence independent of and opposed to the AEA and other professional 
associations:
URPE should not become involved in the internal workings and 
deliberations of the AEA, seeking to shape that organization. There may 
be a resolution before the AEA which, taken alone and in the abstract,
URPE would support. Still, in the concrete nip and tuck battle with 
professionalism among radical economists and other socially concerned 
economists, it would be irresponsible to look at the AEA as the arena for 
social leverage.32
URPE should inform social movements and acting inside the AEA would not develop 
a “real” movement. The optimism of 1972 and of the “Action Program” had been 
eclipsed by growing cases of dismissals of radicals and difficulties faced inside 
academia, the new tone was pessimism. Rose and Zweig warned that:
We have to face the reality that job security cannot be a guaranteed part 
of the lives of radicals. . . .  we cannot depend on the AEA to secure our 
presence ... The only guarantee for our security is connection with strong 
and growing mass movements on our campuses and in our communities.
Again, URPE is led to ties with mass struggle -  as the testing ground for 
our ideas, as the mechanism for social change, and as the source of our 
security33
31Rose and Zweig (1973), p. 10.
32Ibid., p. 12.
33Idem.
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URPE had always opposed professionalism; it had denounced it as a form of 
elitism, hierarchical and oppressive. Yet, these flaws were not seen as precluding 
academic work’s effectiveness in leading to social change. This had been the content 
of the radicals’ indictment of the profession at the AEA’s 1969 meetings protest and 
implicit in Ackerman’s “The University and Socialism”.34 Rose and Zweig’s argument 
was different; they saw professionalism as a misdirection of the radicals’ efforts, as a 
tactical mistake. The only political force was the mass movement of the people and 
nothing could be achieved in the intellectual confines of academia. The people 
constituted a new intellectual community providing a check to radical ideas, URPE 
should be committed to developing the “practice of political economy and testing its 
ideas in the context of [the mass struggles of the people].” For Rose and Zweig, the 
Movement Coordinating Committee’s support of mass action had not gone far enough 
because URPErs were still overly committed to academia. Radicals were asked to 
deepen their involvement with mass movements.
The new organizational line was more than an extension of radical activities. 
URPE’s resources and debates were strikingly redirected, it was not an addition of a 
new kind of activity, it was a new core to the radicals’ work, their most prized 
commitment. The change was not so extreme as to demand an abandonment of the 
radicals’ academic careers to devote themselves fully to political organizing. Neither 
was the new line endorsed by the whole of URPE’s membership. Some URPErs 
remained aloof from the activist efforts, they maintained their involvement with the 
AEA (as dues paying members and participants in its annual meetings) and still saw 
their activities as academic economists to be contributions in building a socialist 
movement.35
4.2.2 Political Education and Action Coordinator
Only a year after the creation of the Movement Coordinating Committee, at the 
Summer Conference of 1973, a new outreach project was designed, the Political
34See p. 81 of this thesis, Ackerman (1971).
35In 1973 at New York there was a strong URPE presence at the AEA meetings to protest against 
the wave of radical firings (American Economic Review  (1974)).
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Education and Action Coordinator, in shorthand PEAC.36 It was “established to 
provide information, analysis, contacts, and valuable links with labor organizations, 
community projects and movement groups.”37 The project was run by a collective 
based in New York. It was entrusted with the task of mobilising URPE members into 
researching pressing economic problems of the time in radical and action oriented 
ways. The collective would collate the research contributions of the several members 
into a “mass pamphlet for political education.”38
The first project undertaken by PEAC was on food inflation. Many URPE 
members attending consumer group meetings and women’s groups found the issue 
frequently raised. Radicals’ inquiries showed that from January to March 1973 there 
had been a sharp rise, of 4.6% in the price of food leading to the formation of 
consumer groups intent on opposing further price increases. A “National Food 
Research Collective” was set up at the 1973 Summer Conference, and about 50 
members throughout the country worked on aspects of the “Food Fact Package.” The 
pamphlet was concluded in early 1974 and then distributed to local URPE chapters 
and organizations that requested it.39
The Food Package included 28 separate fact sheets ranging from one to 14 pages 
each.40 The fact sheets fell into three main groups. A first group described the 
magnitudes and impact of “the food crisis.” A second group provided contextual 
description and analysis of the structure of the food industry, emphasising the 
growing concentration of economic power in that sector. The third group criticised 
the “official explanations” of the food inflation placing them in a political economy 
context. With each fact sheet bearing on a particular subject (for instance, one was 
devoted only to trends in the consumer price index of food, another was an analysis of 
the market structure of the food industry, yet another was a discussion of the impact 
of unionisation on food prices), they could be used independently or combined with
36N ewsletter (1973), p. 9.
37Keefe (1974), p. 17.
381 N ew sletter(1973), p. 9.
39Idem.
40URPE-PEA (1974a). I am indebted to Ruth Inbeck for providing me with copies of the pamphlets 
and one of the reports written on the pamphlet writing activities. I have had access to  what I believe 
is the final version of the package.
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other fact sheets for the writing of popular articles or pamphlets. This design 
represented the radicals’ intention of providing information that could be flexibly 
used by other groups, to make it serve multiple purposes.
In the varied set of fact sheets of the Food Package, radicals estimated the extent 
of price increases and their negative impact on the real wages of workers, on nutrition 
and even its effects on starvation and malnutrition of the poor, while arguing that the 
counterpart was the building up of corporate agro-industry profits. The food sector 
was identified as one of the fastest growing industries in America, with increasing 
concentration and mechanisation. As for the causes of food inflation, radicals argued 
that it resulted from a conjunction of what they labelled “structural dynamics,” and 
“short-term conjunctures” . They noted that the concentrated food industry held the 
consumer to ransom by transferring rises in costs into inflation, and insulating any 
negative effects on profits. The price increases were compounded by speculation in 
the futures markets for food and by weather calamities in Asia during that year, 
raising international demand. The radicals accused the government of not stepping in 
to protect the poor consumers, and instead keeping a cap on food production to allow 
prices and profits to rise.
The distribution of the pamphlet package was deemed successful as several 
thousand copies (over seven hundred in the first few months) were printed and 
distributed. Interest arose from groups making different uses of the information: 
“Liberation News Service wrote a series of articles from the food materials which 
went out to all their subscribers” ; “people in community schools, like the Liberation 
School in Berkeley, have used the food materials in classes” ; “the living theatre 
collective has picked up on the information to make a series of six plays to present in 
front of supermarkets and at work places when they tour”; and “people organizing in 
food processing plants came to pick up the material to use for writing a pamphlet.”41 
The interest generated by the project prompted further requests for radical economics 
insights into: “recession, inflation, taxes, Nixon’s statements and policies about 
workers” . Many URPE members began to offer articles to the New York collective on
41Weinbaum (1974), pp. 12-13.
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such topics as “runaway shops, class war in England, Nixon’s economic policy, 
housing” .42
In 1973-74 a further project was conducted by the PEAC collective entitled The 
Energy Crisis: A Matter of Profits. The “Energy Crisis” was the focus of 
contemporary debate after October 1973, when Arab members of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the midst of the Yom Kippur War, agreed 
on an oil embargo to all countries supporting Israel in its conflict with Egypt. The 
OPEC member states further agreed to use their leverage to produce a four-fold rise 
in international oil prices.
Similarly to the first pamphlet, Energy Crisis was “not intended to be read as a 
book. Rather [radicals noted] that each piece could serve as the basis for a speech, a 
newspaper article, a study group discussion, a radio broadcast, a videotape program, 
or a leaflet” .43 The radicals identified the questions they were trying to answer in the 
packet, the main one being: how do oil companies reorganise production and sales to 
maintain high profits and continued expansion? A host of secondary questions 
addressed the extent of the oil shortage, the origins and use of energy, the structure of 
the energy industry, and government regulation of the sector. Finally, radicals 
explored the long-run implications of the crisis for capitalism and imperialism, and 
for people’s resistance, looking into how people were fighting back. As in the Food 
Package, radicals aimed for a wide ranging discussion of the subject, from its 
quantitative economic description leading to a political analysis.
The radicals’ concluding analysis of the crisis stressed the international 
interdependence of the energy business. They began by noting America’s frailty prior 
to the oil embargo, as a rise in nationalism in the Middle East and in the Third 
World pointed to a decline in American hegemony, further aggravated by competition 
from the European and Japanese and a depreciating dollar. In this context the energy 
crisis had been a godsend, radicals argued: “The energy crisis has pulled the rug out 
from under Japan and Western European countries while boosting the U.S. back up.
42Ibid, p. 14.
43URPE -  PEA (1974b).
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On the whole, the U.S. is much less dependent on oil imports and is raking in the 
money selling oil internationally at such astoundingly high prices.”44 Radicals 
concluded that prices were being kept high to fuel the profits of the oil business and 
the expansion of American imperialism.
The content of both the Food and Energy pamphlets reflected PEAC’s stated 
objectives. Written in non-technical and non-ideological language, they were designed 
to be used as widely as possible. The 1974 Summer Conference of URPE, a year after 
PEAC’s creation, re-affirmed “Political Education and Action (PEA) efforts are a 
correct and essential part of URPE’s overall program of activities.”45A slight change 
of name, with the deletion of the “Coordinator” represented an expansion of activity 
with the proposal that several coordinator units be established on a regional basis. 
The functions of the regional PEAs were to receive suggestions on PEA activity for 
the region and publicise them; encourage participation of movement groups in PEA 
regional projects; and organize a collective to work on specific projects as they 
arose.46 By 1974 there were a number of ongoing national projects, while continuing 
the distribution of the concluded Food and Energy packages, a project on “How to 
Research a Corporation” was near completion, a “Current Economic Crisis Project” 
had been initiated and a “Women’s Work Project” was being coordinated from 
Washington D.C..47
The Women’s Work Project was initially run by two cooperating collectives, one 
based in Washington D.C., the other in New York. It produced in 1974-75 three 
pamphlets, Women in Health (directed at health workers), Women in Today’s 
Economic Crisis and finally Separated and Unequal: Women in the UAW after 
WWII. These pamphlets were shorter than the Food and Energy packages, with 
about 20 pages each, equivalent to the size of some of the larger sections of the PEA
44URPE -  PEA (1974b), p. 4.2.
45Keefe (1974), p. 17.
46Ibid., p. 19.
47 “How to Research a Corporation” remained “near completion” for the rest of the decade, the 
“Economic Crisis” project was concluded but in changed circumstances that are discussed later (URPE- 
PEA (1975)). There was also mention of a “Health Project” conducted from New Haven, Conn. and 
a “Southern Industrialization & Unionization Project” (Keefe (1974), p. 18) but I found no evidence 
of their publication.
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packages. They were also distinct in style, less was provided in terms of analysis or 
insights into current political debates, and more focus given to information and data, 
be it evidence of women’s subaltern position at work (with both personal testimonies 
and statistics), or by giving details of and contacts to unions or action groups that 
would assist women organizing. The overall focus was on women as workers and 
developing women’s consciousness of their social and economic situation, which gave 
the pamphlets a grass-roots flavour compared to the Energy or Food packages which 
were designed primarily for organizers.
The PEA and the Women’s Work Project (conducted under PEA’s wing) 
mobilised many URPE members into building connections with popular movements. 
The outreach initiatives were meant to educate the movement on the unjust inner 
workings of the economy but for radical economists they also represented a check on 
their research. The pamphlet writing was justified on intellectual grounds as it showed 
radicals the way to politically relevant research and shielded them from irrelevant 
scholarship. Away from the lecture halls, radicals were seeking a very different 
intellectual community. The audience was the people, the subjects were current and 
political and communication was made through pamphlets and teach-outs. There was 
no hierarchy and no authority. This was the radicals’ ideal community.
Was URPE’s gamble towards outreach activities a reasonable strategy or was it 
merely an adventure by a few of its members? The absence of opposition to these 
activities between 1972 and 1975 and a substantial growth in membership suggests 
that the new strategy was widely supported. Looking at the membership figures of the 
organization until 1975 there was a steady increase in its members. In the academic 
years of 1970-71 and 1971-72 membership grew at about forty percent a year, from 
821 members in 1969 to 1643 by 1972. Growth slowed down from 1972 onwards but 
the number of new members was stable at 700 plus and membership renewal was at 
around sixty percent. In 1974-75, when the PEAC pamphlet writing activities were at 
their peak there was even a pronounced increase in both new members and 
membership renewals.48 URPE’s move away from academia and towards activism
48N ewsletter (1976).
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seemed at the time a secure strategy for extending the organization’s influence.
4.2.3 Marxism in the Review of Radical Political Economics
The early 1970s ideological reshaping of the American Left towards Marxism and the 
working class and URPE’s outreach efforts also reverberated in changes to the 
editorial line of the Review of Radical Political Economics (RR PE ). The Review had 
been published since 1969, its editorial board voted by the Union’s membership at its 
Summer Conference. It was the obvious platform to debate the intellectual program 
of radical economics, as it had done in 1971 in the definition of the “paradigm of 
conflict.” The “Revised Statement of Editorial Policy for the RRPE” drafted in the 
fall 1973 meeting of the editorial board, candidly communicated to “the rest of 
URPE” a “very interesting development.” It announced that a consensus had been 
reached on the question “What is the RRPE and how should it develop?”49 
It was felt that RRPE  should be a “scholarly journal” written for radical 
intellectuals and that the route toward a mass-media format should be rejected. The 
negation of this route was justified by the pamphlet writing efforts that were then 
becoming a core activity of the URPE membership at large. The editorial statement 
refused to limit the RRPE’s interest to “strictly ‘economic’ subjects” and thus invited 
contributions that might fall within the confines of other disciplines. The crucial 
novelty however was that the editorial statement set the R R P E ’s vocation as 
developing “a specific radical social science, Marxism.”50
The editorial board began by denying that earlier debates on a radical paradigm 
had any content. The new editorial line was a negation of the earlier definition of 
radical economics. The editorial board argued that earlier efforts by radicals had 
remained critiques of “bourgeois ‘science” ’ and that a construction of an alternative 
analysis had not begun in earnest:
Indeed URPE has been defined as a group, both from within and without, 
primarily in terms of its opposition to capitalist society and bourgeois 
ideas. Within this perspective it would seem that the real meaning of the
49Editorial Board (1974a), p. ii.
50Idem.
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desire expressed at the board meeting to work toward the elaboration of 
Marxist science was the wish to see the URPE membership adopt a 
common project, that of “building Marxism,” and by doing so to become 
united in a new and more fruitful way through a common praxis.51
The editorial statement reported, “There was virtually no dissension [at the board 
meeting] to the view that there is no real alternative to Marxism as a science for 
analysing contemporary human society and that the RRPE should accept that as a 
given and act accordingly. This fundamental endorsement was very strong and came 
from many different people” ,52
The editorial board committed itself to tailoring selection criteria to promote 
Marxian economics, which it briefly defined in the editorial statement as “an 
expression of the key role of the working classes in the transformation of modern 
society” and in more scholarly terms as any literature that references, evaluates or 
develops, works in the Marxist tradition (the concrete example given being Baran and 
Sweezy’s Monopoly Capital ).53 Suitable topics of research were also identified: “the 
historical development, current functioning and emerging contradictions of past and 
contemporary social systems, the role of methodologies of the social sciences, and the 
actual and alternative strategies for revolution in America and elsewhere” .54
The statement added a measure of caution. It manifested concern that the 
majority of URPE members might not identify with the common project, and that 
the true and final assessment of the move could only be performed in the following 
annual (summer) meeting. The editorial board’s concern proved to be warranted for a 
number of URPErs made public their opposition to the new editorial line. One 
prominent critique was raised by Thomas Weisskopf, a member of the editorial board 
who had been absent at its 1973 fall meeting. He had tried to modify the statement 
early on, but since this proved without consequence he hoped that the change could 
be defeated at the Summer Conference.
Weisskopf raised three criticisms to the new editorial line. The first was that the
51Ibid., p. ii-iii.
52Ibid., p. ii.
53Baran and Sweezy (1966).
54Editorial Board (1974a), p. iii.
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editorial contained vague generalities and left too many questions unanswered: “the 
statement is very unclear about just what this new emphasis on Marxism is going to 
mean in practice.”55 This criticism was to some extent accepted by the editorial 
board; in a response to the critics, the board in its spring meeting qualified its move 
towards Marxism. Firstly the editorial restated its aim, “more emphasis on the 
Marxian method of analysis,”56 i.e. neither a wholesale adoption of Marxism as the 
sole publishable scholarship, nor Marxism’s characterisation as a theory, it was 
redressed as a method of analysis. Secondly, the Board noted that there was no 
unanimity between its members on what constituted Marxian analysis:
Some people mentioned an emphasis on historical and dialectical methods 
of thought, e.g., the idea that social structures change as a result of the 
conflict among social classes. Others thought the economic theories of 
value and crisis in Marx’s Capital would be important to explore. Still 
others mentioned the earlier philosophic works of Marx on alienation as an 
important theoretical starting point for radical political economy.57
The editorial board felt that the role of the RRPE  was to serve as a forum either to 
explore the usefulness of the Marxian method of analysis, in its many definitions, or 
to present alternatives that could be shown to be “scientifically superior to that 
suggested by Marxian methods of research” .58 The editorial board’s Spring 
clarification was in all respects a weakening of the earlier statement. The move 
towards Marxism was restated as not implying that only Marxist theory was 
acceptable for publication, and multiple definitions of Marxism were shown to be 
acceptable.
The second criticism raised by Weisskopf was that the editorial board was taking 
on an unwanted role: “I don’t believe that the board ‘can and should change the 
Review, beginning now’ when the change is one that is closely linked to questions of 
‘organizational redirection for URPE as a whole”’.59 Weisskopf was therefore
denouncing the adoption of Marxism and the new directive stance of the editorial
55Weisskopf (1974), p. 24.
56Newsletter (1974a), p. 36.
57 Idem.
58 Idem.
59Weisskopf (1974), p. 24.
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board as an imposed redefinition of URPE’s polity. His final point argued that the 
statement was unnecessarily restrictive in its insistence on Marxism as the only form 
of Radical Political Economics. He noted that: “W hat unites members of URPE, if 
anything, is a profound dissatisfaction with American capitalism in general and with 
the currently orthodox discipline of economics in particular. There is not yet any such 
unanimity about either the kind of society or the kind of economics that we should be 
striving for.”60 Weisskopf did not see the way forward as deciding on a shared 
project. Instead, URPE and the Review should remain as forums for diverse 
approaches, this was for him the organization’s strength.
Weisskopf did not demand a full rejection of the new editorial line. In fact, he 
showed willingness to accept the change if this occurred in what he termed as an 
“incremental and experimental basis.” He proposed that a one-off special issue be 
prepared following the new editorial line or that a section be created in the RRPE  
with one or two papers appearing per issue and following the new Marxist line. Only 
with such examples did Weisskopf believe it would be possible for URPErs to make 
an informed decision on a new editorial policy.
The editorial statement facing widespread criticism was subject to discussion and 
was finally retracted at the 1974 Summer Conference.61 A “Note on Editorial Policy” 
was published in the subsequent RRPE  issue, in which the board noted “a great deal 
of criticism, directed both to the process whereby it was issued and the content of the 
statement” ,62 The Board with its withdrawal of the statement issued a mea culpa, 
recognising that it was not in its authority to dictate policy and committing itself to 
including the full membership of URPE in future editorial decisions. Still, the Board 
reasserted its belief that the move towards the “Marxist approach” was the right 
direction to be taken.
No further attempts were made to institute Marxism as the theoretical core of 
the Review. Even the idea of creating a special section in the journal for doctrinal 
debate, to compare Marxism with other approaches, was never pursued. A section
60Idem.
61 Walsh (1978), p. 37.
62Editorial Board (1974b).
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entitled “Theoretical Notes and Comments” continued from earlier issues but it gave 
voice to controversies independent from this episode.63
The adoption of Marxism in the “Revised Statement of Editorial Policy” may 
have been contentious and short lived, but the editorial board’s stated goal of making 
the Review a scholarly journal was never questioned. On this issue there was 
consensus among the URPE membership. In the early 1970s the status of the Review 
was yet undefined, but the pamphlet writing efforts of PEAC (explicitly) acted as a 
reason to root the Review as an outlet for technical and academic research.
I have wanted to stress the move towards Marxism as the most significant aspect 
of the RRPE  debate. Contemporaneous to PEAC efforts in connecting radicals with 
the social movements the Review was aiming for Marxist analysis; both moves reflect 
the impact on radical economists of the changing political landscape of the American 
Left. The resistance mounted to changes to the RRPE  attest that the URPE 
membership was unwilling to define itself wholly in Marxism-Leninism. Many 
URPErs remained indifferent to such left-wing party developments, disconnected from 
the revolutionary political groups. Many URPErs continued to see their professional 
work as their primary contribution to changing American society. Many URPErs 
(and often the same) refused to identify Radical Political Economics with Marxist 
scholarship.
4.3 C onflicting in terests and id en tities in U R P E  
(1971-1978)
Despite URPE’s achievements in outreach not all was shared commitment and 
pleasant cooperation, as the Review episode already demonstrated. That URPE was 
home to a diverse set of personalities and political persuasions was never disputed
63Davis and England (1975) soon after the 1974 debate wrote a polemic for the “Theoretical Notes 
and Comments” section. This was however wholly unrelated to the Marxism debate, it was an attack 
on Tom Riddell’s (1973) proposal of having radicals participate in party political work as advisers to 
Democratic and Republican politicians. Davis and England reaffirmed the PEA line that the only 
correct strategy was alongside the mass/popular movements. The section was later renamed to “Notes 
and Comments” in the Winter of 1975, Summer and Fall 1976 issues and from Winter 1977 “Short 
notes and Comments”.
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and throughout the 1970s the Union remained ecumenical in its approach to politics 
and economic theory. However, this is not to say that diversity was the starting 
point. In fact, the recognition (if not even celebration) of distinct radical groupings 
was a later outcome, brought by internecine battles in the mid-1970s which 
threatened to break URPE apart (as happened to many left groups of the time). 
Before URPE’s move towards outreach, diversity of opinion had not threatened the 
project of a radical economics identity, forged in reference to the elite of the 
economics profession. It was in the course of the outreach activities that diversity 
morphed into consciously organized sub-groups with conflicting and competing social 
identities, and the single radical economics identity became a chimera. In this section 
I turn to identifying what the competing identities were, narrating the episodes of 
conflict and their ultimate resolution.
4.3.1 W omen’s Liberation in URPE
In the history of women’s political movements it is standard wisdom to distinguish 
between two waves, the first located in the late nineteenth century and beginning of 
the twentieth century referring to the suffragettes, the second beginning in the 1960s 
and often labelled the women’s liberation movement, the root of current feminist 
trends. Women’s liberation had its genesis in the civil rights movement (in SNCC) 
and in the student New Left (in SDS). Participation in these movements led women 
to “an ideology of equality and democracy and a politics characterized by the absence 
of hierarchy and authoritarian leadership and by community” ,64 With a changed 
sense of self, developed in political activity, they confronted their male comrades 
when they tried to impose on them traditional gender patterns.
In August 1967 SDS organized a conference in Chicago -  the National Conference 
for New Politics. Its goal was to develop a unified left program and to nominate for 
the 1968 elections a presidential ticket headed by Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. 
and Doctor Benjamin Spock. At the meeting women “devised a resolution requiring 
that women, who represent 51 percent of the population, receive 51 percent of the
64Breines (1979), p. 498.
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convention votes and committee representation” ,65 However, the resolutions 
committee of SDS refused to introduce the statement. Angered by the men’s 
response, women decided to meet on their own and concluded that no further efforts 
should be made at effecting change to SDS, they called for separatism. At their first 
meeting’s manifesto, they wrote: “We hope our words and actions will help make 
women more aware and organized in their own movement through which a concept of 
free womanhood will emerge.”66
Following the Autumn of 1967, “women’s groups rapidly emerged in many places, 
following the social networks and the ‘radical community’ created by New Left 
activism”.67 On the basis of the women’s groups created from SDS, women’s 
liberation organizations began to emerge in 1968:
In January 1968, the New York group Radical Women staged “The Burial 
of Traditional Womanhood” at an antiwar demonstration in Washington,
D.C. In March 1968, a national gathering of radical women occurred in 
Sandy Springs, Maryland, to discuss goals and priorities. The next month 
brought a protest of the Miss America contest; massive media coverage 
created the perception and to some extent the reality of a national 
movement. In October, the Women’s International Terrorist Conspiracy 
from Hell (WITCH) hexed the New York Stock Exchange. In November 
1968, the first truly national women’s liberation conference was held in 
Chicago, as women gathered from thirty-seven states to discuss issues in 
the emerging movement.68
Similar to the pattern set at SDS, SNCC and a number of other organizations, 
political and professional, a Women’s Caucus was created in URPE.69 It emerged very 
early on in URPE’s history, in the aftermath of the 1969 AEA Convention: “After the 
URPE sponsored panel on “The Political Economy of Women’s Liberation” at the 
New York City convention, a Women’s Caucus was formed which will be open to all 
women regardless of whether they are URPE members. The purpose of this
65Evans (1980), p. 198.
66Ibid., p. 199.
67Buechler (1990), p. 33.
68Ibid., pp. 70-71.
69 Prom interview evidence it seems that the example for the creation of the caucus was taken from 
similar moves by professional radicals, namely in the Modern Languages Association and not by Women 
Liberation movements per se. (Interview with Laurie Nisonoff, 2003).
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organization is . . .  to focus on the problems of women.”70 At its core were a group of 
radical graduate students from Yale. The Women’s Caucus’ goals were to join women 
who were isolated from others of their sex and to establish ties with other women’s 
liberation groups. At the professional level, the caucus sought to target discrimination 
in employment, by publicising incidents of discrimination and confronting their 
perpetrators and the AEA. At the academic level it aimed to promote research on the 
economic and social position of women and to assemble a bibliography on the subject.
Any woman participating in URPE activities could join the caucus: she need not 
be an economist, activists interested in radical economics or partners of male URPErs 
were welcomed. A report by Peggy Howard on one of the Caucus’ early meetings in 
the summer of 1970 testifies to the group’s diverse composition.71 Such diverse 
backgrounds meant for Howard that unlike the men, the women’s group did not have 
a set of common interests and commitments. “Some were members of URPE, and 
were concerned with discrimination both in URPE and within the economics 
profession. Others of us resented any obligation to become involved in what was our 
husband’s or boyfriend’s organization, not ours.”72
It was as a weakly bound group that the Women’s Caucus met in the summer of 
1971, at Camp Muffy. At the URPE’s Business meeting, a group of women economists 
decided to demand that the steering committee include two members of the Women’s 
Caucus, and that more women be added to the editorial board of the Review of 
Radical Political Economics (then there was only one). They also wanted “family” 
membership to be recognised in URPE (“family” defined broadly as including people 
living together) which would give voting rights to family members (nearly all female).
The latter proposal was contentious to those that at the time saw URPE as an 
eminently professional organization - a forum to discuss and develop radical 
economics.73 For some men it made no sense to have non-economists as URPE 
members. The Women’s Caucus saw it differently; they argued that non-economists
70Weisskoff (1970). “The Political Economy of Women’s Liberation” was the title of a seminal article 
written by Margaret Benston for the Monthly Review  (Benston (1969)).
71 Howard (1970).
72Ibid, p. 4.
73Interview with Arthur MacEwan, 2003.
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(mostly women) were already an active part of URPE’s organizational life (not least 
as members of the Caucus) and deserved full recognition. Thus the summer 1971 
controversy may be seen as the first sign, preceding the outreach efforts, of URPE’s 
move away from a professional based group towards a more open, less academically 
defined, organization.
The proposed changes to the RRPE  editorial board faced opposition by the men 
and a conflict ensued. As retold in the Newsletter:
During this debate, a male URPE member made a remark which was 
interpreted by some women as implying that women were only qualified to 
speak on women’s issues. This incident, which seemed to us symbolic of 
the treatment of women in URPE, sparked a major encounter. The 
women decided to caucus, and left the room.74
As some of the women economists left the meeting they were (unexpectedly) followed 
in mass by all the other women present. The leading group of women had intended to 
discuss a plan of action given the men’s response to their proposals, but as all the 
other women followed them, their exit took also the symbolic meaning of a protest, 
and a show of solidarity among such a diverse group.75
On their return to the meeting, the women announced that the three women 
nominated for the board would stand as individuals and that they would accept a 
voting procedure agreed on by the plenary. They further demanded that a committee 
be set up to determine how voting would take place in the future, taking into 
consideration the question of regional and sexual representation on committees.76 
Before voting the new editorial board, the women’s group proposed that the meeting 
begin with a session of criticism and self-criticism over the nature of the relationships 
between men and women in URPE.
Criticism-self-criticism sessions were a staple of radical left movements in the 
1960s and 1970s. Based on practices pioneered by the Bolshevik party, mutual 
criticism sessions were developed by the Chinese Communist Party over the decades
74Horowitz et al (1971), p. 3.
75Interview with Laurie Nisonoff, 2003.
76Horowitz et al (1971), p. 3.
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of its struggle to power and “represented an attempt either to pre-empt or co-opt the 
autonomous primary groups which would ordinarily exist in various organizations and 
throughout society” ,77 The sessions comprised of each person analysing his thoughts 
and actions comparing them critically with the ideal standard sought for. One was 
expected not only to criticise ones’ own shortcomings but also to accept criticisms 
from the group and in turn point to the failings of others.78
In the criticism and self-criticism session, over two and a half hours, the women 
accused URPE men of male chauvinist behaviour. In the Newsletter's report of the 
events, the authors highlighted “the arguments” raised by men to dismiss the 
women’s criticisms.79 According to the report men were impatient with the time 
spent on a matter they portrayed as relevant only at the level of personal 
relationships, between them and the women they were involved with.80 Men argued 
that they had joined URPE “to discuss radical economics and not to participate in an 
encounter group.” Women, on the other hand, felt that the male view of politics was 
restrictive and echoing women liberation’s views argued that personal relationships 
were political and that radical economics should not allow itself to reproduce 
oppression within its principal organization.
For women radical change could only occur through collective examination 
coupled with women’s separatism.81 According to them, men were paternalistic and 
domineering, women needed to work together to become independent and 
self-confident of their abilities. Without husbands and men friends women argued it 
would be easier to discuss their personal politics.
As a conclusion, the report of the meeting proclaimed that:
URPE is a male-dominated organization and is oppressive to women.
Moreover it has shown very little remorse at being so. We hope that the 
need for change in the organization is now seen. We will continue to
77W hyte (1974), p. 10.
78Ibid., p. 3.
79Horowitz et al (1971), pp. 4-5.
80 Another view held by some men was that oppression inside the organization was better charac­
terised as elitism and was forced upon new comers and those from less prestigious backgrounds, which 
women argued was a wholly different issue (Horowitz et al. (1971)).
81 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
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struggle within URPE on the assumption that there are men willing to 
struggle with us against sexism in URPE. However, unless progress is 
made within the organization as a whole, some of us may be forced to 
consider leaving URPE.82
The women’s reporting of the men’s views seems to have been an accurate 
description of the divisions emerging within URPE. In the same Newsletter, alongside 
the report, was a comment by Howard Wachtel. The author began by noting that 
URPErs carried a baggage of hostilities, antagonisms, and contradictions thrust upon 
them by society. While formalism and hierarchy were imposed by the lecture form in 
Universities and by the AEA, sexism but also racism and elitism were imposed by 
society generally. He added that these “contradictions,” and in particular sexism, 
manifested themselves in URPE but were not as acute as outside, in larger society.83 
Thus, for Wachtel the issue was not as central and severe as the women had argued.
Despite downplaying the severity of the issue, Wachtel expected future 
disruptions. He feared that radical organizations were internally weak and could not 
withstand intense struggle. To prevent the self-destruction of the organisation 
Wachtel proposed creating “new forms of organizational structure.” He suggested 
that more activities should occur at URPE’s regional level, these becoming decisional 
units with their own general meetings and that the Women’s Caucus might constitute 
itself as a region, if women so wished. He further proposed the creation of a 
Scheduling Committee, with regional and women’s representation, to assist the 
organization of the meetings at the summer conference. Wachtel’s stress in 1971 was 
on transforming URPE’s institutions, arguing that “If the movement does not start 
dealing with problems of internal structure and only with problems of consciousness 
and personal liberation, its rate of disintegration will accelerate” ,84
Wachtel’s article echoed the portrayal of the men’s position provided in the 
report of the 1971 conference.85 While women found personal examination (and 
confrontation) coupled with institutional separatism essential for tackling sexist
82Ibid, p. 6.
83Wachtel (1971), p. 7.
84Ibid, p. 8.
85Horowitz et al (1971).
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behavior, men favoured a solely institutional response, ranking the women’s caucus as 
a “region.” The silence concerning personal examination in Wachtel’s reflections 
suggests that this proposal in particular was difficult to bear for male URPErs.86
The women’s criticisms in 1971 was source of discomfort in URPE. Some men 
responded with hostility, Lawrence Tharp for instance noted his disagreement with 
the women’s solution to sexism, since for him it simply reversed oppression, 
transferring all the power to women.87 Tharp accused women of dominating and 
oppressive behaviour at the conference when they restricted men in their speaking 
and when the Women’s Caucus announced unilaterally changes to the conference 
program: “Undemocratic actions of this sort are oppressive, whether they come from 
authoritarian cliques in our workplaces or from women at URPE conferences, and are 
not consistent with maintaining a non-antagonistic relationship between radical men 
and women.”88
The Women’s Caucus was broadly successful in obtaining its demands. Alongside 
the regions, the Women’s Caucus elected two representatives to the Steering 
Committee. Furthermore, several regions began electing one male and one female as 
their representatives. Four women were elected to the 1971-72, twenty strong, 
editorial board: Heidi Cochran, Grace Horowitz, Peggy Howard and, Lourdes 
Surkin.89
The Women’s Caucus became an active source of activity, organizing several 
conferences on the political economy of women and in December 1971 targeting the 
AEA for its gender discrimination, assisting the creation of the Committee on the 
Status of Women in the Economics Profession (CSWEP)90. At the Review for Radical 
Political Economics, one of the initial targets of the caucus’ criticism, by 1973-74
there were nine women on the editorial board. In 1974 and until 1978 women took on
86I found no evidence of further sessions of criticism/self-criticism over sexism following the 1971 
meeting (Private Communication Laurie Nisonoff, 8 June 2005).
87Tharp (1971), p. 10.
88Ibid. pp. 12-13.
89The next academic year, 1972-73, there were seven women at the editorial board: Grace Horowitz, 
Amy Bridges, Heidi Cochran, Collette Moser, Ann Davis, Laurie Nisonoff and Nancy Hancock.
90It was also thanks to the network established by the Women’s Caucus that the W omen’s Work 
Project was able to function with the success already noted in this chapter, see p. 120
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the role of editorial board coordinator, first Lourdes (Surkin) Beneria and from 1976, 
Constance Blake. Also worthy of note were the special issues put together by women 
collectives: in July 1972 “The Political Economy of Women” included articles, photos, 
poems and book reviews; in the Spring of 1976 an issue in two parts, the first on 
“Women in Changing Societies” and the other of a historical subject, “Women and 
the Great Depression”; and in the Fall of 1977 an issue on “Women, Class and 
Family.”
My narrative of the outreach activities was circumscribed to the mid-1970s, I 
have returned to 1971 to discuss the history of the Women’s Caucus as the first in a 
series of similar developments that fissured the radical economics’ Union. W hat I 
want to highlight is how the radical economics identity was becoming increasingly 
secondary to divisions emerging among radicals. URPE women were both radical 
economists and women and they saw themselves separate from the men that were 
radical economists and men. Even URPE women were not a cohesive unit and their 
caucus too sectioned over controversies raging within the women’s political movement.
The parallel between the women’s activities in URPE and the general trends in 
Women’s Liberation should not be surprising. Women URPErs were an integral part 
of that movement and actively participated in some of its developments. In the 
women’s movement a divide developed between what was labeled socialist feminism 
and radical feminism:
Socialist feminists sought a synthesis of leftist analyses sensitive to class 
and race issues, with feminist analyses oriented to gender. Radical 
feminists asserted the primacy of gender as the root of all hierarchy and 
domination. Socialist feminists insisted on the need for including 
working-class women, minority women, Third World women, and an 
anti-imperialist stance; radical feminists reasserted the primacy of gender 
and rejected the lingering imprint of Marxism within socialist feminism.91
Most URPE women sided with the socialist feminist project and were active members 
of one of its major organizations, “Marxism-Feminism 1” . ‘“M-F 1’ was formed in 
1973 out of an informal network of women, many of them radical academics but
91Buechel (1990), p. 74.
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others involved principally in community organizing, health care, clerical organizing, 
or other kinds of work.”92 The purpose of M-F 1 was to promote regular meetings to 
reflect upon, compare and analyse the possibility of a synthesis between the 
adherents’ of Marxism and Feminism, “to concretize the ‘connection between the 
personal and the political’.”93 Over three years M-F 2, 3, 4 and 5 were created and 
the network (primarily in New York and Boston) reached 175 members.
In the mid to late 1970s controversy ensued between URPE women over the 
desirability and content of the fusion of Feminism and Marxism. The public 
controversy became known after Heidi Hartmann’s “The Unhappy Marriage of 
Marxism and Feminism” first circulated in 1975 and published in 1979.94 This debate 
followed in parallel with the process of disintegration of URPE to which I now turn.
4.3.2 Fighting over the current events newsletter - Dollars & Sense
The Women’s separatism pre-dated URPE’s outreach activities. The resolution of the 
women’s challenge in institutional reform left a lasting mark on the organization but 
was not source of further severe stress. The same cannot be said of the disputes that 
followed in the more militant (post-1972) stage of URPE. At the forefront of URPE’s 
outreach activities and in its new emphasis towards social movements, was the New 
York PEAC collective. At the conclusion of PEAC’s first (and successful) year of 
activity a controversy ensued over the publication of a current events newsletter. The 
controversy was to thrust into sharp relief an aspect of URPE’s new commitment to 
political involvement; that the organization had become open to the humours of left 
sectarian infighting.
In June 1974 PEAC members (who were based in New York)95 wrote to the 
Newsletter claiming priority over the idea of creating a current events bulletin. 
According to David Barkin and Maarten deKadt, since January 1974, PEAC had 
initiated contacts with people from around the country cooperating with the
92Petchesky (1979), p. 373.
93Ibid., p. 374.
94Hartmann(1979). See Sargent (1981) for a collection of essays on the controversy.
95See section 4.4.2.
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pamphlet efforts, to write articles, edit and distribute the bulletin.96 PEAC also 
noted their open approach to the project and how they had enlisted the support of a 
Harvard graduate student, Bill Lazonick. In their narrative of events the authors 
noted that in April they were surprised by news of a similar project being conducted 
from Boston. They had been introduced to Dollars & Sense (D&S) “a monthly 
bulletin of economic affairs” , through a letter sent to the New York URPE chapter. 
The PEAC narrative dramatised the Boston initiative as secretive and of dubious 
intentions.97 Barkin and deKadt made much of the inclusion in the Dollars & Sense 
sample issue of reprints from the New American Movement (NAM) publications and 
that many of the group’s members were active in NAM.98
NAM was created in 1970, envisioned “as a broad-based “mass organization” that 
would “overcome the errors of the New Left””99 which it identified as anti-leadership, 
glorification of the Third World and insensitivity to the interests and needs of 
American workers. NAM’s unofficial manifesto, “Revolution and Democracy,” written 
by Frank Ackerman and Harry Boyte, distanced the group from the Bolshevik model 
as inappropriate for the late-twentieth century US, and endorsed a more open and 
democratic alternative.100 By 1972, NAM had roughly 1,000 members and about 
thirty local chapters.101 In stark contrast with the highly centralised Marxist Leninist 
parties, NAM’s national office was aimed at serving self-defining local chapters.
“NAM saw itself primarily as providing education and political sophistication to . . .  
other struggles, rather than as aiming to be the leadership organization itself.”102 
Barkin and deKadt accused the D&S group of attempting to drain URPE’s 
resources, citing from the D&S letter which identified the group as:
people who have come together through the Boston chapter of the Union 
for Radical Political Economics (URPE). However, we intend to rely 
heavily on URPE chapters around the country to provide us with articles.
96Barkin and deKadt (1974a), pp. 16-17.
97Though no one disputed the claim that the New York chapter and PEAC had only been informed 
of D&S in April, the portrayal of Lazonick’s role in the affair was disputed (Ackerman (1974), p. 8).
98Ibid, p. 17.
"Lerner (1998), p. 543.
100Elbaum (2002), p. 119.
101Ibid., p. 118.
102Lerner (1998), p. 544.
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Although Dollars and Sense has no organizational connection with URPE, 
our association with URPE provides us with important sources of 
support. One URPE chapter has already committed itself to supplying 
one article a month. We are confident that before we begin publication in 
the fall we will have other similar commitments.103
From this quote, the PEAC members argued that D&S was willing to exploit URPE 
for support yet allowed for no accountability to the organization in return. It was 
unclear to PEAC and NY-URPE members how the bulletin project would further 
URPE or radical economics, not least because the close relationship between D&S 
members and NAM threatened the project with sectarian control.
The New York chapter proposed that to solve the impasse both the PEAC and 
D&S bulletin proposals be presented to the URPE Steering Committee for 
consideration and judgment. However, at the time (April) D&S refused to comply, 
maintaining that the bulletin should remain independent from URPE, and that they 
did not require its input. The Steering Committee once informed of the problem 
decided that two members from the Steering Committee, from D&S and from PEAC, 
should meet in May so that a cooperative working relation may be established and 
maintained.104
The May 1974 reconciliation meeting proved inconclusive:
All agreed that the bulletin should be designed to reach movement groups, 
workers, students, and others who might be interested in a regular 
analysis of events from a “radical” perspective. Both groups are interested 
in seeing such a publication emerge relatively soon. The discussions were 
friendly although no agreement was reached in spite of the clear 
articulation of the conflicting views.105
While PEAC wanted writing and research to be regionally decentralised and URPE’s 
editorial control over the publication, the D&S group wanted a centralised, 
autonomous and independent group to run the bulletin. An additional source of 
contention was the financial base for the publication, PEAC contrasted their plans for
103Cited in Barkin and deKadt (1974a), p. 17.
104Barkin and deKadt (1974a), p. 18.
105Ibid., p. 19.
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broadly based fund-raising to D&S's preference for a few large donations and loans.106
PEAC’s claim to control over the burgeoning publication was that it had come 
out (historically) of the Food project’s successes, and thus as part of the new 
challenges PEAC was facing. The NY-based bulletin would be committed to bringing 
together several groups throughout the Country, and thus furthering URPE’s growth, 
while the D&S group showed no such concern.107 Boston’s main argument for taking 
over the responsibility of the current news bulletin was their stress in a quality, timely 
and readable publication (stripped of left or academic jargon) which could only be 
achieved under their proposed centralised format.108 Boston compared to New York 
was also clearly ahead in the preparation of the publication, with a concluded sample 
issue.
The record of the discussions suggests that the D&S group did not insist that the 
bulletin should remain independent from URPE, their primary concern was on the 
structure set up for the publication - centralised in Boston and not overly dependent 
on outside chapters. After the May meeting the D&S group manifested its willingness 
to make the publication an URPE project reversing their original stance.109
Despite the Boston group’s change of heart, the run-up to the decisive summer 
meeting was not peaceful, the New York chapter and PEAC had used the Newsletter 
as a mouthpiece in their campaign against D&S. Ackerman responded on Boston’s 
behalf, “I feel hurt, angered, outraged”.110 The author accused the PEAC collective 
of red-baiting the Boston collective as a front for NAM, when in fact only four out of 
fifteen people that had worked in D&S were members. He further argued that NAM 
had never behaved in a sectarian fashion in URPE and that it was “unprincipled to 
assume that all socialist and communist groups are alike, or to attack an individual or 
group by simply labelling them, without discussing any actual disagreements and
106Ibid, p. 20.
107Ibid, p. 19.
108 Ackerman and Spitz (1974).
109Ackerman and Spitz (1974). The Boston group’s willingness to work under U R PE ’s fold was 
communicated to a Steering Committee member in a statement for publication in the June Newsletter, 
however the text was never printed. The explanation for the loss of the manuscript is unclear, it was 
suggested that it might have been merely an error by the S.C. member, and even the D&S  group was 
reluctant to draw from it political implications (Ackerman (1974), p. 7).
110Idem.
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criticisms”.111 A more severe criticism was targeted at Sandy Orlow, URPE’s 
national secretary, who had written an assessment of the debate in sympathy to the 
PEAC side. Orlow had depicted the debate as a conflict between distinct views of 
what URPE was about. He interpreted the Boston group as saying that “URPE 
started as, has always been, and can be nothing other than a radical professional 
organization, publishing radical intellectual material, organizing in academia around a 
radical-bourgeois ideological struggle and other job oriented issues which affect 
radical professional academics” .112 Orlow had argued that for the Boston group, 
PEAC were “outsiders” pressing for anti-elitism, anti-sexism, anti-professionalism, 
and outreach beyond academic circles, which was not truly representative of URPE 
and would soon die out. Orlow’g rhetoric made Boston into an “old URPE,” 
professional and intellectual-oriented, versus the “new URPE” of activism which 
PEAC epitomised. Ackerman found Orlow’s role in the dispute a breach of the ethics 
demanded from a National representative. He had made no effort to contact the 
Boston group, to discuss and come to know their views; as a result he had grossly 
misrepresented the politics of D&S. Ackerman reassured that Boston was committed 
to the struggle against elitism, sexism and professionalism.113
The summer 1974 meeting brought a reaffirmation and extension of PEAC’s role 
(becoming PEA) but also the membership’s endorsement of the Dollars & Sense 
project. The current events newsletter was to be an URPE project, but along the lines 
defined in the Boston proposal, centralised and largely autonomous from other URPE 
structures. Commenting on the 1974 Summer Conference, Nan Wiegersma, an active 
member in the Women’s Work Project, saw the debates as a battle between “groups 
of people associated with three political parties (or pre-parties) . . .  Progressive 
Labour Party, Revolutionary Union and New American Movement” ,114 while a fourth 
identifiable political group were the women. In Wiegersma’s assessment a compromise
111Ibid., p. 8.
112Orlow (1974), p. 21.
u 3Ackerman (1974), p. 9.
114Wiegersma (1974), p. 27. The mid 1970s were a period of a flurry of activity by Marxist Leninist 
groups to create new communist parties, while building support and discussing political line. In 
preparation for that goal these groups took on the label of “pre-party formations” , see Elbaum (2002).
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had been made between the Boston NAM and the New York Revolutionary Union 
(RU), the latter group being one of the major Maoist organizations of the early 
1970s.115 What distinguished the Maoist movement ideologically was advocacy of 
violent revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat; rejection of the Soviet and 
U.S. Communist parties for alleged “revisionism” (discarding the revolutionary 
principles of Marxism-Leninism); defence of Stalin as a great revolutionary and belief 
that after Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin in 1956 the Soviet Union had moved 
toward restoration of capitalism and became an antirevolutionary force. Domestically, 
the Maoist current saw the key to the U.S. revolution as forging an alliance between 
the “multinational working class” and the “oppressed nationalities.”116 In the light of 
Wiegersma’s comments, the D&S dispute was a battle of organized political groups; 
on the one hand were the Boston-based democratic socialists of NAM, on the other 
the New York based “new communists” of RU.
In retrospect the current-events newsletter dispute was quickly dealt with, once 
the Boston collective was willingly brought into the URPE fold. What was significant 
was a new outlook for URPE as a stage for the maneuvering of political parties. In 
the new matrix for understanding disputes and for reasoning over subjects, there was 
no single, united radical group but a tense collection of political interests (originating 
in outside groups) pursuing their own agendas. URPE members were not solely 
radical economists set on a theoretical redefinition of the science. They had become 
in the early 1970s also feminists, Maoists, democratic socialists, and Marxists of 
various persuasions. For many URPE was not their first home, while it may have 
defined them as economists it could not define them as political activists. Their 
commitment to one of the revolutionary movements and parties of the left often 
demanded a contest with other left groups over strategy, over resources, which 
resulted in doing battle with radical colleagues.
115Alongside the October League (OL) (as RU, also made up of former SDS members). RU was 
founded as the Bay Area Revolutionary Union in 1968, grew into a nationwide organization in 1970-71, 
and in 1975 declared itself the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) (Elbaum (1998), p. 473).
116Idem.
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4.3.3 “W hither URPE?” Yellow Springs, August 1975
Despite the successful resolution to the D&S controversy at the Summer 1974 
conference, tensions in URPE between political groups did not subside. Notably in 
the New York chapter in the early months of 1975 a confrontation erupted between 
RU members and other left groupings. The turmoil was all the more serious since the 
URPE National Office had moved to New York that year and was caught in the 
crossfire.117
URPE’s troubles paralleled growing infighting in the American left. The most 
detailed historical account of the left-wing groups of this period, Revolution in the 
Air, notes that in contrast to 1973 when new communist groups met under the 
auspices of the American magazine Guardian,118 sectarian strife became increasingly 
intense from 1974 onwards, particularly between RU and other groups.119 From the 
host of reasons behind the sectarian moment, historian Max Elbaum highlights the 
belief in Marxist Leninism as a “universal” theory of revolution, as final and 
unquestionable truth. It was assumed that ideological purity was essential for 
political efficacy, “Mao declared that ‘the correctness or incorrectness of the 
ideological and political line decides everything,’ and this dictum was quoted 
endlessly.”120 More contextual reasons have also been offered by Elbaum:
“Conditions outside the movement also facilitated this retreat into purist orthodoxies. 
By 1974-75 the popular movements, which had surged in 1970-73, had ebbed like 
their late-sixties predecessors, leaving the entire revolutionary left adrift.”121
One of the protagonists at the New York troubles commented: “developments in 
various ‘movement’ groups and coalitions was turning URPE into a sectarian 
battleground, totally divorced from questions of political economy, and was in fact 
bringing on ‘narrow sectarian wrecking’ of URPE”.122 At its April meeting the New
117At the 1975 Summer Conference Michael Zweig, Batya Weinbaum and Jeff Keefe (from PEA) were 
castigated for their behaviour, “disruptive of the SC and irresponsible in his treatment of the National 
Secretary since the NO move to NYC” (Newsletter (1975c), p. 25).
118Elbaum (2002), pp. 108-109.
119Ibid., pp. 186-187.
120Ibid., p. 157.
121Ibid., p. 195.
122Zweig (1975), p. 22.
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York chapter decided to abandon the project of turning URPE into “some kind of 
general mass ‘movement’ organization” and to re-assert its role as a forum to debate 
the workings of monopoly capitalism and socialism, by the “broadest number of 
people actively engaged in studying, writing about and teaching about the 
economy”.123 Zweig, formerly an enthusiast of movement organizing, was arguing for 
a renewed emphasis on intellectual tasks, the mission of URPE being the 
“development of the most scientific analysis of political economy.”124
Zweig maintained his earlier suspicion of professionalism and academia.
According to him, URPE’s constituency may have been largely academic but it was 
not exclusively so, and it was much wider that those they organized, i.e. the parties 
and movements they were involved with: “URPE members have an ‘audience’ which 
is broader that those we organize. That is why we correctly publish D&S, arrange 
speakers and forums on the economy in the community and with unions, and support 
PEA publications.”125
The 1975 April and June Newsletters opened a novel front for conflict. A group 
of URPE members had coalesced around the Chicago URPE chapter with the agenda 
of furthering activism against academism.126 Signing their critique as Just Folks,127 
they denounced a “structural antagonism between the natural leadership of radical 
economics and the duly elected membership” . The authors argued for the existence of 
two groups within URPE: there were some of the organization’s founders who sought 
an “alternative AEA”, “they turned to the educated left to find the audience that 
would validate their academic achievements and would hence provide them with the 
respect and recognition bourgeois circles were denying them”;128 and then there were 
those that tried “to make URPE a place where radical political economics, as a tool
123Ibid., p. 23.
124Ibid., p. 24.
125Ibid., p. 23.
126Private Communication Joseph Persky, June 9 2005.
127The Just Folks were Jose Alberro (Chicago), Mitchell Berlin (Chicago; Regional PEAC), Herminio 
Blanco (Chicago), Judy Brody (Women’s Caucus), Amy Bridges (Chicago), Bill Cartmill (Chicago; 
Regional PEAC), Ed Dessau (Chicago), Jim Hill (Chicago), Lori Helmbold (San Jose; Regional PEAC), 
Jim Hill (Chicago), Jo Ann Kawell (Chicago), David Landes (San Jose), Joe Persky (Chicago), Jo Anne 
Preston (Cambridge, Mass.), Gayle Southworth (San Joe; West Coast Organizer) and Al Weinrub (San 
Jose).
128Just Folks (1975), p. 25.
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of social change, is learned and developed.”129
The shortcomings of URPE were due, according to the Mid-West critics, to its 
organizational structure which permitted elitism and sexism to permeate the Union, 
as seen in the emergence of “levels of stardom among our faculty members, and a 
system in which it is always the same clique that gets exposure in the bourgeois 
media” .130 The Mid-West members called for the creation of a “Small Potatoes 
Caucus” and nomination of spokespersons to fight the influence of the radical 
superstars. In a later proposal, they called for a regionalised PEA as the core 
structure of URPE: “It is therefore of the utmost importance that PEA become what 
it was intended to be originally: an instrument to develop Political Education and 
Action.”131 The group wanted more detailed and more widely discussed budgets for 
PEA and generally more money for the Mid-West, West and South as it was argued 
that all the funding was being diverted to the East.
A group of URPE members including many of those considered the radical 
superstars, responded to the Mid-West critics.132 The group hinted that the 
accusations over “the ways in which older, more experienced and more established 
members have been speaking and writing about the economy, fearing that they would 
be taken as “designated representatives” of the organization”133 was part of the 
growing stress inside the Union as political organizations and parties competed to 
influence it. The group argued that the insinuation that the East was exploiting 
URPE’s financial resources was absurd, in fact it merely followed from the location of 
the National Office in New York.134 For the authors’ the Mid-West challenge was 
part of a divisive trend that menaced URPE and did not reflect a correct
129Ibid., p. 25.
130Ibid. p. 26. The claim that a select number of radicals had been singled out by outsiders as leaders 
was not contested. Notably, Paul Samuelson’s Op Ed at the New York Times in March 1973 referred 
to Bowles and Sweezy as the heads of radical economics, characteristically conflated with the Marxist 
movement; and in April 1975, David Gordon was invited by the New York Tim es Magazine to write a 
large opinion piece on the radical perspective on economic recession.
131Alberro et al. (1975), p. 16.
132The authors of the text were Lourdes Beneria (then coordinator of the R R P E  ed. board), Sam 
Bowles, Rick Edwards, David Gordon, Bill Tabb, Mike Reich, John Willoughly, Shaun Hargreaves- 
Heap, Doug Dowd, and Larry Kahn.
133Beneria et al. (1975), p. 7.
134Ibid, p. 8.
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understanding of the organization’s problems.
Arguing against the “Small potatoes” proposals, this group felt that investing 
more resources into PEA would be a mistake, “In our view it would create greater 
schism to bypass the elected Steering Committee by establishing four paid PEA 
coordinators” , it was all the more so since “an unhealthy division has developed 
between PEA and URPE”.135 There was a noted threat that PEA may develop into a 
second URPE. This group, in contrast to the Mid-West critics, did not feel that a 
reshuffling of organizational priorities was required, or even that some tasks, namely 
connecting with outside movement groups, should be singled out as more important 
than others. For “all URPE activities are essential -  building the RRPE and PEA, 
teaching radical political economy within departments of Economics and outside of 
them, organizing counter-conventions at the AEA meetings and conferences elsewhere, 
writing and disseminating URPE’s work as much as possible and at all levels” .136
That URPE was in the midst of a crisis was widely recognised. The August 1975 
issue of the Newsletter was a volumous collection of articles on the open wounds of the 
previous months, aptly titled “Whither URPE?” (see Figure 4.1). The Yellow Springs 
meeting was perceived as the battlefield where the diverse groups with their opposing 
projects would clash.137 The result would decide the fate of URPE for years to come.
Three groups were identified in the report of the 1975 Summer Conference, 
corresponding to the fault lines developing in the previous months.138 The “small 
potatoes” group charged the Union of elitism and individualism, and demanded the 
allocation of more resources to the regions and to activism. The group that had 
responded to “small potatoes” criticisms in the previous months took on for the
135Ibid., p. 9.
136Ibid., p. 7.
137The 1975 meeting was the place for all battles, even among the Women Caucus conflict emerged 
between the Marxists and the Feminists. W hite (1975), p. 14, claiming that feminist political economy 
was a negation of URPE:
There is no separate field called “feminist political economy’ because there is no objective 
basis for it in the political economy of monopoly capitalism. To eliminate the oppression 
of women requires the elimination of monopoly capitalism - a very long process of class 
struggle which is not led either by women alone or men alone, but by the working class.
138Meyer and Gordon (1975), pp. 5-6.
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Figure 4.1: Playful dialectic cover of Newsletter of the Union for Radical Political 
Economics, August 1975, containing articles debating the failings of URPE.
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meeting the label of “eggplants”139 and its proclaimed emphasis was to diffuse 
divisions within the organization. A third group from the New York chapter presented 
a statement “Struggle for Political Economy” that reaffirmed URPE’s main purpose 
as that of “doing political economy”, it further argued for abolishing the separate 
PEA structure and for the creation of a Popular Political Economy Pamphlets series.
The overall outcome of the meeting was a defeat for “small potatoes.” Although 
they obtained a commitment to prioritise activities by Mid-Atlantic, Mid-West South 
and Far West chapters, the crucial demand to regionalise and strengthen PEA lost to 
the New York group’s proposal to abolish the structure. Though deemed a desirable 
end, agreement on how to push for more “team speaking” and for nomination of 
“spokespersons” was thin, and nothing in concrete was legislated.
Following the instigation of the New York group, a Popular Political Economy 
Series was created to replace PEA. Its “Representative Review Board” was not 
responsible for planning or soliciting members to write. Its role was solely that of 
judging the materials’ relevance and quality and to decide whether they would carry 
the URPE seal, and if they were to be funded and/or distributed by URPE. The 
organizational structure of the new outreach initiative Popular Political Education 
Editorial Board (PPEEB) was a break from the PEA past. The PPEEB had five 
members, a steering committee member appointed yearly, and four elected at large at 
the Summer Conference. Unlike the PEA that was run primarily by a non-elected 
and independent collective, directed from New York, the PPEEB was fused to the 
elected steering committee and was made accountable to the Summer Conference. It 
was thus designed as a check on party political contamination of the pamphlet efforts 
immunizing URPE against sectarian strife.
The “eggplant” resolutions were adopted (with minor amendments) by the 
Summer meeting as the standing statement of URPE’s organizational mission, and 
were used as the basis for a new membership brochure.140 The adopted resolutions
139 “Eggplants” was an allusion to a somewhat popular song by Dr. W est’s Medicine Show and Junk 
Band, written by Norman Greenbaum, “The Eggplant that Ate Chicago” (Personal Communication 
Joseph Persky, June 9 2005).
140Meyer and Gordon (1975), p. 7.
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began:
URPE is an association of people devoted to the study, development, and 
application of radical political economics as a tool for building socialism in 
the United States. It functions as an umbrella organization, providing a 
forum and focus for people with many different political inclinations who 
share that common dedication.141
URPE’s three major headings of activity were (in the order in which they were 
named): to encourage the development of Radical Political Economics, namely 
through the R R PE ; to “strengthen our primary bases of activity in the universities 
and other educational institutions” and to “work with many progressive groups in the 
United States, providing supportive political economic analyses” .142 Popular writing 
was reaffirmed, “URPE will attempt to develop new activities to make it more 
responsive to movement, local, and rank and file needs, building upon the lessons” ;143 
but this was now far removed from being the prime concern.
The solution to the growing disruption inside the organization held by “struggle” 
and “eggplants” was to contain independent activism and to reafhrfn the 
organization’s focus on intellectual and academic tasks; “small potatoes” were left 
alone in demanding a more directive and muscular organization with a political 
agenda. Significantly, this was not a mere return to the more intellectual tasks of the 
past. The 1975 summer conference defined URPE as a grouping of different people, 
“an umbrella organization” or a “forum.” This was to deny that such a thing as a 
radical political economist existed or that it could come to exist in the future. Under 
this new outlook URPErs were Marxists, Feminists, Radicals of different kinds united 
by debate and intellectual partnership.
4.3.4 URPE as an “umbrella organization”
The 1975 meeting represented a major break in the history of URPE. The project of 
joining radical academics with activism that had replaced the earlier project of a
141N ewsletter (1975a), p. 10.
142Idem.
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radical paradigm, was dropped with no substitute in sight. The following years of the 
organization were a testimony to this loss of direction, inherently also a loss of 
identity.
As I have noted, PEA was replaced in the URPE Summer Conference of 1975 by 
the Popular Political Education Editorial Board (PPEEB). Its main function was to 
publish and distribute the Popular Political Economy Series, and in 1975 it published 
a reader on economic crisis entitled Radical Perspectives on the Economic Crisis of 
Monopoly Capitalism, initiated and all but concluded under PEA, of which ten 
thousand copies were distributed in the first year. However, no further projects were 
initiated or concluded beyond the distribution of the Crisis volume. Even the 
Newsletter came into troubles with delays in publishing that year, and only the 
Review continued publication with no noticeable difficulties.
The 1976 Summer Conference was a world apart from the meeting of the previous 
year. As remarked in the Newsletter report: “The mood of the conference can be 
summed up by saying that it was a very mellow experience.” The business meeting 
“ran in a relaxed, low-key manner” .144 The reasons for the new mood were put down 
as “people have learned from experience that certain political issues are divisive and 
for the strength of the organization are best left outside of URPE’s politics”.145 In 
contrast with the 150 attendance of the previous year there were under 90 
participants at the 1976 Summer Conference, which sparked a discussion on the “lack 
of energy” in the organization.146 It was remarked that older URPE members were 
no longer taking active roles and the younger members were not getting the “high” 
that the first generation got from founding URPE.147
Facing the failures of the PPEEB, that had not yet properly convened, the 
Women’s Work Project, argued and achieved in the 1976 Summer Conference its 
independence. In 1977 the Women’s Work pamphlets were reprinted and updated, 
with a new addition in 1978 of Women Organizing the Office. The new pamphlet
144Carlson (1976), p. 4.
145Ibid., p. 5.
146 A similar pattern of growing disengagement was identified by the report of the RRPE, ASS A 
meeting and regional organizing (Carlson (1976)).
147Carlson (1976), p. 5.
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with over 70 pages was larger than the earlier ones, with three sections: “On the job” 
collecting testimonies of women’s working conditions in clerical jobs; “Our heritage: 
from Office Clerk to Automated Office” a brief labour history of women;148 and lastly 
“Organizing Today” , setting out strategies and institutions for women to organize. 
The Women’s Work Project was the only outreach activity that continued into the 
late 1970s with recognised success, printing 18,500 copies and selling over 13,000.149 
But in 1979, the Women’s Work Project decided to discontinue, attributing its demise 
to URPE’s inability to define political direction:
While we think that it is important to take political positions in political 
education work, URPE does not have a framework for debating the 
political positions which should be taken. This leads to groups within 
URPE taking positions which are not shared by or debated with the rest 
of the organization. I think that URPE politics should be more defined if 
truly widespread political education work is going to be done in URPE.150
The lack of enthusiasm in URPE continued into 1977. Responding to the failure of 
the PPEEB a new initiative was outlined at the 1977 Summer Conference, the 
“Economics Education Project.”151 The new activity differed from PPEB in that 
members of the Project would actively solicit materials for publication,152 the 
previous editorial board had expected to receive manuscripts from interested 
members, and was intended as a political check on the content of pamphlets. It was 
becoming clear that the mid-1970s ferment of movement activity was gone. In the 
absence of spontaneous interest the writing of pamphlets would have to be solicited. 
In addition, the number of members involved in organising the project was expanded 
from four to six, elected in the Summer Conference.
The post-1975 outreach activities were no longer part of a grand plan for 
connecting URPE with mass movements but were poised as “attempts to produce
148This section was source of some controversy between feminists and socialists members of the 
women’s group, as they proposed different interpretations of women’s history (Wiegersma (1979), 
P- 24).
149Ibid., p. 23.
150Ibid., p. 24.
151Hartmann (1977).
152 N ewsletter (1977), p. 5.
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politically relevant political economy.”153 These efforts were also increasingly seen as 
part of URPE’s vocation to educate. They were another facet of being a radical 
economist, but never again were they played out as the first priority.
When in January 1978 URPE, through its Economics Education Project, 
published a new Economic Crisis volume, U.S. Capitalism in Crisis, the publication 
bore little resemblance to the mid-seventies pamphlet work. It was a book collecting 
independently written scholarly papers over a range of complementary issues, no 
longer attempting a single and clear message. The preface all but excused itself for 
the political views represented:
This collection of readings does not present an URPE political position on 
the current crisis of U.S. capitalism. The selection of articles and the 
range of views presented is the responsibility of the editorial collective; the 
authors of the individual articles are responsible for the views presented in 
their own essays; and the four members of the editorial collective who 
wrote the Introduction and Conclusion take full responsibility for their 
views154
Despite the disclaimers, the volume was not without political message. But unlike the 
earlier years’ emphasis on activism, the conclusion was to open a debate on the left, 
and a long list of unresolved issues was put forward for reflection.155
In 1977 facing lack of interest and participation URPE redefined its membership 
rules, with a new category of membership providing full voting rights and receipt of 
the Newsletter at a much lower cost, an incentive to join the frail Union. And in the 
following year, 1978, URPE was incorporated.156 It adopted the status of an 
educational organization which implied its formal abandonment of any political line, 
something that was inscribed into its by-laws.
153Ibid., p. 6.
154Crisis Reader Editorial Collective (1978), preface.
155Ibid., pp. 340-342.
156 N ewsletter (1978).
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4.4 D ivisive activism
Activism has been largely ignored in histories of the radical group. Typically histories 
are content with asserting activism’s presence in the radicals’ value system.157 Yet 
taking activism as an essentialist feature of radical economics conceals the important 
history of how it was first interpreted and pursued in URPE c. 1972 and how this 
understanding collapsed amidst turmoil in 1975. For such a short period, three years, 
the activist experiment left a lasting mark on URPE and radical economics’ identity.
From the outset the move towards activism was divisive. Although the radical 
identity was solidly cast on the ideal of the scientist-partisan, it was contentious to 
interpret it as warranting the scientist to move away from academic work and to offer 
his services to social movements as expert pamphleteer. Such an interpretation came 
about as a result of a general redirecting of the American Left towards the working 
class complemented with a disdain for academism and professionalism. While the 
New York PEAC/PEA increasingly sought to define URPE in a drive towards 
outreach, the more academic-oriented URPErs coalesced around the RRPE  or acted 
independently from the Union. The latter group mounted resistance when, led by the 
working class emphasis of the time, the editorial board of the RRPE  decided to 
re-centre the editorial policy in Marxism.
But the truly disruptive and divisive force was not to be the activists vs 
academics divide. It came from the outreach enthusiasts. Barely a year into the 
pamphlet writing efforts, radicals began to look at each other less as fellow radical 
economists but as members of competing political groups with their distinct 
ideologies and agendas. The infighting began with the D&S controversy and became 
critical at the New York chapter in the early months of 1975. It was a battle for 
control and definition of URPE staged by different political persuasions. The radical 
identity proved powerless to keep the group together in the new non-academic setting.
By 1975 a variety of proposals to resolve the crisis were at hand. The “small 
potatoes” caucus argued for deepening the activist commitment and create
157See chapter 2 of this thesis, in particular my discussion of Attewell (1984), on p. 46.
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institutions that guaranteed that a political line once defined could be enforced. The 
New York group called for a return to intellectual tasks and to reform outreach into a 
more modest and contained effort, to be yearly scrutinized at the Summer 
Conference. Finally there were the “Eggplants” that represented not only a return to 
intellectual tasks but also to academic ones. The victorious “Eggplant resolutions” 
restrained activism and communion with popular movements and ultimately 
reinterpreted it as yet another form of educational work, emptied of ideological 
content. There was no desire to unite what stood divided by the bitter infighting of 
the previous year. “Radical economist” had become an “umbrella” identity for the 
many (and more primary) identities of the party-political left, the Feminists, Socialist 
Feminists, Democratic Socialists, Populists, Marxists-Leninists of various persuasions, 
that gained definition in the infighting of the mid-1970s. The years of activism taught 
radical economists about divisions that they would not easily forget.
5Conclusion to Radical Political 
Economics
5.1 U R P E  and R adical P olitical Econom ics
Radical economics is typically portrayed by radicals as emerging in response to the 
social movements of the sixties.1 If the statement is interpreted as noting that radical 
economists were once student radicals, one of the sixties’ movements, then it is merely 
stating a fact. But if it is meant to signify, as it usually is, that the content of radical 
economics was somehow directly informed by radicals’ involvement with social 
movements, one risks a misleading generalisation. The political ferment of the 1960s 
(and 1970s) played a prominent role in the making of radical economics but in often 
indirect and convoluted ways. I propose that the thread that allows one to string 
together social context and the specific dynamics of the economics profession for the 
history of radical economics is the Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE). 
The history of Radical Political Economics is, at least until 1978, a history of URPE.
The Union grew out of the organising efforts of University of Michigan economics 
students protesting against the Vietnam War. Beginning in 1966 in a dispute over the 
military draft system, economics students had joined together to oppose the 
University administration and some in the economics faculty. Following this early 
contact and as calls for student power came to the fore in the late 1960s, these 
economics students were among those that called for curriculum reform.2 It has been
xGintis (1984), Bowles and Edwards (1990) as discussed in chapter 2.
2Brazer (1982), pp. 251-252.
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suggested that radicals were already by the mid-1960s debating radical economics, at 
SDS’s Radical Education Project, at Free University seminars, and while advocating 
curriculum reform.3 But at the end of this thesis, I find it unlikely that the idea of a 
radical economics, distinct from conventional economic theory, was at the time a 
subject of debate. URPE was not created in 1968 to give voice to a new economic 
theory. It followed in its design the program set by the New University Conference of 
1967, aiming to support action by radicals as they moved into professional careers.4 
URPE was part of a larger trend of founding radical caucuses in the professions, 
intended as contact groups for graduating radical students.
The motivation for creating URPE was derived from the unfolding of late 1960s’ 
student activism, in particular the chosen career path of an older cohort of SDSers. 
The character of the Union was soon reshaped by events specific to the economics 
profession. The decision taken by AEA officials to hold the 1968 annual meeting in 
Chicago, angered many in the profession. After the August “police riot” targeting 
anti-war protesters,5 many economists demanded a boycott of the city. As an 
alternative to the AEA Chicago meeting, the Grey Market meeting was organized by 
Lawrence Klein in Philadelphia.6 Participation in this meeting changed URPE. In a 
few days the membership of the Union increased beyond all expectations. Radicals 
began to believe that more could be done than just act as a contact group.7
Brought together in URPE, radicals sought to define a shared intellectual 
programme. Over conferences, radical courses and articles in the period of 1969 to 
1971, URPErs were designing a critique of “conventional economics” and an 
alternative to it. Radicals’ aim was a transformation of the University not merely at 
the theoretical level, but also in its research and teaching practices. The intellectual 
programme was invested with the character of a paradigm, a “paradigm of conflict.”8 
Radical economics was announced unabashedly as a revolution for economics that
3Lee (2004a), pp. 187-188.
4On the New University Conference see p. 65 in this thesis.
5Farber (1988).
6On the Grey Market see p. 68 in this thesis.
7N ewsletter (1969a); Bluestone (1969).
8The most accomplished exposition of this program can be found in the Review of Radical Political 
Economics special issue of July 1971, “On Radical Paradigms in Economics.”
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would transmit the ferment of the times to what was perceived as an indifferent and 
complicit profession. Yet, the process of radical economics’ definition was strikingly 
disconnected from the social movements it was said to speak for. It was at URPE’s 
conferences and in the pages of its Review that the definition was laboured and 
ultimately sanctioned. Definition was accomplished in the confines of academia and 
using well-established scholarly language, as the wielding of the term “paradigm” 
clearly denotes. The 1960s movement that did play a prominent part in URPE and 
radical economics’ was student power, and the connected protest over the Vietnam 
War. The conflict in Indochina was a core subject in the radicals’ teaching and 
research.9 During 1969-70, campus protests escalated in number and in tactics, and 
administrations resorted to a heavy-handed response, expelling students and calling 
for police intervention. It is likely that the radicals’ support for the student protesters 
reinforced their disaffection from more conservative faculty colleagues and the 
profession as a whole, further committing them to challenge the perceived 
mainstream.
The radical challenge was disruptive of the public standing of the profession. 
Accounts of the radicals’ controversial, at times scandalous, participation at the AEA 
meetings reached the national media, and their alternative courses were offered at 
elite universities.10 Those that responded in defence of the profession and its 
theoretical products sought to reassert the scientific credentials of economic science. 
Their strategy was both conservative and accommodating, hoping to contain 
disruption, keep the dissenters within the professional fold but also marginalise them. 
IJltimately, the result of the contest was the removal of radicals from centre-stage.
The profession denied radicals the route to tenure and reappointment at the 
institutions that had housed the radicals’ emergence and that projected their 
criticisms to public awareness.11
9See Edwards, Reich and Weisskopf (1972) and the August 1970 special issue of the Review of 
Radical Political Economics, “On the War Economy.”
10On the media portrayal see the articles at the New York Times and Washington Post, for in­
stance Bender (1970), Salmans (1970) and Harbron (1972). Prominent among the radical courses was 
Harvard’s Social Sciences 125, see Edwards and MacEwan (1970).
11 Places such as Harvard University, University of Michigan, Yale University, MIT, and Stanford 
University.
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The marginalisation of the radicals, occurring in 1973-76, paralleled the steady 
decrease in student unrest.12 The dismissal cases at times took the shape of a contest 
between the radicals’ prime ally, the students, and the established faculty for whom 
radical economics was of no import and to be neglected. Where student response was 
strong, as in Yale University, radicals would be hired. But somewhat surprisingly it 
was with support from established colleagues that radicals secured some success at 
Stanford and achieved the creation of the U.Mass.- Amherst radical department. 
Overall, radicals made only modest gains, convinced of the profession’s hostility many 
went “underground” hiding their radical convictions.13 From the mid-1970s radicals 
no longer participated in the AEA meetings and abandoned public challenge.14
Despite what has been suggested by Frederic S. Lee, the reasons for the radicals’ 
evolving silence should not be put down solely to the dismissals and the mainstream’s 
refusal to sponsor the radical alternative.15 The marginalisation of radicals in 
academia co-occurred with a very important transformation in URPE. From 1972 a 
major section of the Union moved to replace its earlier intellectual focus with 
activism. Although the Review of Radical Political Economics continued to publish 
scholarly work, the Union was re-directing its resources to publish pamphlets 
designed for the social movements. The PEA/PEAC pamphlets were unprecedented 
in URPE and I would suggest also unprecedented in other radical professions, where 
radicals were in .contrast deepening their academic commitments.
The claim that radical economists were responsive to left-wing politics was never 
more true than in 1972-75. Through URPE’s outreach projects radicals interacted 
with left political groups. In this period radical economists wholeheartedly employed 
their economics training in service of left political causes. In these efforts, radicals 
consciously sought outside academia a testing ground for their ideas.16 The truth
12See Lifshultz (1974) on the most media worthy cases of radical firings.
13Golden (1975).
14URPE has since 1969 held its own convention at annual Allied Social Science Associations meetings, 
the venue where the AEA holds its annual convention. W hat I note here is that radicals since the mid- 
1970s moved to present their work to the URPE sessions only, where before they also participated in 
AEA sessions.
15Lee (2004b), pp. 749, 751-752.
16For radicals and the 1970s, and in the logic of their outreach work (Rose and Zweig (1973)), 
academia and the movement were two very separate entities.
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claims of their research were to be examined not by their professional colleagues but 
by “the people.”
The clearest legacy of URPE’s outreach activities was severe infighting that foiled 
any hope of returning to the earlier years of communal work. In 1974-75 strenuous 
schisms developed among the membership and it seemed impossible for URPE to 
speak again as a single voice.17 URPE was mirroring the bitter sectarianism of the 
1970s American left.18 The settlement of the internal strife left the Union as an 
“umbrella organization.” To be able to accommodate the diverse political 
persuasions, it was defined as being without definition. More importantly, the Union 
sought to sever its connection with the political left by restraining its outreach work 
and finally becoming in 1978 an incorporated educational organization.
The aftermath of this period was a dispersed radical community.19 Different 
groups now undertook their own activities in isolation from the Union.20 URPE 
remained as a professional organization instrumental for maintaining, and 
reproducing, a network of scholars meeting through publications and conferences. Yet 
this was very far from the URPE of 1969-71: it abandoned the project of designing 
and promoting a radical paradigm; and it was unwilling to battle the AEA.
The focus of this thesis is on the emergence and definition of dissent. 
Self-definition continues as long as the group exists and is subject to change, any 
cut-off point to the narrative will be arbitrary. Still, one can take heed in choosing 
watershed moments where a stage in the history of the radical community runs its full 
course. The late 1970s signify such a moment. Two characteristics may be seen as 
distinguishing pre and post-1980 radical economics. URPE was no longer at the core 
of radical activity, except for the Review of Radical Political Economics which
17One need only compare U R PE’s 1971 statement on Nixon’s economic policy published by the 
Review of Radical Political Economics in August 1972, with the Crisis Reader of 1978.
18Elbaum (2002).
19 One may question that given such lack of common purpose, if the term “community” is still 
appropriate.
20For instance the Centre for Popular Economics was created at U.Mass -  Amherst, staffed with 
URPErs and with goals very similar to URPE’s outreach activities, but wholly independent from the 
Union (Magnuson (1979)). And soon Dollars Sense gained full independence from URPE (interview  
with Arthur MacEwan, 2003).
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continued as a prominent outlet for radical scholarship.21 The radical economics 
departments, notably U.Mass.-Amherst, became the stage for radical debate. New 
adherents to radical economics were not recruited through URPE, they were typically 
the graduate students of the older radical generation based at U.Mass.-Amherst, New 
School, U.C.-Riverside and American University.22 The second striking change was 
that controversy between radicals was no longer explicitly political or directed at 
reshaping the radicals’ institutions (i.e. URPE). The focus became primarily 
intellectual, addressing subjects that would interest few outside the radical group, 
and even within the group only the more theoretically inclined. For instance, in the 
early 1980s there was a flurry of research on the falling rate of profit, discussing its 
theoretical and empirical validity.23 In another example, the department at 
U.Mass.-Amherst became divided in two factions, one led by Stephen Resnick and 
Richard Wolff, the other by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, over the role of 
postmodern Marxism in radical theory.24 Radicals engaged in controversies that were 
played out within the confines of their community. These efforts were of a character 
very different from the 1970s radical challenge to mainstream economics.
5.2 B oundary work and radical iden tity
To conclude my discussion of the history of Radical Political Economics I wish to 
review the changes operating in the radicals’ identity, in what bound radicals as a 
community. In 1968, what University of Michigan radicals shared with those that 
joined them in URPE was the experience of student activism. They were bound by
21 Although alternative outlets also began to appear: Capital and Class (in 1977); Research in P olit­
ical Economy (1977); the Cambridge Journal of Economics (in 1978), and somewhat later Rethinking 
Marxism  (in 1989). The Review of Radical Political Economics was not hegemonic as the journal for 
publishing radical work.
22That was the experience of Robert Pollin who joined URPE at the behest of his teacher David 
Gordon (interview with Robert Pollin, 2003).
23The debate was in part a response to the Okishio Theorem of 1961, that disproved Marx’s law of 
the falling rate of profit. However, debate over the theorem only began in earnest in the late 1970s, 
early 1980s (Cullenberg (1994), pp. 59-67).
24Impressed by the work of Barry Hindress and Paul Q. Hirst’s Pre-capitalist modes of production  
(1975), Resnick and Wolff began to research Louis Althusser’s Marxism and the postmodern strains 
it motivated (interviews with Wolff, Resnick, and Gintis, 2003). The debate that split the U.Mass.- 
Amherst department began in the pages of the Review of Radical Political Economics in 1979 (Resnick 
and Wolff, 1979; Gintis, 1979).
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the culture of the sixties, which they celebrated at URPE’s yearly Summer 
Conference in parties, music and debating. They identified with a suspicion of 
authority and of the professional commitments of their elders.
Events in 1968 and 1969 moved to the top of radicals’ agenda the need to 
challenge and change their profession. The AEA failed to respond to the August 1968 
events in Chicago by not boycotting the city, and it remained silent over the War in 
Vietnam and the civil rights struggles. Adding to this official negligence, 
administrations and faculty responded to the student activism of the late 1960s with 
repression. Estranged from the profession, seeing it increasingly as an adversary, 
radicals were seeking to undermine its authority. Their challenge was not a rejection 
of science or of the value of knowledge, instead their aim was a refashioning of 
scientific practice. In their criticisms radicals portrayed themselves as the best future 
for economics. I want to draw attention not only to the content of the challenge but 
on how it reshaped the radicals’ identity, what they saw as their shared interests, and 
defining attributes.
To understand radicals’ design of their challenge and how it shaped radical’s 
identity I use the concept of boundary work. I follow Thomas Gieryn in his metaphor 
that likens boundary work to the design of a cultural map:
Boundary-work stands in the same relationship to what goes on in 
laboratories and professional journals as a topographic map to the 
landscape it depicts; both select for inclusion on a cultural or geographic 
map those features of reality most useful for achieving pragmatic ends 
(legitimating authority to knowledge claims or hiking through 
wilderness).25
In the terms proposed by Gieryn, radicals’ challenge amounted to drawing a new map 
of knowledge. Following this topographic metaphor I wish to describe what referents 
were part of the radicals’ and mainstream’s maps, and how each map prescribed
movement within science.26
25Gieryn (1995), p. 406.
26Despite evoking a topographical metaphor Gieryn never attem pts to draw a visual map of the 
controversies he studies (Gieryn (1999)), neither have later authors working with this methodology 
(see for instance, Kinchy and Kleinman (2003)). Their analysis is literary and no visual aids are
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The radicals’ earliest statement of their challenge, appearing in 1968 and 
enshrined in URPE’s original prospectus, was a call to lead economics into politically 
relevant research. It was not a critique of economic theory and its heuristics, it sought 
to rewrite the questions posed by economists.27 W hat radicals depicted was a cultural 
landscape where the economics profession was distant from the social problems of the 
day. As John Weeks stated, the source of economics’ state lay in the “politics of 
economists.”28 In the radicals map, the distance between science and society existed 
because the mainstream economists had moved away from awareness of society and 
its ills into the land of “irrelevancy.” Economists were free to travel in this cultural 
landscape. While radical economists moved towards society and its problems and thus 
became political; the conventional economists were those that distanced themselves 
from society, and thus became irrelevant.29 Therefore, radicals were proposing a map 
of the politics of economists. Science was not demarcated, because “science” was 
what scientists did “science” was mobile. Economists could apply their scientific 
efforts across this landscape without changing the scientific status of their work.
The episodes of radicals conflict with faculty and administrators over the campus 
unrest intensified in 1969-70, and so the debates between radicals and mainstream at 
the AEA conventions became ever more bitter. Radicals began to argue that theirs 
was an identity empty of intellectual content, and that they should define their own 
economics. This became their goal in the 1969-71 period as they designed courses and 
debated within URPE. Radicals raised the stakes from a critique of the subjects 
studied by economists, to a critique of the profession, its institutions and ideas as a 
whole.30 As the debate between Michael Zweig and John Weeks testifies, some 
radicals resisted such an ambitious challenge. However, by 1971-72 even the critics
provided. Following this work I have also shied from using illustrations. To depict these maps visually 
requires deciding on shapes, textures and many more relationships between the maps’ contents than 
are available in the record of the controversies. I found that to supply an illustration I would have to 
accompany it with a cumbersome justification of the many decisions needed for its construction, and I 
judged that this would add little insight into the subject of study.
27See U R PE’s Prospectus, in URPE Secretariat (1969).
28Weeks (1971).
29This was the dominant message of the papers of the Conference in December 1968 with the excep­
tion of Zweig’s “New Left Critique of Economics.”
30Evidenced in the 1969 storming of the AEA Business meeting (American Economic Review  (1970)).
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had been converted to a wholesale rejection of prevailing economic theory.31
In their new challenge radicals mapped a very different landscape of science and 
its relationship with society. As before science and politics overlapped, they were not 
demarcated. What stood separate were scientific paradigms located in the cultural 
map, thus, theirs was a map of the politics of paradigms (see table 5.1.).32 As an 
outcome of philosophy of science, the existence of two competing paradigms (the 
radicals’ and the mainstream’s) implied a battle for hegemony, where only one 
paradigm could prevail.33 Yet, radicals did not draw much attention to this aspect, 
their major stress was to show how paradigms were interlocked with the struggle for 
social change in American society.
The radicals located their paradigm linked to the revolutionary movement in 
America, as a science for the oppressed and their emancipation. The paradigm was 
part of the “movement.”34 In contrast, they placed the professional mainstream as 
implicated with the conservative forces in society, as part of the ideology of the status 
quo. Both the paradigms and the social forces were bound and were irrevocably in 
conflict and distant in the cultural map. The radical map had no place for neutrality, 
the radicals thus denied the mainstream refuge. Such referent did not exist in the 
radical map, instead, the mainstream paradigm was said to be in partisan support of 
the status quo. While the mainstream’s was a concealed partisanship, the radical 
paradigm on the other hand was overtly partisan.
Besides the paradigms overlap with the progressive or conservative forces of 
American society, what separated them was their adherence to subjectivity or 
objectivity. Radicals located traditional economics overlapping with objectivity. For 
them, objectivity was also objectification or alienation. The alleged mainstream’s 
denial of the subjective was with counter-cultural overtones made into a denial of
31 Zweig (1971b[1969]), Weeks (1971(1970]), Zweig (1971c), Weeks (1972).
32The design of the radical paradigm and its contrast to the mainstream one were the subjects of 
the July 1971 Special Issue of the RRPE, see p. 76 of this thesis.
33To evoke Kuhnian paradigms was a very contemporary weapon to deploy, one that economists 
shared with radical historians and other radical professionals. For more on the dissenters use of 
paradigms, see section 10.1. of this thesis.
34Fusfeld (1973), p. 145.
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“life” itself.35 The traditional economics paradigm was said to depoliticise and 
de-socialise the scientist while training students to become “machine-like,” - 
objectivity was used interchangeably with the notion of an ideology of the status quo. 
In contrast, radicals located themselves in subjectivity.36 Their scientific approach 
would allow the scientist to be close to the ills of society and hence revolt against 
injustice. Its goal was to teach people how to live without alienation.
The mainstream’s response to the radical challenge focused explicitly on the 
alleged Overlap between politics and science (or scientists). Mainstream economists 
denied that politics and economics were one. For them, they stood separate. But the 
mainstream also denied that there was a clearly defined boundary between the two. 
One could be near to science and far from politics, but there was no means of being 
wholly immune to the influence of society. By conventional economists’ own 
admission there was a difficult balance to strike, one should be close enough to 
identify the social ills in need of response and yet, also ensure that economists work in 
near isolation from partisanship and societal commitments.37 Politics was not a social 
space where two separate classes (the oppressed and the oppressor) were clearly 
demarcated. Instead, for the mainstream, politics was part of economists “personal 
tastes,” alongside for instance with personality, it was the starting point of any 
scientific voyage.
To move away from the influence of personal tastes and to become closer towards 
the ideal of objective, neutral scientific knowledge, the scientist had to pose sensible, 
quantifiable questions and then open his work to professional criticism as an antidote 
to personal idiosyncrasies.38 The mainstream mapped a path of “knowledge of 
technique and acquaintance with data”39 that economists should travel towards 
science. This route to science was part of a single paradigm of economics, the 
mainstream denying radicals’ claim that they offered a new paradigm. The radicals 
were seen as abandoning science to do politics, what Solow called “cant and
35Behr et al (1971), p. 25
36Ibid., p. 39.
37Solow (1971), p. 64.
38This was the core message of Solow (1970).
39Solow (1971), p. 65.
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role-playing” . In the mainstream’s map, the radicals, with their claims of joining 
politics and economics, were located outside science. They had abandoned the path 
towards knowledge and were engaged in exercise of their “personal tastes.”
Table 5.1: Boundary maps of radicals and mainstream.
Maps Location o f radicals Location of mainstream
Radicals’ map of the 
politics of economists
In society, addressing its prob­
lems.
Away from society, in irrele­
vancy.
Radicals’ map of the 
politics of paradigms
In partisanship and subjectivity.
With the revolutionary move­
ment and the oppressed.
In false neutrality and objectiv­
ity.
With the status quo and their 
ideology.
Mainstream’s map 
of the practice of 
economists
In personal and political com­
mitments.
Close to ideology.
In quantification and knowledge 
of technique.
Close to objective knowledge.
The translation of each contender’s argument onto a cultural map highlights their
enlisting of allies. It shows how radicals were exhibiting their distance from the 
remainder of the profession. While the economics profession was made the enemy, 
deeply committed to the status quo; radicals boasted their partisanship to social 
revolution. According to the radical map, the greater one’s distance from the 
profession the greater one’s closeness to the “movement.” In radicals’ definition of the 
“movement” their students held a paramount role: “college and university teachers 
work in one of the centers of radical social activity in the United States. Radical 
teachers should, therefore, view their work as part of a wider radical movement. They 
should design their courses to be relevant to the concerns and needs of that 
movement.”40 The University was a place of social experimentation, where liberation 
and the battle against alienation could begin. Teachers and students, together, would 
liberate themselves of prejudices and of oppressive social relations through curriculum
40Edwards and MacEwan (1970), p. 361.
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and grading reforms. The radicals sought to enlist the support of their radical 
students.
The historical record demonstrates that students in revolt were in fact close to 
radical economists. Students were not only an ally in radical rhetoric, they did act as 
an ally. Throughout the apex years of student unrest, radical economists were 
outspoken advocates for the students, and many students joined URPE and became 
involved in radical economics. Students through protest or argument assisted the 
creation of radical courses and the hiring of radical economists. As the post-1971 
years of decay in student activism demonstrated, the fate of radical economists was 
bound to the fate of student unrest. Having not secured other viable sources of 
support, radicals were left open to dismissals and marginalisation which followed in 
the mid-1970s. They did benefit from support from older established colleagues, an 
unlikely and unsolicited ally. But despite the fine sounding names, such as J. K. 
Galbraith, J. G. Gurley, K. Arrow, W. Leontieff, this did not amount to a sufficient 
base of support in the profession to ensure radicals’ success. In fact the majority in 
the profession were convinced by the opposing cultural map, drawn as a defence 
against the radical challenge.
Those that spoke in “defence of economics,” or as they often stated it in “defence 
of science,” were primarily aiming at accommodation and reassurance of economics’ 
scientific credentials. Their argument highlighted how radicals had diverged from the 
correct path. They did not seek so much to make radicals into an enemy. The aim 
was to deny the radicals’ dangerous boundary work and to impose the conventional 
mode of debate in the profession, well-contained from political digressions and 
questioning of economics’ credibility. The strategy, I argue, appealed to professional 
economists that benefited from the profession’s status as neutral and objective. If the 
mainstream’s goal was to convince the radicals to rejoin the professional discourse of 
objectivity and neutrality then it failed, but it is doubtful this was what was 
intended. W hat they achieved was the containment and marginalisation of the 
radicals, under Solow’s dictum: “we neglect radical economics because it is
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negligible.”41 It is noteworthy that economists outside the debate behaved according 
to what was outlined by the mainstream spokespersons. When radicals were denied 
tenure at Harvard, the faculty chairman noted that the radicals’ achievements were 
“not significant” .42 It appears that the bulk of the profession joined in the defence of 
economics, unconvinced by the promised benefits of the radicals’ alliance with the 
“movement” and revolution.
The process of radical economics’ self definition was underscored by the 
controversy between radical economists and their conventional colleagues. Radicals 
came to see themselves as challengers and their identity was built to articulate the 
challenge. Radical Political Economics was in 1971 no longer an empty label, it had 
been filled with meaning. The radicals’ shared past as student activists - an initial 
identity - was not as important as the development of a (radical) economics for 
revolution -  their new identity.
There is continuity between the radicals’ paradigm building period, up to 1971, 
and their post-1972 involvement in outreach work. The radical (URPE) efforts of 
connecting with the popular movements were a living out of the radical identity, of 
the scientist-revolutionary. The radical paradigm passionately called for a University 
beyond the campus, with the scientist mixing with the people to test his ideas, to 
allow society to inform his research.43 What was new was to interpret such 
connection without the mediation of the University or its restless students. The 
radical paradigm was a programme for the University, but the radical activists of 
PEAC/PEA were acting away from the campuses through URPE, with no connection 
to their professional roles.
I have argued in the previous chapter that radicals and URPE in the mid-1970s 
were moving away from the academic community into the political activist 
community. As the record shows the radical identity proved unsuited to the new 
environment. It failed both to provide guidance for action and it failed to maintain a 
sense of shared interest and purpose. Political line was strenuously debated and
41 Solow (1971), p. 63.
42James Duesenberry in Kennebec Journal (1973), p. 32.
43This theme runs from Wolff (1969) to Behr et al (1971).
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revised, never consensually settled, and divisive solidarities began to populate URPE, 
fragmenting the radical economics community.
The 1970s left-wing political arena was ostensibly ideological. URPErs looked not 
at each other’s economics views but at political affiliation and ideological belief.44 It 
was not in their economics that radicals differed, though there were differences 
between those zealously Marxist and those that were suspicious of Marx,45 where 
radicals differed was in their politics. They clashed not on debating the economy, but 
on the political directing of URPE. It was in politics that divisions emerged. In under 
two years, sections of the URPE membership were in New York battling over control 
of the organization’s resources. Commitment and solidarity was due primarily to the 
ideological group and not to the radical economics identity. URPE began to resemble 
yet another battleground for feminists, socialist feminists, democratic socialists, and 
Maoists to face each other.
It is significant that radicals did not battle it out to the end, and knowing all too 
well what was in sight if the conflict was allowed to continue, i.e. the wrecking of 
URPE, they negotiated a settlement.46 The 1975 Summer Conference, issuing a new 
Prospectus for the Union, emptied URPE of its political focus, towards what were 
clearly academic and educational goals.47 URPE was an “umbrella” organization.
The goal of designing a single radical economics, of identifying a radical economist, 
was abandoned and no further discussions followed along those lines. There were no 
further conferences on the subject, or special issues in the Review of Radical Political 
Economics. The organization that had originated the radical economics identity and 
paradigm to fight the profession, was working without a map defining the landscape 
of economics and prescribing radicals movement within it.
44 At the Dollars & Sense controversy the most damaging argument made by New York about Boston  
was their commitment to the political group New American Movement, see p. 136 of this thesis.
45 As in the R R P E  1973 editorial board debate, see p. 122 of this thesis.
46Zweig (1975).
47The careful tone of the Crisis Reader of 1978 epitomises the new stage (URPE-EEP (1978)).
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6Introduction to Post Keynesian 
Economics
6.1 Participant histories o f P ost K eynesian  Econom ics
The second community of dissenters which I have chosen to study is Post Keynesian 
Economics. Post Keynesian economists’ relationship to their history is nothing less 
than the converse of that of radical economists. Post Keynesians passionately debate 
their intellectual origins. Their research, in contrast with the technical style dominant 
in the economics profession, is paved with incursions into the history of economic 
doctrine. Some authors have favourably argued for “the organic way which history of 
thought is embedded in Post Keynesian economics.”1 According to this view, history 
of thought is pursued to inform present day economics, building on a “historian’s 
understanding of older texts” , “studying different historical contexts and the theories 
developed to address them helps economists to build up the judgment necessary for 
developing theories appropriate to new contexts.”2 How and why this Post Keynesian 
heuristic works is seldom fully articulated. What stands out clearly is the noble 
standing that history of thought holds in Post Keynesian Economics.
Post Keynesians have produced a far-reaching and detailed body of work on their 
own intellectual origins, but often this research has been subordinated to the 
demands of contemporary controversies in economics. Some of this historical work is 
then underpinned by generously interpretative and impressionistic use of evidence,
1Dow (2002), p. 319.
2Ibid., pp. 321, 330.
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where justificationist myth tries to pose as history. As an illustration to this style one 
need only recall Paul Davidson’s often repeated account of Sir John R. Hicks’s 
conversion to Post Keynesian Economics. Davidson proposed the following tale:
With his IS-LM equational system, the young Hicks of the 1930s became a 
forefather of what Joan Robinson would call “Bastard Keynesianism” . . .
In the mid-1970s, however, his Hicksian equational system failed to 
provide any workable solution to the inflation problem plaguing the free 
world. Hicks -  now Sir John Hicks, a Nobel Prize winner -  apparently 
recognized the errant ways of his neoclassical youth . . .  By the winter of 
1980-81, Hick’s conversion away from neoclassical economics towards a 
Post Keynesian analytical approach was complete.3
It is almost with teleological fatality that Davidson reveals the young neoclassical 
Hicks ultimately accepting the truth of Post Keynesian Economics, in his wiser later 
years as a Nobel Prize laureate. The evidence however is slim. For instance, 
concerning the last and crucial twist to the tale, Hicks in 1980-81 did write a piece to 
the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics critical of his IS-LM work but it was far 
from an endorsement of Post Keynesian Economics.4
Beyond the noted cases of justificationist historicizing, a more difficult hurdle to 
overcome in reading this secondary literature arises from the fact that these are 
participant accounts - Post Keynesians writing their own history. From the vantage 
point of the group and its culture many questions about the past are never posed and 
researched. There are many silences. One very important question for my current 
concerns is: how did the group emerge? Intellectual participant accounts such as the 
ones we are offered by the members of the group, have not much to say on the subject.
This chapter does not attempt to survey three decades of Post Keynesian 
controversies on the history of economics. I take a much more focused inspection of 
the literature. What I am urged to do is to sketch some of the claims made on the 
emergence of Post Keynesian Economics. These will be valuable clues for motivating
and framing my own approach to the historical problem of emergence.
3Davidson (1991), p. 27-28.
4The comment that Davidson extracted from Hicks’ 1980-81 article was rather subdued in its re­
jection of past commitments, “I have, however, not concealed that, as time has gone on, I have myself 
become dissatisfied with it [IS-LM]” cited in Davidson (1991), p. 28.
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6.2 T he K eynesian generations
Post Keynesian intellectual histories are populated by the giants of economic thought. 
Although some authors reach back to David Ricardo and Karl Marx to begin their 
narratives, the majority position tends to start with John Maynard Keynes, “Post 
Keynesian economics starts with the work of Keynes, specially his General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money. This work threw the gauntlet and challenged 
established economic thinking in numerous ways.”5 Keynes’ work has been 
characterised as a critique of neoclassical economics. Post Keynesians have portrayed 
the General Theory (and to some also his Treatise on Money) as a major intellectual 
break with the mainstream of far reaching importance for economics. Keynes’s 
revolution6 is the first and central theme of Post Keynesian accounts of their 
emergence.
Post Keynesians contest what they see as the establishment’s reading of Keynes 
embodied in the Hicksian IS/LM analysis.7 This interpretation of Keynes is known 
among Post Keynesians as the “Neoclassical synthesis” or dismissively as “Bastard 
Keynesianism”:
the central message of the synthesis is the view that long-term equilibrium 
is determined by the supply side and may be understood through the 
analysis provided by classical economics, whereas short-term departures 
from equilibrium are the result of demand fluctuations and market 
imperfections, in particular the sluggish movement of wages and prices in 
response to changes in demand.8
It was Joan V. Robinson that coined the term “Bastard Keynesianism” in a 1964 
review of Harry Johnson’s Money, Trade and Economic Growth, “arguing that what 
Johnson and other ‘bastards’ of his generation saw as weaknesses were in fact 
strengths -  to wit, a sense of time, of the structure of society and of economic life as a
5Holt and Pressman (2001), p. 2.
6Steindl (1997).
7Debates over Keynes’ theory: its content, how it should be developed, and how the economics 
profession responded to his work are raging to this day and are not exclusive to Post Keynesian 
economists. For a recent debate on the subject of the IS/LM  see the 2004 supplement to the History 
of Political Economy, volume 36.
8McKenna and Zannoni (1997), p. 463.
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process.”9 The economists traditionally associated with the mainstream version of 
Keynesianism are Paul A. Samuelson, John R. Hicks, Franco Modigliani, Don 
Patinkin, Robert M. Solow and Milton Friedman.10
Post Keynesians characterise the Neoclassical synthesis as a (mostly American) 
movement that prevented the economics profession from discarding those traditional 
ideas, that Keynes had shown to be flawed, notably traditional notions of equilibrium 
“in which all markets (including the labour market) clear, [as] an accurate description 
of the outcome of tendencies in the economic system”.11 For Post Keynesians, 
neoclassicals forced Keynes’s ideas into their mathematical apparatus where 
equilibrium and certainty reigned and this did irreparable damage to his intended 
message.12 It is a hallmark of this secondary literature “to speak for” Keynes, the 
weight of the argument placed first in showing Keynes’ revolutionary intentions and 
then interpreting how Keynes would have sought to fulfil them in today’s debates.
In Post Keynesian historical reflections, following the work of Keynes came the 
contributions of the first Post Keynesians, described as his close associates at 
Cambridge, Joan Robinson, Richard Kahn, Nicholas Kaldor and Piero Sraffa but also 
the Polish economist, Michal Kalecki.13 This first generation “inspired a new 
generation of economists in Cambridge during the 1950s and 1960s,” namely Tom 
Asimakopulos, Pierangelo Garegnani, Luigi Pasinetti and Geoff Harcourt.14 In 
America two economists, J. K. Galbraith and Alfred S. Eichner, are “the bridge 
between the European and American Post Keynesians” by developing “insights of 
Robinson on imperfect competition.”15 The first generation of American Post 
Keynesians is said to have been followed by another led by Sidney Weintraub and 
Paul Davidson and with Hyman Minsky and Basil Moore.16 The third generation of 
Post Keynesians is currently active and has founded its work on the insights of
9Harcourt (1987), p. 204.
10Holt (1997), pp. 508-9.
11 Harcourt (1987), p. 204.
12Davidson (1991), p. 22.
13Holt (1997), p. 509.
14Holt and Pressman (2001), p. 4.
15Idem.
16Ibid., p. 5.
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previous authors.
In Post Keynesian histories each generation of authors is said to build on the 
work of the previous one. What is proposed by these accounts is a genealogy to 
describe Post Keynesian theory development. Continuity is assured through the 
professor-student relationship, an institutional link that is redressed intellectually into 
an originator-developer connection.
The added dimension of space to the genealogical sequence, i.e. the existence of 
European and American branches, has been used to represent the existence in Post 
Keynesian Economics of distinct approaches. The Europeans, often referred to as 
Neo-Ricardians or Sraffians, are described as concerned with the study of income 
distribution and models of the economy labelled as real economy (no-money) models. 
They are said to have argued “that income allotments are not determined by the 
neoclassical theory of marginal productivity and of factor inputs, but by 
macroeconomic aggregates and social and political forces.”17 The Americans on the 
other hand are said to place their prime stress in the role of money and finance for a 
modern and complex economy riddled with uncertainty: “In an economy where the 
future is unknown, contractual agreements through institutional arrangements are 
needed to incur the factor inputs necessary for efficient production through historical 
time. Such contractual agreements require money and liquidity, so that entrepreneurs 
are able to meet their contractual liabilities before production takes place.”18
The genealogical net (mixing generations and geography) is said to account for all 
theoretical positions in Post Keynesian Economics. The seminal systematization of 
this net was proposed by Omar Hamouda and Geoffrey C. Harcourt in the 
mid-1980s.19 This survey proposed three branches, adding to the above mentioned a 
Kaleckian-Robinsonian branch. I have chosen not to discuss this work here since their 
reading of the group’s history, although still cited with admiration, has been replaced 
by the two-branch description.20 Each branch characterised as a succession of
17Holt (1997), p. 509.
18Ibid., p. 511.
19Hamouda and Harcourt (1988).
20Hamouda and Harcourt’s proposal is discussed in detail in section 8.5.2.
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authors, has its own methodology, its own set of core ideas and reading of Keynes’ 
original critique. One could say there is an intellectual DNA based on which new 
contributions are founded. Critically all branches converge retrospectively to Keynes, 
this lineage establishes the Post Keynesian group as the “true” follower of Keynes’s 
revolutionary ideas.
The major work on the history of Post Keynesian Economics was authored by 
John Edward King, A History of Post Keynesian Economics since 1936.21 Unlike 
earlier accounts, King was primarily concerned with a study of history and he seeks 
to push aside economists’ presentist concerns. Still, King’s book was nonetheless 
primarily an intellectual history in line with the major themes noted above -  Keynes 
was maintained as the main figure for the Post Keynesian group/theory, and a 
genealogical structure accounted for further theory developments. These two themes 
were quite explicitly enunciated from the outset. As suggested by the title, the book 
began with a discussion of Keynes and his 1936 General Theory. As a methodological 
choice, King adhered to a view from the history of sociology, that schools of thought 
were structured in terms of: a “founder-leader,” a set of “converts” who build on the 
master’s innovative message and finally the “foot-soldiers” who are in charge of the 
organizational work, for instance the editing of journals.22 This can be easily likened 
to the three generations scheme presented above, where the labours of later authors 
seem to be downplayed in homage to the innovative leaps of earlier generations.
King placed Keynes’ General Theory at the beginning of his account, however he 
did not argue that Keynes’ message was unambiguous: “the final version of the 
General Theory that went to the publishers in January 1936 . . .  differed substantially 
from earlier drafts and was itself less than entirely coherent.”23 According to King, 
Keynes’ work was not coherent for contemporary Post Keynesian standards and 
proved fatally ambivalent on crucial theoretical issues, despite this it became the
21 King (2002) The book was the outcome of an extensive research involving interviews conducted 
with Post Keynesian authors (King (1995a)), a annotated bibliography of Post Keynesian works (King 
(1995b)) and editing a collection of Post Keynesian most significant texts (King (2003)).
22King cites Tiryakian (1977) as his entry point into the history of sociology. King acknowledges 
that this structure is evocative of a religious sect which he accepts as innate to  any school of thought 
(King (2002), p. 3).
23Ibid., p. 12.
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starting point for a generation of Cambridge economists to explore and develop. 
Before surveying the work of these authors, King introduced into his narrative 
another founding father, Michal Kalecki, a polish economist who had arrived at 
Keynes’ most important insights prior to the publication of the General Theory, and 
had in some respects already gone beyond him. King tells the reader that Kalecki’s 
work was well received in Cambridge by Maurice Dobb and Joan V. Robinson and 
had a lasting influence in the latter’s work.24
In King’s history, the first generation of Cambridge economists was said to be 
striving for “a generalization of the General Theory.”25 Keynes by his own admission 
had presented only a short period theory, and Roy Harrod’s 1939 “An essay in 
dynamic theory” published in the Economic Journal, was the first among a series of 
attempts to formalize a Keynesian long-period theory of growth. According to King, 
it was as a critique of Harrod’s growth model and with strong Kaleckian influences, 
that Robinson in 1956 wrote the Accumulation of Capital.26 And it was also by 
following Harrod’s model that Kaldor and Pasinetti developed a Post Keynesian 
theory of income distribution.27
King argued that in the 1960s Post Keynesians’ work moved from the heading of 
growth theory to that of capital theory. The first departure from (neoclassical) 
marginal productivity theory was located in Robinson’s 1953-4 Review of Economic 
Studies article, but King then adds that it was only with Sraffa’s 1960 book The 
production of commodities by means of commodities that the critique fully matured.28 
The 1960s were marked by what became known as the Capital Controversies, where 
Post Keynesian Economists attacked the orthodox theory proposed by Franco 
Modigliani, Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow of MIT.
King argued that the first Post Keynesian work done outside Cambridge occurred 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. First in Sidney Weintraub’s, 1958, Approach to the 
Theory of Income Distribution, followed by Hyman Minksy’s work on financial
24Ibid., pp. 49-50.
25Ibid., p. 56.
26Ibid., p. 62.
27Ibid., p. 70.
28Ibid., p. 92.
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instability as the cause of economic crisis and in Paul Davidson’s theory of money 
and finance in his 1972 book, Money and the Real World.
In King’s narrative the 1970s were years of battle between Post Keynesian 
Economics and the neoclassicals, a struggle that King saw as being lost by Post 
Keynesians, “It had indeed been a comprehensive defeat, most apparent in the utter 
failure of Cambridge political economy to reproduce itself.”29 Somewhat 
contradictorily, King noted Post Keynesian Economics’ continued expansion 
throughout the globe. With already a strong group in America in the late 1970s, 
economists from other nations began to contribute to the approach, King lists 
Australia, Austria, Canada, France and Italy.
King’s history was written as a meticulous knitting of works, by describing 
models and theoretical positions manifest in the literature and arguing for their 
intellectual connections. The study was ambitious in its attempt to cover nearly sixty 
years of work and in alluding to the main Post Keynesian texts. The ordering of the 
materials was made to suggest a tentative development of ideas, progressing in clarity, 
elegance and scope. In this walk to intellectual maturation there were steps 
backwards. It was a slow process where authors sometimes took the wrong route, as 
was the case of Joan Robinson with her 1937 Introduction to the Theory of 
Employment, which King identified as a largely “Bastard Keynesian” text.30 In time 
authors corrected their path and found their way back to the advancement of Post 
Keynesian Economics. But despite the order he imposed on the historical record, 
King avoided an ostensively “whig” account by concluding that Post Keynesian 
development has fallen short of complete success. Post Keynesian Economics for King 
is not a coherent field; as evidence to this claim he surveyed debates reflecting long 
unresolved tensions between branches of the Post Keynesian family tree.
King’s history effectively voiced claims that Post Keynesians have made 
concerning their intellectual ancestry, it tracked and registered these tentative 
intellectual connections. That King was keeping with the established narratives of
29Eminent Post Keynesians at Cambridge when retiring were not replaced by like-minded dissenters 
but by the “neoclassical enemy” (ibid., p. 133).
30Ibid., p. 25.
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Post Keynesians has been noted in several reviews of the book, for instance Eric 
Tymoigne and Frederic S. Lee commented: “King’s story of Post Keynesian 
economics from Keynes to the capital controversy, although well told, is all quite 
familiar.”31 In the same review it was remarked how much of King’s insights were 
drawn from the oral tradition of the Post Keynesian group.32 W hat this tells us is 
that King did not examine the accuracy of his collected oral history against the 
historical record. His account was indistinguishable from the oral history and as such 
from participant accounts. King wrote a history of Post Keynesian Economics as Post 
Keynesians know it. It was a history about the Post Keynesian family, how authors 
should be ordered and how one should rank their contributions. King’s history was 
also restrictively intellectual: any sense of a Post Keynesian community living in 
society is lost, replaced by Post Keynesians ideas disembodied of social history.
While conservative by keeping with the consensus established in participant 
accounts, King did break some new ground by exploring and clarifying some 
intellectual claims in great detail. Most notably, King courageously diagnosed 
ambiguities in Keynes’s message which most Post Keynesians would be reluctant to 
admit, and as a result King suffered the attack of one of the most prominent members 
of the Post Keynesian community, Paul Davidson.33
Undoubtedly because of Post Keynesians’ passionate relationship with their own 
history, King’s book has been widely discussed and became a focus of controversy. It 
is telling that most of the disagreements arose on questions of emphasis. Members of 
the Neo-Ricardian or European branch felt that their position had not been 
adequately represented,34 those reading from an American perspective wanted less 
detail on Cambridge economists and more attention given to the work of Davidson 
and Weintraub;35 yet others would have wanted more detail on the second generation
31 Tymoigne and Lee (2004), p. 276.
32Ibid., p. 275.
33Davidson (2004) was a lengthy review of King’s history. King (2005) is a point by point response 
to Davidson, who as editor of the journal reserved for himself the last word on the discussion (Davidson 
(2005)).
34Trezzini (2003), pp. 121-122. ,
35Bateman (2004), p. 582.
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of Post Keynesians.36 These responses reflect long-standing feuds within the Post 
Keynesian group concerning its history.
Of particular interest, in the debate over King’s history, was the contention by 
Tymoigne and Lee that King had not provided an adequate moral to his narrative. 
King concluded his study with the diagnosis that Post Keynesian Economics was a 
failed paradigm given the unsettled Post Keynesian internal controversies. Tymoigne 
and Lee argued against King’s assessment, proposing that the true measure of Post 
Keynesian success or failure ought not to be theoretical coherence but whether the 
group survived in the hostile environment of economics, “the formation of such 
community is in fact an outstanding accomplishment.”37 This critique echoed 
Frederic S. Lee’s own work on the history of Post Keynesian Economics.
6.3 P unished  by orthodoxy
Frederic S. Lee, an established Post Keynesian price theorist,38 has undertaken a 
study of the history of Post Keynesian Economics that deserves to be singled out 
from other accounts, as Lee broke with the traditional intellectual character of earlier 
histories. Paramount in Lee’s research was the notion of network, which, compared to 
contemporary uses of concept in the sociology of science was rather narrowly 
defined.39 It denoted participation in meetings, membership of associations, mailing 
lists, publishing in journals or teaching in the same graduate programs: “a Post 
Keynesian economist is defined solely in terms of participating in identifiable Post 
Keynesian events.”40 Interestingly, Lee posed the question of how Post Keynesian 
emerged, within his frame how the Post Keynesian network emerged.
Lee’s history of Post Keynesian Economics (PKE) was part of a broader project, 
a historical study of contemporary heterodox economics.41 This research comprised
36Fontana (2005), p. 410.
37Tymoigne and Lee (2004), p. 279.
38 Lee (1998).
39Such as for instance, in the “sociology of translation” (Callon (1999)).
40Lee (2000b), p. 141. W hat makes an event Post Keynesian is not addressed.
41 In addition to his work on radical economics, reviewed earlier in this thesis, he has also focused 
on the Conference of Socialist Economics (Lee (2001)), and Association of Heterodox Economics (Lee 
(2002a)). As I have noted in the introduction to this thesis, the terms “heterodox” and “dissent” are
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both analysis and critique of the economics profession for its alleged exclusion of 
heterodox economists. Polemically, Lee contended that twentieth century economics 
was characterised by the unending effort of neoclassical economics to purge the 
profession of its competitors. As a result of their de facto exclusion from the AEA 
annual conference and the American Economic Review (A E R ) and other mainstream 
journals, heterodox economists gathered in three much smaller professional 
associations, the Union for Radical Political Economics, the Association for 
Evolutionary Economics and the Association for Social Economics.42 The heterodox 
networks were therefore a reaction to the mainstream’s repression.
Lee’s account of Post Keynesian Economics history drew extensively from the 
correspondence between Alfred S. Eichner and Joan V. Robinson, which he collected 
and published.43 In light of this archive, Lee argued that Eichner was the main driver 
in the creation of the Post Keynesian network.44 The formative period of the Post 
Keynesian network was located to the period from 1971 to 1980.45 Lee traced the 
beginning of the Post Keynesian network to a meeting organised by Eichner and Luigi 
Pasinetti under Robinson’s sponsorship at the 1971 AEA meetings in New Orleans. 
The meeting attended by seventeen economists was held with the aim of discussing 
ways by which heterodox economists may begin to open-up economics to 
non-neoclassical approaches.46 It was, according to Lee, with the desire to re-open 
economics to heterodox discourse that the PKE network grew. He further argued 
that it was only in 1976-77 that a social network of Post Keynesians became fully 
formed. The core of the Post Keynesian group consisted of ten economists -  Paul
used interchangeably in economics. Lee’s “heterodox groups” is more inclusive than the sixties and 
seventies dissenters, it encompasses for instance Grants economics and institutionalists which I do not 
consider.
42Lee (2000a), p. 22.
43 “Correspondence: Working out the Megacorp and Oligopoly, 1969-1971”; “Correspondence: Or­
ganizing the U.S. Post Keynesians and Macrodynamics, 1971-1972”; “Correspondence: Neoclassical 
Economics and the Post Keynesian Paradigm, 1973-1976” in Warren J. Samuels (2000), Research in 
the History of Economic Thought and Methodology, volume 18c, pp. 79-204.
440th er  important promoters of Post Keynesian Economics were not given sufficient attention, such 
as Geoffrey Harcourt, Jan Kregel, and Paul Davidson.
45Following the period of creation of a social network, Lee notes the building of institutional structures 
from 1977 to 1982; and from 1978 to 1995 the reproduction and development of the Post Keynesian  
social structures (Lee (2000b), p. 142).
46Lee (2000a), p. 22.
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Davidson, Alfred Eichner, Jan Kregel, Hyman Minsky, Basil Moore, Ed Nell, Roy 
Rotheim, Steve Rousseas, Howard Sherman, and Sidney Weintraub -  who were 
involved in or attended at least two Post Keynesian “events” between 1971 and 1977 
and also subscribed to and/or were on the editorial board of the Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics (JPKE) when it was founded in 1978.47
Lee’s crucial insight was that the origins of Post Keynesian group lay not in the 
1930s as as suggested by intellectual accounts, but in the early 1970s. Lee did not set 
out to displace earlier (intellectual) accounts. In his history, the heterodox networks 
were said to emerge in response to the repression of heterodox ideas by the 
mainstream. Hence, for Lee heterodox ideas must have pre-dated the heterodox 
networks. Still, I would argue that in light of Lee’s findings Post Keynesian 
participants’ intellectual histories become increasingly untenable. If Post Keynesian 
ideas had existed since Keynes’ 1936 General Theory, as an independent and 
alternative body of theory, why would one have to wait for three decades for them to 
be enunciated? Why would one have to wait for the repression of the mainstream to 
create a Post Keynesian group that would advance this alternative? Lee’s work 
unwittingly casts doubt over previous research.
But Lee’s work is not without its shortcomings. It offered a meta-narrative that 
binds the history of heterodox groups together. Its characteristic claims were the 
repression imposed by the economics’ establishment, and its counterpart: the 
heterodox community tradition of self-support that successfully resisted the attack.48 
Lee has argued that his work must be read as a recovery of heterodox memory, on 
which a heterodox identity could be based.49 The author conceded that such a 
heterodox identity is a destination and it is far from reflecting the present.50
47Lee (2000b), p. 150. In this analysis one can see the hallmark of Lee’s approach to networks, the 
register of attendance to meetings is equated to commitment to the group.
48According to Lee, the counterpart to the establishment’s attack is the self-support from fellow 
heterodox economists, mutual aid was crucial to survive the mainstream’s repression (Lee (2002b), p. 
53).
49Lee (2000b), p. 142.
50 For Lee, the historical tradition of self-support is maturing into a convergence of theoretical po­
sitions and institutions (Lee (2002b), p. 55). Seen by the author as a major development in this 
direction, the Association for Heterodox Economics hopes to transform what was once a fragmented 
heterodox “community in which the component parts seemed at times to be at war with each other 
or simply did not acknowledge that others existed.” into a “community where pluralism, not division
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Regrettably, to strike the unifying narrative of heterodoxy Lee remained silent over 
the controversies and conflicts between and within dissenting groups. His history of 
PKE made no provisions to how internal disputes may have shaped the 
community/network, despite the historical record being saturated with such debates. 
Lee has made little of this record, in his discussion of Post Keynesian meetings he 
bypassed the details of their contents, the discussions undertaken, and the roles 
played by its participants.
6.4 E xternalising th e h istory o f P ost K eynesian  
Econom ics
In my review of the histories of Post Keynesian Economics I have kept intellectual 
and institutional histories separate. They correspond to largely independent 
narratives. Intellectual histories locate the origins of Post Keynesian Economics to 
the “revolutionary message” of Keynes and to the lineage of scholars that have 
followed in his stead. Institutional histories, namely that proposed by Lee, target the 
repression by the mainstream, in denying access to journals and academic 
appointments, as the motive force in creating the Post Keynesian network. 
Comparing the two accounts I have argued that the origins of Post Keynesian 
Economics have not yet been adequately scrutinized.
I do not contest the claim that the PKE network was created in the 1970s, Lee’s 
work is invaluable in making this point. His publication of the Eichner-Robinson 
correspondence51 revealed a rich chronology of meetings, of institutions gained and 
lost, that any future history must address in detail. Although King’s intellectual 
history was overwhelmingly restricted to the reading of texts and their connections, 
paying little attention to meetings, personalities, or institution building, he too 
singled out the 1970s as the crucial decade of PKE and mainstream confrontation.52 
However, the conditions surrounding the formation of the Post Keynesian
exists." (Lee (2002a), p. 39).
51 Lee (2000a).
52King (2002), chapter 6.
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“network” are not so well established. Not least because so much of this body of 
literature is written by the group’s participants and with presentist concerns. Lee 
downplayed conflict within and between dissenting groups. He dismissed the need to 
treat these divisions by providing evidence of cooperation between dissenters and 
arguing for a current trend of convergence between the groups. Recently, such a 
tendency has been exemplified by Davidson’s review of King’s history, where he 
appeared to want to purge Post Keynesian history from anything that did not relate 
to his particular and current definition of the field.53 As I noted in the beginning of 
this chapter, Post Keynesians see history as a vehicle for internal controversy. Such 
approach to history only conflates the difficulty to understand the past. To stay clear 
of this instrumentalist baggage, the historian needs to be careful when handling these 
participant histories as secondary material. In fact, they may prove much more 
insightful as primary material.
Following Lee, this thesis begins the account of Post Keynesian emergence in the 
late 1960s but I am aware that the conditions of this emergence have yet been 
adequately addressed. I also take Post Keynesians’ writing of history as an important 
element in the making of the group, in the making of their identity.
53Lavoie ((2005), p. 372) replies to Davidson’s critique and rightly points out that King’s definition 
of Post Keynesian Economics was akin to Davidson’s 1970s and early 1980s definitions of the field. In 
a later chapter I will discuss in detail Davidson’s boundary work.
7Atlantic alliance
The emergence of Post Keynesian Economics
7.1 C apital theory, Cam bridge econom ics and  
survey-history
The historical scholarship on the origins of Post Keynesian Economics offers us two 
disconnected bodies of work. On the one hand, a detailed genealogy of Post 
Keynesian ideas ignoring even the existence of a Post Keynesian community with a 
genesis and a history. On the other, a history of the Post Keynesian network, 
meticulous in its chronology of events but silent concerning the intellectual content of 
the meetings, and the agenda of the actors that inhabited the network.1 It was left 
unexamined how Post Keynesians developed a sense of shared interests and purpose 
in the constitution of a Post Keynesian community.
W hat I aim to do in this chapter is to describe the intellectual element in the 
constitution of the Post Keynesian community: the construction of a Post Keynesian 
identity. This identity gave dissenters a narrative perception of who they were, what 
they stood for and the nature of the profession they inhabited. I aim to show that it 
is within this identity that dispersed critiques and authors were assembled into a new 
sociological entity inside the profession, Post Keynesian Economics.
I trace the origins of the Post Keynesian identity to the “Cambridge Capital 
Controversies” of the 1960s. I argue that a distinction ought to be made between the 
capital debates of the 1960s, briefly discussed in section two of this chapter, and the
xSee previous chapter for a rendition of this claim.
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later readings given to the debates in 1968-1969, as it is the latter that is of most 
interest to the present discussion. The main claim of this chapter is that the 
emergence of a Post Keynesian identity was not so much a product of the Capital 
debates but of the historical accounts that strove to make sense of them as they 
waned into a stalemate. It was in these narratives that Cambridge England redrew 
the intellectual space of economics, contesting the canon of the profession and 
presenting an alternative to it. It was in the reinterpretation of the canon and its 
narratives that the group was to find an identity.
I argue, in section four of this chapter, that the organizational efforts of the 1970s 
that created the Post Keynesian community were grounded on the identity provided 
by the “Cambridge Capital Controversies” . The identity was critical for the 
formation of the group by mediating the coalition between the distinct dissenting 
approaches that became known as Post Keynesian Economics. I conclude by arguing 
that to this day the controversies have kept a prominent place in Post Keynesian 
Economics’ identity.
7.2 T he capital debates o f the 1960s
Over four decades, the capital controversies have continued to motivate an outpouring 
of reflection and analysis. Hindsight affords many benefits in assessing the terms and 
consequences of the debate but it may also cloud our understanding of how the 
debate was perceived by its contemporaries. For the purpose of my argument it is 
crucial to recover the “uncertainty” contemporaries felt over what was being debated 
and what was to be concluded. This section places the debate in its context.
7.2.1 The 1961 MIT seminar
Joan V. Robinson2 circa 1960 was known in US academia for her 1933 Economics of 
Imperfect Competition, the publication of which alongside Edward H. Chamberlin’s
2Joan Violet Robinson (1903-1983) born in Surrey, England, studied at Cambridge (MA in 1927) 
where she taught from 1932 to 1971, becoming Professor of Economics in 1965. Main works include 
Economics of Imperfect Competition (1933); The Accumulation of Capital (1956) and Aspects of De­
velopm ent and Underdevelopment (1979).
7. Atlantic alliance 184
The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, transformed equilibrium value analysis 
(price formation).3 Soon after publication of this work and following J.M. Keynes’ 
General Theory in 1936, Robinson moved away from price theory to devote herself to 
work on growth theory.4 Such later work was received with less enthusiasm by 
American readers. In a review of Robinson’s 1956 book Accumulation of Capital, 
Abba P. Lerner commented: “that this line of thought does not seem to the present 
reviewer to be too helpful” , recommending the book as a good exercise for graduate 
students given the many and demanding models expounded in its pages.5
In 1961 Robinson visited the US: she was at MIT and Harvard, she also lectured 
at Northwestern, Chicago and Washington State Universities, University of Colorado 
and addressed the Midwestern Economic Association.6 It was her visit to MIT that is 
worth noting for the focus of this thesis, as she engaged the Faculty with the 
criticisms arising from Piero Sraffa’s7 work and the ongoing discussions at Cambridge 
UK. That same year Pierangelo Garegnani8 was at MIT and he is credited for having 
approached Paul Samuelson9 and Robert Solow with the same critical challenge.10
The challenge began with the claim that any quantity measure of capital required 
the assumption that capital was, or could be approximated as a single homogeneous 
good. The alternative conceptualization of capital, as money, required a set of relative 
prices to account for the heterogeneity of capital goods, and in a capitalist economy
3 It also initiated a famous debate over which of the two approaches was the most adequate. See 
W hite (1936) for a contemporary review and discussion of the two approaches.
4Robinson (1937a, 1937b, 1952, 1956).
5Lerner (1957), p. 693. Inspection of reading lists published by the American Economic Association 
(Stigler and Boulding (1953); Fellner (1946)) show Robinson referenced but not for her later work on 
capital theory, references are to Robinson (1937-1938; 1941).
6Turner (1989), p. 171.
7Piero Sraffa (1898-1983) born in Turin, Italy, graduated from the University of Turin, taught at 
Perugia (1924-26), Cagliari (1926-27) and Cambridge (1927), from 1927 to 1983 was Fellow of Trinity 
College, Cambridge. He was editor of the Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo (with M. H. 
Dobb) (1951-1973) and his major work was the Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities: 
Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (1960).
8Pierangelo Garegnani born in 1930 in Milan, Italy. Has a BA from the University of Pavia (1953) 
and a PhD from Cambridge (1959) under the supervision of M. H. Dobb. Garegnani taught at Sardinia 
(1962-66), Pavia (1966-70), Florence (1970-74), Rome (1974-92) and Cambridge (1973-4), he is since 
1992 Professor of Economics in Rome.
9Paul Anthony Samuelson born in 1915 in Indiana, USA. Has a BA from the University of Chicago 
(1935) and an MA and PhD from Harvad University (respectively 1936 and 1941). He made his entire 
career at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) becoming professor in 1947 and professor 
emeritus in 1986. In 1970 he received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics.
10Hodgson (1997), p. 97.
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such prices depended on the rate of profit.11 Thus in the standard aggregate 
production function, which is a function of capital a priori measured in price terms, 
the determination of profits that followed led to circular reasoning. Sraffa’s work was 
the source of this insight having claimed to show a host of disturbing properties of 
such aggregate production functions, namely reswitching or double switching and 
capital reversing.12 Reswitching corresponded to the possibility that the same 
method of production may be the most profitable at more than one rate of profit, 
even though other methods were more profitable at values in between. Capital 
reversing corresponded to the value of capital moving in the same direction as the 
rate of profit.13
7.2.2 From the 1962 to the 1966 symposia
It was Robinson’s seminar that prompted the controversy.14 In 1962 the British 
Review of Economic Studies (RES) held a “Symposium on production functions and 
economic growth,” which included papers by Kenneth J. Arrow, Nicholas Kaldor, 
James A. Mirrless, Paul A. Samuelson, Robert M. Solow, Joan Robinson, J. E. Meade,
D.G. Champernowne, J. Black, Richard Stone and J.A.C. Brown. The major piece of 
the volume was a paper by Samuelson entitled “Parable and Realism in Capital 
Theory: The Surrogate Production Function” which was dedicated to “Joan Robinson 
on the occasion of her memorable 1961 visit to MIT.”15 In the paper the author 
formalized a “surrogate production function” that was safe from the Sraffian results,
11 Throughout the chapter I shall refer to the term “rate of profit” following the Cambridge England 
use, since this is the side of the debate that I am following more closely, the neoclassical side preferred 
“rate of interest” to label the return to capital, see Cohen and Harcourt (2003), fn.7, for the distinction.
12Sraffa (1960).
13Birner ((1996), pp. 227-229) has argued that Sraffa’s book was not the igniter of the controversies. 
This is consistent with evidence of a cold reception which greated Sraffa’s book in the US. A reviewer 
commented: “This is a terse book.” (Reder (1961), p. 688) and assessed that had it been published 
in the late 1920s or 1930s it would have constituted a major theoretical innovation but work in Von 
Neumann models had now anticipated much of what Sraffa was saying (ibid., p. 695). It was Robinson 
and Garegnani’s challenges made to Samuelson at MIT that led the latter to take notice of Sraffa’s 
reswitching. The controversy begins when Samuelson engages with the criticism.
14I interviewed a former MIT graduate student that was present at the 1961 seminar. He recalled 
the polemical tone Robinson gave to the lecture, claiming that neoclassical economics was defunct. He 
also added that only Samuelson and a few others seemed to follow her argument, he had not at the 
time (interview with Stephen Resnick, 2003).
15Samuelson (1962), p. 193.
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thus preserving what the author called neoclassical parables, namely: an association 
between lower rates of profit and higher values of capital per man employed; an 
association between lower rates of profit and higher capital-output ratios; an 
association between lower rates of profit and higher sustainable consumption per 
head; and in competitive markets, a distribution of income between profit-earners and 
wage-earners explained by knowledge of marginal products and factor supplies.
As Robinson was later to confess: “For several years, everyone (except Piero 
Garegnani) was somewhat baffled by the surrogate production function. Then, in 
1965, a fortunate accident occurred. A disciple of Professor Samuelson claimed to 
have proved that reswitching can never occur” .16 David Levhari’s17 1965 piece in the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE) was an attempt to sweep the Sraffian criticism 
away. In Robinson’s words Levhari’s contribution was a fortunate accident because it 
was soon shown to contain a formal error, prompting a new series of exchanges. The 
Harvard based QJE in 1966 gave a follow up to the Levhari article under a 
symposium on “Paradoxes in Capital Theory.”18 The symposium included a counter 
example to Levhari’s theorem by Pasinetti,19 two articles discussing the significance 
of reswitching,20 a refutation of the non-switching theorem by Morishima21 and 
Samuelson and Levhari’s admission that the non-switching theorem was false.22
The concluding piece in the QJE symposium was Samuelson’s “Summing up,” 
where the author both recognized the possibility of reswitching, and provided an 
intuition for it based on an “Austrian circulating capital model.”23 In Samuelson’s 
concluding remarks he praised the Sraffian critics for demonstrating reswitching as a 
logical possibility of which economists needed to be aware, he ended: “If all this 
causes headaches for those nostalgic for the old time parables of neoclassical writing,
16Robinson (1975), p. 37.
17David Levhari was a graduate student of Samuelson at MIT. Levhari concluded his PhD thesis 
entitled “Essays on optimal economic growth” in 1964.
18 “Paradoxes on Capital Theory: A Symposium” in the November 1966 issue of the Quarterly Journal 
of Economics.
19Pasinetti (1966).
20Bruno et al (1966); Garegnani (1966).
21 Morishima (1966).
22 Samuelson and Levhari (1966).
23Samuelson (1966), p. 573.
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we must remind ourselves that scholars are not born to live an easy existence. We 
must respect and appraise, the facts of life.”24
For a reader more familiar with the controversies, my description may seem 
rather narrow. I made note of only two sets of exchanges (the RES  and QJE 
symposia), in what was later portrayed as a debate “raging” over three decades. The 
reason for this narrowing of focus is that I wish to present the debate in its immediate 
temporal context, that is, as it was perceived in the mid-1960s, before the 
reconstructions of the debate produced by the late 1960s and early 1970s surveys.
The reader that I am interested in is American. As we shall see particularly in 
the next chapter but also later in this one, Post Keynesian Economics despite its 
intellectual connections with Cambridge England was of American design, a 
socio-historical fact not often noted in Post Keynesian histories due to their 
intellectual focus. For the American audience, the American QJE exchange was 
better known than the British RES  one. Hence, without the surveys and the histories 
as guides to travel through the literature, the reader of the mid-1960s may have 
recognized a debate but would not have easily considered it part of a larger 
controversy. Furthermore, it would not have been easy for such a reader to appreciate 
the significance of what was being debated. It is against this uncertainty concerning 
the content and significance of the debate that the surveys emerged.
7.2.3 The 1969 survey
The symposia mentioned above had a significant impact in MIT and Cambridge, and 
in fact all the main participants in the symposia were connected to these two 
institutions.25 These participants had a reading from their own experience of what 
was under discussion and what could be concluded, but the same is not necessarily 
true for the remainder of the profession. As E. Roy Weintraub notes: “from the 
present we look back and see order, but that order was not always evident to those 
who were in the field at the time.”26 The survey article provides order as it
24Ibid., p . 583.
25See Cohen and Harcourt (2003), p. 200, for a list of the main participants.
26Weintraub (1991), p. 129.
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reconstructs past work so that it may be seen as leading somewhere, to knowledge, or 
in this case to the debate’s resolution.
The first survey appearing in the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) in 1969 
was apparently not commissioned as an account of the debate. There was an earlier 
request made by Mark Perlman, editor of the JEL, to Jack Hirshleifer for a survey on 
capital theory: “stressing the developments in capital theory in the last five to ten 
years.” . Hirshleifer accepted the request and added: “I follow the Fisher tradition 
which considers most of the traditional debates about ‘capital’ irrelevant. W hat all 
this leads to is that I would be more comfortable if the assigned topic were, say,
‘inter-temporal decision and equilibrium’ rather than ‘capital theory’.” Compromise 
was met with the title proposed by Perlman: “Some Modern Aspects of Capital 
Theory: Inter-Temporal Decision and Equilibrium.”27 However, by July 17 Hirshleifer 
wrote with the news that he would not be able to write the piece.
Perlman was in Australia for the Summer of 1968. In G.C. Harcourt’s28 words: 
“So there Perlman was, with the second issue of this new journal and no one to do the 
major survey article. Wilfred [Prest] said, ‘Don’t worry, go to Adelaide and ask Geoff 
Harcourt. He’s good on capital theory, he’ll do it for you.’ So Perlman came over and 
spent a day talking me into it.”29 In a letter formally commissioning the survey, 
Perlman asked Harcourt to write a survey “reviewing recent developments in capital 
theory” covering the preceding decade and then added: “I am particularly interested 
that American readers should have the opportunity to see where Mrs. Robinson’s 
views come from and how they may be contrasted with the views of other writers.”30 
The evidence suggests that Perlman was not looking for a survey of the capital 
debates. The Journal of Economic Literature had just been created by the American
27April 24th, 1968; May 14th, 1968; May 20th, 1968. Letters in Mark Perlman Papers, The 
Economists’ Papers Project, Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University, 
Durham, North Carolina, Box 24.
28Geoffrey Colin Harcourt was born in Melborne, Australia in 1931. Harcourt has a BCom, MCom 
from Melbourne (1954, 1956) and a PhD (1960 - initially with Nicholas Kaldor but in the end under the 
supervision of Ronald Henderson) and a LittD from Cambridge (1988). He taught at Adelaide (1958- 
85) where he became Professor in 1967, from 1982 to 1999 he held a Readership at the University of 
Cambridge.
29King (1995a), p. 176.
3°28th August, 1968. Letters in Mark Perlman Papers, The Economists’ Papers Project, Box 24.
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Academic Association as an outlet for book reviews and the occasional survey of the 
economics literature. Foremost, Perlman was looking for a survey on the broad 
subject of capital theory and was willing to negotiate the survey’s focus with the 
assigned writer.31
7.3 T he Cam bridge C apital C ontroversies
It was Harcourt’s survey to write. It is beyond question that the text bore his 
personal mark, both his experience in capital theory and his humorous and polemic 
style of writing. But the text was also a collective undertaking. Harcourt had to draw 
on a store of meaning with which to make sense of the debates. Thus in this section I 
examine which resources Harcourt drew to support his survey writing. I also examine 
the content of the survey against other readings offered in the early 1970s on the 
debates.
7.3.1 Writing the survey
To write the survey Harcourt divided it into five self-contained working papers and 
sent them to some of the participants of the debate to gauge early reactions to his 
interpretations.32 That is, in order to write about the controversies Harcourt engaged 
in a dialogue with participants from both sides of the debate. By looking at these 
exchanges33 we are able to better appreciate what views were represented in the 
survey.
In August 1968, Harcourt wrote to Robinson with the news of the commissioned 
project. In Robinson’s reply she outlined what she thought ought to be the content of 
the survey: “Various attempts have been made to move from the one-commodity 
world to a multi-commodity world, but these have been finally discredited in the 
double-switching controversy.”34 This excerpt (underlined by Harcourt in the letter)
311 should note however that I have asked Perlman whether this was the case and his reply was 
inconclusive (Private communication Mark Perlman, 5th July 2003).
32Harcourt (2000), p. 278.
33Harcourt (1969) acknowledges the people that had access and input to the working papers, however 
the original list as found in Harcourt’s personal correspondence was more extensive including 28 names.
34Letter from Harcourt to Perlman, 13th August 1968. Geoff C. Harcourt Personal Papers. I am
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outlined a historical position that as we shall see, was reflected in the final text of the 
survey. The double-switching controversy was the subject of Harcourt’s first working 
paper and that the other sections/working papers were written around it.35 Harcourt 
later re-organized them in chronological order, since in writing them he moved from 
the present to the past.
In September 1968, with the plan of the survey in view, Harcourt wrote to 
Perlman:
The selection of issues that I have made is influenced by my own 
association with the puzzles as they have arisen and there is in my 
bibliography a distinct Cambridge England, Cambridge America 
preponderance. This may seem to some readers a distortion of what in the 
long run will turn out to be the more important problems but I think it 
fits in reasonably well with your view that American readers should have 
an opportunity to see where Mrs. Robinson’s views come from, etc.36
The focus of the survey was therefore moving away from treating “recent 
developments in capital theory” in the preceding decade to treat the views of the two 
Cambridges, England and America.37
The imprint of a Cambridge England perspective was strong both in style and 
content. It was derided by some of the readers of the working papers, from an Oxford 
economist: “[I] would go through the paper eliminating all the light-hearted remarks 
that go very well in a Cambridge seminar but do not read so well in print” ;38 while 
praised by others, from a Cambridge England economist: “I found your exposition 
clear and interspersed with carefully chosen puns that enliven it nicely. Actually I 
found in it many of the characteristics which I normally associate with Joan 
Robinson.”39 From the Cambridge England readers of the working papers came
indebted to G. C. Harcourt for having allowed me to study his private records and correspondence on 
the subject of the 1969 survey.
35 Working paper 2 was: “The rate of profit”; Working paper 3: “Solow on the rate of return”; Work­
ing paper 4: “Wicksell effects” and Working paper 5: “Malleability, Fossils and Technical Progress” 
(Private communication G. C. Harcourt, 6th April 2004).
36Letter from Harcourt to Perlman, 6th September 1968. G.C. Harcourt Personal Papers.
37Hahn and M atthews’s (1964) survey of growth theory was then seen as the standard to match.
38Letter by W.M. Corden to Harcourt, 16t/l January 1969, G.C. Harcourt Personal Papers.
39Letter by L. Pasinetti to Harcourt, 14th June 1969, G.C. Harcourt Personal Papers.
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encouragement and corrections, such as points of priority and clarification,40 from 
Cambridge America readers came mostly indifference. Solow saw Harcourt’s working 
papers as grounded on old misunderstandings between him and Robinson, and 
one-sided in its indictments of ideological bias and error.41 Solow concluded:
To tell you the truth, I’ve retired from this debate. It just makes time 
away from useful pursuits. It infuriates Joan that I won’t dance any more, 
but you get enough of the stately sarabande after a while. Nothing ever 
changes and I keep thinking that I could be estimating the demand curve 
of peanut butter or doing something else that might actually help the 
world and advance economics.42
A third view expressed in this correspondence was that of estrangement from 
what was being discussed:
I think you take the disputants (on both sides) a little too much at face 
value, and you take Paul Samuelson (and somewhat less so, Bob Solow) as 
the canonization of neoclassical economics. That is perhaps how both 
Cambridges view it, but does not do justice to the less polemic (but no 
less neoclassical) economists, (e.g. Meade).43
Taken together the comments by readers of the working papers show a survey taking 
shape as a distinctly Cambridge England assessment of the debate.
7.3.2 The survey and its narrative
Harcourt’s final survey paper entitled “Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory 
of Capital” was divided into four sections: “Malleability, Fossils and Technical
40For instance Dobb in a letter of 6th January 1969 to Harcourt, established Sraffa’s priority over 
reswitching, according to Dobb even though in print Sraffa only discussed it in 1960, it was a result 
informally discussed in Cambridge much earlier. In Harcourt’s private records some of the working 
papers’ early drafts show extensive comments by Robinson, Pasinetti, and others.
41 Perlman also requested Samuelson’s comments on the survey, “Although there are a number of 
interpretations that I might not deem optimal, I think it worthy of publication. ( . . . )  Survey items 
like this should represent the opinions of the author and not be subject to  overmuch auditing and 
refereeing.” (letter from Samuelson to Perlman, 22nd January, 1969). A harsher assessment came from 
another reviewer: “It is a rather one-sided (Robinsonian) survey of the literature written primarily for 
Cambridge, England. I don’t think it really exposits well the Robinsonian position to those that don’t 
know it or presents the M.I.T. side of it fairly.” (Zvi Griliches to Perlman, January 22, 1969). The two 
letters in Mark Perlman Papers, The Economists’ Papers Project, Box 24.
42Letter from Solow to Harcourt, 8t/lJanuary 1969, G.C. Harcourt Personal Papers.
43Letter from J. Stiglitz to Harcourt, 11th December 1968, G.C. Harcourt Personal Papers.
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Progress” ; “Solow on the Rate of Return: Tease and Counter Tease”; “A Child’s 
Guide to the Double-Switching Debate” and “The Rate of Profit in Capitalist 
Society” , with a technical appendix on Wicksellian effects, it followed closely the five 
working papers.44
The first section discussed a series of exchanges prompted by Robinson’s 1953-4 
question: How to measure capital?45 Robinson is placed at the start of the series of 
contributions, but the main protagonists were neoclassical economists: some 
responding directly to Robinson’s question,46 others surveyed to show different 
responses to the same question even though Robinson’s challenge was not their 
motivation. Harcourt reconstructed work on growth models as a series of attempts to 
answer Robinson’s question. Despite all these efforts, Harcourt suggested that the 
Robinson problem remained unanswered; no satisfactory measurement of capital was 
ever presented by the neoclassicals.
At the core of the second section of his paper lay a debate between Solow and 
Robinson. According to Harcourt, Solow had in his De Vries lectures of May 196347 
“[prefaced] his analysis with a discussion of why there are recurring controversies in 
capital theory. He gives two reasons, one of which is ideological - the social function 
of providing an ideological justification for profit which in the 19th century was the 
non-Marxist backlash; the other reason is analytical - it’s difficult.”48 To escape the 
ideological weight of the debates Solow had drawn a ’’conceptual distinction between 
the imputed return to capital and the income of capitalists” .49 Robinson attacked 
Solow, interpreting his work as ”an attempt to justify the marginal productivity 
theory of distribution and, in particular, the microeconomic proposition that in a 
competitive capitalist economy labor is paid its full employment marginal product.”50 
Thus, the purpose of this section was not to shed light on another theoretical debate
44 Harcourt (1969).
45 Robinson (1953-54).
46Champernowne (1953-54); Solow (1955-56); Swan (1956).
47 Solow (1963).
48Harcourt (1969), p. 380.
49Idem.
50Ibid., p. 382.
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but to ”highlight some of the causes of the controversy,”51 namely ideological ones.
The third section of Harcourt’s survey paper presented the reswitching 
controversy as the high point of the debate and intimately linked these ideas to 
Sraffa’s Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities.52 Harcourt placed 
Sraffa not as a third independent entity holding a distinct theoretical construct but as 
a contributor on the Cambridge, England side of the debate. Sraffa’s work was shown 
as concerned “with a view of economic life and especially of the production process, 
price formation and income distribution which was more akin to that taken by the 
classical economists -  Smith, Ricardo, Marx -  than by the neo-classicals -  Jevons, 
Wicksteed, Marshall” .53 In doing so, Harcourt suggested a link between Sraffa and 
Robinson’s own interest in (re-)introducing Marx to economics. Harcourt thus added 
the Sraffian reswitching and capital reversing ideas to the arsenal of the Cambridge 
England theorists. The early 1960s debates in the RES  and QJE, and Samuelson’s 
“Summing up”54 were presented by Harcourt as the point at which neoclassicals were 
forced to abandon their neoclassical parables and therefore aggregate production 
functions and the marginal productivity theory of distribution.
Finally we are lead to a section on the rate of profit. The statement that 
connected the sections was: “that, in order to determine the rate of profit, further 
factors have to be introduced from outside the production system,” such factors were 
the “saving propensities” in the work of Nicholas Kaldor, Luigi L. Pasinetti and 
Robinson. Harcourt after having presented a Cambridge England critique to 
neoclassical economics gives the reader an alternative economics - a Cambridge 
England alternative.55
Harcourt molded together several distinct instances of debate into his survey. All 
were broadly connected to the concept of capital in growth and distribution, thus
51 Ibid., p. 380.
52Sraffa (1960).
53Harcourt (1969), p. 378.
54Samuelson (1966).
55It is arguable if what Harcourt presented was an alternative. Such a claim is certainly rejected 
by neoclassicals but it is also subject to debate by those who came to stand side by side with the 
Cambridge England critics. Harcourt himself wrote on the possibility and existence of such a complete 
alternative, see King ((2002), chapter 10) for a review of this literature.
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justifying the choice of title for his survey, multiple capital controversies and not a 
single controversy.56 While Perlman had commissioned a survey on developments in 
capital theory over the preceding decade, Harcourt went as far back as 1953 to argue 
that the controversies of the 1960s should be seen as part of a broader critique set out 
by the work of Robinson, Kaldor, Pasinetti and Sraffa, or following the author’s label: 
Cambridge, England. Harcourt’s survey was not an inquest into a sub-field of theory 
rather, his presentation was a narrative of emergence. In the narrative Robinson had 
challenged the mainstream that promptly reacted, but to no avail. Harcourt told us 
the mainstream’s efforts were unable to meet her challenge (section 1 of the survey). 
The debate with Solow was made to show the ideological motivation of the 
controversy, and its political and social content, Harcourt described Solow’s attempt 
at escaping the ideologically content of the debate as a failure (section 2 of the 
survey). He then brought in Sraffa to administer the final and definitive blow, one 
that was written as a logical refutation of neoclassical belief, and grounded his claim 
in the fact that Samuelson had conceded defeat (section 3 of the survey). The stage 
was set for something to happen, and Harcourt presented an alternative that he 
claimed was immune to the problems raised by the critics (section 4 of the survey).
In contrast to the strong claims made in the body of his article, Harcourt’s 
conclusion may at first sight seem conservative: “We break off in midstream and few 
issues are settled. A key one relates to marginal productivity and its role in 
distribution, about which as we have seen there is a complete cleavage of opinion on 
the significance of double-switching results for this issue.”57 This open-ended 
conclusion was an invitation for the reader: the critique/alternative that Harcourt 
had narrated as emerging was an incomplete edifice to which the reader could 
contribute. And Harcourt predicted that the debate would surely move into more 
fundamental areas “for it is the general methodology of neoclassical analysis, rather 
than any particular result, which basically is under attack”.58 W ith the writing and
56The title of the survey also resonated Harry Johnson’s 1950s survey “Some Cambridge Controversies 
in Monetary Theory” (Johnson (1951-52)).
57Harcourt (1969), p. 398.
58 Idem.
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rewriting of the history of the controversies the theoretical importance of reswitching 
and its place at the center of the controversies changed. By 1971 Robinson was 
downplaying the importance of reswitching and in 1975 her plea was to move the 
debate into methodology and abandon its technical emphasis (namely issues 
concerning reswitching).59
My account here is designed to highlight, as the most important feature of 
Harcourt’s survey, the narrative that lay in the background. The author constructed 
a parting of ways and the formation of two distinct camps. In the language adopted 
throughout this thesis it was an instance of boundary work. In this narrative we see 
how two sides take shape, a neoclassical one where aggregate production function 
theorists struggle to solve the puzzles of dealing/measuring capital, and a Cambridge 
England side where there is an abandonment of such attempts and the search for new 
solutions, initiated through Robinson’s Accumulation of Capital and the later work of 
Kaldor and Pasinetti.
7.3.3 Harcourt’s critics
A book followed the 1969 survey, the plan of which closely resembling that of the 
article, it contained five chapters with the same titles as the article’s sections.60 The 
book was a more elaborate rendition of the survey’s argument, the author aiming to 
“extend the assertions into what I hope are persuasive or, at least, respectable
59Robinson (1971; 1975). No methodological reenactment of the debate followed, neoclassicals did not 
engage with Robinson’s redesigned critique (Samuelson and Solow commented on Robinson’s “Unim­
portance of Reswitching” but merely to discuss the significance and status of reswitching for neoclassical 
theory (Robinson (1975); Samuelson (1975); Solow (1975)). Her call was met only in later reconstruc­
tions of the debate that began to identify two parallel critiques set out by Cambridge, England: one 
was the reswitching result which was the core issue debated in the RSE  and QJE  symposia; the other 
was Robinson’s equilibrium versus history critique, presented as a deeper methodological challenge to 
the mainstream (see Harcourt (1975; 1976)). And Harcourt by 1994 commented on the controversies: 
“I think the methodological nature of Joan Robinson’s critique is the dominant one.” (King (1995a), 
p. 178) As the controversies were being reconstructed in later histories and surveys, new readings were 
being attached to them.
It is not my task in this chapter to assess these later reconstructions. W hat matters for the present 
argument is to  distinguish these later readings from the Harcourt (1969; 1972) ones where the equilib­
rium vs history critique was not dominant.
60Harcourt (1972). However, the contents of the article’s section I: “Malleability, Fossils and Tech­
nical Progress” were broken into two book chapters: “Search for a will-o’-the-wisp: capital as a unit 
independent of distribution and prices” and “Treacle, fossils and technical knowledge” .
i
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arguments.”61 What was added to the book was an introduction that summarized the 
argument and highlighted as its main lesson the “fundamental cleavage” between the 
two Cambridges. The clash of views was portrayed as rooted in ideological and 
political differences and in distinct intellectual lineages. It was said that while the 
neo-classicals followed the tradition of the marginalists, Cambridge England followed 
that of the classicals (David Ricardo and Karl Marx).
To understand what is entailed by Harcourt’s position and to assess the 
significance of the survey’s narrative for the economic literature of the time one needs 
to first consider the major resource he used for his boundary work, the canon. 
Harcourt’s boundary work was predicated on the selection, ordering and 
interpretation of texts and was meant to identify the crucial materials for the 
discipline. In so doing he was redefining the canon. It is significant that Harcourt 
made allusions to “founding fathers” of economic theory such as Ricardo and Marx 
and offered new interpretations of their work, namely by placing them as alternative 
and opposite to Alfred Marshall and Leon Walras (the marginalists). Alongside the 
classicals the Cambridge England texts were read as a revolutionary approach 
overcoming the problems endemic to all previous literature. It followed that 
Cambridge England should replace Cambridge Massachussets. The construction of 
the present required a new interpretation, a reconstruction, of the past, a new history 
for economics. The survey should be read as an attempt at the reconstruction of the 
discipline’s canon, and in the process mapping in economics those approaches that 
should be adopted and that should replace those that exited.
But Harcourt’s attempt at reconstructing the canon failed to gather the 
acceptance required to produce a sweeping reshaping of the discipline. Soon after its 
publication the survey was challenged. In 1974 three surveys were published that 
portrayed the controversies in ways that disagreed with Harcourt’s .1969 survey and 
his 1972 book. By presenting alternative ways to read the controversies, these three 
surveys underline the particularity of Harcourt canonical map and assert it as but one
61Harcourt (1972), p. vii.
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of many competing interpretations available in the discipline.62
John Hicks writing in 1974 in the American Economic Review also recognized 
two competing visions in economics, but the author had his eyes on a longer history. 
Hicks made a distinction between a Fundist position in capital theory with its roots 
in Adam Smith and British classical authors (capital is a fund and capital’s value is 
derived from the value of future net products) and a Materialist position going back 
to Cannan, Marshall, Pigou and J.B. Clark (where capital consists of physical goods 
whose value is the market value of the capital goods).63 Hicks however saw no 
destructive tension between the two since they were both worth pursuing. Both 
definitions had their place and importance, one was forward looking, the other 
backward looking. In Hicks’ understanding, debates about capital were therefore 
often a product of misunderstanding, but one with deep roots in the history of 
economics, namely that one had to choose between the two views. For Hicks, the 
1960s Capital controversies were just another instance of this misunderstanding. In 
his version of the never-ending capital debates, the English side was seen as taking a 
Fundist position, while the American one a Materialist stance. So in Hicks’ account 
there was none of the novelty in approach that Harcourt associated with the 
Cambridge England side. Rather, what motivated the analytical standoff was not 
discovery and theory development but two groups working under distinct and 
well-established conceptualizations of capital.
A more direct challenge to Harcourt came from Joseph Stiglitz and his 1974 
review of Harcourt’s book. Stiglitz engaged with the Cambridge England theories and 
gave voice to the neoclassical criticisms of this approach. In this account, critique did 
not run solely from England to the USA. Stiglitz identified a number of weaknesses in 
the Cambridge, England approach: for instance, their models were not amenable to 
be extended to include more than two factors (beyond labor and capital).64 The
62 As Samuels notes, in economics it may be that plurality of interpretations is more frequent than a 
single view: “Throughout its history, at every point in time, economics, has been comprised of multiple 
schools of thought. Moreover, each school of thought (and its theories and doctrines) has been given 
multiple interpretations.” (Samuels (2001), p. 485).
63Hicks (1974), p. 309.
64Stiglitz (1974), p. 895.
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author also charged the Cambridge England theorists with rejecting any attempt at 
empirical verification.65 Stiglitz did recognize an emerging theory in the Cambridge 
England group but made it the object of fierce criticism. This stands in contrast with 
Harcourt’s survey where neoclassicals were reacting to a challenge but never 
responded with criticism towards the alternative approach. Stiglitz presented the new 
theory as empty of promise, negating Harcourt’s identification of an alternative.
Of all the pieces here discussed Mark Blaug’s discussion of the Cambridge 
Revolution was the most akin to Harcourt’s in its structure. It too identified the 
existence of competing theories, the neoclassical and the Cambridge England one, the 
latter defined as composed by the contributions of Kaldor, Pasinetti and Robinson.66 
It too assumed the need for comparison and judgment, and saw the controversies in 
this light.
The Cambridge UK theories are certainly logically consistent, even if they 
do not always hang together in a logically consistent, total framework of 
theories. They are possibly more realistic in some of their basic 
assumptions, although the statement is itself highly ambiguous. But they 
are not simpler, they are not more elegant, they are totally incapable of 
producing testable predictions. Whatever is wrong with neo-classical 
economics (and who doubts there is much to complain of?), it wins hands 
down on all possible criteria.67
W hat is noteworthy in Blaug’s discussion is that his theory appraisal did not attach 
laurels of victory to the logically consistent one over the alternative. Unlike in 
Harcourt’s survey, Samuelson’s recantation was not sufficient to sustain the claim 
that the Cambridge England theory had “won” and therefore should be adopted.
The comparisons between Harcourt’s 1969 article and these three 1974 surveys 
reveal the controversial nature of the claims embedded in Harcourt’s construction of a 
canonical narrative. The comparison with Hicks’ paper shows Harcourt’s stress on 
novelty and the importance of the debate in sustaining his claim that a theoretical 
alternative is emerging. The comparison with Stiglitz’s article brings out a hidden
65Ibid., p. 901.
66Blaug (1974), p. 61.
67Ibid., p. 85.
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dimension of the controversies obscured in Harcourt’s survey, namely that of 
criticisms directed from the US/neoclassical side to the UK side. Harcourt’s article 
had portrayed only the attack of a challenger on the entrenched status quo. Finally, 
the comparison with Blaug leads one to question the resolution of the controversies as 
Harcourt presented it. While Harcourt saw an admission of defeat by the 
neoclassicals, Blaug saw an alternative that had not proven itself and a critique that 
had little impact when considering the neoclassical edifice in all its breadth and 
strength of analysis.
These comparisons underlie how Harcourt’s 1969 survey constructed the 
controversies to identify the formation of a new space for theory development, a space 
filled with promise. Harcourt set the beginning of the controversies at the point when 
the first line is drawn between the two groups, though according to Hicks, that debate 
was a long running one. Harcourt portrayed the demarcation line splitting the field of 
economics as coming from the Cambridge England side, while in Stiglitz the 
demarcation was being drawn by critiques originating from both sides of the debate. 
As the culmination of this process of definition Harcourt identified a victory over the 
old theory, whereas Blaug argued that there was no victory and so no new viable 
space.
7.4 T he P ost K eynesian Econom ics alliance
Harcourt through his survey of the capital controversies aimed to identify a new space 
in economics. Carving out the literature he invested this space with an ancestry -  the 
classical economists, Keynes and the Cambridge economists; proven critical powers -  
victory in debate over MIT; and promise of the future economics -  a field yet 
unexplored of great potential. This space was to become Post Keynesian economics, 
Harcourt called it “neo-Keynesian.”68 To be effective it would have to attract a 
sizable following and secure an institutional presence. My task in this section is to 
show how Harcourt’s “Cambridge capital controversies” were used to create the Post
68More about labels to follow in the next chapter.
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Keynesian community and have continued to play a role in its social reproduction.
7.4.1 Contacts between American dissenters and Cambridge
Despite its critics Harcourt’s survey and book69 also enjoyed a wide and favorable 
response. From the editor of the JEL, Perlman wrote to Harcourt: “Many students 
have written to me asking for reprints and I imagine that it has become standard 
stock in virtually all graduate courses in macroeconomic analysis (it’s been stolen 
from our library -  a sign of success the librarian tells me).”70
One of the most significant effects of Harcourt’s survey was in prompting the 
contact between groups of dissenting economists in the USA and Cambridge, England 
economists. One case that I wish to discuss in greater detail is that of Paul 
Davidson,71 partly because of the role this author later played in the history of the 
group72 but also because there is archival evidence that allows us to follow his 
changing perception of the discipline during the period.
In 1967 in the aftermath of the QJE symposium, Davidson corresponded with 
Samuelson: “I enjoyed your seminar yesterday but I am sorry I didn’t get into a 
further discussion of the income distribution aspects of the controversy between the 
two Cambridges. I find something to agree with and some areas of disagreement with 
in both schools of thought.” , adding that he had written two articles on the subject 
one for the Economic Journal where he attempted “to put neo-classicism in a 
Keynesian prospectus” and another in Econometrica which “attempts to blend 
Keynes’ views of the Treatise and The General Theory into a modern theory of 
capital accumulation”.73 Both articles were however agnostic towards the debate and
69Harcourt (1969; 1972).
70Letter from Perlman to Harcourt, 26th November, 1969. In G.C. Harcourt’s Personal Papers.
71Paul Davidson born in 1930 in New York, USA, obtained a BS in Chemistry from Brooklin College 
in 1950, an MBA from City University, NY, in 1955 and a PhD in Economics in 1959 from the University 
of Pennsylvania. Davidson taught at Pennsylvania (1955-1958), at Rutgers University (1958- 1986) and 
from 1986 has held the Chair of Political Economy at the University of Tennessee. He is founding and 
current editor of the Journal of P ost Keynesian Economics (since 1978). His major works include 
Aggregate Supply and Demand Analysis (with E Smolensky, 1964); M oney and the Real World (1972) 
and International Money and the Real World (1982).
72Of which more later, chapter 8 is devoted to debates within Post Keynesian Economics.
73Letter from Davidson to Samuelson, May 2nd, 1967 in Paul Davidson Papers, at Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library, Duke University.
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were instead devoted to a study of the labour market following an aggregate 
demand-aggregate supply analysis74 and the role of money and Keynesian uncertainty 
to the investment/capital accumulation decision.75 Davidson in 1967-68 should be 
properly characterised as writing largely outside the debate.
Also in 1967 Davidson began to correspond with Joan Robinson presenting her 
with his work on the demand for finance. A long theoretical exchange was to follow. 
At Robinson’s instigation the discussion ran into themes of the capital controversies. 
In this Davidson favourably compared the “Cambridge school” to “Samuelson’s 
neo-classical muddle”76 but hesitated to embrace it. While Robinson emphasized the 
importance of introducing the rate of profit into a theory of investment and capital, 
Davidson argued that to be fully convinced some work had still to be done in linking 
profit to the theory of effective demand.77 Davidson resisted the approach, reporting 
the results of the correspondence to his economics mentor Sidney Weintraub,78 who 
replied:
I suggest that you write her [Robinson] a kind note indicating your 
acceptance of her view on profit, and rather complete agreement, while 
proposing to work out some of the details and qualifications at a later 
date. There is every reason for you to make a friend of her, though many 
find her equally hostile to friend and foe.79
As Davidson moved closer to the Cambridge England perspective in his 
correspondence with Robinson, in 1969 he received a draft of Harcourt’s JEL survey 
which prompted the comment: “Received your latest manuscript and a fast reading 
leaves me very impressed. I would very much encourage you to develop this into a
74 Davidson (1967).
75 Davidson (1968).
76Letter from Paul Davidson to  Joan Robinson, August 30th', 1967 in Turner (1989), p. 186.
77Letter from Paul Davidson to Joan Robinson, King’s College Library, Cambridge, Joan Robinson 
Papers, J V R /v ii/14/29.
78Sidney Weintraub (1914-1983) was born in Brooklyn. He studied at LSE and New York University 
where he received his PhD in 1941. Weintraub taught at St. Johns University (then in Brooklyn) and 
was occasional visiting teacher at the New School for Social Research prior to his move in 1950 to the 
University of Pennsylvania. He was a founding member of the Journal of P ost Keynesian Economics. 
His main works include Price Theory (1949); Income and Employment Analysis (1951); An Approach 
to the Theory of Income Distribution  (1958); Keynes, Keynesians and the M onetarists (1973).
79Letter from Weintraub to Davidson, August 29th, 1967 in Paul Davidson Papers, The Economists’ 
Papers Project, at Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Duke University, Box 6.
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book. Because of the comments you have made some of the points you have made on 
the controversy make some sense to me.”80
The Harcourt survey article and book,81 which were contemporaneous to this 
trans-Atlantic correspondence, added status to the Cambridge England positions, 
reinforcing the contact already made between dissenters in Britain and the USA. As
E. Roy Weintraub has argued, surveys amongst other things, validate the importance 
of the subject for the wider academic audience and may set directions for theory 
development.82 Harcourt’s survey told, as its main moral, that Cambridge England 
was a powerful critique of the mainstream in need of further work,83 an invitation 
American dissenters’ took seriously:
now that a seemingly mortal blow to the neoclassicals has been delivered, 
creating a tremendous redundancy in the human capital stock in this side 
of the ocean, the American school will try to restore its capital values by 
drawing the Anglo-Italian school into an endless controversy as to which 
of the two simplified unrealistic models -  the Cambridge, Massachusetts 
or the Cambridge, England one -  is the least unrealistic.84
«
Paul Davidson was in 1969-70 calling for the construction of a new and “realistic” 
economics, portraying a mainstream that had lost credibility from the Cambridge 
England attack. The new theoretical development however had to respect the 
boundaries drawn by the controversies; it had to fit the theoretical space defined by 
Harcourt’s survey. A sizable portion of the Davidson-Robinson correspondence during 
the early 1970s was focused on the introduction of profit into Davidson’s analysis. In 
1970-71 he visited Cambridge, where he wrote his book Money and the Real World: 
“In this book I try to integrate this monetary view with the growth theories of
Harrod and the neo-keynesians”85 and his chapters XI-XII in Money and the Real
80Letter from Davidson to Harcourt, 9th January 1969 in Paul Davidson Papers, The Economists’ 
Papers Project, Box 3.
81Harcourt (1969; 1972).
82Weintraub (1991), p. 132.
83As noted by King ((2002), p. 121): “It seemed for a while to many critics of neoclassical economics 
as though the enemy had been taken on and beaten, on its own ground ( . . . ) .  There was the real 
prospect ( . . . )  “Post Keynesian” economics might constitute a potential lethal threat to orthodox 
thinking.”
84Letter from Paul Davidson to Joan Robinson, 15th of December 1969, Joan Robinson Papers, 
King’s College Library, JV R /vii/114/88.
85Davidson (1972). Letter from Paul Davidson to Luigi Pasinetti, 15th November, 1971 in Paul
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World were his self-recognized attempt to integrate his work with the Cambridge 
England theory.86
Though the case has been made for Davidson, other authors also came to 
reference the Controversies and to side with the Cambridge England position. In 1969 
Alfred S. Eichner,87 then an Assistant Professor at Columbia University, wrote to 
Robinson.88 The content of their ensuing correspondence was centered on Eichner’s 
theory of oligopoly. His approach focused on the microeconomics of the firm, while 
Robinson by then worked under a macro one, for Eichner these were compatible. The 
discussion that followed focused on laying down a synthesis of the two approaches89 
and resulted in Eichner’s adherence to theoretical positions of Cambridge England.90
The early 1970s were a time to downplay differences and highlight what was 
shared: “As Hy Minsky told me recently: ‘“There are so few of us, that we must be 
careful not to make issues of the little differences in our approaches in the literature. 
We must continually attack the orthodox and not be trapped into quarrelling 
amongst ourselves.’” 91 In the late 1960s, early 70s, the work of American Post 
Keynesians was framed to a large extent by the controversies. It was not just the 
work of Davidson but also the work of Edward Nell, Tom Asimakopulos, Donald 
Harris, and David Laibman.92 This literature explored the significance of reswitching 
and attempted to develop models under Cambridge England assumptions. The 
themes of the capital controversies were a means to mediate a joining of forces
Davidson Papers, The Economists’ Papers Project, at Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Duke Uni­
versity, Box 5.
86Letter from Paul Davidson to Joan Robinson, 25th September, 1970. Joan Robinson Papers, King’s 
College Library, J V R /v ii/1 14/125.
87Alfred S. Eichner (1937-1988) was born in Washington D.C. He obtained his PhD in Economics from 
Columbia University in 1966. He taught at Columbia (1961-71) at the State University of New York at 
Purchase (1971-1980) and at Rutgers University (from 1986). His major works include The Emergence 
of Oligopoly: Sugar Refining as a Case Study (1969); The Megacorp and Oligopoly. Micro Foundations 
of Macro D ynam ics (1976) and The Macrodynamics of Advanced Market Economies (1987).
88Lee (2000a), p. 20.
89This desire is expressed by Eichner, “It seems clear, at least to  me, that I don’t fully know what 
I am talking about when I discuss the post-Keynesians and what their analysis encompasses. I shall 
certainly try to correct for this deficiency over the next years as I do the final revising of the manuscript 
[his work on oligopoly].” Letter from Eichner to Robinson, April 1969, Joan Robinson Papers, King’s 
College Library, JVR Misc 79/4.
90Lee (2000a), p. 21.
91 Letter from Davidson to Paul Wells, 28th December, 1972 in Paul Davidson Papers, The 
Economists’ Papers Project, Box 6.
92Nell (1967a; 1967b), Asimakopulos (1969), Harris (1973; 1978), Laibman and Nell (1977).
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between critics from both sides of the Atlantic ocean.
The controversies were also a valuable teaching tool, as Donald Harris 
commented: “the JEL article has had a powerful effect in exposing the 
neo-neoclassicals and the meaning of the Cambridge contribution -  in particular, 
among graduate students, which is where it matters.”93 Jan Kregel94 recalls that for 
his formation as a Post Keynesian the “basic influence was that when I was a student 
at Rutgers, Paul Davidson gave an advanced seminar on the Cambridge Capital 
Theory Controversies, so that I was introduced relatively early to those controversies. 
And at the same time, these were linked to the Tract on Monetary Reform, the 
Treatise on Money and the General Theory.”95 Through his contact with Robinson, 
Davidson sent Kregel to Cambridge for the academic year of 1968/9. In Davidson’s 
words; “Kregel was a PhD student of mine that I sent to Cambridge to be tutored by 
Joan Robinson on the reswitching controversy. He successfully defended his PhD 
dissertation on the Cambridge Capital Controversy at Rutgers on April 14, 1970.”96 
Kregel’s dissertation work was followed by two books on the work of Joan Robinson 
and the Cambridge England approach to growth theory.97 On capital theory Kregel 
adapted a series of lectures he gave to undergraduates in Holland into a book.98
The positions drawn in Harcourt’s interpretation of the capital controversies 
played directly into the turmoil developing in American campuses.99 Harcourt was a 
vocal opponent to the Vietnam War in Australia100 and he saw a link between 
intellectual controversy and political belief. His stress on the ideological basis of the 
neoclassical argument101 led him in his 1972 book to claim:
93Letter from Don Harris to Harcourt in May 29t/l 1970, at G.C. Harcourt’s Private Correspondence.
94 Jan Allen Kregel was born in 1944 in Dallas, Texas. He received his PhD in Economics from Rutgers 
University in 1970. He taught at the University of Bristol (1969-72), University of Southampton (1973- 
9), at Rutgers University (1977-81) at Rijkuniversiteit Groningen (1980-5) and at the John Hopkins 
University School of Advanced International Studies at Bologna (since 1985). His major works include 
Rate of Profit, D istribution and Growth: Two views (1971), The Reconstruction of Political Economy: 
An Introduction to Post-Keynesian Economics (1973); Theory of Capital (1976).
95Kregel (2000).
96Davidson (2004), p. 256.
97Kregel (1971; 1973; 1972).
98Kregel (1976). Interview with Jan Kregel, 2003.
990 n  student unrest, see chapter 3 of this thesis, particularly pp. 55-59.
100 Harcourt was a founding member of the Australian Executive Committee of the Campaign for 
Peace in Vietnam in South Australia and for two spells, its Chairman (Harcourt (1999), p. 45).
101Harcourt (1969), pp. 380-386.
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It is my strong impression that if one were to be told whether an 
economist was fundamentally sympathetic or hostile to basic capitalist 
institutions, especially private property and the related rights to income 
streams, or whether he were a hawk or a dove in his views on the Vietnam 
War, one could predict with a considerable degree of accuracy both his 
general approach in economic theory and which side he would be on the 
present controversies.102
Robinson was recognised as a radical103 and received invitations to lecture at US 
Universities. These invitations that came both from students and colleagues, were 
met by lectures from Robinson on the capital controversies and economic 
methodology. Appreciation for Robinson’s work was more felt in the student 
population than by the academic staff.104 One such invitation came from Anwar 
Shaikh who had begun graduate work in economics at Columbia in late 1967. With 
the contact with Robinson (in 1970) and after reading Harcourt (1969), Shaikh moved 
from studying trade and development to write a thesis on “theories of value and 
theories of distribution”.105 It was in line with the controversies that Shaikh wrote his 
“Laws of Algebra and Laws of Production: the HUMBUG production function.”106 
The capital controversies as they unfolded had touched a latent discontent in 
American economics and this became manifest in the rising correspondence between 
Robinson and dissenting American economists. For these American dissenters the 
controversies, as interpreted by Harcourt, defined both a place of departure; and a 
direction to follow, namely the construction of an alternative to replace a “defeated” 
mainstream. What these contacts show is a theoretical alliance taking shape, distinct 
theoretical approaches uniting under the banner of an emerging school of thought.
102Harcourt (1972), p. 13.
103Between 1950 and 1983 Robinson wrote fourteen pieces for the socialist Monthly Review  (Turner 
(1989), p. 85). The texts voiced her views on the Soviet Union, China, Korea and Cuba, motivated 
by her visits to  these countries all through the 50s and 60s. She also participated in debates sponsored 
by the Monthly R eview : in 1961, “Has capitalism changed?”, in 1967, on the changes in economic 
organization taking place in Russia.
104Although coming from a sympathetic colleague the following quote from a letter by Sidney Wein­
traub echoes this growing interest: “You will be interested in the fact that I am being “petitioned” by 
our second year graduates to  offer a course built around your “type” ideas: they are in near rebellion at 
the econometrics and math-econ to which they have been subjected by our substantially MIT crowd.” 
Letter from Sidney Weintraub to Joan Robinson, November 29th, 1973 in Turner (1989), p. 182.
105Interview with Anwar Shaikh, 2003.
106Shaikh (1974).
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The controversies proved to be a much-warranted instrument to create “the necessary 
critical mass of academically situated economists to bring the post-keynesian 
revolution to this country.”107
7.4.2 Beginnings of Post Keynesian institutions
The emergence of a Post Keynesian institutional network has been researched by 
Frederic S. Lee. W hat I now show is that this network building was founded on the 
contacts stimulated by the Capital Controversies and parallels the theoretical alliance 
described in the previous section. I argue that it was the desire by these dissenters to 
further a theoretical perspective/alliance that they envisaged would change the 
profession and not, as Lee argues, a desire to defend themselves from the 
mainstream’s attacks.108
In 1971 J.K. Galbraith, as president-elect of the American Economic Association 
(AEA), invited Joan Robinson to deliver the Richard T. Ely lecture at the annual 
meeting of the Association. Eichner saw this invitation as a positive sign towards a 
change in American economics: “Perhaps, however the time is ripe for a 
post-Keynesian Revolution in this country. Your invitation to visit this country is 
certainly a hopeful sign.”109 Robinson in this visit was the catalyst for the first Post 
Keynesian meeting, more precisely, the first of a series of meetings that lead to the 
development of Post Keynesian institutions.
In November 1971, Robinson was at Columbia “at the invitation of Anwar Shaikh 
and other graduate students following the upheavals the previous spring over the 
Cambodian invasion.”110 During her visit she met with Eichner and Pasinetti, the 
three discussed the present state of economics in America and decided that a letter by 
Robinson should be sent to sympathetic economists thus setting up a meeting at the 
coming ASS A (Allied Social Sciences Association) meetings in New Orleans.111
107Letter from Alfred S. Eichner to Joan Robinson, July 3rd, 1974. Joan Robinson Papers, King’s 
College Library, JVR Misc 79/4.
108As discussed in the previous chapter, Lee (2000a, 2000b).
109Letter from Alfred Eichner to Joan Robinson, April 1971, in Lee (2000a), p. 106.
110Eichner note in Lee (2000a), p. 113. In an interview Shaikh denied any connection between 
Robinson’s visit and the Cambodia protests (interview with Anwar Shaikh, 2003).
m A letter from Alfred Eichner to J.K. Galbraith, February 17th, 1972, in Lee (2000a), p. 125,
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The meeting on the 2%th of December 1971 was attended by seventeen economists 
out of the original twenty to thirty that received Robinson’s letter. There was little 
agreement on what could be done to change the landscape of American economics. 
Still, “there was agreement on one point: everybody at the meeting felt that The 
American Economic Review was closed to heterodox economists and that something 
should be done about it.”112 Eichner was designated to contact Galbraith, President 
of the AEA, in the name of the group, and present him with the conclusions of the 
meeting, namely their shared concern over the biased assessment of non-neoclassical 
articles sent to the AER.
To keep the group informed about the developments of the protest a mailing list 
was created.113 By January of the following year (1972) Eichner had began editing a 
newsletter, which he sent to the participants of the New Orleans meeting. In one of 
early newsletters a Post-Keynesian Theory bibliography was sent, under the heading 
of “classics” it included the works of Keynes, Robinson, Kaldor, Harrod, Kalecki, 
Sraffa and Dobb, under the heading of “others” the list of references was headed by 
Kregel’s two books on capital controversy themes; Harcourt’s capital controversies 
book and Davidson’s book written in Cambridge and “integrating” his work with the 
Cambridge England theory.114 The bibliography is in line with the canonical view 
portrayed in Harcourt’s survey argument, labelled “post-Keynesian” and inclusive of 
dissenters from both Cambridge England (the “classics”) and the USA (the “others”).
The existence of a mailing list also encouraged the organization of sessions at the 
ASSA annual meetings, “we feel that there is too little awareness, even among those
presents a transcript of Robinson’s letter:
As a result of my visits to a number of North American Universities over the last few 
years, I am much concerned over the way economics is being taught. A vulgar version of 
neoclassical theory continues to be offered in the graduate schools -  although I find that 
many of the professors themselves privately admit that it is not intellectually defensible 
-  while students are forced to pretend to accept whatever they are taught in class.
I thought that perhaps the convention of the American Economic Association this month 
might provide an opportunity to discuss with economists from the United States what 
can be done to remedy this situation.
112Lee (2000b), p. 143.
113For more on the AER protests see Lee (2000a).
114 “Post-Keynesian Theory” in Paul Davidson Papers, The Economists’ Papers Project, Box 2.
7. Atlantic alliance 208
disenchanted with neoclassical economics, as to the possibilities which some of the 
recent work growing out of Cambridge post-Keynesian growth theory offer as an 
alternative to the conventional analysis.”115 The meetings, the first Post Keynesian 
sessions, were initially held under the auspices of the Union of Radical Political 
Economics (URPE) in 1972, 1973 and 1974,116 but Eichner also made efforts to have 
these included in the AEA label in the program, in 1974 he proposed a session to the 
President of the AEA:
Post-Keynesian theory, based on the pioneering work of Roy Harrod, Joan 
Robinson, Nicholas Kaldor, Piero Sraffa, Michel Kalecki and Luigi 
Pasinetti, represents a coherent, fully developed alternative to 
neo-classical theory which predominates in this country. Unfortunately, it 
has received little exposure in this country and, as a result, American 
economists who might be receptive to it have had little chance to judge on 
its merits. The re-switching controversy, which has had some airing in this 
country, presents a much distorted and inadequate view of the theory, in 
much the same way that the 19th century debate over the wages fund 
doctrine did in the case of marginal productivity theory.117
Departing from the Controversies as the most visible instance of their (adopted) 
critique, Post Keynesians were organizing means to voice their alternative economics, 
Eichner signalled that there was (in 1974) more to Post Keynesian theory than 
reswitching. The letter to the AEA President further listed speakers for the session 
Edward Nell, Tom Asimakopoulos, Donald Harris and Paul Davidson.118
One of the less recognized results of the 1971 meeting between Robinson and 
American dissenters was the idea of an “anti-neoclassical” book. The project was 
entrusted to Ed Nell and the envisaged title was: Growth, Profits and Property -  
Essays in the Revival of Political Economy. Although by 1976 Nell had collected all
115Letter from Eichner to Davidson, June 27th 1973 in Paul Davidson Papers, The Economists’ Papers 
Project, Box 2.
116Lee (2000a, 2002b).
U7Letter from Eichner to Gordon, March 6th, 1974 in Paul Davidson Papers, The Economists’ Papers 
Project, Box 2.
118Letter from Eichner to Gordon, March 6th, 1974 in Paul Davidson Papers, The Economists’ Papers 
Project, Box 2. I have no record of the Post Keynesian session taking place.
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the essays119 publication only came in 1980.120 The book is introduced with the 
paragraph:
This book of essays was conceived at the 1971 convention of American 
Economics Association, at a meeting called by Joan Robinson for those 
dissatisfied with orthodox economics. Hence in a very real sense, this book 
is a tribute to her, and to the influence she has exercised over the 
profession. Her influence in one form or another has been decisive in 
shaping a new and critical approach to economics. All of us would like to 
take this opportunity to honor her contributions to the field.121
In reference to the book: “The reason [for the book’s importance] is that it completes 
and clarifies a critique that has been going on for some time at the heart of 
economics. But in addition to critique, it states for the first time most of the aspects 
of a positive, new paradigm.”122
The burst of organizing initiated by the 1971 meeting and followed by sessions at 
the ASSA, by the edition of a newsletter, and edition of an anti-neoclassical book, 
constituted the genesis of the Post Keynesian group. The organizing was made 
possible by the contacts established from 1967 to early 1970s between American 
dissenters and their shared desire to further Cambridge England theory. As an
119There were a number of differences between the 1976 version first submitted and the published 
one. In Part IV on Macroeconomics papers by John Eatwell and Alfredo Medio were added. Part 
VI “Welfare, Capitalism and Socialism” was renamed to  “Property and Value” and Victor Lippitt 
and Howard Sherman’s “Comparative Economic Systems: A Radical Approach” was replaced by a 
paper by David P. Ellerman. The published version also included a new section (VII: Marxism and 
modern economics) with papers by Kregel “Marx, Keynes, and social change: is post-Keynesian theory 
neo-Marxist?” and Frank Roosevelt’s “Cambridge economics as commodity fetishism”.
120The book was nearly cancelled in 1979 since it was seen by Cambridge University Press as being 
too long and therefore too expensive (leading them to demand reduction of the number of essays, 
shortening some and asking for authors to give up their royalties), problems with the payment of the 
art work of the book proved to be a further complication.
121Nell (1980).
122From Davidson’s letter of support for the book, sent to Cambridge University Press, (undated), 
in Paul Davidson Papers, The Economists’ Papers Project, Box 6.
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institutional alliance it reinforced the theoretical alliance operated in the early 
1970s.123
7.5 R evisiting  the C ontroversies and th e P ost K eynesian  
identity
The great transformation of the profession implied in the Post Keynesian reading of 
the controversies didn’t occur. In time, the capital controversies slipped away from 
the memories of the majority of the profession. As Geoff Hodgson documents with 
the assistance of citation indexes, the profession as a whole was never much caught by 
the capital critique. The controversies and the Sraffian assault “[were] not only 
bypassed, but became irrelevant for the new core theory of neoclassicism. Sraffian 
results have no apparent critical effect on game theory. Losing their status even as 
internal criticism of the mainstream core, they became less and less relevant.”124 
And, by early 1980s, the focus of Post Keynesian work had also moved away from the 
battles of capital theory. Debates inside the Post Keynesian field were now on the 
subjects of methodology and the role of uncertainty in economic processes (prompted, 
according to King, by a rediscovery of J. M. Keynes through the publication of his 
Collected Works).125 And their debates with the mainstream were most notably on 
monetary theory, where they offered a critique of monetarist policies.126
However, and unlike the rest of the profession, the capital controversies were not 
forgotten by Post Keynesians. Time and time again this episode was revisited and 
reassessed and therefore also relived. W hat I wish to discuss in this section are the 
uses given to the capital controversies by a new generation of economists coming into 
Post Keynesian economics. I show the role the controversies played in the
123The “theoretical alliance” is therefore, in this context, shorthand for changing positions in theory. 
“Institutional alliance” referred to the meetings, newsletter, joint sessions and book edition. I see 
this distinction as merely pragmatic, a way to organize my evidence, since I find no methodological 
justification to keep them separate, they occur during the same period, they follow and reinforce each 
other, they are one and the same, network building.
124Hodgson (1997), p. 104.
125King (2002), pp. 181-182. An account of this reshifting of emphasis reflects also power struggles 
inside Post Keynesian economics, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
126As King documents, in King (2002), chapter 8.
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reproduction of the group. The controversies continued to provide direction for new 
research and, as a narrative, they identified the origins and the role that the group 
should strive to play in the profession, namely that of a critic and alternative to the 
mainstream.
The ways through which the new generation came to learn of the controversies are 
varied. Older Post Keynesians taught the controversies to their students in courses on 
macro theory and on the history of economics.127 The promotion of summer schools, 
starting in 1981 in Trieste, also allowed a younger generation to come into contact 
with the history of the capital debates. The summer schools were an opportunity for 
Post Keynesians from Europe and America to join in discussion. Post Keynesians 
brought their graduate students to the summer schools for an intensive course on 
what was Post Keynesian economics and what were its most recent theoretical 
developments. Not only was Harcourt present at these meetings but his 1972 book on 
the capital controversies was included in the reading lists of the school.128
The new generation of Post Keynesians used the Capital Controversies as a 
motivation for their work. They brought new denunciations of the limitations of 
neoclassical models,129 extended the models of the Cambridge England side130 and 
responded to critiques raised by the neoclassicals.131 Further contributions 
re-explored the significance of the reswitching132 and discussed new ways of 
presenting the Cambridge argument more in tune with the 1980s increasing focus on 
Keynes’ work.133 The critique was even reproduced as an attack on other fields of 
neoclassical theory, namely neoclassical demand theory: “Reswitching in capital
127A s comes out in reading King’s interviews of Post Keynesians (King (1995a)), Rutgers University’s 
graduate program trained some of the most influential Post Keynesians of the 1980s generation. The 
controversies were taught at Rutgers in the early 1980s in the history of economics course taught by 
Nina Shapiro (interview with Radhika Balakrishnan 2003). I should note that some students already 
knew of the controversies from earlier reading of dissenting literature and were convinced “the capital 
controversy effectively destroyed neoclassical theory and [were] willing to use the controversy in a 
number of ways to show it.” (Private communication Fred Lee, October 11, 2003).
128Harcourt (1972). Sidney Weintraub Papers, at The Economists’ Papers Project, Rare Book, 
Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. For more 
on the Trieste Summer School see the next chapter.
129Baldone (1984).
130Fazi and Salvadori (1985).
131 Ahmad (1986).
132Halevi (1985).
133Fleck and Domenghino (1986).
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theory led to the destruction of the neoclassical parables regarding the relationship 
between prices, production and distribution. Likewise, reversal (and reswitching) of 
commodity bundles ( . . . )  undermine the orthodox consumer theory.”134
A further use given to the capital controversies was to revisit the debate for 
methodological insights. As younger Post Keynesians revisited the moment where the 
demarcation between post Keynesian economics and neoclassical economics was 
drawn, they saw themselves as drawing lessons over the main differences between 
Post Keynesian economics and the mainstream. I provide two examples of this use.
The first example is a debate in the pages of the Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics from 1980 to 1985 and its main question was: Why did the capital 
controversies fail to produce a “Kuhnian scientific revolution”? The question was 
raised by Sheila Dow.135 She depicted the controversies as showing the weaknesses of 
the neoclassical paradigm and prompting a crisis, yet they were not followed by a 
paradigm shift. In her paper Dow stressed the incommensurability of two paradigms, 
the neoclassical and the Cambridge England one, to explain neoclassical economics’ 
survival of the crisis. Two years later, Andrea Salanti took issue with Dow. The 
author argued that the Cambridge School “has not yet been able to provide a 
sufficiently general and/or “value-appealing” theory to dislodge the neoclassical 
standard.”136 Salanti saw the controversies in a different light: since the Cambridge 
School provided an incomplete alternative, the effects of its critique were only partial. 
Dow’s reply claimed Salanti held a positivist view, naively expecting theories to be 
testable and refutable. Dow reasserted her stress on the value-ladeness of paradigm 
assessments.137
This debate continued with Avi Cohen interpreting the value-ladeness of the two 
paradigms as competing methodological approaches and therefore distinct evaluative 
outlooks on theory.138 According to Cohen, the critique of the Cambridge UK 
stressed the requirement to explain historical processes and underplayed the need for
134W atts and Gaston (1982-3), p. 287.
135Dow (1980).
136Salanti (1982), p. 129.
137D ow (1982).
138Cohen (1984).
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prediction; this was in stark contrast with the methodological and evaluative outlook 
of neoclassicism. He concluded that Post Keynesians should “be explicit about their 
methodology, so as to avoid the kind of misunderstandings surrounding the 
Cambridge controversies. ( . . . )  [and] use that methodology to provide good historical 
and theoretical explanations of economic phenomena.”139 Cohen’s contribution was 
challenged by Michael Bernstein. Like Salanti, Bernstein saw the Post Keynesian 
alternative as incomplete, “attention should be focused on the development of a 
coherent and systematic theory.”140 Bernstein concluded that the methodological 
reengagement that Cohen had proposed would not produce the necessary 
transformation of the profession. Cohen’s response141 was to reject Bernstein’s 
reading of his article. He (Cohen) argued that his methodological re-engagement was 
not a strategy to battle neoclassical opponents, but a means to bring out the 
underlying issues dividing the profession.
A second example of exploration into the history of the controversies in search for 
renewed methodological insight was undertaken by John B. Davis. Davis derived from 
the capital controversies one of the three key methodological principles of Post 
Keynesian economics, which was portrayed as “a response to the failures of the 
neoclassical theory and its inadequate characterisation of economic activity.”142 The 
principle he drew from the Cambridge controversies was that:
Contrary to the neoclassical conception of economic science as the steady 
accretion of analytical technique that renders past theory obsolete, post 
Keynesian theory allows for the re-examination of a variety of past 
theories as the needs of contemporary investigation bring forward new 
problems of characterization.143
The above examples show the Capital debates discussed as a starting point for 
the Post Keynesian (Cambridge) paradigm and the critique it raised as a shattering 
of the neoclassical edifice that should have brought its demise. In these examples,
139Cohen (1984), p. 627.
140Bernstein (1985), p. 610.
141 Cohen (1985).
142Davis (1987), p. 552.
143Ibid., p. 563.
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young Post Keynesians discuss the history of Post Keynesian economics through the 
history of the controversies. Significantly, the capital controversies are said to provide 
methodological lessons for the future of Post Keynesian Economics, as an alternative 
to mainstream economic theory.
The latest reviewing of the controversies in 2003 maintains this outlook over the 
Cambridge Capital debates:
While many of the key Cambridge, England, combatants stopped asking 
questions because they died, the questions have not been resolved, only 
buried. When economists decide to delve again, we predict controversies 
over these questions will be revisited, just as they were time and again in 
the 80 years prior to the Cambridge controversies144
Cohen and Harcourt invite the reader to use the controversies to understand the 
nature of the profession and the nature of orthodox economic theory, and suppose 
that the controversies may assist economics in overcoming the mainstream theory’s 
shortcomings. The main thrust of the Cohen and Harcourt review article is that 
differing outlooks in both “ideology and methodology, two subjects most economists 
would rather avoid”145 fuelled the controversies and prevented their resolution. This 
explanation brings together old and new readings of the debate: the older emphasis 
on ideology present in Harcourt’s 1969 review article and Cohen’s stress of differing 
methodological perspectives inside the discipline.146
Cohen and Harcourt’s 2003 survey testifies to my claim that the capital 
controversies were instrumental to bring together older and younger generations of 
Post Keynesians. Addressing the canon established by Harcourt’s reading of the 
controversies, and providing it with new readings meant that, a younger generation 
appropriated the history of the controversies as their own. Revisiting the 
controversies allowed them to position themselves side by side with older Post 
Keynesians and share the identity that the controversies’ history provided, namely 
Post Keynesian economics as inheritor to a devastating critique of the mainstream
144Cohen and Harcourt (2003), pp. 211-212.
145Ibid., p. 210.
146Cohen (1984).
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and as the key to an alternative economics. Born out of a reinterpretation of the 
canonical history of economics Post Keynesian identity is grounded on this canonical 
alternative which is hence continuously revisited.
7.6 T he em ergence o f P ost K eynesian  Econom ics
Post Keynesian economics was the product of an alliance. It was primarily an alliance 
between American economists and the designed Cambridge England school of 
Harcourt’s survey (which Robinson also promoted). Post Keynesian economics was 
the combination of a group of economists with a shared theoretical agenda, which in 
the early 1970s began to: reference each other, to attend each other’s meetings (for 
instance, seminars in Columbia in 1976), to protest against the AEA together, and 
later (1978) to set up and publish in a Journal of Post Keynesian Economics. 
Examination of these efforts should also make clear that the bulk of this Atlantic 
alliance resided in America. Robinson did not remain an enthusiast of these efforts for 
long, and other Cambridge Economists were never militant supporters.147 The 
organising was American-led, the alliance was made between Americans.148
I have located the source of the alliance activity to 1969 and Harcourt’s 
survey-article and in 1972 book on the capital controversies. Out of the unsettled 
exchanges Harcourt redrew the economics canon, he repositioned authors and texts to 
reveal what others had failed to recognise, a new theory in economics about to 
supplant the old. This was indeed a powerful message particularly for the 
“revolutionary craving” times of the late sixties, early seventies. Post Keynesians were 
not social revolutionaries but they wished for a revolution in economics nonetheless. 
Cambridge England positions were following the controversies, being adopted and 
developed by American dissenters. Adopting a canon, a new map of economics, is a
147It is interesting to note that Robinson when she wrote a textbook in 1973 (Robinson and Eatwell 
(1973)), did not make much of her American allies in its content, although she requested their help to  
promote the textbook in America, see King and Millmow (2003) for a history of the textbook’s ill fate. 
Robinson did comment on American economics, notably in her “W hat are the questions?” (Robinson 
(1977)) but she remained primarily attuned to debates in Cambridge (Robinson (1980), pp. 123-130).
148The Americanization of Post Keynesian Economics is partly discussed in the next chapter.
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political act.149 By siding with Cambridge England, American dissenters were joining 
with the Cambridge England canon and the authority that it then commanded, 
voiced in the JEL, included in reading lists, applauded by students. By siding with 
the Cambridge England canon they could then join a growing alliance of dissenters. A 
theoretical harmonization between approaches was being sought, manifested in the 
pronouncements in the authors’ correspondence, and later reflected in their writings.
The Cambridge Capital Controversies hold a prominent place in Post Keynesians’ 
identity. The controversies are periodically remembered and retold. They are passed 
on to later generations in Post Keynesian courses, oral or written histories. This 
episode in the history of economics is to this day, the foundation for Post Keynesians. 
Similarly to the 1970s where it was reason to join American and British dissenters, it 
now justifies young and older generations of Post Keynesians is furthering the Post 
Keynesian approach.
Interestingly the intellectual innovation that bred Post Keynesian Economics was 
not Keynes’ General Theory, neither was it Sraffa’s Production of Commodities by 
Means of Commodities. What first bound Post Keynesians was a reading of the 
economics literature. It was a vision of the past, a history that explained the future. 
It was frequently in battling over that past that Post Keynesian economics developed, 
the subject of the next chapter.
149Samuels (2001), p. 487; Brown (1993), p. 65, which I will discuss in detail in section 9.2.
8Many labels
The battle for self-definition
8.1 Conflict in P ost K eynesian  Econom ics and th e  
history o f a label
In 1972, Paul Davidson approvingly paraphrased Hyman Minsky1 as saying, “There 
are so few of us, that we must be careful not to make issues of the little differences in 
our approaches in the literature. We must continually attack the orthodox and not be 
trapped into quarrelling amongst ourselves.”2 However, tensions between dissenters 
were present in the early history of the Post Keynesian community. In the following 
year Minsky reviewed Davidson’s Money and the Real World, prompting the following 
remarks by the latter:
With friends like these who needs enemies! ( . . . )  I certainly would agree 
with your statement that MRW [Money and the Real World] is “a large 
step forward but it does not signal our arrival at the destination;” but I 
do not think you are correct in indicating that it is not a paradigm shift.
( . . . )  I would have thought we could keep our squabble out of the printed 
literature or if they are to appear, put them in the context of how this 
work suggests the need for further research in these areas.3
1Hyman P. Minsky (1919-1996) born in Chicago, USA. He earned a BA in Mathematics from the 
University of Chicago and PhD in Economics from Harvard University. Taught at Carnagie Mellon 
University (1947), Brown University (1949-1957), University of California Berkeley (1957-65), and at 
Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri (1965-90). After his retirement he was involved with the 
organization of the Jerome Levy Economics Institute (Bard College). His major works include John 
Maynard Keynes (1975), Can ‘I t ’ Happen Again? (1982) and Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (1986).
2Letter from Davidson to Paul Wells, December 28th, 1972. Paul Davidson Papers, The Economists’ 
Papers Project, at Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Duke University, North Carolina, U .S.A., Box 
7.
3Letter from Davidson to Minsky October 16th, 1974.Paul Davidson Papers, The Economists’ Papers 
Project, Box 4.
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Whereas, the subject of the previous chapter was to show how the Capital 
Controversies mediated a coalition of dissenters that defined the outline of a Post 
Keynesian community, the current chapter investigates how internal conflicts shaped 
its intellectual and institutional definition.
This chapter is about conflicting definitions of Post Keynesian Economics, the 
context of these disputes and its actors. My main entry-point into internal 
controversy is a history of the label of “Post Keynesian Economics” . For this purpose 
it is useful to discuss the label as a “classification,” an “ordering or arrangement of 
objects into groups or sets on the basis of their relationships,”4 the objects of interest 
in the present case being theories and authors. For the label of Post Keynesian 
Economics, we have a case of self-definition. It was the group that defined its own 
label and the features that distinguished the objects of its class from objects of other 
classes in the field of economics. Keeping with the recurring metaphor of this thesis, 
reclassifying or relabelling is redrawing the map of economic theory, and in the 
process drawing in allies and drawing out enemies. Post Keynesians are thus seen as 
constantly seeking to redefine their own intellectual and social boundaries in debates 
where the label was one of the core subjects of contention.
This chapter distinguishes evolving definitions of the label Post Keynesian but 
also notes the existence of different labels and their spellings such as 
“post-Keynesian,” “Anglo-Italian theory,” “Cambridge School,” “Neo-Keynesian” and 
“Post Keynesian”. Each section devotes attention to the debates that marked the 
specific period for the group (first subsections) followed by an analysis of the texts 
that came to define the label for that period (second subsections). The first uses of 
the label appeared at the pre-history of the Post Keynesian group and are discussed 
in section 8.2. The following section deals with the formation of the group in the first 
half of the 1970s and how it came to appropriate the label and redefine it. Section 8.4 
deals with the second half of the 1970s, the culmination of which was the creation of 
the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics. This period also corresponded to changes 
in the balance of power inside the group and with it came a new definition for the
4Sokal (1974), p. 1116.
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label. In the early 1980s, and prompted by efforts to extend the Post Keynesian 
network internationally, a debate ensued that motivated a further redefinition of the 
label; this is the subject of the final section.
8.2 Before th e  C apital Controversies
The term “post-Keynesian” first appeared in a book published in 1955 and edited by 
Kenneth K. Kurihara, a macroeconomist from Rutgers University.5 The collection of 
essays printed in the volume was meant as an “extension of Keynes’ General Theory 
by a group of well-known economists.”6 J. M. Keynes’s work was portrayed as a 
frame of reference upon which to search for “criticisms, further explorations, 
imaginative extrapolations and novel insights, yet all trying to add something” .7
For authors in the volume, the sympathy that Keynes’s work merited had its 
limits. Keynes had provided indispensable “tools of analysis” and had raised 
important questions but he had not answered them all. Furthermore, new questions 
had arisen for which Keynes could provide little help, Kurihara noted in his 
introduction: “many would now consider [Keynes’s] analysis less than adequate for 
meeting such special problems as cyclical forecasts and controls, persistent inflation, 
the maintenance of full-employment booms, secular growth, nonlinear structural 
relations, and macrofunctional distribution.” These problems were said to lie outside 
the scheme of the General Theory and called for fresh approaches, as those proposed 
in the book.8 More important was the statement that this extension of the General 
Theory was “only now possible.” The passing of time had given perspective as to 
what were Keynes’s contributions to economics and what were the problems of 
Keynesian economics. Since Keynes’s contributions had then been fully assimilated 
one could engage in answering some of the questions he had left unanswered and draw
5Kurihara (1955).
6Kurihara (1955), p. vii. The contributors were: Howard R. Bowen; Martin Bronfrenbrenner; 
Richard Brumberg; Dudley Dillard; Shinichi Ichimura; Lawrence R. Klein; Kenneth K. Kurihara; R. 
C. 0 .  Mattews; Franco Modiglinani; Gerald M. Meier; Anatol Murad; Don Patinkin; Paul P. Streeten; 
Lorie Tarshis; Mabel F. Timlin; Shigeto Tsuru and William S. Vickrey.
7Idem.
8Ibid., p. vii.
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support from some of his “tools of analysis” for answering new questions.9
Paul Samuelson in the concluding paper of a book entitled Keynes ’ General 
Theory -  Reports from Three Decades, also made use of the term for “A Brief Survey 
of Post-Keynesian Developments.”10 One can read from the preface the book’s stated 
motivation:
The immediate stimulus to the compilation of this volume was 
chronological. What better way to celebrate the General Theory's first 
quarter century than to ask some of the distinguished economists who 
responded to Keynesian economics at the doctrine’s inception to place in 
print their present evaluations of the Keynesian revolution or 
“revolution”?11
In his “brief survey” Samuelson offered “a personal interpretation of some major 
trends in macroeconomic analysis that have grown out of the General Theory” } 2 
Samuelson played with the idea of how a second edition of the General Theory might 
look and he listed contributions that had picked up from Keynes and developed his 
insights, of which the crucial one was that “economic equilibrium need not produce 
full employment.”13 The author also wanted to make note of contributions that could 
be seen as valuable additions, for instance a theory of the wage and price level that 
was lacking in Keynes’s General Theory. The paper was a reading of the breadth of 
contemporary macroeconomic theory (it included references to Simon Kuznets,
Robert Solow, Nicholas Kaldor, Milton Friedman and others) and how it might be 
related to Keynes’ work.
John E. King in his history of Post Keynesian Economics characterizes these uses 
of the term as carrying “chronological rather than a doctrinal meaning.”14 King is 
correct in that the term was not a reference to a section of the economics discipline as
it was later to denote, instead it was a description of economics as a whole. But it
9The articles covered such diverse topics as econometric research, modeling and a comparison be­
tween Marx and Keynes.
10Leckachman (1964); Samuelson (1964).
u Leckachman (1964), p. v. The book included papers by D. G. Champernowne, Gottfried Haberler, 
Roy Harrod, Abba Lerner, Austin Robinson, W. B. Reddaway, Paul A. Samuelson, Paul M. Sweezy, 
Jacob Viner.
12Samuelson (1964), p. 332.
13Ibib, p . 332.
14King (2002), p. 9.
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was also more than just chronological in meaning. As Samuelson and Kurihara’s uses 
exemplify, when Keynes’ legacy was under scrutiny the label “Post-Keynesian” was 
made to take the place of “Keynesian.” When comparing Keynes’ economics with 
their own research, authors underlined how the profession had transcended Keynes, 
fully accessing his contributions, adopting some, rejecting others and going so much 
further than the General Theory.
Joan V. Robinson first recorded use of the term was in the preface to her second 
volume of Collected Economic Papers of 1960: “The bulk of the present volume was 
written within the last five years [i.e. 1954-59], and all but one piece in the last eight. 
It belongs to the field of what is sometimes called post-Keynesian economics.”15 She 
was adhering to the standard use of the time. However in an article in 1964 
“Pre-Keynesian Theory After Keynes” ,16 Robinson redefined her list of labels. 
According to Robinson, Keynes had been responsible for a fundamental criticism of 
neoclassical economics; he had not so much presented a complete new system, but a 
powerful yet partial critique of the orthodoxy. Therefore, the work of Keynes 
sectioned the history of economics, those that had not understood his critical insights 
lived in a “pre-Keynesian” world of ideas, those that had understood it, moved onto a 
“post-Keynesian” one. The article indicted neoclassical economics as being built upon 
“pre-Keynesian” ideas.
Thus for Kurihara and Samuelson the profession was one, united in having 
advanced beyond Keynes. For Robinson in 1964, some economists ( “neo-neoclassical” 
ones as she also called them) had not understood Keynes’ message, they were lost in 
a pre-Keynesian past. Her message was that to move forward one needed to return to 
Keynes. To Robinson, Keynes was the beginning of a critique that she was aiming to 
conclude and that grounded new enquiries better suited to understand the world. In 
all these uses of the term, Keynes was a landmark in the history of economics that set 
about a change in the profession, redesigned the issues, questions and tools of
15Robinson (1960), p. vi. In the second edition (1974) Robinson compares “Post-Keynesian Analysis” 
and “Neo-Classical Capital” . The use of the term is different here, as we shall see it was in line with 
the definition attached to the term in 1974, bearing the mark of the Capital Controversies episode.
16Robinson (1964).
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economics.
8.3 P ost K eynesian m eetings (1971-1978)
The previous chapter discussed the early contacts between American dissenters and 
Joan Robinson in connection with the Capital Controversies. It was shown that a 
theoretical alliance was formed mediated by the reading of the debates provided in 
Harcourt’s surveys.17 The theoretical alliance creating Post Keynesian economics was 
effected by the adoption of Cambridge England ideas in America and by efforts at 
developing and extending these theoretical perspectives. As the alliance was taking 
shape there wasn’t yet a label to designate the approach.18 But as the relationship 
between British and American dissenters developed, the need for a label to denote the 
emerging approach began to be felt. It was negotiated between American dissenters 
(who disliked “Anglo-Italian”) and Cambridge England (disliking “Neo-Keynesian”), 
the compromise was finally met with “post-Keynesian.”
Evidence of this negotiation can be found in Paul Davidson’s correspondence 
with Robinson. While debating methodology and the Capital Controversies,
Davidson referred always to the “Cambridge school”19 while Robinson talked of an 
“Anglo-Italian theory”20 to denote the Cambridge England side of the controversies. 
In later letters Davidson came to adopt Robinson’s label but there is no evidence of a 
discussion over the issue in the correspondence. Alfred S. Eichner on the other hand, 
in his correspondence with Robinson manifested displeasure with Robinson’s 
preferred term “Anglo-Italian.” He wrote: “Perhaps you might be able to clarify for 
me how the group should most properly be delineated. Should they be known as the 
Cambridge Neo-Keynesians, as I have been wont to term them, or as the 
Anglo-Italian school, as you refer to them in your last letter?”21 Eichner argued that
17Harcourt (1969; 1972).
18For convenience in the previous chapter I adopted the term “Cambridge England” as in Harcourt’s 
surveys (1969; 1972).
19Letter from Paul Davidson to Joan Robinson, August 30th, 1967 in Turner (1989), p. 186.
20Letter from Joan Robinson to Paul Davidson, September 3rd, 1969, ibid., p. 189.
21 Letter from Joan Robinson to Alfred S. Eichner. This letter, undated, was a reply to a 9th of 
June letter. Joan Robinson Papers, Kings College’s Library, Cambridge, U.K., JVR Misc 79/4. “Neo- 
Keynesian” was the label used in Harcourt (1969).
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the term “Anglo-Italian” would never “catch on” in the United States. By April 6, 
1971, he was using “post-Keynesian” while Robinson continued to use 
“Anglo-Italian.” 22 Eichner further promised Robinson that he “would not refer to it 
again as the neo-Keynesian theory.”23
Some of the exchanges that led to the changes in labels have been lost.24 
However, Eichner’s correspondence with Robinson is prefaced by a note, that might 
elucidate what motivated the change: “My distinct recollection, though I do not see it 
in the correspondence that survives, is that she objected to neo-Keynesian because it 
sounded too much like ‘neoclassical’.25
By this time, as I have shown, Robinson had already used the term 
“post-Keynesian,”26 but in the context of her correspondence with Eichner it was 
employed with new meaning. In 1971 it was no longer a reference to the profession 
and its reception of Keynesian ideas but an allusion to a set of theoretical 
contributions, those of the Cambridge England side of the Capital Controversies.27
8.3.1 Alfred S. Eichner and Jan Kregel as spokespersons
It is significant that Eichner was the protagonist for the definition of the label as 
“post-Keynesian” since he was soon to take on the role of main publicist of the 
approach. One of the points that will be recurrent in this chapter is that the need for 
labeling was more acutely felt by the institutional promoters of the group, by those 
aiming to stand as its spokespersons. Eichner and Luigi Pasinetti were the instigators 
of the first meeting between American dissenters receptive to Cambridge England 
views. The meeting took place on 28th of December 1971 in New Orleans at the 
American Economic Association (AEA) convention.28 The meeting was not what
22Letter from Alfred S. Eichner to Joan Robinson, on 16th April, 1971. Joan Robinson Papers, JVR  
Misc 79/4.
23Turner (1989), p. 191.
24In the late 1970s Robinson destroyed virtually all her correspondence (interview with Jan Kregel, 
2003).
25Lee (2000a), p. 113.
26 Robinson (1964).
27Referring to the work of Robinson on profit and accumulation (Robinson (1956)) and the work of 
Kaldor (1960a; 1960b; 1966) and Pasinetti (1962) on distribution.
28 A very important AEA convention in this history of dissent, referred to  in chapter 3 and 7, pp. 83, 
206 of this thesis.
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Eichner expected from it, the consensus achieved by the dissenters present was 
limited to a protest over the American Economic Review's (AER) editorial policy, 
which was perceived as closed to non-neoclassical economists. Eichner suggested in 
the meeting that “post-Keynesian” be adopted as the label for the group, but the 
suggestion was met with hostility by many participants.29
Eichner and Edward Nell, a year later, organized a session at the Union for 
Radical Political Economics (URPE) meetings held in Toronto, entitled “The 
possibility of an alternative to the neo-classical paradigm: a dialogue between 
Marxists, post-Keynesians and Institutionalists.”30 The session reviewed Nell’s 
anti-neoclassical textbook, had a paper by Minsky, “An Alternative to the 
Neo-Classical Paradigm: One View”, and one by Eichner with the title: “Outline for 
a new paradigm in economics.” Eichner’s goal was to tackle the disagreements made 
evident in the 1971 meeting and look for grounds for consensus. He argued that the 
widespread dissatisfaction with the neoclassical paradigm sprang from two beliefs 
shared by all dissenters: “that the conventional analysis provides a faulty and 
incomplete explanation of how the economic system itself functions and, two, that it 
ignores the critical interaction between economics and other aspects of society.”31 
The critiques by Marxists, neo-Marxists, Keynesians, post-Keynesians and 
institutionalists were deemed compatible, though they presented different emphasis 
depending on author and tradition. For Eichner, what prevented this critique from 
being more effective was the absence of a paradigm.32 It would enable each school to 
pursue distinct lines of enquiry that were seen most promising, but also yield a shared 
basic model of the economy and society.
Eichner discussed change in economics resorting to Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of 
science.33 This was contemporaneous with similar debates happening within URPE.34
29Lee (2000b), p. 146.
30Letter Alfred S. Eichner to Paul Davidson, 12th December, 1972. Paul Davidson Papers. The 
Economists’ Papers Project, at Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Duke University, Box 2.
31 Eichner (2000 [1972]), p. 147.
32 “W hat has so far been missing, and thus what has prevented these critiques from sweeping the 
textbooks clean of error, has been the lack of an alternative paradigm” Eichner (2000 [1972]), p. 147.
33Kuhn (1970).
34Recall the 1971 special issue of the Review of Radical Political Economics “On Radical Paradigms 
in Economics” discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis, p. 76.
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In Kuhn’s account a whole discipline could be transformed: a discipline in crisis 
would generate a new approach (paradigm) that would replace the prevailing status 
quo. It was the dissenters’ perception that neoclassical economics was in crisis, as 
stated in Robinson’s Richard T. Ely lecture of 1971 to the AEA.35 They reasoned 
that if no scientific revolution was underway it was because the alternative paradigm 
was not yet in place, not yet complete. Kuhn’s account of discontinuity in science was 
once again turned from a descriptive statement to a programmatic one; to overcome 
the mainstream the dissenters had to construct a consistent alternative in the form of 
a paradigm.
Eichner’s conference paper was a sketch of how an anti-neoclassical paradigm 
could be designed.36 The first task was to model the larger society’s functions so that 
the role of the economic system might be better understood. Secondly, some variant 
of a Ricardo-Sraffa general equilibrium growth model would be used to analyse 
market economy. Marx’s economics would be seen as a particular version of this 
general class of models, while the work of Keynes stood as a refinement of the model. 
The paper was as an appeal for a rallying of approaches against the mainstream, in a 
designed paradigm that made the different perspectives compatible. Eichner reported 
on the meeting: “I would like to add that the session reinforced my belief that it is 
possible to develop an alternative to the neo-classical paradigm, that the differences 
between Marxists, neo-Marxists, Keynesians, post-Keynesians, institutionalists and 
grants economists are not necessarily irreconcilable.” However it would not be easy 
given “This tendency to talk past one another was certainly evident in Toronto.”37 It 
was decided that the dialogue in search of a new paradigm inclusive of Keynesian, 
Marxist and Institutionalist approaches was to be pursued in local discussion groups 
established for that purpose, designated Political Economy Clubs.
Eichner’s appeals at URPE came in a period where the Union and radicals were
35 Robinson (1972).
36Eichner (2000 [1972]).
37Letter. from Eichner to Davidson, 7th February 1973. In Paul Davidson Papers, The Economists’ 
Papers Project, at Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Duke University, North Carolina, U .S.A., Box 
4.
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redirecting their efforts away from strictly intellectual tasks.38 Even more troubling 
for Eichner’s efforts was the growing sectarianism within URPE, and the exemplar of 
this new stage of intolerance was Anwar Shaikh’s expulsion from the URPE-New 
York chapter for his sympathies with Sraffa and other Cambridge authors.39 Eichner 
was therefore even unable to organise a Political Economy Club in New York City.
Frederic S. Lee comments that Eichner became disillusioned with the possibility 
of a single paradigm uniting the different heterodox perspectives, and it was only 
“with Robinson’s encouragement, Eichner regained his determination to promote Post 
Keynesian economics now tempered with a more realistic perception of how difficult 
it would be.”40 In 1973 at the New York URPE annual meetings Eichner organized a 
workshop: “Post-Keynesian theory as a teachable alternative macroeconomics.”41 
Eichner, again with Nell’s support, compiled a post-Keynesian bibliography that was 
distributed in the meeting and through the newsletter that had been first issued after 
the New Orleans meeting with Robinson. The 1973 meeting signalled a change in 
Eichner’s efforts. His aim was no longer that of creating a paradigm uniting radical 
and Keynesian approaches but that of developing post-Keynesian theory as the 
alternative paradigm.
Eichner’s next step in developing and promoting post-Keynesian economics in the 
U.S.A. was to announce its existence to the profession. For this he requested the 
assistance of Jan Kregel, who had been at Cambridge as a graduate student of 
Robinson (and had concluded a doctorate on the Capital Controversies).42 Eichner 
wanted them both to write a survey article that presented the post-Keynesian 
paradigm and publish it in a major journal.43
Contemporaneously to Eichner’s efforts in the U.S.A., Kregel was promoting the
380 n  radicals’ outreach work see chapter 4.
39Interview with Anwar Shaikh, 2003.
40Lee (2000a), p. 28.
41The workshop was chaired by Ed. Nell, with talks by Ed Nell on “The implications of the Sraffa 
model” , a paper by A1 Eichner on “Development and Pricing in the Megacorp” and a further paper on 
Cambridge theory.
42His thesis was published under the title: Rate of Profit, distribution and growth: two views (1971). 
The text referred to “neoclassicals” vs the “Keynesians” in what were Harcourt’s (1969, 1972) respec­
tively “Cambridge Mass” and “Cambridge England”.
43 Interview with Jan Kregel, 2003.
8. M any labels 227
new approach in Britain. In the early 1970s, Jan Kregel published two articles in the 
Bulletin for the Conference of Socialist Economics, the journal of a group of radical 
economists that were organizing in Britain.44 Like Eichner, Kregel was looking for an 
audience in the radical community. What is striking in these articles, is the use of 
terms “post” and “pre” Keynesian in accordance with Robinson’s (1964) 
understanding of them. Pre-Keynesian were those ideas that had survived in 
neoclassical economics, ignoring the critical insights of Keynes: “In the less ambitious 
sense of short-term cycles or crises there is a large pre-Keynesian literature which was 
made largely nugatory by the analysis of the General Theory.”45 Post-Keynesian 
contributions were those that understood the content of Keynes’ work: “A radical 
Keynesian must then mean someone who believes that no advance has been made in 
monetary theory since around 1938. In commonly accepted terminology such a 
position would be that of ‘post-Keynes’.”46
In 1973 Kregel published the Reconstruction of Political Economy: An  
Introduction to Post-Keynesian Economics,47 In this text the meaning of 
post-Keynesian was no longer a chronological one as given in his previous articles but 
a brand for a new approach, its main goal was “to link Keynes’ own theory with the 
long-period theory of the classical political economists. The possibility of such a 
relation has become obvious with the post-Keynesian construction of a long-period 
theory based on Keynes’ short-period theory which closely resembles, in both content 
and concern, the classical theory of Ricardo and Marx.”48 The book dealt in detail 
with the work of Robinson on growth theory. In two short sections headed: 
“Alternative Post-Keynesian Analyses,” Kregel discussed Nicholas Kaldor’s “stylised 
facts” method and distribution models, followed by Luigi Pasinetti’s work on 
distribution. The alternative analyses made up a single approach, an alternative to 
neoclassical economics, Kregel concluded:
44Kregel (1972; 1974). For a history of the Conference of Socialist Economics see Radice (1981) and 
Lee (2001).
45Kregel (1972), p. 59.
46Kregel (1974), p. Kregell.
47Kregel (1973).
48Kregel (1973), p. xv.
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the post-Keynesian approach is not identical in its approach or application 
to specific areas or problems. We have tried to show, however, that the 
general base of the theory is unified and coherent in that it stems from the 
work of Keynes and is potentially able to analyse all the problems that 
classical political economy found of interest. In this sense it qualifies as a 
true alternative to the existing neoclassical orthodoxy. It remains that it 
will not answer all the questions posed by neoclassical theory. If it did it 
would not be an alternative. At the same time it provides a method of 
approach and a point of view widely different from the neoclassical, 
offering questions that the neoclassical approach cannot treat. It is in this 
sense that it becomes a true alternative.49
Eichner’s desire to work with Kregel for promoting the post-Keynesian approach 
was justified given Kregel’s earlier efforts at presenting post-Keynesian economics as 
an alternative to the neoclassical establishment.50 They shared the vision of an 
emerging approach in economics. Furthermore, Kregel’s 1973 book provided a 
detailed exposition of Robinson’s work and so he was well qualified to bring into 
Eichner’s survey-article Robinson’s views on theory.
8.3.2 Post-Keynesian as an American extension of Cambridge 
England
In July 1974, Eichner approached Mark Perlman, editor of the Journal of Economic 
Literature (JEL), with the survey article authored jointly with Kregel: “Our purpose 
in writing this article was to provide a guide to the post-Keynesian literature on 
matters other than the capital controversy, a literature which seems largely unknown 
to American economists.”51 Eichner in this statement placed the capital 
controversies, a publicly recognised event to readers of the JEL , within the class of 
post-Keynesian theory. He argued that that there was more to post-Keynesian theory 
than what had been presented in the Capital debates. Perlman had sponsored 
Harcourt’s capital controversies survey of 1969, and appeal to the subject was likely
49Kregel (1973), p. 204.
50Kregel (1972; 1973; 1974).
51Letter from Alfred S. Eichner to Mark Perlman, July 31st, 1974 in Mark Perlman Papers, The 
Economists’ Papers Project, at Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Duke University, North Carolina, 
USA, Box 24.
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to have favourable resonance.
The Eichner and Kregel survey was subjected to two referees, one supportive and 
one very negative, however, Perlman showed resolve in publishing it: “As some of our 
mutual friends may have told you, I am quite interested in seeing that members of the 
American Economic Association get regular and useful exposure to the economics 
work done elsewhere, particularly in Cambridge on the Cam.”52 In face of mixed 
reviews, it was ultimately the intellectual authority commanded by Cambridge that 
secured the article’s publication.
Eichner and Kregel’s survey was entitled: “An Essay on Post-Keynesian Theory: 
A New Paradigm in Economics.” The starting point of the essay was to assert the 
significance of Keynes’ “critical insights into the workings of a modern, technologically 
advanced economy” .53 In a footnote the authors clarified the choice of label:
The term neo-Keynesian has also been used. It should be added that 
Keynes’s is only one of the contributions upon which the new approach is 
based. Certainly the work of Kalecki has been no less important than that 
of Keynes; and to the extent that the new approach rests on the theory of 
value which grows out of the work of John von Neuman and Piero Sraffa, 
those names need to be mentioned as well. Indeed, to Marxists the work 
of Sraffa is seen as being the most fundamental of all, and they are likely, 
to refer to the new approach as neo-Ricardian.54
The paper promised a review of post-Keynesian literature, highlighting the salient 
features of the new approach. The authors grouped these under four headings: 
growth dynamics, distributional effects, the Keynesian constraints and the 
microeconomic base. The means by which each of these was addressed differed. While 
Keynesian constraints were presented as an exemplar, a way of approaching a 
problem, the other three were presented by reference to models and theories.
52Letter from Mark Perlman to Alfred S. Eichner, December 16th, 1974 in Mark Perlman Papers, 
The Economists’ Papers Project, Box 24.
53Eichner and Kregel (1975), p. 1293.
54Ibid, p. 1293. The reference to the term “neo-keynesian” appears because that had been used 
in Harcourt’s 1969 JEL survey. The inclusion of Kalecki and Von Neumann seems to have been at 
Robinson’s suggestion: “I think a paper on these lines would be very useful. The general introduction 
is excellent but I think both Kalecki and von Neumann should be mentioned along with Keynes. It 
would be truly remarkable to see this published in the U.S.A.” Letter from Robinson to Eichner l l t/l 
September 1974, Joan Robinson Papers, JVR Misc 79/4.
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Post-Keynesian growth dynamics was said to have originated in Roy Harrod’s 
work in the 1930s which had been revised in light of Joan Robinson’s Accumulation of 
Capital and the contributions of Kaldor and Pasinetti, including class and 
distributional considerations for the determination of the rate of savings.55 Eichner 
and Kregel stressed what they saw as “analysis done in historical time” and 
“recognizing the dynamic nature of the economic system.” Distributional effects were 
closely connected with studies of growth and were again referenced to the work of 
Pasinetti, Robinson and Kaldor. Distribution was seen as an integral part of all 
economic explanation and analysis, highlighting the distinct economic behaviour of 
capitalists and workers with regard to saving and consumption. These first two 
sections corresponded to materials connected to the Capital Controversies.56 The 
discussion of the “Keynesian constraints,” the third section of the paper, asserted the 
centrality of money for modern economies. The section discussed how to analyse the 
macroeconomic aggregates, it placed investment as the primary determinant of 
economic activity and savings as adjusting to the former. The main contributions 
discussed in this section were those of Kregel, Davidson, Minsky and Tom 
Asimakopolous. Finally, the fourth section addressed the microeconomic base of 
post-Keynesian economics by presenting a theory of non-competitive pricing 
grounded on the Michal Kalecki’s mark-up and addressing the nominal wage as 
exogenously determined. The main contributions referred to in this last section were 
those of Donald Harris and Eichner.57
The survey presented “post-Keynesian theory” as an approach originated in the 
1950s and 1960s at Cambridge (sections 1 and 2 of the survey) and joined by 
American economists who developed and added to it (sections 3 and 4). The survey 
can therefore be read as a progress report of the alliance between British and 
American dissenters. The authors’ desire to showcase “post-Keynesian theory” 
beyond the Capital Controversies was a desire to show their own work as a valuable
55Harrod (1939); Robinson (1956); Kaldor (1960a) and Pasinetti (1974).
56It would be a perfect match with Harcourt’s canonical interpretation of growth and distribution 
theory (Harcourt (1972)) if not for Eichner and Kregel’s inclusion of references to their own work for 
post-Keynesian distribution (Eichner and Kregel (1975), p. 1299).
57Harris (1974) and Eichner (1973; 1976).
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addition to an emerging theory.
Eichner and Kregel noted that neoclassical economists did recognise this 
literature by commenting and exploring its insights, but they remarked that the 
neoclassical reading was at odds with the post-Keynesian perspective.
Post-Keynesian theory should be treated as a “new paradigm” surfacing in the midst 
of an economics profession in crisis. The emerging paradigm as an alternative to 
neoclassical economics was the focus of the survey’s final section. The inclusion of a 
table comparing post-Keynesian theory and neoclassical theory (see Figure 8.1) 
asserted that economists were faced with a choice. The authors argued that while the 
purpose of post-Keynesian theory was to explain the real world, the purpose of 
neoclassical theory was to serve as basis to optimal decision-making.58 The survey 
article concluded that the post-Keynesian paradigm was still developing but from the 
onset it was clear it was better suited to answer the concerns of the day.
TABLET
Aspect
Dynamic properties
Explanation of how income is 
distributed
Amount of information assumed 
to be available
Conditions that must be met 
before the analysis is con­
sidered complete
Microeconomic base 
Purpose of the theory
Post-Keynesian Theory
Assumes pronounced cyclical 
pattern on top of a clearly 
discernible secular growth rate
Institutional factors determine 
a historical division of income 
between residual and non* 
residual shareholders, with 
changes in that distribution 
depending on changes in the 
growth rate
Only the past is known, the 
future is uncertain
Discretionary income must be 
equal to discretionary expendi­
tures
Imperfect markets with signif­
icant monopolistic elements
To explain the real world as 
observed empirically
Neoclassical Theory
Either no growth, or steady- 
state expansion with market 
mechanisms assumed to preclude 
any but a temporary deviation 
from that growth path
The distribution of income 
explained solely by variable 
factor inputs and the marginal 
productivity of those variable 
factor inputs
Complete foresight exists 
as to all possible events
AH markets cleared with 
supply equal to demand in each 
of those markets
Perfect markets with all micro 
units operating as price takers
To demonstrate the social 
optimality If the real world 
were to resemble the model
Figure 8.1: Comparing post-Keynesian and neoclassical theory, in Eichner and Kregel 
(1975), p. 1309.
*Ibid, p. 1310.
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This survey came at the end of a series of debates and institutional efforts led by 
Eichner during the early 1970s. It mirrored the successful alliances forged in this 
period. The project for an anti-mainstream paradigm enlisting Marxists, 
Institutionalists and Keynesians had failed, however an alternative paradigm was 
possible when constructed from the Capital Controversies with additions by American 
dissenters (see Table 8.1.).
Table 8.1: Label’s definitions and spokespersons until 1975.
Period Spelling Spokesperson Refers to
1950s-60s Post-Keynesian Economics
Late 1960s Anglo-Italian Robinson Cambridge, England side of 
Capital Controversies
Early 1970s Post-Keynesian Eichner Paradigm of Cambridge, Eng­
land and their American follow­
ing
8.4 T he Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 
(1977-82)
Eichner took on himself to be the promoter of the Cambridge approach. This mandate 
allowed him to redraw the boundaries inherited from Harcourt’s survey of the Capital 
Controversies. He was drawing attention to the efforts of American economists in 
joining Cambridge England, he was connecting the American group to the renowned 
Cambridge authors. It is not surprising then that Eichner and Kregel’s survey for the 
JEL stressed American developments over Cambridge England subjects.
Eichner’s standing as spokesperson for Post-Keynesian economics was as good as 
the means he used to make himself heard. His mouthpieces were the annual URPE 
meetings, the post-Keynesian newsletter he edited and his own writings, prominently 
his survey at the JEL in 1975. As the institutions supporting the Post Keynesian
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community changed in the late 1970s so did Eichner’s standing as spokesperson. The 
most significant institutional change of this period was the creation of a Post 
Keynesian journal. It is at this point that the label changes (“post” is capitalized and 
the hyphen deleted) though the explanation for the change only came later.
8.4.1 Sidney Weintraub and Paul Davidson as spokespersons
The idea of a dissenting journal appears to have originated early in the 1970s, out of 
a failure by dissenters in gaining access to the mainstream outlets. The 1972-73 
protest towards the AER  led by Eichner, agreed to in the 1971 meeting, proved to be 
without major consequences. As President of the AEA, Galbraith after receiving 
Eichner’s protest letter asked the editor of the AER , George Borts, to respond to the 
dissenters’ claim. His reply was that there was no discrimination and that the work 
dissenters had submitted simply did not live up to the quality standards of the AER. 
He further suggested that “a separate journal to identify the heterodox and divergent 
points of view” be formed and “a group to sponsor sessions at the annual meetings of 
the AEA” be set up.59 Borts challenged Eichner to present evidence that papers were 
being discriminated against on the basis of ideological bias.
Davidson had also engaged in efforts of his own, following a debate between John 
G. Gurley and Robert Solow and published in the 1971 May issue of the AER,60 he 
proposed to Galbraith to set a ten percent quota for “radical” economic papers. The 
response from Borts was: “There is no doubt that setting a quota of 10 percent as 
Davidson suggests would attract more articles in this area, but I don’t think they 
would be the good ones. Moreover, every branch of economics can lay claim to a 
share of space in the Review.”61
In September 1972 the AER  editor responded to the criticisms by printing an 
editorial statement where he reaffirmed the editorial policy of encouraging “perfect
" L etter from George Borts to Alfred S. Eichner, August 8th 1972 in Paul Davidson Papers, The 
Economists’ Papers Project.
" T h is  exchange figured prominently in chapter 3 of this thesis, p. 85.
61Letter from Davidson to Galbraith, 21st September 1971, and letter from George Borts to J.K. 
Galbraith, 4th October, 1971. Letters in Paul Davidson Papers, The Economists’ Papers Project.
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freedom in all economic discussion.”62 At the Toronto AEA business meetings it was 
decided the AER  should institute anonymous refereeing. Borts somewhat resisted the 
decision by implementing the new rule only to half of the refereed manuscripts and 
arguing that it had produced no effects. However, by January 1974 all manuscripts 
were anonymously refereed.63 The changes were not enough to convince the 
protesting group, which continued to feel unfairly excluded from the AER  and 
consequently without a scholarly outlet to present their research to the profession.
After the publication of the Eichner and Kregel survey article, meetings between 
American post-Keynesians intensified. It then seemed possible to organize locally in 
New York in addition to the yearly sessions at the ASSA meetings. So, in 1976 
Eichner organised in Columbia a set of seminars on post-Keynesian topics.64 The 
purpose was to bring together the then few post-Keynesian economists in working out 
what post-Keynesian economics was. The seminars were short-lived, six in total, with 
divisions emerging between the participants and the final seminar was held in 
December.65
Eichner and Davidson given the problems faced by the seminars sought to 
organise a conference. It was held at Rutgers University in April 16th 1977 on 
“Post-Keynesian theory and inflation policy,” with the purpose of serving “as a forum 
for the exchange of ideas and scholarship by those economists whose work falls within 
the tradition established by Keynes, Kalecki, Robinson, Kaldor and Sraffa.”66 The 
conference lasted two and a half days and was attended by 65 economists from the
USA and Canada.67
62 American Economic Review  (1973b), p. 503.
63Somewhat independently, in March 1974 and since John G. Gurley and Paul M. Sweezy were in 
the A EA ’s Executive Committee, Borts was ordered to take in a radical economist into his Board of 
Editors, he chose U.Mass.-Amherst’s Stephen Resnick.
64The seminars included papers by John Eatwell, Paul Davidson, Sidney Weintraub, Harvey Gram 
and Basil Moore, see Lee (2000a), p. 30.
65In a letter to Robinson in Nov 9th, 1976, Eichner reports on the first seminar. It was attended by 
about 25 people and had John Eatwell presenting a paper where he combined the Kaleckian analysis of 
aggregate demand and distribution with the Sraffian value equations in order to analyze fiscal policy. 
Davidson in the meeting contested the Kaleckian interpretation of aggregate demand and the overall 
validity of Eatwell’s efforts. Joan Robinson Papers, JVR Misc 79/4.
66Lee (2000a), p. 31.
67There were four sessions at the conference, the first entitled “The monetary aspect of inflation” 
having as chairman Davidson and as panellists H. Minsky and B. J. Moore; “The international dimen­
sion” with L. Tarshis as chairman and J. Burbridge and A. S. Eichner as panellists; “Incomes Policy
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Sidney Weintraub’s participation in the conference convinced him that the 
project of a journal for Keynesian economics was possible.68 Creating a journal 
focusing on dissenting Keynesianism was a viable option since the doors of the AER  
seemed forever closed and given the group’s surprising expansion witnessed in the 
conference. The Journal of Post Keynesian Economics saw its first issue in the Fall of 
1978. The journal was Sidney Weintraub’s project and he invited his former student 
Paul Davidson to share with him the editorial responsibilities. In the editors’ 
statement of purposes we can read its goals, to: “encourage evolving analysis and 
empirical study to contest the conformist orthodoxy that now suffuses economic 
journals in the United States”, “committed to the principle that the cumulative 
development of economic theory is possible only when the theory is continuously 
subject to challenge.”69. The definition of the camp of acceptable papers was made in 
the negative, with the refusal of all those neoclassical models that: “(1) assume 
automatic full employment; (2) ignore the vital presence of a public sector; (3) 
postulate perfect certainty; and (4) provide only “long run” steady state solutions.”70 
As a definition of Post Keynesian economics the statement was sufficiently vague 
to imply a broadening of the Post Keynesian camp. But what sort of broadening was 
it? Who was to be included? These questions are important because the journal and 
its editorial policies held the power to reshape the field of Post Keynesian Economics 
by giving voice to some authors and perspectives over others.
I
8.4.2 A broader Post Keynesianism?
To better understand the content of this change one needs to look into the work of 
Paul Davidson and to his changing views on the landscape of economics. Unlike 
Eichner, Davidson was no enthusiast of Kuhn’s philosophy of science, he preferred the 
more traditional reference to “schools of thought.” In 1972 Davidson had identified
as a Stabilization Device” chaired by S. Weintraub and with R. Marris and L. Seidman and finally 
“Beyond Post-Keynesian Theory: the Unexplored Issues” with E. Nell as chair and J. Kregel and S. 
Rousseas in the panel and with G. C. Harcourt as commentator.
68Turner (1989), p. 196.
69Weintraub and Davidson (1978), p. 3.
70 Idem.
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five schools of thought (see figure 8.2.) characterised along such dimensions as 
“Politics,” “Money,” “Wage rate and income distribution,” “Capital Theory,” 
“Employment Policy,” “Inflation” and “Government Role” . Davidson further 
characterised his work and that of the “Keynes’s school” as developed along three 
basic assumptions:
that in the real world (1) the future is uncertain (in the sense that Knight 
and Keynes used the term), (2) production takes time and therefore, if 
production is to occur in a specialization economy, someone must make a 
contractual commitment in the present involving performance and 
payment in the uncertain future, and (3) economic decisions are made in 
the light of an unalterable past, while moving towards a perfidious future71
In 1972, what was to become under Eichner’s labelling the “post-Keynesian 
paradigm” was identified by Davidson as the “neo-Keynesian school.”72 Despite 
Davidson’s stated efforts to integrate Cambridge England views into his work,73 he 
nonetheless preferred to locate himself in the “Keynes’ school” at the centre of 
politics and economics.
Ten years later, in 1982, following the creation of the JPKE , Davidson produced 
a similar table of schools of thought (see figure 8.3).74 The significant change is the 
inclusion of a brace under some of the schools to identify the formation of the Post 
Keynesians:
Post Keynesian economists are primarily an amalgam of those from the 
Keynes and Neo-Keynesian schools, but are also joined by some 
right-leaning members of the socialist-radical group, such as Galbraith. 
Moreover, certain left-leaning members of the neoclassical Keynesian 
school have exhibited some sympathy for Post Keynesian analysis in 
recent years (e.g. John Hick’s writings of the late 1960’s and 1970’s).75
71 Davidson (1972), p. 7.
72Recall that this was Harcourt’s (1969) use of the term.
73See p. 202 of this thesis.
74Davidson (1980) lists in socialist-radical the authors “Galbraith, Bowles, D. Gordon, all Marxists,” 
in Neo-Keynesians “Robinson, Kaldor, Sraffa, Pasinetti, Eichner, Kregel, Harcourt,” in “Keynes” “Har- 
rod, Shackle, Weintraub, Davidson, Minsky, Wells, Vickers,” in “Neoclassical synthesis Keynesian” 
“Solow, Samuelson, Tobin, Clower, Leijonhufvud, J.R. Hicks” and finally in “Monetarist-Neoclassical” 
“Friedman, Brunner, Meltzer, Parkin, Laidler.”
75Davidson (1980), p. 152.
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Table 1.1
A TABLE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
Politics
Money
Wage rate and
income
distribution
Capital Theory
Employment
Theory
Inflation
Government role
Socialist-Radical 
Extreme left 
Real forces empha­
sised -  money 
merely a tool for 
existing power 
structure
Wage rate basis of 
value. Income 
distribution the 
most important 
economic question 
Surplus generated 
by reserve army 
Any level of em­
ployment possible. 
Assumes growth 
in employment 
overtime. Full em­
ployment creates 
crisis for capitalism 
Primarily due to 
money wage 
changes, but can 
also be due to pro­
fit margin changes
Socialise the 
capitalist sector
Neo-keynesian Keynes
Left of centre Centre
Real forces empha- Money and real
sised, money as- forces intimately
sunned to accom- related
mod ate
Money wage is the 
linchpin of the 
price level. Income 
distribution very 
important 
Surplus needed 
over wages 
Growth with any 
level of employ­
ment possible, al­
though growth at 
full employment 
emphasised
Money wage rate 
fundamental; in­
come distribution 
question of less 
importance 
Scarcity theory 
(quasi-rents)
Any level of em­
ployment possible; 
full employment 
desirable
Neoclassical-Bastard Keynesian 
Right of centre 
Money matters along with 
everything else
Monetarist-Neoclassical 
Extreme right 
Only money matters
Wage rate one of many prices. Income distribution is the 
resultant of all the demand and supply equations in a 
general equilibrium system. Income distribution a matter 
of equity, not of ‘scientific’ inquiry.
Marginal productivity theory and well-behaved production 
functions
Full employment assumed; Full employment assumed in
unemployment is a disequi- long run; no explicit short-
librium situation run theory of employment
Due to money Due to changes in
wage or profit money wages,
margin changes productivity and/
or profit margins
Laissez-faire except Laissez-faire except 
for macroeconomic for macroeconomic 
controls over in- controls over 
comes money, investment
decisions, and the 
earnings system
In long-run primarily a mo­
netary phenomenon being 
related to money supply via 
portfolio decisions. In  short 
run may be related to 
Phillips curve
Laissez-faire except for exter- Laissez-faire 
nalities and some ad hoc 
macro-controls
Primarily a monetary pheno­
menon in the sense of being 
related to the supply of 
money via portfolio decisions
Figure 8.2: Paul Davidson’s “Table of Political Economy” in his 1972 Money and the 
Real World, p. 4.
But there were other (minor) changes to Davidson’s “Table of Political Economy.” 
“Neo-keynesian” was renamed to “Neo-Keynesian,” i.e. the “K” capitalized, and 
“Neoclassical-Bastard Keynesian” was replaced by “Neoclassical 
Synthesis-Keynesian.” Now (partially in the case of neoclassical Keynesian school) 
grouped under Post Keynesian economics these schools of thought deserved greater 
respect, thus the small “k” to capital “K” change and the substitution of “bastard” 
for “synthesis.”
Davidson’s clearest statement (in the late 1970s and early 1980s) on the 
definition of Post Keynesian Economics appeared in 1980. It was part of a 
symposium entitled “The Crisis in Economic Theory” marking the fifteenth 
anniversary of the journal Public Interest. The debate was prefaced by Peter F. 
Drucker, according to whom economics had undergone four major “paradigms” 
shifts76 and it was on the throes of a fifth “scientific revolution,” with the demise of
76The first revolution from the Cameralists and Mercantilists to the Physiocrats, the second with 
the Physiocrats replaced by the Classicals, a third with the advent of the neoclassicals, from the
8. Many labels 238
T a b l e  1.1 A T ab le  o r  Political Econom y
Socialist -  
Radical
Neo-
Keyncsiart
Keynes
Neoclassical 
Synthesis -  
Keynesian
Monetarist-
Neoclassical
Politics E xtrem e left
M oney  Real forces
em phasized  - m oney 
m erely a  too l for 
existing pow er 
s tru ctu re
W age R ate  an d  Incom e W age ra le  basis o f
D istribu tion
C ap ita l T heory  
E m ploym ent T heory
value. Incom e 
d is tr ib u tio n  the m ost 
im p o rtan t econom ic 
question
S urp lus  generated  by 
reserve a rm y  
A ny level o f  
em ploym en t possible. 
A ssum es grow th  in 
em ploym en t overtim e. 
Hull em ploym ent 
c reates crisis for 
cap ita lism  
P rim arily  du e  to  
m oney wage changes, 
b u t can  a lso  be due to  
profit m arg in  changes
Left o f  centre 
R eal forces 
em phasized, m oney 
assum ed to 
accom m odate
M oney wage is the 
linchpin o f  the price 
level. Incom e 
d is tribu tion  very 
im portan t
S urp lus needed over 
w ages
G ro w th  with any  level 
o f  em ploym ent 
possible, although 
g row th  a t  full 
em ploym ent 
em phasized
D ue to  m oney wage o r 
profit m argin changes
C en tre
M oney an d  real forces 
intim ately re la ted
R igh t o f  cen tre 
M oney  m atters  a lo n g  with 
every th ing  else
Extrem e righ t 
O nly m oney m atters
M oney wage ra te  W age ra te  One o f  m any prices. Incom e d is tr ib u tio n  is the
fundam ental. Incom e result o f  all the d em and  an d  supply  eq u a tio n s  in a
d istribu tion  question  o f  general equ ilib rium  system . Incom e d is tr ib u tio n  a m atte r
less im portance o f  equity , n o t o f  'scientific ' enquiry
Scarcity  theo ry  (quasi­
rents)
A ny level o f  
em ploym ent possible. 
Full em ploym ent 
desirable
D ue to  changes in 
m oney wages, 
p roductiv ity  a n d /o r  
profit m argins
M arginal p roduc tiv ity  theo ry  an d  w ell-behaved 
p ro d u c tio n  functions 
Full em ploym ent assum ed 
U nem ploym ent is a 
d isequilibrium  situ a tio n
Full em ploym en t assum ed 
in long  run. N o  explicit 
sh o rt-ru n  theo ry  o f  
em ploym ent
In  long  ru n  prim arily  a 
m onetary  phenom enon  
being re la ted  to  m oney 
supply via p o rlfo lio  
decisions. In  sh o rt ru n  may 
be re la ted  to  Phillips curve
P rim arily  a  m onetary  
phenom enon  in the sense 
o f  being  re la ted  to  the 
supply  o f  m oney via 
p o rtfo lio  decisions
Post Keynesian
Figure 8.3: Paul Davidson’s “Table of Political Economy” in his 1982 International 
Money and the Real World, p. 2.
Keynesian theory and policy of the preceding 30 to 50 years. In the Public Interest 
symposium, under a section “Radical Critique,” Paul Davidson authored a paper: 
“Post Keynesian Economics: solving the crisis in economic theory.” The paper is of 
significance since it gave a JPK E’s editor’s definition of Post Keynesian Economics.
Davidson began by arguing that Keynes’ revolution had been aborted by the 
failure of neoclassical economists to comprehend Keynes’ “logic” . Post Keynesians 
were those that understood Keynes, “Post Keynesians ( . . . )  share the view that 
Keynes provided a revolutionary new logical way of analysing a real world 
economy.” 77
Davidson added in a footnote:
There is no hyphen between the words “Post” and “Keynesian.” In the 
past there has been a lack of uniformity in labelling schools of thought; 
hence perceptive readers will note that others have used the term 
Post-Keynesian (with the hyphen) to designate the school that I have 
labelled Neo-Keynesian. In the order to provide a nonambiguous
neoclassicals to the Keynesians was the fourth (Drucker (1980), pp. 7-9).
77Davidson (1980), p. 152, emphasis in original.
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terminology I have eliminated the hyphenated term from this text and 
request that others do the same.78
Davidson explained his change in label differently to different audiences. If in the 
Public Interest volume he portrayed it as a clarification, for Post Keynesians he 
described it as a broadening of the approach. Robinson, when she received the early 
issues of the JPKE, praised Davidson’s work and commented: “I am rather bothered 
by the way A1 Eichner set up as the spokesman for what all Post Keynesians think 
and he then slips in fancy ideas of his own. I hope you are keeping an eye on him.”79 
Davidson replied:
I know what you mean regarding A1 Eichner’s attempt to straight jacket 
what Post-Keynesian school means. If you will note that A1 always uses a 
hyphen between the Post and the Keynesian and we at the Journal have 
specifically removed the hyphen. It is a subtle way to suggest that Post 
Keynesian in the view of the JPKE is much broader than Post Keynesian 
in the view of A1 Eichner.80
The nature of this “subtle” change was acknowledged by Eichner who, in a footnote 
to his first JPKE  article “A post-Keynesian short-period model”, wrote:
The appearance of this journal [JPKE] , as well as the series of articles in 
Challenge magazine beginning with the May of 1978 issue, are further 
evidence that a distinct body of post-Keynesian theory is coming to be 
recognized. It should be noted, however, that the present journal, by 
omitting the hyphen, hopes to encompass a much broader approach than 
the one identified here as “post-Keynesian.”81
Despite what may be taken from statements by the protagonists, I suggest that 
there was more to Davidson’s redefinition than a mere broadening of the scope of 
Post Keynesian Economics. Davidson’s Public Interest article characterized Post
78 Idem.
79Letter from Robinson to Davidson, 2nd April 1979. Joan Robinson Papers, JV R /v ii/144 /8 .
80Letter from Paul Davidson to Joan Robinson, 3rd May 1979. Joan Robinson Papers, 
JV R /vii/114/173 . It is also likely that Weintraub and Davidson’s choice of label reflected a desire 
to differentiate their dissenting approach from Kurihara’s conventional Keynesian 1955 book, men­
tioned earlier in this chapter. The need for this differentiation was all the more poignant given that 
Kurihara and Davidson were colleagues at Rutgers University.
81Eichner (1979b), p. 38.
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Keynesian models along axiomatic lines and a reading of these does not suggest that 
a broadening of the group was implied. Davidson noted three propositions shared by 
all Post Keynesian models: the economy is a historical process; in a world where 
uncertainty is unavoidable, expectations have an unavoidable and significant effect on 
economic outcomes, and political and economic institutions play a significant role in 
shaping economic events.82 This was Davidson’s 1972 definition of the “Keynes’s 
school.” Following Davidson, Keynes and the Keynes’s school should become the 
centre of economics and the defining core of Post Keynesian Economics.83
Weintraub, co-editor of the JPKE, was not as vocal in discussing the definition of 
Post Keynesian Economics. Yet, he seemed to be in agreement with Davidson’s 
definitional work. He joined Davidson in castigating Samuelson for describing himself 
a “Post-Keynesian” in the 1980 edition of Economics. The criteria for disallowing 
Samuelson’s use of the label were those outlined in Davidson’s writings.84
The aim of Davidson’s definitional work was unlike Eichner’s continued efforts. 
Through books, seminars and the graduate work of his students Eichner kept his long 
time pursuit of paradigm construction.85 He was not only trying to extend 
post-Keynesian economics to new fields of research but also working out a synthesis 
that might unite the different perspectives and preferences of the diverse group of 
economists. In the words of William Millberg, one of Eichner graduate students in the 
late 1970s: “He really had ‘this grand design’, . . . ,  which was an attempt both to give 
an overview of Post Keynesian economics and to synthesise the conflicting strands.”86 
Davidson did not seek a unifying paradigm. He did not call for the construction 
of a new approach that united the varied contributions, fusing them into one.
Instead, he aimed to stabilize the alliance activity of the previous decade by noting a 
shared communality in Keynes and the axioms of the “Keynes’s school” , departing
82By institutions Davidson meant money and contracts, in particular spot and forward price con­
tracts. (Davidson (1980), pp. 158-164). This definition is very close to Davidson’s (1972) definition of 
the “Keynes” school.
83Notably Davidson (1980; 1982).
84Davidson and Weintraub (1981). Similarly Weintraub (1978-79; 1979) pressed the same buttons 
than Davidson in defining Post Keynesian Economics, notably in the stress given to uncertainty and 
Keynesian “animal spirits.”
85 Eichner (1979a).
86King (1995a), p. 53.
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from these diversity was apparently allowed. Davidson’s definition provided stability 
because unlike Eichner’s anxious calls for new formulations of an (elusive) paradigm, 
it demanded nothing of Post Keynesians. Their communality in Keynes was said to 
be a fait accompli Keynes was raised to a new prominence as the foundation, and as 
what bound Post Keynesian economists together. That Davidson became the 
dominant spokesperson of the Post Keynesian community can be seen from how 
discussions were re-centred on how to interpret Keynes and his legacy and no longer, 
along Eichner’s vision, on designing a single paradigm that encompassed all authors 
(see Table 8.2.).
Table 8.2: Label’s definitions, spokespersons until 1982.
P er io d S p e llin g S p ok esp erson R efers  to
1950s-60s Post-Keynesian Economics
Late 1960s Anglo-Italian Robinson Cambridge, England side of 
Capital Controversies
Early 1970s Post-Keynesian Eichner Paradigm of Cambridge, Eng­
land and their American follow­
ing
Late 1970s Post Keynesian Davidson Communality between Cam­
bridge England, American 
following and other dissenting 
Keynesians
8.5 T he Trieste sum m er school (1981-85)
Recently, Davidson has claimed that his late 1970s, early 1980s broad definition of
Post Keynesian Economics was merely a strategy to battle the mainstream.87
Davidson’s statements in 2005 are a defence of his current definition of Post
Keynesian Economics over his own earlier pronouncements. Portraying a continuity
in his “true beliefs” (inevitably his current ones), for Davidson the past was no more
87Davidson (2005), p. 395.
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than an accidental deviation. To give credit to Davidson’s present reflections obscures 
the conditions which lead him from a federation of adjacent schools of thought in
1980-82, to his current definition of Post Keynesian Economics as a narrowly 
inscribed and distinct school of thought. To attribute such changes in definition 
merely to Davidson’s change of mind is evading the issue of why he changed his mind. 
Once again, change in the definition of Post Keynesian Economics followed from 
changes in its institutional make-up. With institutional change came a new set of 
spokespersons who used their power to redraw the boundaries of Post Keynesian 
Economics. What marked the early 1980s in the history of the Post Keynesian 
community was the organization of a Summer School in Trieste, Italy.
8.5.1 Many spokespersons
Kregel was in Rome, Italy, in the late 1970s working as adviser to the federation of 
employers. Kregel with Pierangelo Garegnani devised the project of an informal 
school, which was facilitated under Italian law, for Cambridge-related dissenting 
ideas. Sergio Parinello, a colleague of Garegnani in Rome, had contacts with the 
education authorities in the autonomous region of Trieste and secured the 
organization of a Summer School.88
A Roundtable in Udine-Trieste, Italy, held from September 22nd to 28th in 198089 
was organized to discuss the creation of an international summer school, “The general 
format of the School would be such as to bring together students and teachers 
interested in pursuing specific aspects of economic theory and policy critically and 
constructively in an informal setting.”90 For the purpose of organizing the Summer 
School, a Centre of Advanced Economic Studies was created.91 It was projected that
88 Interview with Jan Kregel, 2003.
89The sessions at the Roundtable were: “An Evaluation of the Theory of Value and Distribution 
from the Classics to the Modern Neo-Ricardians”; “The Principle of Effective Demand in the Short 
and Long Periods”; “Monetary Theory and Modern Economics”; “Modern Economic Theory as a 
Basis for Economic Policy”; Economic Growth and Development: A Developed or Developing Country 
Problem?”; Discussion of International Summer School” ; “The Theory of International Exchange and 
the Problem of Natural Resources”; “Organizational Session for the School” . Letter from Angelo 
Mazollo to Paul Davidson, March 11, 1980, Paul Davidson Papers, The Economists’ Papers Project, 
Box 4.
90Idem.
91It included Giampaolo de Ferra (Rector of University of Trieste), Pierangelo Garegnani (University
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25 to 30 students92 and 20 to 25 teachers would attend. The organizing committee 
was composed by Pierangelo Garegnani, Jan Kregel and Sergio Parrinello. There were 
four broad areas of study defined for the school: “a) value and distribution; b) money 
and effective demand; c) theory and policy of development and international 
economics, d) fact and experience in economic policy.”93 The format of the school 
would comprise a lecture series, seminars (with teachers and students in discussion) 
and a conference as its conclusion.
The first International Summer School in Trieste was held from the 23rd of 
August to the 3rd of September of 1981 and was concluded with a “Conference on 
Distribution, Effective Demand and International Economic Development” on the 4th 
and 5th of September. The papers from the conference with comments by discussants 
were published by Kregel.94 It is the examination of these comments that is most 
telling for the present history since these evidence a debate within the school.
The first paper of the conference volume was Krishna Bharadwaj’s “On effective 
demand: certain recent critiques.”95 In this text the author aimed to bring the 
critical insights from classical economists to bear on Keynes’ theory of effective 
demand. Bharadwaj argued:
While there is no denying the need to incorporate real world 
considerations and the fact that expectations and uncertainty are endemic 
in such situations, there is also the need to provide theoretical structures 
that lead to firm and meaningful results with real-world applications. It 
has been argued here that a firmer theoretical scaffolding may be available 
in the surplus theory which offers greater promise in this direction.96
of Rome), Jan Kregel (University of Groningen), Angelo Marzollo (CISM and University of Udine), 
Sergio Parinello (University of Rome -Chairman of the Centre). Letter from Sergio Parinello to Sidney 
Weintraub, 6th December, 1980 at Sidney Weintraub Papers, The Economists’ Papers Project, at Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library, Duke University.
920 f  the students it was thought that six would come from the USA, one from Australasia, one from 
Canada, four from Latin America, 4 from India and other Afro-Asian countries, five from Italy, seven 
from other Western European countries and two from socialist countries. Letter from Sergio Parrinello 
to Sidney Weintraub, 6th December, 1980, Sidney Weintraub Papers, The Economists’ Papers Project.
93Letter from Sergio Parinello to Sidney Weintraub, 6th December, 1980 at Sidney Weintraub Papers, 
The Economists’ Papers Project.
94 Kregel (1983a).
95 Bharadwaj (1983).
96Bharadwaj (1983), p. 24.
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Bharadwaj was advancing a critique originated by Garegnani.97 He had engaged 
Robinson in a controversy over Keynes’ concept of effective demand within a Srafhan 
system of production.98 Garegnani denied that Keynes had anything to contribute to 
a long-period Sraffian theory of interest/profit. This critique was enunciated as an 
alternative approach -  the surplus approach.
The claims made by the surplus approach were contested by Asimakopulos and 
Minsky. Asimakopulos argued that Bharadwaj had not understood Keynes’ account 
with regards to uncertainty and distribution.99 Furthermore, he denied Bharadwaj’s 
crucial distinction between a short and long-period. Minsky was more clearly critical 
of Bharadwaj,100 he saw the author operating a flawed separation between the 
financial and the real world: “One great advance that I have always associated with 
Keynes is that he held that we cannot dichotomise the financial and the “real” when 
it comes to understanding capitalism.”101 Evidence of a debate in the first conference 
of the Summer School was also contained in the second paper of the volume 
“Effective Demand: Origins and Development of the Notion” by Kregel. The paper 
was introduced with the comment: “During the last few days [of the summer school] 
much has been said and written about “long-period” and “short-period” theories of 
“effective demand”.”102
The controversy expanded in the years that followed. In the Trieste Summer 
School there were increasingly bitter disputes. A few years later, Kregel spoke vividly 
of the mood:
The faceoff that was to take place between you [Davidson] and Eatwell 
was replaced by the two of us ( . . . )  this time I think I clearly got the best 
of him, including some fancy footwork which got me the right to the last 
reply of the session. Musu supported me very strongly, while Nell was 
dispersive. Harcourt also was very strongly on our side in first session and 
Roncaglia supported Minsky and attacked Vianello and the “Surplus 
people” as they are now called in the policy session. Piero [Garegnani] left
97 Garegnani (1979a).
98Robinson (1979); Garegnani (1979b).
"Asimakopulos (1983), p. 31.
100Minsky (1983).
101 Minsky (1983), p. 49.
102Kregel (1983b), p. 50.
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a day early.103
But debate also continued outside the school’s walls. The Summer School ignited a 
flurry of exchanges between members the group, which were printed in the pages of 
the Cambridge Journal of Economics. It developed into a battle over the intellectual 
legacy of Cambridge. On the one hand were those that identified with Keynes and 
critiqued Sraffa. On the other those that found Keynes to be a neoclassical and held 
Sraffa as the crucial reference point.
One exchange that I wish to highlight appeared in the Cambridge Journal of 
Economics volume dedicated to Joan Robinson in 1983. John Eatwell wrote on “The 
long theory of employment” arguing that Keynes lacked an adequate critique of 
output theory, but added that such critique was possible following the Capital 
Controversies. He wrote: “it must be admitted that the analytical imperfections in 
Keynes’s theory have contributed to the decline [of Keynesian theory]. The structure 
needed to be reworked; the new, innovative elements (the principle of effective 
demand) retained, and the insidious remnants of orthodox theory discarded.”104 
Further blame was assigned by Eatwell to some of Keynes’ followers for taking a 
short-run interpretation of his work, “The ‘short-run’ interpretation of The General 
Theory provided a convenient means of absorbing ‘Keynesian economics’ into the 
mainstream of orthodox theory.”105 An alternative long period theory of employment 
needed to be designed, a “theory of output that may be considered the concomitant 
of the long-period or ‘normal’ theory of value and distribution.”106
Kregel was the one to respond against such views. His article was aimed at 
answering an emerging critique that rejected
certain aspects of Keynes’ work which give a “central role to uncertainty 
and expectations” for, it is suggested, such factors involve theoretical 
“weaknesses” which facilitated “the subsequent rehabilitaton of the 
orthodox long-run relation between savings and investment” in the
103Letter from Jan Kregel to  Paul Davidson, 19th September 1984, Paul Davidson Papers, The 
Economists’ Papers Project, Box 3.
104Eatwell (1983), p. 270.
105Ibid, p. 272.
106Ibid, p. 271.
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“neoclassical synthesis” and the “neo-neoclassical” theory of long-run 
growth.107
Kregel saw no flaws in Keynes’s theory, instead, Keynes was the sound foundation for 
all future work. The paper, written for a volume dedicated to Joan Robinson, made 
of Robinson a guide to travel the literature. Robinson’s early work was characterised 
as a search for a long-period theory to supplement Keynes’s short-period analysis. 
According to Kregel, her efforts only led her to see such a project as undesirable. 
With Robinson Kregel criticised the Eatwell project: “Joan Robinson’s position 
[abandoning the search for long-period analysis] would seem to reflect a realistic 
scepticism concerning application of stationary neoclassical theory or the natural 
positions of the surplus approach to the analysis of the problems of accumulation and 
employment.”108
Richard Arena, a participant of the Summer School, later characterized the 
positions that developed in the Trieste Summer School. According to Arena, there 
were two main positions, the “post-Keynesian theory” and the “surplus approach 
theory.” The former included authors such as Davidson, Weintraub, Minsky, Eichner, 
Kregel, Robinson, Kaldor and Pasinetti’s 1960s work. The latter included the work of 
Garegnani, Milgate, Vianello and others.109
Post-Keynesian theory was described by Arena as an analysis of monetary 
production economies in both the short and the long-period. The existence of 
uncertainty over the future of the economy is the reason for the institution of money, 
which was seen as a refuge against the insecurity of investment by permitting 
arbitrage between productive and speculative activities. The short period analysis 
revolved around the principle of effective demand and allowed the determination of 
production and employment levels while the long-period was centred on a theory of 
the level of investment and liquidity preference.110
According to Arena, the surplus approach saw itself as an inheritor of classical
107Kregel (1983c), p. 343.
108Ibid, p. 360.
109I note that the account given here is focused on Arena’s (1987) two main groups, he further lists 
dissenting authors and positions inside each group but it is not my aim to discuss this.
110Arena (1987), pp. 209-212.
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theory, with Marx as the most developed contribution. For these authors the task at 
hand was to construct a classical theory of the long-period taking some elements from 
Keynes, notably the role played by variations of income for the process of equalization 
of investment and savings, but an abandonment of the notion of the marginal 
efficiency of capital as determining investment. Their long-period theory would 
provide a framework to treat problems of distribution, production, accumulation and 
money. Critically it had no place for uncertainty and expectations.
The Summer School debate became the all consuming focus of Post Keynesians’ 
work in this period. The solidarities constituted in the debates developed into 
institutional form. In 1983, a group of “surplus people” from Cambridge created the 
journal Contributions in Political Economy, a yearly journal that exists to this day.111 
In 1985 another journal titled Political Economy: studies in the surplus approach was 
created. The organization of the summer school was redesigned to reflect the various 
constituencies. Following the summer school’s second year112 “the Scientific 
Committee of the Center for Advanced Economic Studies, considering the 
opportunity of a more agile organization of the School, approved a Working 
Regulation which provides for a division within the competence of the Committee 
into three sections.”113 Three areas of competence were created, section A, devoted to 
“the surplus approach; criticism of marginalism; the theory of effective demand and 
the long period” was coordinated by Pierangelo Garegnani; section B, focusing on: 
“the Post Keynesian approach; criticism of marginalism; money and finance” was 
coordinated by Jan Kregel;114 finally section C, “analytical economics,” devoted to 
the themes of “development and technical progress; economics of international trade 
and natural resources; mathematical economics with a critical perspective”
111 Its three-person editorial board from its inception is composed by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate 
and Giancarlo de Vivo.
n 2 In 1982 the school was held from the 18th to the 29th of August with a conference on “Theories of 
Accumulation and the control of the economy” in 30 and 31 August. The conference had two papers 
by Garegnani, commented by Kregel, Nell, Parrinello, and Vianello; and another by S. Weintraub, 
commented by Bharadwaj, Davidson, Harris and Pasinetti.
113Letter from Parinello to Weintraub, 13th January 1983. Sidney Weintraub Papers, The Economists’ 
Papers Project.
114Its Advisory Board included: Davidson, Harris, Minsky, Nell, Pasinetti, Steiger, Vicarelli, Wein­
traub and Sylos Labini.
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coordinated by Sergio Parrinello.115
With such strenuous cohabitation the Summer School was held only until 
1985.116 However, it seems the assessment by some was not wholly negative:
We [Paul and Lousie Davidson] really had become addicted to it [Summer 
School]. If it disappears an important unifying force in Post Keynesian 
economics will be gone. I really believe that it did a tremendous good in 
developing young people from all over the world. Of course, not the entire 
class, but even if only 10 to 25 % of the class each summer was inspired by 
the Summer School, that did a world of good for Post Keynesian 
Economics.117
The summer school had ran its course in the expansion of the group, it had allowed a 
number of graduate students to come into contact with the work and discussions that 
characterised Post Keynesian economics but it had also significantly transformed it.
A surplus’ approach had consciously taken shape and led a critical charge on other 
theoretical perspectives. Soon, two positions had formed increasingly independent 
and embittered. Although, it has been alleged that most of the ill temper resulted 
from Garegnani’s zealous pursuit of the surplus approach, it was a transformation 
more permanent than the vagarities of personality.
8.5.2 Post Keynesian Economics or “horses for courses”?
The impact of the Trieste Summer School and the discussions it ensued can be best 
assessed in later pronouncements over the definition of Post Keynesian Economics. In
115Letter by Sergio Parinello to Weintraub, 13th January 1983, in Sidney Weintraub Papers, The 
Economists’ Papers Project. The third Summer School was held in August 1983 and concluded with a 
conference entitled: “The economic dynamics of resources, technology and employment -  theories and 
policies for open economies”, from the 1st to the 3rd of September. The 1984 Summer School ran from 
the 27th to the 31st of August. It concluded with the Conference on “Streams of Economic Thought: 
A critical appraisal of the last four summers’ work in Trieste-Udine” between the 1st and the 3rd of 
September. The 1985 Summer School was held between the 29th of August and the 3rd of September. 
That year’s conference was on “Alternative Policy Analyses for Third World Development” on the 4th 
and 5th of September.
116 “The Summer School for next year is off. PG [Pierangelo Garegnani] has refused to accept any of 
Sergio’s proposed changes and without them neither he nor I will organise the School for next year. I 
have now proposed that the Centre be dissolved, but we couldn’t do it in the last meeting ( . . . ) .  We 
then need to decide if we want to form a new one, or if the thing has run its useful course.” Letter from 
Kregel to Davidson, 23rd November 1985, Paul Davidson Papers, The Economists’ Papers Project.
U7Letter from Davidson to Kregel, 5th December 1985. Paul Davidson Papers, The Economists’ 
Papers Project.
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August 1987, at a conference entitled “New Directions in Post-Keynesian Economics” 
held at Great Malvern, one such attempt was put forward by Omar Hamouda and 
Geoff Harcourt. The conference was asked to “consider the past achievements and 
future prospects of post-Keynesianism.”118 Hamouda and Harcourt’s text was a 
overview of the field, “It considers the different strands of post-Keynesianism and 
questions whether an integrated and coherent research tradition can emerge. After 
clarifying what post-Keynesianism means to different groups, the authors conclude 
that attempts to integrate the three identifiable strands are doomed to failure.”119 
Hamouda and Harcourt’s proposal120 is still seen as an influential statement on the 
nature of Post Keynesian Economics, it has been reprinted numerous times and has 
been extensively cited.
What Hamouda and Harcourt put forward was a new definition for Post 
Keynesian Economics:
Post Keynesian economics is thus a portmanteau term which contains the 
work of a heterogeneous group of economists who nevertheless are united 
not only by their dislike of mainstream neoclassical theory and the IS/LM 
general equilibrium version of the “Keynesian” theory but also by 
attempts to provide coherent alternative approaches to economic analysis.
( . . . )  We say “approaches” because we may identify several strands which 
differ from each other both with regard to method and with regard to the 
characteristics of the economy which are included in their models.121
Hamouda and Harcourt identified three strands inhabiting Post Keynesian 
Economics. The first was the “American Post Keynesians” who included Sidney 
Weintraub, Davidson, Kregel and Minsky:
The implications of the Treatise [on Money] and the General Theory were 
the base on which the American post Keynesians built. They stressed 
uncertainty, the necessary integration of money from the start of analysis 
of the workings of the economy, the central position of the money-wage as
118Pheby (1989), p. ix.
119Idem.
120I shall use the 1988 Bulletin of Economic Research version of the 1987 conference paper, the paper 
was also published in the 1989 book collecting contributions to the Malvern conference (Pheby (1989)).
121Hamouda and Harcourt (1988), p. 2. Although Pheby hyphenised the label, it is interesting to  
note that Hamouda and Harcourt used the JPKE  version.
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both the major determinant of the price level and of the stability (or 
instability) of the economy, and the stock-flow interrelationship of the 
process of capital accumulation122
This definition is evocative of Davidson’s pronouncements on Post Keynesian 
Economics and the Kregel side at the Trieste Summer School battles.123 The second 
strand referred to the work of Garegnani, Bharadwaj, Eatwell, Milgate and Pasinetti, 
know as the neo-Ricardians. They were said to argue for “a theory of a long-period, 
level of income and employment (in the sense of the ultimate outcome of persistent 
forces) that should be placed alongside the classical theories of value and 
distribution”.124 Finally the third strand was said to correspond the work of 
Robinson and her followers,125 and was characterised as holding that
the real wage is historically determined by the state of the class war 
(amongst other factors), and it determines in turn the maximum  rate of 
profits available. Whether what is potentially there is realized in fact as a 
rate of profits and a rate of accumulation depends upon the forces of 
effective demand.126
Post Keynesian Economics was defined by Hamouda and Harcourt as a reunion of 
approaches which shared two general characteristics. Firstly, the approaches were 
represented as strands coming out of classical political economy; by Keynes’ critique 
of Marshall, by Sraffa’s extension of Ricardo’s model economy, and by Kalecki’s 
development of Marx. A set of ancestors, of canonical figures were thus identified: 
Ricardo, Marx, Keynes, Kalecki, Sraffa and Robinson. The references to these 
founding parentage were aimed at showing a common tradition shared by all Post 
Keynesians. A second characteristic was that all the strands advanced critiques of
neoclassical economics.
122Ibid., p. 6.
123Davidson’s (1980; 1982); Arena (1987).
124Hamouda and Harcourt (1988), p. 9.
125The three strands did not cover the whole spectrum of contributions, certain authors overlap the 
barriers, bridging strands: Kaldor and Robinson are seen as important for all strands; Passinetti and 
Goodwin for the Neo-Ricardians and Kaleckians; and Shackle for the American Post Keynesians and 
Kaleckians.
126Hamouda and Harcourt (1988), pp. 12-13.
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The authors were justifying a reunion of the different approaches under the 
banner of Post Keynesian Economics, they suggested that approaches “differ from one 
another, not least because they are concerned with different issues and often different 
levels of abstraction of analysis.”127 Though recognising that at times disagreement 
emerged in the Post Keynesian camp, implying that strands overlapped in their 
interests and research, the authors stressed that their emphases are essentially 
different. They warned that paradigmatic unity should not be sought in synthesizing 
the different strands in order to see if a coherent whole emerged, this would be 
looking for “another box of tricks.” The dreaded weakness, diversity, was redressed as 
a strength. They noted that “the policies that may be rationalised by post Keynesian 
analysis are very much geared to concrete situations, the historical experiences and 
the sociological characteristics of the economies concerned.” 128 Diversity which was 
an obstacle to the creation of a single approach, was turned into a necessary feature 
of the pluralist theory. This prospect was dubbed a “horses for courses” approach.
The redefinition of Post Keynesian Economics as a “horses for courses” approach 
was a response to the schisms brought about by the Trieste Summer School. It 
identified a shared ancestry that would accommodate approaches that refused unity 
in terms of any theoretical precepts. The connection between this proposal and the 
Trieste events has been explicitly noted by Davidson.129 But more significantly, the 
argument of Hamouda and Harcourt’s survey had been anticipated in 1982 by 
Harcourt.130 His article titled “Post-Keynesianism: Quite Wrong and/or Nothing 
New” was originally a seminar given on the lQth of October 1981 at the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, as Harcourt returned from the first Summer School. Already in this
1981-2 article, Harcourt identified three strands in Post Keynesian Economics: the 
two battling factions of Trieste and a third where he located himself. He also 
anticipated the “horses for courses” argument, but this earlier article compared to the 
1988 one was distinctively more optimistic, since Harcourt claimed that shared
127Ibid., p. 25.
128Idem.
129Davidson (2004), p. 263, footnote 21.
130Harcourt (1985). I cite from the 1985 reprint of the Thames Papers in Political Economy 1982 
article.
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intellectual commitments existed between the strands. He noted a “preoccupation 
with time” arising from Robinson’s critique of equilibrium and advocacy of models in 
historical time; secondly the “importance of social relationships and institutions in 
post-Keynesian theory.”131
In the early to middle 1980s it became increasingly difficult to hear Post 
Keynesians speak at a single voice. In America the dominant definition of Post 
Keynesian Economics was still that coming from the JPKE. Both Davidson and 
Kregel argued for a definition of Post Keynesian Economics centred on Keynes’s 
legacy. Kregel in 1983 defined Post Keynesian Economics as the “generalization of 
the General Theory”, and he discussed in detail the Post Keynesian interpretation of 
Keynes.132 The following year, at a session in the AEA annual meetings, Kregel was 
arguing that Cambridge economists had missed Keynes’s major message, “Keynes’ 
General Theory was exclusively concerned with a monetary economy in which 
changing beliefs about the future influence the quantity of employment. Yet money 
plays no more than a perfunctory role in the Cambridge theories of growth, capital 
and distribution developed after Keynes.” According to Kregel it was only with the 
work of the American Post Keynesians that Keynes’s original message had been 
recovered.133 In 1984 in “Reviving Keynes’s revolution,” Davidson interpreted 
Keynes’ revolutionary message in terms his concept of “non-ergodicity” and 
concluded: “Post Keynesians are trying to build on the logical foundations of Keynes’s 
real world analysis to resolve modern day economic problems. They invite all who 
possess open minds to undertake the further evolution of Keynes’s logical heresy” .134
To the above authors Hamouda and Harcourt’s definition was implausible. It 
sought to unite groups that did not wished to be joined. Still, th e .“umbrella” 
definition135 of Post Keynesian Economics has proven to be a resilient one. It still 
reigns over many discussions on the history and definition of Post Keynesian
131Harcourt (1985), pp. 130-139.
132Kregel (1983d), pp. 34-37.
133Kregel (1985), pp. 133, 138.
134 Davidson (1984), p. 574.
135Davidson has called it “large tent”, Davidson (2005).
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Economics.136 It holds an appeal to those that saw an identity with Cambridge and 
the whole of its legacy, not just Keynes, but also Sraffa, Robinson, and Kaldor. It 
appealed to those that sought to federate the dissonant voices. This was of course 
Eichner’s emphasis in his efforts to create a “post-Keynesian paradigm.” Eichner in 
1983 was arguing against those that sought to distinguish Sraffian from Keynesian 
economics:
While some post-Keynesians may disagree, I would argue that both types 
of analysis, short-period as well as long-period, are essential and indeed 
are complementary to one another. This is the basic methodological 
position underlying the econometric model of the American economy 
which my colleague, Leonard Forman, and I are constructing in an 
attempt to demonstrate the empirical validity of post-Keynesian theory.137
And Eichner was not alone. Under his sponsorships Alessandro Roncaglia wrote on 
Sraffa’s work as “playing a decisive role in the development of post-Keynesian 
theory.”138 Peter M. Lichtenstein researched Sraffa’s work as the “Post-Keynesian 
theory of value and price.”139 Eichner died in 1988, the year of publication of the 
Hamouda and Harcourt article. With Eichner’s death the paradigm building project 
was abandoned but Hamouda and Harcourt’s “horses for courses” took its place as 
the means to unite the feuding groups.
8.6 M eaning, institu tions and spokespersons
The history of the self-definition of Post Keynesian Economics offers us no simple 
narrative. Unlike the standard set in the historical scholarship on Post Keynesian 
Economics I attempt iio narrative of progress or of decadence.140 Instead, I underline 
discontinuities in the history of the Post Keynesian group and its boundaries. Post 
Keynesians debating the definition of their approach redrew their social and
136See the discussion on the secondary literature in chapter 6.
137Eichner (1983), pp. 2-3.
138Roncaglia (1979), p. 87.
139Lichtenstein (1983). This book was published by M.E. Sharpe owing to Eichner’s negotiation of a 
series of post-Keynesian works.
140See Tyraoigne and Lee (2004) review of King (2002), discussed in p. 177 of this thesis.
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intellectual boundaries with new intellectual and institutional programs. To the end 
of the period I have examined, the subject of Post Keynesian Economics’ definition 
remained unsettled.
Until 1972 three labels were being used interchangeably with the same content, 
“neo-Keynesian,” “Anglo-Italian theory,” and “post-Keynesian.” Curiously the label 
that was soon adopted to denote the Cambridge England side of the Capital 
Controversies and its American supporters was the one that was already in use by the 
mainstream of the profession under another meaning, “post-Keynesian.” From 1978, 
while “post-Keynesian” still remained in use, the new label “Post Keynesian” came to 
dominate. By 1985-88, although no further changes to the label occurred, no meaning 
for the label had secured hegemonic assent: on the one hand there was the JPKE  
understanding, on the other the “horses for courses” of Hamouda and Harcourt.
The observed discontinuity in the meaning of Post Keynesian Economics arises 
because each proposed definition was a response by different actors to different 
contexts. Eichner’s “post-Keynesian paradigm” was part of his early 1970s solution to 
expand the alliance between Cambridge economists and American dissenters. He 
sought the support of other discontents within the profession, and announced the 
emerging approach as an alternative to neoclassical economics. In contrast,
Weintraub and Davidson’s “Post Keynesian Economics” was designed to stabilize the 
alliance activity of the previous years, suggesting that further attempts to homogenise 
approaches were unwarranted. In addition it favoured the more conventional audience 
that Davidson and Weintraub sought to enlist as contributors to the JPKE. Finally, 
the “Post Keynesian” of the early to middle 1980s was an outcome of the Trieste 
Summer School disputes. It was a reaction to the emergence of the “surplus people” 
seeking to redefine the content of Post Keynesian Economics.141 The definitions of 
Post Keynesian Economics were pragmatic responses to changes in the group’s 
institutional environment. I suggest that these were the expansion and contraction of 
Post Keynesian boundaries in response to the changed context.
141 For the purposes of this thesis, American-centred, the emergence of the “surplus people” is an 
exogenous event. I have not studied what led to formation of the “surplus approach.” There is 
regrettably no material on this subject though it is one that deserves to be researched.
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Each definition of Post Keynesian Economics discussed in this chapter had its 
distinct origins but one should not fail to see that they were often perceived as 
alternatives. In fact, changes to the label were markers of difference between 
competing proposals. Ostensively, the “Post Keynesian” of the JPKE  had lost the 
hyphen to indicate distance from Eichner’s earlier “post-keynesian” efforts. It was a 
battle of spokespersons, of those that took on the role of interpreting the content of 
the approach, its reasons to be and its future. That some spokespersons were more 
successful than others can only be attributed to the institutional power they 
commanded. Eichner spoke for the approach, with the occasional support of Nell and 
Kregel, for most of the 1970s with no competitors. When Davidson came into the 
scene and took on role of spokesperson, Eichner was virtually displaced. Davidson 
had the platform of the JPKE , he was a tenured professor at Rutgers University and 
later even employed Eichner at his department. Although Eichner had organized 
seminars at the ASSA meetings, and had M.E. Sharpe’s commitment to publish 
“post-Keynesian” books and articles in the magazine Challenge, he held a precarious 
academic post and could never command the same resources as Davidson.142 In the 
battle of spokespersons at Trieste, the result was not so clear. Davidson and Kregel 
did not have similar success in displacing the challenge of the “surplus people.” The 
spokespersons at Trieste were equally matched. They argued with similar numbers of 
graduate students, publishing records and academic credentials.
The history of the Post Keynesian community is one of competing spokespersons, 
of their personalities and the institutional platforms from which they voiced their 
vision for Post Keynesian Economics. The conflict in the history of Post Keynesian 
Economics’ self-definition reflected competing strategies for the boundaries of the 
group - who were to be its allies, who were to be its enemies. In the concluding 
chapter of my study of Post Keynesian Economics, I wish to discuss in greater detail 
how this boundary work, with its making and breaking of alliances, shaped Post 
Keynesian identity.
1420 n  Eichner’s professional carreer, see Lee (2000a), p. 32-35.
9Conclusion to Post Keynesian Economics
9.1 Cam bridge, K eynes, and Post K eynesian  Econom ics
The subject of my research is the emergence of dissent in post World War II 
economics. I began by arguing that the intellectual participant accounts that 
dominate the historical scholarship can mislead on the origins of Post Keynesian 
Economics.1 I do not dispute that if Post Keynesians reference and seek to develop 
the work of the Cambridge left Keynesians then some connection exists between the 
seminal ideas and the later developments. However, this intellectual link is often 
taken to mean that the historian must search for the source of the initial 
revolutionary ideas to the detriment of the study of more recent record.
Consequently, the origins of Post Keynesian Economics have typically been located to 
a distant past, often 1936, the date of J. M. Keynes’ General Theory. I have shown 
that the question of the emergence of Post Keynesian Economics is not that of the 
tentative development of Cambridge economists’ revolutionary vision, or that of 
locating its first and true source. Instead my analysis concerns how the Cambridge 
authors’ work came to be seen as revolutionary.
In the early 1960s, the work of Cambridge economists was not debated as a 
distinct body of theory. Cambridge economics (then defined as the work of Joan V. 
Robinson, Piero Sraffa, Nicholas Kaldor, and Luigi Pasinetti on the subjects of 
growth and distribution) came to be seen as an alternative to neoclassical economics 
only after the debates on capital theory between Cambridge economists and members 
of the MIT economics faculty. Crucially, it was Geoffrey C. Harcourt, in an influential
xSee chapter 6 of this thesis.
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survey article for the Journal of Economic Literature, tha t identified the work of 
Cambridge economists as an alternative to neoclassical economics. Harcourt’s piece 
tapped into growing discontent in American economics. In the years that followed, 
American dissenters sought to join their research with that of the Cambridge authors; 
they corresponded, met in seminars, and visited the University of Cambridge.2 This 
was an American passion; Americans were the primary promoters of this challenge to 
neoclassical theory and to this day dominate the Post Keynesian group in numbers. 
The community of Post Keynesians was thus formed in the early 1970s on the belief 
that Cambridge held a foundation for an alternative economic theory. The group 
originated with the goal of challenging the mainstream.
Intellectual histories of Post Keynesian Economics today crown Keynes as the 
originator of the Post Keynesian revolutionary message. Interestingly, this was not 
the early to mid-1970s perception. For Alfred S. Eichner, Cambridge was important 
because it was residence to Robinson, Sraffa, Kaldor and Pasinetti and not because of 
Keynes.3 Keynes takes a prominent role in Post Keynesian Economics only with the 
creation of the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics {JPKE)  in 1978. Thus Post 
Keynesians’ appreciation of Keynes as originator of the approach and their devoted 
discussion of his work is more recent than suggested in the intellectual histories.4 
These participant histories have projected onto the past the cultural norms of the 
present, notably Keynes as the undisputed founder of the Post Keynesian approach.
It was Paul Davidson’s early 1980s redefinition of Post Keynesian Economics that 
placed the “Keynes’s school” as the intellectual core of the group.5 Prior to this, 
Keynes had been paired with Michal Kalecki, on the understanding that the former 
had provided a critique but had fallen short of creating a viable alternative, which
2 In chapter 7 I devoted particular attention to the correspondence of Eichner and Davidson with 
Robinson, and noted Kregel and Davidson’s visits to Cambridge.
3This was noted in my discussion of Eichner and Kregel (1975), but the observation can be made 
in all of Eichner’s later work in the “post-Keynesian paradigm” .
4J. E. King does note that Post Keynesians’ work on Keynes was concentrated in the 1980s but 
seems unaware that this represents a discontinuity in Keynes’s standing in Post Keynesian identity 
(King (2002)).
5See his table of schools of thought reproduced in p. 236 of this thesis, and my discussion later in 
this chapter.
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Kalecki had more fully developed.6 Davidson, and possibly Weintraub, disagreed.7 
For them the alternative was to be found in Keynes. But until the Trieste 
controversies Davidson’s statements implied only a change of emphasis. Despite the 
“Keynes’ school” providing its essential character, Post Keynesian Economics was 
still said to be a collection of theories and authors, encompassing the contributions of 
many Cambridge economists.
At Trieste, Pierangelo Garegnani critiqued the features that Davidson had 
inscribed as Keynes’s revolutionary insights and sought to appropriate for himself the 
legacy of Sraffa and of Cambridge.8 To this, Davidson and Kregel responded by 
making Keynes the beginning and end of all things Post Keynesian, and in their 
battle with the “surplus people” other references were dropped as tainting Keynes’s 
true message. Garegnani succeeded in framing the debate as a choice between 
Keynes’s short period approach and Sraffa’s long period one. Since Robinson and 
Pasinetti had argued in favour of a Sraffian conceptualization of the economy,9 for 
Davidson and Kregel to include them in their Post Keynesian Economics would 
appear as an acceptance of Sraffa. That Keynes was being made distinct from other 
Cambridge authors, became explicit when in 1984 Kregel argued that Cambridge 
economists had missed Keynes’s crucial message.10
I have extended the scope of this research well into the 1980s to provide closure to 
the very significant change that began in 1978-79 with the creation of the Journal of 
Post Keynesian Economics and with Garegnani’s contemporaneous attack on Keynes, 
while laying a claim to Sraffa’s legacy. To have finished my narrative in 1980 would 
have captured this process in its infancy. As I have shown, it developed in 1981-85 at
6 At Robinson’s suggestion in Eichner and Kregel (1975), see p. 229 of this thesis.
7As I have noted although Weintraub never openly debated the definition of Post Keynesian Eco­
nomics, his pronouncements as editor evidence agreement with Davidson’s views. In Davidson and 
Weintraub (1981) he endorsed the distinction between Post-Keynesian Economics and Post Keynesian 
Economics, taking the latter to mean “real world” economics.
8His critique appeared famously in the recently created Cambridge Journal of Economics, Garegnani 
(1979a).
9Pasinetti (1981), Robinson’s recollections on her 1970s work are illustrative of her desire to further 
Sraffa’s insights Robinson (1980).
10Kregel (1985), p. 133. Today, Davidson argues that him and Weintraub are the first Post Keyne­
sians, whereas Robinson and Sraffa are more distant family (fore-fathers) (Davidson (2004), pp. 247, 
251).
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the Trieste Summer School and when I looked even further ahead to 1987-88 it was to 
provide an assessment of these developments.11 Still, as I have noted in my discussion 
of radical economics, there is no definitive closure to the task of defining and 
redrawing the boundaries of a dissenting group. In late 1980s and 1990s the Post 
Keynesian group continued to undergo change. In Britain with Economic and Social 
Research Council funding, the Post Keynesian Study group was founded by Victoria 
Chick and Philip Arestis. In the USA, facing faculty opposition at Rutgers University, 
Davidson moved to the University of Tennessee where he began to organize his own 
Summer School and Conference.12 All these developments were source to further 
changes to the anatomy of power and to the boundaries of Post Keynesian 
Economics, inevitably, also to the role that the Cambridge legacy was seen to play.
My remarks in this section distinguish my account of Post Keynesian emergence 
from that offered in participant histories. I make clear that Post Keynesian 
Economics’ relationship with Cambridge was far more contingent than current 
historical scholarship indicates; in the period I have researched opinion shifted as to 
the content and role played by the Cambridge legacy. W hat I have not yet done is to 
discuss explicitly how these changes that have held such a prominent place in my 
narrative are related to the concepts of boundary work or to the identity of Post 
Keynesian Economics.
9.2 B oundary work and P ost K eynesian  identity
This thesis has examined Post Keynesians’ pronouncements on the label and the 
intellectual definition of their community. These were authoritative statements on the 
identity of the group. Not all Post Keynesians were involved in the process of 
self-definition. It is significant that those that actively debated the meaning of Post 
Keynesian Economics were those that set themselves up as promoters of the group, 
heading its institutional campaign, whom I have called spokespersons. The discursive
n The major assessments were Arena (1987) and Hamouda and Harcourt (1988).
12The contents of the conference were zealously published by Edward Elgar (Davidson and Kregel 
(1989; 1991; 1994;1999)).
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power of defining Post Keynesian Economics was always in line with institutional 
power. The majority of Post Keynesians seemed to accept the spokespersons 
mandate.13
Recalling my earlier discussion of boundary work, I want to suggest that the 
debates on the definition of Post Keynesian Economics comprised of cases of 
boundary work. The aim in defining Post Keynesian Economics was to denounce the 
mainstream as flawed science or non-science and ultimately take its place.14 Post 
Keynesians were mapping the field of theory, stressing as crucial for the future of 
economic science some elements at the expense of others, and re-fashioning 
relationships between theories and authors. The label’s changing meanings represent 
a process of inclusion and exclusion, to create allies and enemies.
The Post Keynesian boundary work was of a very different kind from that 
performed by radicals. Firstly, the mainstream did not react strongly to the Post 
Keynesian challenge. There were numerous exchanges between the notables of the 
profession and the Cambridge economists but little engagement between the former 
and the American dissenters, who constituted the Post Keynesian group proper.15 
Consequently, I will not contrast the Post Keynesian map with the mainstream 
response (there was none) but contrast instead the different maps proposed by Post 
Keynesians. Secondly, the referents in Post Keynesian Economics map-making were 
characterised by an interlocking of economic content and intellectual ancestry. The 
focus of the radicals had been on the politics of science and science’s relationship to 
society. Post Keynesians’ focus was on an assessment of past authors and their 
contributions, notably the canon of economic literature.
In the late 1960s American dissenters became convinced, notably by Geoffrey C.
13In my interviews with Roy Rotheim and Victoria Chick, they seemed aware of the “Davidson view” 
and the “Harcourt view” and expressed sympathy for one or the other (interview with Roy Rotheim, 
2004; interview with Victoria Chick, 2005).
14The more frequent argument was to say neoclassical economics was outdated, a pre-keynesian 
paradigm. Only Eichner made the claim that neoclassical economics was not scientific. Eichner (1983) 
argued that “Economics was not a science” because neoclassical economics failed empirical testing, he 
hoped to show that the “post-keynesian paradigm” would fare much better in that crucial criterion. The 
design of a “post-Keynesian” macro-econometric model was Eichner’s primary focus in the mid-1980s.
15For instance see the symposium “Appraising Post Keynesian Economics” , at the 1979 Annual 
Meetings of the AEA, American Economic Review, 1980, 70(2), pp. 10-28, organized by the then 
recently created Journal of P ost Keynesian Economics.
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Harcourt and Joan Robinson’s reading of the capital controversies, that from 
Cambridge, England a new economics could be built. In the early years of the 1970s 
they linked their research to the work of Robinson, Sraffa, Kaldor and Pasinetti.16 
Through their interest in Cambridge these dissenters joined in meetings to discuss 
their challenge to the mainstream and the contours of a new economics. Among this 
early group, Eichner most militantly took on the task of announcing and enunciating 
the emerging approach. His 1975 article for the Journal of Economic Literature, 
authored with Jan Kregel, followed from Harcourt’s earlier discussion of the capital 
controversies and updated it with additions by American dissenters.17 More 
importantly, Eichner presented “post-Keynesian theory” as a paradigm and he listed 
several criteria along which to distinguish the new approach from that of the 
mainstream.
Prom 1972, he became convinced that “post-Keynesian theory” was a new 
paradigm for economics. In the URPE 1972 meetings at Toronto and through his 
efforts to create Political Economy Clubs across the USA, he argued for a paradigm 
inclusive of many brands of dissent (Marxist, Institutionalist, Keynesian). But a year 
later, in the aftermath of the failed Political Economy Clubs, the paradigm was 
reconsidered to become solely Keynesian, combining the insights of Cambridge 
economists and American Keynesians.
Eichner mapped the general field of economic theory as comprised of two 
competing paradigms.18 The space of each paradigm was filled by groups of models of 
similar characteristics, which were described under the headings of: “dynamic 
properties,” explanation of income distribution, information available in the economy, 
“conditions that must be met before the analysis is considered complete,” and 
microeconomic base. The above characteristics struck the claim that the neoclassical 
paradigm was not designed to explain the real world. The neoclassical paradigm was 
said to expound no growth or steady-state growth models of the economy, where
16This was the subject of chapter 7.
17Eichner and Kregel (1975)
18Although Eichner recognised the existence of radical and institutional economics, he never men­
tioned these as paradigms. It is likely he believed these did not stand as viable alternatives to neoclas­
sical economics to the same extent as “post-Keynesian theory.”
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there was perfect foresight, perfect markets with no monopolization, and where 
income distribution was explained restrictively with reference only to the availability 
and productivity of factor inputs.19 Neoclassical economics was thus more a theory 
“to define an optimal decision rule than to explain the world as it is.”20 The 
distinction between the real world and the idealized world of the social optimum, was 
a crucial one to which all other later instances of boundary work would return.21 The 
paradigms occupied these very different (very separate) cultural worlds. The location 
of the “post-Keynesian paradigm” in the real world made it the strongest candidate 
to solve the ills of the American economy.
Eichner did not revise his definition of “post-Keynesian theory.” After 1975 he 
held on to his vision of a new paradigm developing from the insights brought out in 
the work of Cambridge economists and extended by American authors. He sustained 
a dichotomy in his map of economics, it was split into a neoclassical orthodoxy and a 
“post-Keynesian” alternative. In the second instance of Post Keynesian boundary 
work, undertaken following the creation of the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 
in 1978, this duality gave way to a plurality of entities occupying economics.
The main spokesperson for the new definition of Post Keynesian Economics was 
Paul Davidson and he argued, in coherence to what he had expressed in 1972, that 
the landscape of economics should be mapped by distinct schools of thought.
Davidson in 1982 listed five schools of thought: Socialist-Radical, Neo-Keynesian, 
Keynes, Neo-Classical synthesis Keynesian, and Monetarist-Neoclassical. He 
described them in terms of their views on money, wages and income distribution, 
capital theory, employment theory and inflation. Davidson listed the schools in order 
of their political beliefs, from extreme-left to extreme-right. The effect of this 
ordering was to place at the centre of economics, the “Keynes school,” within which
19Eichner and Kregel (1975), p. 1309.
20Ibid., p. 1310.
21 This distinction also echoes radicals’ claims concerning the economics orthodoxy’s irrelevance to­
wards the urgent social ills of America. However, radicals interpreted it in relation to the politics of 
science, for radicals it was a matter of how economics was related to social struggles. For Eichner it 
was a result of the realism of the models economists chose to employ, the Cambridge models were the 
most realistic.
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Davidson counted himself.22
There was no mention of a paradigm, instead Post Keynesian Economics was a 
reunion of authors and approaches. As I have argued, underlying this definition was 
the creation of the JPKE. To ensure its future the publication needed to appeal to a 
large audience, which imposing paradigm coherence would have severely restricted. 
Post Keynesian Economics was presented as eminently non-intrusive. It encompassed 
the whole of the Neo-Keynesian school (the Cambridge economists, Eichner and other 
Americans) and the Keynes School (where Davidson placed himself and other 
American dissenters) and part of the Socialist-Radical and Neo-Classical synthesis 
schools. This created the impression of Post Keynesian Economics as a broadly based 
movement, only one out of five schools of thought was completely excluded from it, 
the Monetarist -  Neoclassical school. The politics of Post Keynesian Economics was 
also broadly defined, from left-wing to right of centre economists, but its core was 
placed at centre/left of centre politics. Davidson’s definition did not seem to strike 
much of an attack on the mainstream. The neoclassical mainstream was portrayed as 
a fringe, a minute part of the profession at the “extreme right.” In Davidson’s map 
the mainstream was marginal. However, as the Trieste Summer School opened up a 
debate over the meaning of Keynes’ work and the role he might play in an alternative 
to neoclassical economics, Davidson changed his views on how the boundaries were to 
be drawn.
Garegnani and the “surplus people” initiated the debate and imposed the duality 
between short period and long period analysis. They saw their position in terms of a 
dichotomy that was said to fully characterise the field of economic theory. Upon this 
primary distinction others were woven. Davidson and Kregel, spokespersons for Post 
Keynesian Economics, accepted this boundary. For them on the side of short period 
analysis was Keynes and the Post Keynesians with their stress on the uncertainty of 
future economic outcomes and their stress on considering the economy as a
22Davidson (1982), p. 2. Whereas in the radicals’ mapping the political element was the primary 
distinction and from it followed all other distinctions, for Davidson, politics was not primary. In the 
contrary, economists’ politics followed from their views of the economy, from their theory. This did 
not make him into a “conventional economist” which would argue economic views and politics were 
orthogonal, Davidson proposed a “third way.”
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money-economy. On the side of the long period analysis were the “surplus people” 
but also the neoclassical mainstream, all adopting a variation of a general equilibrium 
model, with no consideration for money, and taking the future to be certain or liable 
to statistical modelling.23
Recalling Davidson’s earlier mapping of economics, as a set of five schools of 
economic thought, the new understanding of Post Keynesian Economics narrowed it 
to the “Keynes’s school.” Davidson’s Neo-Keynesian school, so close to the core of 
Post Keynesianism, was expelled. This was not just a hardening of the boundaries 
between the schools of thought, it was a transformation of the space. There were 
again only two entities occupying the economics profession, the Post Keynesian 
Economics of the short period initiated in Keynes’ revolutionary analysis, and the 
long period Walrasian analysis of the “surplus people” and the neoclassicals 
unsuitable to study the real world. Remarkably, this was a return to the distinction 
rehearsed by Eichner of two worlds: the real world and the idealized world of the 
social optimum.
Interpreting these controversies as instances of boundary work highlights Post 
Keynesians’s enlisting of allies. Paramount among these allies were dead economists -  
Ricardo, Marx, Marshall, Keynes. To be able to speak for these past giants of the 
profession was a powerful resource to endow the group with credibility and hence 
attract a larger following. To understand how this was the case one must consider the 
role of the canon in economics and how it underscores the identity of the economics 
profession and the identity of Post Keynesian economics.
In the history and methodology of economics there has recently been a growing 
appreciation for the existence and role played by the canon in economics.24 The 
concept of the canon is borrowed from literary theory where it refers to “the texts 
that are valued as works of literary merit and in so doing [the canon] helps define the
23For the “surplus people,” the short period analysis was a misreading of Keynes, undertaken by the 
mainstream and some American dissenters (although Keynes himself had erred by using a Marshallian 
framework). The only correct reading of Keynes was through Sraffa’s work and that lead to the surplus 
or long period approach. See my discussion on chapter 8 of the Trieste debate, p. 244.
24Interest for the subject has been stimulated by the work of Vivienne Brown on Adam Smith (Brown 
(1994)) which had as notable follow up a conference in Athens, in 1997, entitled “The canon in the 
history of Economics” (Psalidopoulos (2000)).
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nature and scope of literary practice and literary theory” .25 It is through chronologies 
of texts and authors past, that some disciplines record their own achievements and 
advances. “The canon presents a view of the discipline that epitomizes and 
underscores the discipline’s own sense of identity and intellectual tradition.”26
The concept of canon need not be restricted to literary theory. In sociology for 
instance, a “classical theory” defined with reference to a set of “founding fathers” 
namely Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber,27 embodies that discipline’s 
canon. These authors and their collaborators’ works are identified as the most 
valuable contributions of the past that modern work must reference and develop. The 
interpretation and reinterpretation of these founding fathers’ texts “influence what 
kind of discussion counts as a sociological theory, what theoretical language 
sociologists are to speak in, and what problems are most worth speaking about.”28 
Although today it is arguable whether the main part of the economics profession 
recognises an economics canon,29 it clearly did in the 1960s and 1970s. Some of the 
major protagonists of the discipline of this period related their work to readings of 
older greats.30
Post Keynesians’ boundary work claimed as their ancestry Ricardo, Marx, 
Keynes, Kalecki, Sraffa, Robinson and Kaldor; in an attempt to constitute themselves 
as part of a long tradition in economics. This strategy was not new to the history of 
economics, fifty years earlier this had also been the strategy taken by the 
institutionalists. They wished to undertake a “reclamation” of the American 
Economic Association. For this “they were placing themselves in this longer
American tradition that stretched back to the 1880s.”31 To effect their 1920s
25Brown (1993), p. 65.
26Idem.
27Connell (1997), pp. 1511-2.
28Ibid., p. 1512.
29Samuels (2001).
30Paul A. Samuelson’a Collected Scientific Papers have large sections devoted to his history of eco­
nomics writings in this period (Samuelson (1972), pp. 640-711; Samuelson (1977), pp. 841-946). 
Another towering member of the profession, Milton Friedman, became involved in the late 1960s in a 
controversy with Don Patinkin concerning a Chicago economics tradition (see Tavlas (1998)). Mark 
Blaug’s famous textbook on the history of economics focused on the economics canon was also from 
this period, first edition in 1964, second in 1968 (Blaug (1964)).
31 Rutherford (2000), p. 303.
9. Conclusion to Post Keynesian Economics 266
challenge to the economics profession, the early institutionalists posed themselves as a 
long and accredited tradition in economic thought. This legitimizing strategy is also 
present in Post Keynesian Economics. But unlike the early institutionalists, Post 
Keynesians further denied the soundness of the mainstream’s reading of the canon. 
They attempted to deligitimize their adversaries. When they argued that the 
mainstream had misread Keynes and scorned them as “bastards,” they were denying 
the mainstream’s claim to Keynes’ intellectual lineage. Consequently, for the 
profession to recover its sense of identity and tradition, to once again be truly 
Keynesian, it would have to become Post Keynesian.
The profession was not converted to the Post Keynesian reading of the canon. In 
spite of its ineffectiveness as a weapon to transform economics, the Post Keynesian 
reading of the canon and the links of ancestry it established played a continuous role 
in the history of the group. It was with reading and re-reading of these canonical 
authors and texts that Post Keynesians engaged in conversation, it was through these 
readings that alliances within the community were made and broken. In this thesis I 
have shown how the Capital Controversies have been revived by generations of Post 
Keynesians pouring through its canonical texts and authors.32 I have made the case 
that the debates on the reading of such canonical figures as Keynes and Sraffa 
reshaped Post Keynesian Economics in the 1980s. It is by sharing the parentage of 
these canonical figures that Post Keynesians come to see themselves as part of a 
single group.33 Post Keynesians are not alone in having their adopted intellectual 
ancestry underscore their sense of identity, for example Austrian economists find their 
identity in discussions over the work of Menger, Wieser, Mises, and Hayek.34 And in 
institutional economics “Veblen’s influence, whether direct or indirect, was one of the 
major elements providing a commonality and a bond between the members of the
institutionalist movement.”35
32See section 7.5 of this thesis.
33Hamouda and Harcourt (1988) claim of a shared ancestry is an accurate description of Post Key­
nesians relationship to their past. It is more doubtful whether this ancestry need imply a “horses for 
courses” methodology or any direct intellectual content. For a discussion of the Hamouda and Harcourt 
methodological claims, see Backhouse (1988).
34Vaughn (1994), pp. xi-xii.
35Rutherford (2000), p. 284.
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Post Keynesians defined themselves in opposition to the mainstream, as 
challengers. They did not redrew the outer boundaries of the profession that define 
its relationship to the world outside the campuses, as radicals had done. Instead they 
redrew the inside of the profession into a Post Keynesian camp and a defunct 
neoclassical one. Post Keynesians sought as their ally the canon of economics. While 
their boundary work was met by the mainstream’s silence, Post Keynesians never 
abandoned their stance as challengers. The Post Keynesian identity had become fixed 
by the episodes of boundary work as that of a contender to the mainstream. 
Furthermore, the canonical figures, once weapons to battle the mainstream, retained 
their role as mediators of the relationships between the group’s members. Being a 
Post Keynesian was to discuss Cambridge economics.
Part IV
C o n c l u s io n
268
10
Crisis, dissent and settlement
Comparing two cases of dissent in economics
10.1 Crisis and revolution in econom ics
In 1962 Thomas S. Kuhn introduced the notion of scientific revolution to the 
discourse on science. Kuhn favoured a metaphor between the patterns of political and 
scientific change. He described scientific change as occurring in a sequence of 
malfunction -  crisis -  scientific revolution, “In both political and scientific 
development the sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is pre-requisite for 
revolution.”1 Kuhn described the period when the role of the paradigm within a 
discipline is attenuated: “by proliferating versions of the paradigm, crisis loosens the 
rules of normal puzzle-solving.”2 As crisis deepens scientists commit themselves to 
one of the alternative paradigms, and the scientific community becomes divided 
between competing camps or parties.
To dissenting economists, reading Kuhn’s philosophy of science in the 1970s, it 
may have seemed prophetic. They had witnessed economics, in the early 1960s self 
confident and self-congratulating, fall into a state of factious controversy and retreat 
from public life. If Kuhn was right, following this crisis an epoch making change to 
economics was in the coming.
Dissenters (particularly the young radicals) had been educated in a period of 
proud confidence in the profession and its achievements. The main proponents of the 
new science of growth pronounced “the promise of modern economic policy, managed
1Kuhn (1970(1962]), p. 92.
2Ibid., p. 80.
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with an eye at maintaining prosperity, subduing inflation, and raising the quality of 
life” .3 Economists heralded the “obsolescence of the business cycle” : “As of this 
writing [November 1969], the nation is in its one-hundred-and-fifth month of 
unparalleled, unprecedented, and uninterrupted economic expansion.”4 The “age of 
the economist” was proclaimed:
Economists have become the high priests of a world of money, wealth, and 
aspirations for material goods. . . .  It would be hard to name another 
discipline that has exerted as much influence on the modern world. . . .  
economics is the only social science with a generally accepted body of 
theory whose validity almost every practitioner would accept.5
To anyone who had witnessed the “golden age” of economics, the late 1960s and 
early 1970s must have seemed a world apart.6 The American Economic Association 
(AEA) meetings of this period were assaulted by many brands of dissent. In 1967 the 
Association was first petitioned on the war in Vietnam, an effort that was deemed in 
violation of the AEA charter. In 1968, the August “police riot” at the Chicago 
Democratic Party Convention drove a wedge in the professional ranks. That year, two 
meetings of economists took place at the same time: the AEA official meeting in 
Chicago, and a Grey Market Meeting in Philadelphia in boycott of the official 
meeting. In 1969, as I have reported, scandal broke with the radicals taking over the 
floor of the business meeting to indict the profession of complicity with the evils of 
American society.7 In a more cordial tone, a group of black economists presented a 
“Statement of Concern of the Caucus of Black Economists to the American Economic 
Association,” demanding greater representation to fight social, racial and professional 
bias.8 The radicals were not the only critics attacking the mainstream during this 
early period. In 1971, Mancur Olson and Christopher Clague paired the radicals with 
the emerging Chicago-Virginia school (with James Buchanan and Milton Friedman as
3Heller (1966), p. 116.
4Okun (1970), p. 31.
5Fusfeld (1966).
6 Coats (1992b) suggests plausibly that the economics profession’s over exposure may have created 
false expectations over its possible achievements and made the public too educated in its limitations. 
For him it was this public trial that brought about the crisis.
rThese events have been discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis.
8Spratlen (1970).
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figure-heads), politically at the extreme right of the profession.9 The profession was 
braced in fencing off attacks from both the left and right of the political spectrum, 
voiced publicly in the December 1970 AEA meetings with disputes between 
monetarists, Keynesians and radicals.10 In 1971, the meetings presided by J. K. 
Galbraith had a substantial radical presence and were host to the first Post 
Keynesian meeting. At Galbraith’s invitation Joan V. Robinson famously attacked 
the profession. A year later Galbraith’s Presidential Address produced a similar 
critical charge.11 In the Galbraith meetings, women economists accused the 
profession of gender bias and founded the Committee on the Status of Women in the 
Economics Profession.12 This is a list of deepening crisis.
Unable to quiet the dissenting voices, the economics profession was in a spiral of 
decreasing credibility. The state of disarray was recognised by “the veritable orgy of 
public self-flagellation provided by some of the economics profession’s leading 
spokesmen”,13 the Richard T. Ely lectures and the presidential addresses at the AEA 
meetings became pulpit to self-doubt about the state of economic knowledge.14 It was 
not just Galbraith and Robinson that expressed concern over the soundness of 
economics practice. In 1970 Harry G. Johnson, following statements that year about 
a monetarist revolution in the making, spoke of the benefits of monetarism to curb 
the “nonsense” that had accumulated in the Keynesian orthodoxy.15 Wassily 
Leontief, President to the AEA in 1970, spoke of how “an uneasy feeling about the 
present state of our discipline has been growing in some of us who have watched its 
unprecedented development over the past three decades.”16 Kenneth Arrow’s 
Presidential Address in 1973 was an “expression of discontents and expectations” , 
and he sought an answer to the uncertainties about economics in the economics of
901son and Clague (1971).
10Bender (1970).
u Robinson (1972), Galbraith (1973).
12More on the 1971 AEA meetings see pp. 83, 206.
• 13Coats (1992b), p. 462.
14A.W . Coats lists another set of complaints pointing to less doctrinal and more technical deficiencies 
in economics, Coats (1992b), p. 464.
15Johnson (1971), p. 13.
16Leontief (1971), p. 1.
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uncertainty.17 But probably the most explicit acknowledgement of economics’ crisis of 
credibility came in Walter Heller’s 1974 Presidential Address, where he proposed that 
“going against our current fashion of telling the world what’s wrong with economics, I 
offer a modest contribution to the immodest subject of what’s right with 
economics.”18
It is difficult to identify in late 1960s economics an “anomaly” as Kuhn defined it: 
a violation of the “paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science,”19 a 
puzzle of difficult resolution that is only solved by modifications to the paradigm. 
There was no single unresolved puzzle underlying the crisis in economics, consistent 
throughout the period. Prom early on the monetarist critics focused on the 
orthodoxy’s failings in tackling inflation, but the radicals stressed the irrelevance of 
economics in addressing the problems of poverty, war and imperialism. There was no 
agreement among dissenters on the nature of the problem with economics. Only later 
in the crisis of economics did some convergence in concerns begin to emerge. In 1971, 
contemporary economic policy prescriptions came under wide scrutiny.20 And even 
later, circa 1973-4, the attention of the mainstream and of the dissenters turned to 
the problem of stagflation (inflation accompanied by slow economic growth).21
Economics was not alone in its crisis; with it were also the other social sciences. 
As I have noted in my discussion of the emergence of Radical Political Economics, the 
troubles in economics were part of the sixties American “civil war.”22 It was social 
crisis that fed intellectual dissent. More importantly, for the radicals it was the 
prospect (however unreasonable it may seem to us now) of social revolution that 
wrecked the consensus in economics. Radicals designed their science for social 
revolution.23 The same pattern was manifest in radical history. In a study of the 
historical profession, Peter Novick has noted that Staughton Lynd the spokesperson
17Arrow (1974), p. 1.
18Heller (1975), p. 1.
19Kuhn (1970 [1962]), pp. 52-53.
20See the AEA symposium “Have Fiscal and/or Monetary Policies Failed?” in American Economic 
Review , 1972, 62 (1 /2), pp. 11-30.
21 Coats (1992b), p. 462.
22Isserman and Kazin (2004).
23Particularly in Zweig (1971a) and in URPE’s pronouncements in the early 1970s, before and during 
its outreach efforts.
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for the radical historians, abandoned concerns for scholarship to adopt what he 
termed “guerrilla history.” Many radicals believed they were on the eve of an 
“American October” revolution.24
The expectation of social revolution has long been noted to favour the emergence 
of dissent. This point has been made in the literature on religious radical ideas.25 In 
seventeenth century England the widespread belief in the coming of a millennium, i.e. 
in a future thousand-year golden age of peace, and prosperity, typically initiated by 
the Second Coming of Christ, promoted radical action and ideas among the people.26 
The expectation of the millennium, with its utopian image of social transformation, 
further weakened the bounds of authority to benefit the challengers of the social and 
religious order. In 1960s and 1970s America, the enthusiasm for a profound 
transformation of society was mirrored by equally profound intellectual critique.27
As a description of the crisis of economics, Kuhn’s structure of scientific 
revolutions is not very helpful. It was not a Kuhnian-type anomaly that led to the 
feeling of malfunction and fed the crisis. Instead, what triggered the spiral of 
deepening crisis seems to have been the “millenarianism” or “revolutionarism” of 
1960s America. Kuhn is relevant to this history for other reasons. He clearly informed 
many of the dissenters’ views about scientific change, as members of the radical, Post 
Keynesian, and Austrian economics communities engaged in the design of new 
paradigms for economics.28 Where Kuhn wrote: “when paradigms change, the world 
itself changes with them” , radicals read that they could assist the world to change by 
inventing a new paradigm.29 But more importantly, as both radicals and Post 
Keynesians witnessed the crisis in which the profession was immersed, Kuhn’s 
philosophy seemed to assure the imminence of change to the dissenters’ advantage, 
and further pressed them to raise the temper of their critique. An intellectual and
24Novick (1988), p. 432.
25 A literature I discussed in the introduction to this thesis, see section 1.3.
26Hill (1991), p. 33-34.
27This argument is clearly applicable to the radicals which were among the first in the wave of late 
sixties, seventies dissenters. It is not reasonable when considering the Post Keynesians, although some 
among its ranks shared in the revolutionary enthusiasm of the radicals.
28 As I have discussed in chapters 5 and 9, on the Austrians see Vaughn (1994), p. 112.
29Kuhn (1970[1962]), p. 111. See Peabody (1971).
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institutional remaking of economics was on the horizon.
10.2 S ettling  dissent
I have noted how at the end of my period of study, dissenters had failed to effect a 
major change to the profession. In the 1980s both dissenting communities were 
increasingly isolated from the rest of the profession and fragmented by internal 
controversy. Radicals, following URPE’s involvement with outreach work, abandoned 
efforts of defining the “radical economist” and splintered into independent groups. 
Radicals were unable to manage their divisive political commitments into a single 
project for economic science. They were also unwilling to undertake another challenge 
to the profession as they had done in 1969-71. Through the outreach activities many 
had found ways of connecting their involvement in politics with their research in 
economics without the mediation of URPE.30 Others found a community of radicals 
in other social sciences with whom to research and debate.31 Post Keynesians after 
the Trieste Summer School also became increasingly differentiated and groups of 
authors developed their research in relative independence. Post Keynesians, unlike 
the radicals, never abandoned their critique of the mainstream of economics. But 
they too were becoming in the mid-1980s increasingly centred on their community, 
partly due to an affluence in conferences, summer schools and graduate research on 
Post Keynesian Economics. In the 1980s a string of new journals appeared. Adding 
to the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics and the Cambridge Journal of 
Economics both created in 1978, were the annual Contributions to Political Economy 
beginning in 1983; the bi-annual Political Economy -  Studies in the Surplus Approach 
began in 1985, the quarterly Review of Political Economy was created in 1989, and 
the following year the quarterly Journal of Evolutionary Economics.32 The new
30Some turned to party political activity, others to movement groups such as feminist collectives, 
other still continued their involvement in Dollars & Sense or in U.Mass -  Amherst Centre for Popular 
Economics (interview with Arthur MacEwan, 2003).
31 For instance, the case of Marxism Feminism groups, see p. 134 of this thesis.
32 Also early in this period several journals became amenable to the Sraffian and Post Keynesian ideas 
Australian Economic Papers, Cahiers de Economie Politique, Economia Politica, Economie Politique, 
Kyklos, Metroeconomica, and Manchester School.
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outlets provided greater visibility to the proposals of the dissenters and created a 
self-sufficient environment of intellectual exchange.33
One can therefore find reasons internal to the dissenting groups for their 
increasing isolation from the main body of the profession. However, to explain the 
isolation of the dissenters one also needs to consider the role played by the economics 
profession. The mainstream’s response to dissent was not a major element to my 
narrative. I have looked primarily to how dissenters constituted themselves into 
communities and how they designed their challenge to the profession. But I have 
noted in passing some of the immediate responses of the mainstream to the 
dissenters. Examining this record further highlights how this is a political history.
Of the two groups that I have studied, the radicals were the best placed to make 
themselves heard. Some amongst their ranks had family connections to the political 
and professional establishment and they were educated and hired to some of the elite 
Universities of the American East, namely MIT, Harvard and Yale Universities. 
Radicals also benefited from powerful allies among senior members of the profession, 
of which Leontief, Galbraith and John G. Gurley stand out.34
Radicals had in the early 1970s, a disruptive participation in the AEA annual 
meetings in full gaze of the national media. In 1969 they stormed the business 
meeting to read a statement of critique of the profession.35 In 1972 they passed a 
(diluted) resolution condemning political discrimination in hiring practices. In 1973 
they nearly succeeded in obtaining the AEA’s opposition to the recent military coup 
in Chile.36 The radical proposals were either ruled out of order, with resort to the 
Charter of the Association, “The Association as such will take no partisan attitude, 
nor will it commit its members to any position on practical economic questions” , or 
were discussed and then defeated by the business meeting. But in 1974 with Gurley 
as Vice-President and Paul M. Sweezy as a member of the executive committee,
33 At times it also promoted differentiation between groups. Some journals were often narrow in their 
orientation, for instance Political Economy- studies in the surplus approach published only 6 volumes 
and ended in 1990.
34 These are subjects I have discussed in chapter 3.
35See p. 81 of this thesis.
36American Economic Review  (1973a; 1974).
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radicals obtained a commitment by the American Economic Review to take into its 
editorial board one radical, Stephen Resnick. In the business meetings that year, 
radicals assisted in the creation of the Committee on Political Discrimination. After 
these apparent victories by the radicals, a change to the bylaws of the Association 
was introduced:
A resolution adopted at the annual meeting in which less than five percent 
of the membership of the Association has voted thereon shall be 
submitted within ninety days to a vote by mail ballot if a majority of the 
Executive Committee determines that, because of the nature or 
consequences of the resolution, all members should have the opportunity 
to participate in the final decision.37
Effectively this move transferred the power from the business meeting to the 
executive committee, from an organ which was liable to be taken over by dissenters to 
one of more conventional preferences.
The strategy of the mainstream was one of containment. Many prominent 
members of the AEA sought to diffuse attempts by the radicals to politicize the 
Association, but were reluctant to take any further step that might jeopardise the 
profession’s stake to political neutrality. The radicals’ political passions were not a 
legitimate reason to expel them from the AEA, that could be construed as a violation 
of the Association Charter’s dogma of non-partisanship. As I have argued, the 
mainstream (notably Robert Solow) did not seek to brand radical economics as 
non-science.38 Their aim was to protect the credentials of the economics profession as 
objective knowledge. Those that spoke for the mainstream repeated to the radicals 
that the standards for debating and resolving intellectual disputes were carefully 
drawn research questions and technical rigor, and not a language that mixed analysis 
with advocacy. These were rules of conduct radicals explicitly rejected.
W hat was most dangerous and in need of curbing was the spread of the idea that 
economists could not be trusted to provide politically neutral insight. In this respect 
the Post Keynesians were not as dangerous an adversary as the radicals. The former
37Amerincan Economic Review  (1976), p. 466.
38See section 5.2 of this thesis for a detailed rendition of this argument.
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accepted the rules of scholarly exchange, the limits of how and of what the scholar 
could speak.39 It was only in protesting the alleged bias against unorthodox views by 
the American Economic Review (AER) that Post Keynesians prompted a response by 
the profession’s Association. In their protest they were placing the profession’s 
standards of objectivity in check, they argued that editors and referees were acting as 
advocates in defence of a doctrine. From January 1974 the AER  began to submit 
articles anonymously for refereeing, which was enough to diffuse charges of bias. The 
new policy however was not enough to induce an opening up of the AER  to dissenting 
perspectives as Post Keynesians had envisaged. The editorial line was not changed to 
give greater representation to non-neoclassical views, and the editor George Borts 
remained in his post despite criticisms levied against him.
The investigations of academic freedom cases by the Committee on Political 
Discrimination invite a comparison with Mary O. Furner’s study of academic freedom 
cases at the time of the professionalisation of American social science, in the late 
nineteenth century. This comparison reveals that the mainstream’s behaviour in the 
1970s had a very well established precedent. Furner shows that the professionalization 
of social science, and notably of economics, brought the containment of advocacy to 
, the confines of professional expertise. The first concern of the professional economists 
was to secure their claim to objective knowledge, “The value of objectivity was 
emphasized constantly in both training and professional practice, until it occupied a 
very special place in the professional ethos.”40 But professionals did not abdicate 
participation in social reform, in fact they “wrapped their reform intentions in a 
mantle of professional prerogative that shielded them from consequences of advocacy 
which would otherwise have been too severe to risk.”41 In addition, professional 
economists were able to secure a substantial degree of social autonomy under the 
claim “that specialists in a discipline were the only ones qualified to judge each
39 In the early days of the Post Keynesian community they followed the radicals in accusing the 
profession of ideological bias; this was a crucial element of Harcourt’s narrative of emergence (1969; 
1972). The American Post Keynesians were however more reluctant to take this left-wing route and in 
their work such claims were abandoned.
40Furner (1975), p. 323.
41Ibid., p. 322.
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others’ work and ability.”42 The emerging ethics of professional conduct explain how 
some nineteenth century violations of academic freedom succeeded in invoking the 
outrage of the AEA and fellow economists (such as in the case of Edward Ross at 
Stanford University) while others failed (such as in the case of Edward Bemis at the 
University of Chicago).43 W hat distinguished these cases was that the former 
respected the limits of professional expertise, the latter did not.44
The profession in the nineteenth century would not rally in support of a radical 
being fired for his political views when those fell outside the limited range of his 
expertise. The profession in the 1970s behaved in the same manner. The Committee 
on Political Discrimination when faced with the University administrations’ charge of 
incompetence levied against the radicals, could have challenged such claims and 
accused the administrations of violating academic freedom, this was a possibility both 
in the 1890s as in the 1970s.45 But such course of action would be seen as legitimizing 
the radicals’ approach to advocacy, which did not respect the limits of professional 
expertise. To support the radicals would undermine the professions’ claim to be an 
“objective advocate.” The 1970s Committee’s work was in the end inconclusive, both 
because it was difficult to judge on the conflicting claims of administration and 
radicals, but also because it worked to avoid further scandal. The committee did not 
anger the administrations by judging in favour of the radicals’ claims of political 
discrimination, but neither did it anger the radicals already too disillusioned by the 
profession to expect much from it.46
The 1970s dissenters remained in the economics profession not because their work 
was object of widespread interest, but because the cost of rejecting them was to cast 
further doubt in the public over the political passions of the experts. Instead 
dissenting work was merely branded a worse sort of economic science, in Solow’s 
words “we neglect radical economics because it is negligible.”47 Ultimately, the
42Ibid., p. 244.
43Ibid., chapters 8 and 9.
44This is a simplification of Furner’s narrative. She also considers the reputation of the victim, the 
political context of the case and even geographical differences in the standing of universities.
45Ibid., p. 182.-
460 n  the issue of the Committee on Political Discrimination, see p. 96 of this thesis.
47Solow (1971), p. 63.
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mainstream facilitated the isolation of the dissenting communities because it treated 
their work with indifference.
The mainstream of the profession as can be gauged by the behaviour of the AEA, 
was carefully defensive and never overtly repressive towards dissent. It limited its 
response to attacks on the credentials of objectivity and neutrality so essential to the 
profession’s standing in American society. As the comparison with the nineteenth 
century illustrates, this was an old game being played under old rules. The ultimate 
prize that the mainstream was seeking throughout this crisis was to restore the 
credibility of academic economics.
10.3 C om paring identities
This thesis is about the emergence of dissent in American economics in the 1960s and 
1970s. Part of my focus has been on the creation of dissenting identities. When I 
discussed the “identity of radical economics” and the “identity of Post Keynesian 
Economics,” the concept denoted the communities’ sense of belonging to a distinct 
entity within economics. The dissenting identities provided members of the group, 
the communities, with a sense of shared interest and purpose, which distinguished 
them from those external to it.
Frederic S. Lee has argued that the “heterodox economist” is without identity, 
because he is missing a sense of his past, denied by the hegemony of mainstream over 
the history of the- profession.48 For Lee, the role of the historian is to offer the missing 
identity. For instance, his history of radical economics
takes the reader on a transformational journey, via a narrative, where, in 
spite of repression, Marxian and radical economics survive and grow. This 
brighter, more hopeful journey culminates in the formation of URPE. By 
the end of the article, the reader will have experienced what it concretely 
meant to be a radical economist, and this is in part what constitutes the 
historical identity of a radical economist.49
Lee argues that all dissenting groups share a single past of repression, and a single
48Lee (2004a), p. 178.
49Ibid., p. 179.
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history justifies a reunion of the independent groups under a single identity. For the 
author, in place of “radicals,” “institutionalists,” or “Post Keynesians” one ought to 
see only “heterodox economists.”50 This view seems to imply that existing identities 
are false ones, predicated in a flawed knowledge of the past. Lee with the history of 
heterodox economics wishes to participate in reshaping the communities which he 
studies. My approach is very different, I researched identity as it was perceived by the 
members of the dissenting groups and whilst Lee clearly takes the side of the 
dissenting groups, I withhold allegiance.
I have used the notion of identity to register the emergence of dissenting 
communities. There was no radical economics until the creation of the Union for 
Radical Political Economics, and the subsidiary belief of a political divide 
distinguishing the young radicals from their established elders.51 Similarly, there was 
no Post Keynesian Economics prior to a belief in Cambridge’s revolutionary new 
theory, which brought dissenters into cooperation to change American economics.52 
We can only speak of dissent once a dissenting identity emerges.
In spite of being both dissent, the identities of the two communities were clearly 
distinct. The focus of radicals’ identity rested in politics and the social turmoil 
occurring outside the walls of academia. Their purpose was to bring the profession 
into the ferment of American society, to make knowledge effective for social change. 
Radicals saw themselves as the voice of future social revolution. For Post Keynesians 
the focus of their identity was the Cambridge past. They saw themselves as 
responding to a profession that had dismissed the revolutionary message of 
Cambridge, Keynes’s groundbreaking critique and the alternative economics 
developed by his former students. Post Keynesians saw themselves as the voice of the 
Cambridge tradition.
Given the distinct identities it is not surprising to find these were fairly 
independent communities. That does not mean that no attempt was made to join the 
two. As I have shown Eichner early on attempted a dialogue with the radicals,
50Lee (2002a; 2002b).
51 The subject of chapter 3.
52 The subject of chapter 7.
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suggesting that radical analysis become a sub-class of the “post-Keynesian 
paradigm.” However, he very soon abandoned these efforts when radicals’ responded 
with hostility to the proposal.53 On the side of the radicals, Howard Sherman and his 
students at the University of California -  Riverside have argued that Post Keynesian 
Economics is a variety of Radical Political Economics.54 But the most stable bridge 
between the two groups has arisen following radical interest in the subjects of money 
and finance, where they have turned to the work of Hyman Minsky on the financial 
instability of capitalism. Today some radical authors see the two communities and 
their approaches as compatible,55 but this was not the case in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The radical James R. Crotty’s appraisal of Post Keynesian Economics in 1979 
concluded with the telling criticism of Post Keynesians’ unrealistic political vision: 
“Like Keynes’ own theory, it fails to appreciate the immense power that the 
corporations derive of their exclusive control of capital investment and thus of jobs 
and income.”56 A further critique of Post Keynesian Economics that deserves 
mention was put forward by Frank Roosevelt, in his doctoral research at the New 
School for Social Research, titled: “Towards a Marxist Critique of the Cambridge 
School.” Roosevelt was responding to Harcourt’s claim that Cambridge economics 
was a development in the tradition of Marx. Focusing on the work of Robinson and 
Sraffa, he pointed out “how the Cantabrigians diverge from Marx in their method of 
differentiating societies” and argued “that they mystify the defining characteristics of 
capitalism and fail to grasp what the struggle for socialism is all about.”57 As Kregel 
wrote during this period, any similarities between Post Keynesian Economics and 
radical economics were “only superficial.”58
Using the concept of boundary work I have drawn attention to the dissenters’
53See p. 225 of this thesis.
54Sherman (1987), p. 4.
55Interviews with Jim Crotty and Robert Pollin, 2003. I should note that Hyman Minsky’s good 
standing in Post Keynesian Economics during the 1980s was unchallenged. But in the 1990s this may 
have changed. Davidson has recently expressed misgivings on taking Minsky as a Post Keynesian 
(Davidson (2004), p. 252).
56Crotty (1980), p. 25.
57Roosevelt (1980), p. 277. The article was originally published in 1975 in the Review of Radical 
Political Eocnomics.
58Kregel (1980), p. 267.
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design of a challenge to the mainstream, with its choice of friends and foes. I have 
spoken of maps of culture.59 They allowed me to interpret the dissenters’ intellectual 
challenge in relation to their institutional efforts and to the context of 1960s and 
1970s American society. For instance, radicals’ map of the “politics of paradigms” 
allowed me to clarify how radicals’ challenge was fused to the growing revolutionary 
temper of American society.60 And Paul Davidson’s map of the “many schools of 
economics” was evidence of how the editors of the Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics hoped that this institutional platform might serve to expand the Post 
Keynesian community.61 I have followed Thomas Gieryn’s work on the topographic 
metaphor in studying scientific controversies. This thesis does not seek to add to 
Gieryn’s methodology. Instead, my contribution is to show that this metaphor is 
effective in following a history of controversies, of recurring clashes between dissenters 
and mainstream, translated into a succession of maps. My study of the history of 
dissenting communities saw many maps in the making, asking: how and why this or 
that ally was included?; Why this enemy was inscribed in this particular way? The 
contrast between maps is telling to understand the history of dissent and its 
relationship with the status quo. For instance, radicals’ abandonment of a map of the 
“politics of economists” for one of the “politics of paradigms” strikingly reveals their 
new ambition of undermining the economics profession as source of neutral and 
objective expertise.
In line with current science studies literature, I take an outsider’s account of the 
history of dissent, one that stresses how contingent the meaning of “radical” or “Post 
Keynesian” economics was. As they were made, identities and communities were also 
remade. In particular, I have noted how their design of a challenge to the profession 
reshaped the dissenting communities -  the interplay between identity and boundary 
work. Radicals’ early identity was the source of resources for their boundary work, 
namely by supplying the emphasis on the politics of science. But the episode of 
boundary work ultimately forced a restructuring of the radical community, under a
59In sections 5.2 and 9.2 of the thesis
60See p. 161 of this thesis.
61 See p. 263 of this thesis.
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new understanding of what were radicals’ shared interests and programme for action. 
In 1971 the identity became grounded on the promise of a science for social 
revolution, their “paradigm of conflict.” The new radical identity was the ideal of the 
“scientist-revolutionary.” It was this new identity, coupled with the belief on 
imminent social revolution that motivated ip 1972-73 the URPE emphasis on 
outreach work.62
Post Keynesian identity was also subject to change. Although Cambridge as 
ancestry was never displaced as the core of the Post Keynesian identity there was 
discontinuity over which of the Cambridge economists to include as a parent. In 1975 
Alfred S. Eichner’s “post-Keynesian paradigm,” the first Post Keynesian challenge to 
the profession, established a Cambridge ancestry composed of the protagonists of the 
Capital Controversies -  Joan Robinson, Piero Sraffa, Nicholas Kaldor and Luigi 
Pasinetti. In the late 1970s Paul Davidson initiated another instance of boundary 
work and the Post Keynesian identity was further redefined. Although the other 
Cambridge authors were kept as ancestors, Keynes became the principal figure of the 
Post Keynesian tradition. This was seen as facilitating a broadening of the group’s 
membership. But when in 1981-85 at the Trieste Summer School, Davidson’s 
interpretation of Keynes came under dispute; a new episode of boundary work sought 
to define a more restricted ancestry. In the late 1970s Keynes had been used to 
broaden the group, in the mid-1980s Keynes was used to evict the “surplus people.” 
Davidson and Jan Kregel’s new reading of Keynes justified a rejection of all other 
Cambridge economists as Post Keynesian ancestors. These episodes of boundary 
work, either primarily driven as challenges to the profession or as disputes internal to 
the community, resulted in changes to the identity of Post Keynesian Economics.63
Dissenting economics offers the historian a wealth of controversy. These were 
communities in a permanent flow of change, that seemed almost to refuse definition. 
They teach us a great deal about how controversies develop in modern social science, 
and show the multiple resources that can be marshalled to do so -  from the canon to
62These were the subjects of my discussion in chapter 5.2.
63These were the subjects of my discussion in chapter 9.2.
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the student body. Dissenters’ distinct identities and interests teach us that there were 
many avenues leading to dissent in 1960s and 1970s American Economics. But 
foremost, this history is evidence of how in the “harder of the soft sciences,” 
economists have fought over the boundaries of their discipline.
AInterviews and oral history
I began this research with the benefit of prior knowledge in Post Keynesian 
Economics. I had studied Post Keynesian Economics during my undergraduate 
training in economics. While undertaking postgraduate work at the University of 
Cambridge, I had heard Geoffrey Harcourt lecturing on the history of Post 
Keynesianism and attended Tony Lawson’s critical realist workshop. These gave me a 
measure of insight into how to approach my reading of the literature and into the oral 
history of the group. For Radical Political Economics I had no similar benefit. I had 
to rely solely on the secondary literature, which is remarkably thin, at least when 
compared to the Post Keynesian one. My research strategy had to address the 
insufficiencies of my prior knowledge of the groups. Since for Post Keynesian 
Economics I had a good grasp of current controversies and the tributary 
secondary/historical literature, I set my focus on a study of archival materials. I was 
increasingly convinced that this had been an adequate choice as the archives revealed 
a different past from that offered in participant accounts or in the oral history. For 
Radical Political Economics, given the absence of archival sources and the fact that 
many of the protagonists are still active academics, I interviewed those that I 
identified from the secondary literature as the main protagonists in the group’s 
history. The interviews would serve as a guide for my reading of the radical literature 
and would allow for invaluable access to personal files.
There is a vast literature on interviewing and its uses in sociology,1 ethnography,2 
and history.3 The approaches are distinguishable in their goals and anxieties. While
1 Bauer and Gaskell (2000).
2Hammersley and Atkinson (1996).
3Thompson (2000).
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ethnographers’ interests lie in recovering meaning and in reconstituting culture, they 
are concerned with the obstacles to access and understanding of distant languages 
and practices.4 Sociologists on the other hand, typically aim at data collection and 
are led to discuss the design of the interview/survey in yielding reliable factual 
content.5 Oral historians zoom in on the reliability of memory, such as in the much 
noted “telescoping” of events, and on the making of narratives.6 Oral historians 
overwhelmingly adopt the method of life history interviewing. The advantages lie in 
eliciting history in the informant’s own terms, not attempting to divert the subject’s 
experience of the past. My interest in interviews as road maps to the history of each 
group (notably of the radical one), set the life history approach as the most adequate.7
In preparing for the interviews, I examined similar uses of interviews in the 
history of economics. There are several collections of “conversations” worth exploring 
as a sampler of what can be done with interview materials. The standard of this work 
I found to be rather varied. In David Colander and Harry Landreth’s The Coming of 
Keynesianism to America for instance, the interviewer prompted the subjects to be 
discussed, effectively listing events and themes to the interviewee for commentary.8 
This interviewing strategy was successful at keeping a clear narrative for the reader, 
but only because of the interviewer’s dominance and at the cost of trampling the 
voice of the informant. John E. King’s Conversations with Post Keynesians is yet 
another example of an approach I found unsuited for my goals, for in these 
conversations controversy overwhelms history. The material pertains to running 
polemics between Post Keynesians and it primarily assisted in clarifying current 
debates (Kaleckian vs Neo Ricardians vs American Post Keynesians), but 
undermining any attempt at glimpsing their past.9 Arjo Klamer’s Conversations with 
Economists was to my reading the most significant achievement and the closest in 
design to what I intended to undertake. Klamer’s questions were open ended and
4Fontana and Fey (2000), pp. 654-655.
5Gaskell (2000).
6Portelli (1991).
rMorrissey (1998), Anderson and Jack (1998).
8 Colander and Landreth (1996).
9King (1995a).
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emerged from the interviewee’s own narrative;10 this brought out the informant’s 
sense of history as a crucial element for the historian to consider.
Because of limited financial resources I had to couple my interview work with 
archive research at the office files of the Union for Radical Political Economics and at 
the The Economists’ Papers Project at the Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special 
Collections Library of Duke University.11 After two years of secondary and primary 
research I had produced a list of radical economists (and of a few prominent Post 
Keynesians) with information on their current occupation, email addresses, and brief 
notes on their role in the history of Radical Political Economics. The majority I found 
were located on the U.S.A.’s East Coast, in New England and New York. I therefore 
planned a set of interviews constrained by location and cross-sectioning of my listed 
pool of authors. I tried to balance the number of radicals from what I perceived to be 
the major groups, those educated at Harvard (Herbert Gintis, Arthur MacEwan, 
Stephen Marglin, Patricia Quick), Michigan (Barry Bluestone, Michael Zweig) and 
Yale (Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff). While these represented the “founding” 
generation of radicals, I also chose to interview a later generation with more diverse, 
less well documented backgrounds (Jim Crotty, Robert Pollin, Anwar Shaikh).
I contacted my potential interviewees by email two months ahead of my 
departure to the US. In the email I briefly outlined the topic of my doctoral research, 
as an exploration in the history of dissent in post-World War II economics, with my 
request to conduct an interview on the themes of the respondent’s life work and 
history. I also provided in the email means for the respondent to verify my 
credentials, namely by contacting my Ph.D. supervisor. No one refused to be 
interviewed. However, there were several non-respondents that despite an additional 
email still did not reply (Samuel Bowles, Edward Nell, Dimitri B. Papadimitrou). 
There were also instances when following an early positive reply, respondents later 
expressed unavailability for a meeting at the dates suggested (Phillip Arestis and
10Klamer (1984).
U I was awarded by the Central London Research Fund a two-month travel and subsistence grant 
to  finance the interviews. I also received a Economists’ Papers Project grant from Duke University to 
financially support my research at their archives.
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William Millberg). In the course of my research-trip a few more names were added to 
my list of interviewees, although I was able to contact and interview only a few of 
them (Radhika Balakrishnan, Laurie Nisonoff).
At the start of each interview I set out my commitment to notify the informant 
prior to any use of quotations and to only do so upon their expressed consent. I also 
requested to record the conversation, in five cases the interview was not taped 
(Balakrishnan, Crotty, Quick, Resnick, Wolff) either at the interviewee’s request or 
because the meeting was conducted in a public place unsuited for the recording. All 
the recording was done in mini-disc digital format and the recordings were not 
deposited. The majority of interviews were conducted either at the informant’s house 
or at their office, four of the non-taped interviews were conducted at public places. 
Interviews lasted from forty minutes to a maximum of two hours, although in two 
cases the conversation continued outside the interview setting for more than three 
hours (Nisonoff and Wolff).
Ideally, life history interviewing requires several sessions, of approximately two 
hours each, but from the outset it was clear that it would be harder to negotiate 
access on that basis, as well as creating further difficulties for the scheduling of the 
research trip. Instead, I aimed for single two-hour interviews designed as life history 
but with a few semi-structured questions on topics of paramount interest.12 For each 
interview I outlined a schedule of topics and questions, partly general, dealing with 
life history, partly specific, departing from my prior knowledge on the informant’s 
historical role as evidenced in the written record. All questions were open-ended and 
I tried to approach my specific topic in connection with the unfolding of the life 
history, addressing subjects when possible in their chronological order. Inevitably, I 
revised my question and topic schedule informed by the archive work that I was 
performing alongside the interviews and by the information and experience I was 
gaining from the interviews.
Given the difficulty in undertaking an additional interview collecting trip to the 
United States, I later conducted a few interviews by telephone. As it has been noted
12Gaskell (2000).
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unlike the face-to-face interview, it is harder in this context to make more probing 
questions and impossible to take on evidence from the body language of the 
interviewee.13 I consequently adjusted my question and topic schedule. I made fewer 
and more direct questions, usually in order to address a limited subject (for instance 
with Roy Rotheim, I wanted to discuss his time as a student at Rutgers University).
I did a summary transcript of the interviews, avoiding a cumbersome verbatim 
transcription, I summarized every thirty minutes into about 500 words. I transcribed 
very few quotes from each interview. I was concerned primarily in accessing the 
meanings given to events and documents, and extracting the respondent’s narratives 
of the group’s history, elements that were revealed only by repeated listening to the 
recordings. Because of my “narrative use” of the interviews, their imprint is not 
always apparent in the thesis text.14 When I use the interviews as evidence I duly 
reference the source in footnotes. But my debt to the interview evidence lies also 
beyond these references, as it underpins my understanding of texts and events, and 
my choices in exploring some events over others.
Finally, below I provide a list of the people I interviewed and location and date of 
interview.
Radhika Balakrishnan, in New York City, USA, on the 16th of June 2003.
Barry Bluestone, in Boston, USA, on the I I th of June 2003.
Victoria Chick, in London, UK, on the 16th of June 2005.
Jim Crotty, in Amherst, USA, on the 9th June 2003.
Herbert Gintis, in Northampton, USA, on the 6th of June 2003.
Jan Kregel, in Cambridge, UK, on the 18</l of September of 2003.
Arthur MacEwan, in Cambridge, USA, on the 10th of June 2003.
Stephen Marglin, in Cambridge, USA, on the 28th of May 2003.
Laurie Nisonoff, in Amherst, USA, on the 6th of June 2003.
Robert Pollin, in Amherst, USA, on the 9th June 2003.
13Seldon and Pappworth (1983), p. 14.
14Jovchelovitch and Bauer (2000).
Interviews and oral history 290
Patricia Quick, in New York City, USA, on the 16th of June 2003. 
Stephen Resnick, Boston, USA, on the 11th of June 2003.
Roy Rotheim, telephone interview, on the 14th of September 2004. 
Anwar Shaikh, in New York City, USA, on the 17th of June 2003 
Richard Wolff, New Haven, USA, on the 2nd of June 2003.
Michael Zweig, in New York City, USA, on the 18</l of June 2003.
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